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Abstract 
This thesis challenges the dominant view that municipal elections tell us practically 
nothing about the preferences and attitudes of the voter to local issues and events, that 
municipal elections are no more than national referendums. It suggests that the 
influence of socio-economic environment and political context and indeed structural 
factors have hitherto been underestimated. It argues that municipal politics and voting 
behaviour impact upon parliamentary electoral behaviour and outcomes and thereby 
the politics of place impinge upon the national electoral level. The thesis employs a 
multi-disciplinary approach that combines the qualitative research methods of the 
historian and the quantitative statistical analysis of the political scientist to unravel the 
interactions between the politics of place and voting behaviour in Britain between 
1959 and 1979 at a time of dealignment at the parliamentary level and increased 
politicisation of elections at the municipal level. 
Patterns and trends in party support at parliamentary elections in four constituencies 
were analysed using quantitative methods and contrasted with patterns and trends in 
party support at municipal elections in coterminous electoral units. Significant 
variance between the two levels of electoral activity was evidenced. The research then 
employed qualitative methods and evidence from four case studies was presented that 
local contextual factors could account for much of the disparity between municipal 
and national patterns of party support in these locations. 
Quantitative research methods were resumed and the statistical techniques of 
multivariate regression and logistic regression employed to analyse socio-economic, 
political and structural variables in relation to party support at municipal and 
parliamentary elections in the c£ise study areas. The findings of the quantitative 
analysis corroborated much of the qualitative findings and the conclusion reached 
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that the influence of contextual factors upon party support at municipal elections has 
been underestimated Furthermore, that the interdisciplinary methodology employed 
is one that others in both political science and history may fruitfully follow to the 
advantage of both disciplines. 
L I S T O F CONTENTS 
Page 
Abstract ( i i i) 
List of Contents (iv) 
List of Tables (vii) 
List of Figures (xii) 
List of Maps (xv) 
Acknowledgements (xvi) 
Author's Declaration (xvii) 
C H A P T E R 1 : W H Y L O O K A T DEALIGNMENT AGAIN? 
1.1 Introduction 1 
1.2 Political science and electoral change - stability to volatility 3 
1.3 Political historians and electoral change 9 
1.4 Thesis structure 15 
1.5 Conclusion 19 
C H A P T E R 2 :PREVIOUS R E S E A R C H ON L O C A L E L E C T I O N S 
2.1 Introduction 20 
2.2 Survey research 21 
2.3 Aggregate data 22 
2.4 Local electoral research 24 
2.5 Conclusion 36 
C H A P T E R 3 :METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 38 
3.2 Case studies 40 
3.3 Methods and sources of data 45 
3.4 Problems with data 48 
3.5 Criteria for selection of case study locations 51 
3.6 Coterminous electoral units 53 
3.7 Local electoral cycles 58 
3.8 Conclusion 59 
C H A P T E R 4:ANALYSIS O F E L E C T O R A L DATA 
4.1 Introduction 61 
4.2 Inner-London 62 
4.3 LCC and GLC elections 74 
4.4 Borough, LCC/GLC and parliamentary voting behaviour in 
Inner-London 
81 
4.5 Summary of Inner-London voting behaviour at local authority 
Aggregate level, and comparison with Inner-London 
85 
parliamentary constituency voting behaviour 
4.6 Birmingham County Borough elections 1959-1972. and 88 
Birmingham District Council elections 1973-1979 
4.7 West Midlands County Council elections 1973, 1977 and 1981 95 
4.8 Birmingham parliamentary and local electoral voting 97 
behaviour contrasted 
4.9 Summary of Birmingham local electoral voting behaviour at 100 
local authority aggregate level and comparison with 
Birmingham parliamentary constituency voting behaviour 
4.10 Electoral trends in coterminous electoral units 101 
4.11 Conclusion 117 
CEIAPTER 5:BIRJ\IINGHAM L A D Y W O O D 
5.1 Introduction 120 
5.2 Ladywood, its boundaries and electoral history 121 
5.3 Inner-city Birmingham and Liberal Party electoral strategy 125 
5.4 Iimer-city housing and Lawlerism 127 
5.5 Housing conditions, voter discontent and Liberal responses . 130 
5.6 Birmingham Labour Group and political pragmatism 137 
5.7 Changing salience of the housing issue 149 
5.8 Voting and issues of immigration and education 153 
5.9 Conclusion 156 
C H A P T E R 6:SUTTON C O L D F E E L D 
6.1 Introduction 162 
6,2 Labour's displacement by the Liberals 169 
6,3 Sutton's socio-political backdrop 171 
6.4 Liberal strategy 175 
6.5 Sutton Liberals and local issues 179 
6.6 Sutton Coldfield's Conservative dealignment and realigrmient 190 
6.7 Conclusion 200 
C H A P T E R 7:ISLINGTON 
7.1 Introduction 206 
7.2 Party political background 208 
7.3 The Labour group and housing in Islington 213 
7.4 Islington Labour Party dissent 218 
7.5 London Liberal Party strategy 219 
7.6 The Liberal Party's foothold in Islington 223 
7.7 The electoral salience of housing 225 
7.8 The 1970s Liberal revival constrained by the Labour left 228 
7.9 1970s Liberal campaigns 231 
7.10 An alliance lifeline 233 
7.11 Conclusion 234 
C H A P T E R 8:CAMDEN 
8.1 Introduction 240 
8.2 Party political background 240 
8.3 Labour's tenuous control 247 
VI 
8.4 Housing conditions and voter discontent 250 
8.5 Liberal revival 254 
8.6 Liberals limited by local Labour Party Organisation 257 
8.7 Housing and the 1964 election for control of Camden 259 
8.8 Camden Labour Group 1964-1968 262 
8.9 Labour's declining support 265 
8.10 The Labour Group in the 1970s 270 
8.11 Liberal lifeline 272 
8.12 Conclusion 272 
C H A P T E R 9 : M U L T I V A R I A T E R E G R E S S I O N ANALYSIS 
9.1 Introduction 277 
9.2 The variables in the data-base 279 
9.3 Outline of the core model 286 
9.4 Determination of relevant and irrelevant variables 286 
9.5 Hypotheses 290 
9.6 Multivariate regression analysis Birmingham and Inner- 292 
London elections 
9.7 Conclusion 312 
C H A P T E R 10: L O G I S T I C R E G R E S S I O N ANALYSIS 
10.1 Introduction 317 
10.2 Report of Birmingham logistic regression analysis 322 
10.3 Report of Inner- London logistic regression analysis 327 
10.4 Liberal Party support and odds of winning in Birmingham, 332 
Sutton Coldfield and inner-London 
10.5 Summary of logistic regression of Birmingham and London 333 
elections 
10.6 Interpretation of the residuals 341 
10.7 Conclusion 348 
C H A P T E R 11:A C O M P A R A T I V E ANALYSIS O F T H E 
QUANTITATIVE AND Q U A L I T A T I V E E V I D E N C E 
11.1 Introduction 352 
11.2 Summary of quantitative evidence 353 
11.3 Birmingham qualitative and quantitative evidence 356 
11.4 Inner-London qualitative and quantitative evidence 366 
11.5 Conclusion 378 
C H A P T E R 12:CONCLUSIONS 
12.1 Introduction 381 
12.2 Not so irrelevant elections 382 
12.3 Partisan and class-party alignment 385 
12.4 Future research 392 
12.5 Conclusion 395 
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 396 
APPENDIX A: Cells used from each census in relation to each variable 417 
APPENDIX B: Model assumptions and equation 418 
APPENDIX C : Technical appendix 420 
v u 
L I S T O F T A B L E S 
Table Contents Page 
1 Sources of socio-economic data. 46 
2 Structure of party competition, Irmer-London Borough elections, 63 
1956-1978. 
3 Liberal Party percentage share of the total vote and contestation, 64 
Irmer-London Borough elections, 1956-1978. 
4 Candidate/seats ratios, Inner-London Borough elections, 1956- 65 
1978. 
5 Party percentage share of the total vote, Iimer-London Borough 66 
elections 1956-1978. 
6 Liberal Party percentage share of the total vote and Liberal Party 68 
percentage share of the total vote contested wards only, Inner-
London Borough elections, 1956-1978. 
7 *Butler Swing' index of volatility at successive Irmer-London 69 
Borough elections, 1959-1982. 
8 Pedersen index of dissimilarity, all boroughs aggregate at 70 
successive Inner-London Borough elections, 1956-1982. 
9 Pedersen index of dissimilarity, individual boroughs at 71 
successive Inner-London Borough elections, 1956-1982. 
10 Structure of party competition at LCC / GLC (Inner-London) 76 
elections, 1955-1981. 
11 Candidate/seat ratio LCC / GLC (Inner-London) elections, 1955- 77 
1981. 
12 Party percentage share of the total vote at LCC / GLC (Inner- 78 
London) elections,1955-1981. 
13 Liberal Party percentage share of the total vote and Liberal Party 79 
percentage share of the total vote in contested wards only at 
LCC / GLC (Inner-London) elections, 1955-1981. 
14 'Butler Swing* index of volatility at successive LCC/ GLC 79 
(Inner-London) elections. 1955-1981. 
15 Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive LCC / GLC (Inner- 80 
London) elections, 1955-1981. 
VIU 
16 Pedersen index of dissimilarity for individual boroughs at 81 
successive GLC (Iimer-London) elections 1964-1981. 
17 Party percentage share of the total vote and Liberal Party 81 
contestation at General Elections in Inner-London 
constituencies, 1955-1979. 
18 Structure of party competition at Birmingham County Borough 89 
elections 1959-1972, and Birmingham District Council elections 
1973-1979. 
19 Candidate /seat ratios at Birmingham County Borough elections 91 
1959-1972,and Birmingham District Council elections 1973-
1979. 
20 Party percentage share of the total vote at Birmingham County 92 
Borough elections 1959-1972, and Birmingham District Council 
elections 1973-1979. 
21 'Butler Swing' index of volatility at Birmingham County 93 
Borough elections 1959-1972, and Birmingham District Council 
elections 1973-1979. 
22 . Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive Birmingham 94 
County Borough elections 1959-1972, and Birmingham District 
Council elections 1973-1979, 
23 Structure of party competition at West Midlands County Council 95 
elections 1973,1977 and 1981. 
24 Liberal Party percentage share of the total vote. Liberal Pparty 96 
percentage share of the total vote contested wards only, and 
Liberal Party contestation at West Midlands County Council 
elections 1973.1977 and 1981. 
25 Candidate /seat ratio and Liberal Party candidate/seat ratio at 96 
West Midlands County Council elections 1973,1977 and 1981. 
26 Party percentage share of the total vote at West Midlands 97 
County Council elections, 1973-1981. 
27 Party percentage share of the total vote all constituencies and 98 
Liberal Party percentage share of the total vote contested 
constituencies only at General Elections in Birmingham 
constituencies, 1955-1983. 
28 Turnout in the Inner-London Boroughs, Borough Elections 104 
1945-1998 
IX 
29 Standard deviations in Labour Party and Conservative Party 113 
percentage share of the total vote at borough and parliamentary 
elections in coterminous wards 1949-1970. 
30 Birmingham Ladywood Constituency and its component local 121 
electoral wards 1959-1979 and contiguous constituencies. 
31 Lower-tier municipal election data, 1959-1979, the wards that 124 
comprised the Birmingham Ladywood Constituency at General 
Elections 1959-1970 (Feb. 1974 constituency revised). 
32 Estimated resident populations of central redevelopment areas: 151 
persons dwelling in old and new properties mid-year 1963-1969 
Birmingham. 
33 Applicants for council accommodation 1963-1969, families re- 151 
housed by Corporation 1963-1969, and new dwellings 
completed by type 1963-1969, Birmingham. 
34 Estimated annual net migration by ward mid-year 1964-1969, 152 
1971-1973, 1974-1978 
Sutton Coldfield's wards and constituencies, 1958-1979. 
Lower-tier municipal election data, 1958-1972, the wards that 
comprised the Sutton Coldfield Constituency at General 
Elections 1959-1970. 
37 Lower-tier municipal electoral data. Borough of Islington 1964- 210 
1982. 
38 Lower-tier municipal electoral data. Borough of Camden 1964- 245 
1982. 
39 Seats won by party at metropolitan borough elections 1945- 249 
1962,St Pancras MB, Holbom MB, and Hampstead MB. 
40 Membership of the Labour Party, 1953-1967. 270 
41 Census data related to particular electoral data. 280 
42 Socio-economic variables used in the analysis. 281 
43 A comparison of the regression coefficients for best fitting 295 
models of party support and socio-economic variables (turnout 
included), at Birmingham, lower-tier municipal, upper-tier 
municipal and parliamentary constituency elections 1959-1979, 
44 A comparison of the regression coefficients for best fitting 297 
models of Conservative Party support and socio-economic 
variables (turnout included), controlling for decade at 
Birmingham, lower-tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and 
parliamentary constituency elections 1959-1979. 
45 A comparison of the regression coefficients for best fitting 300 
models of Labour Party support and socio-economic variables 
(turnout included), controlling for decade at Birmingham lower-
tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and parliamentary 
constituency elections 1959-1979. 
46 A comparison of the regression coefficients for best fitting 301 
models of Liberal Party support and socio-economic variables 
(turnout included), controlling for decade at Birmingham, lower-
tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and parliamentary 
constituency elections 1959-1979. Liberal Party contested only. 
47 A comparison of the regression coefficients for best fitting 304 
models of Conservative Party and Liberal Party support and 
socio-economic variables, (turnout and majority included, all 
wards Conservative, Liberal Party, contested wards only) at 
Sutton Coldfield lower-tier municipal elections,l959-1972. 
48 A comparison of the regression coefficients for best fitting 306 
models of party support and socio-economic variables (turnout 
included) at Inner-London lower-tier municipal, upper-tier 
municipal and parliamentary constituency elections, 1959-1979. 
49 A comparison of the regression coefficients for best fitting 308 
models of Conservative Party support and socio-economic 
variables (turnout included), controlling for decade at Inner-
London lower-tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and 
parliamentary constituency elections, 1959-1979. 
50 A comparison of the regression coefficients for best fitting 310 
models of Labour Party support and socio-economic variables 
(turnout included), controlling for decade at Inner-London 
lower-tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and pariiamentary 
constituency elections, 1959-1979. 
51 A comparison of the regression coefficients for best fitting 311 
models of Liberal Party support and socio-economic variables 
(turnout included), controlling for decade at Inner-London 
lower-tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and pariiamentary 
constituency elections, 1959-1979. Liberal Party contested only. 
XI 
52 Birmingham and Inner-London lower-tier municipal elections 315 
1959-1979. A comparison of the regression coefficients for best 
fitting models of Liberal Party support, socio-economic 
variables (turnout included), controlling for past party political 
control of ward at time of election, all contests. 
53 Logits of significant predictors (categorical dependent variable 324 
LABWIN/LABLOSE) at Birmingham lower-tier municipal, 
upper-tier municipal £md parliamentary constituency elections 
1959-1979 and by decade. 
54 Logits of significant predictors (categorical dependent variable 326 
CONWIN/CONLOSE) at Birmingham lower-tier municipal, 
upper-tier municipal and parliamentary constituency elections 
1959-1979 and by decade. 
55 Logits of significant predictors (categorical dependent variable 328 
LABWIN/LABLOSE) at Inner-London lower-tier municipal, 
upper-tier municipal and parliamentary constituency 
electionsl959-1979 and by decade. 
56 Logits of significant predictors (categorical dependent variable 331 
CONWIN/CONLOSE) at Inner-London lower-tier municipal, 
upper-tier municipal and parliamentary constituency 
elections 1959-1979 and by decade, 
57 Logits of significant predictors (categorical dependent variable 332 
CONWIN/CONLOSE) at Sutton Coldfield lower-tier municipal 
elections 1959-1972. 
58 Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only, Birmingham 333 
lower-tier municipal elections 1959-1979 
59 Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only, Birmingham 333 
lower-tier municipal elections 1959-1972 
60 Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only, Birmingham 334 
lower-tier municipal elections 1972-1979 
61 Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only, Inner-London 337 
lower-tier municipal elections 1959-1979 
62 Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only, Inner-London 337 
lower-tier municipal elections 1959-1970 
63 Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only, Inner-London 337 
lower-tier municipal elections 1970-1979 
64 Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only, Sutton 338 
Coldfield lower-tier municipal elections 1959-72 
Xll 
65 Birmingham lower-tier elections 1959-1979, residuals. 345 
66 Inner-London lower-tier elections 1959-1979, (Camden LB and 347 
Islington LB) residuals. 
L I S T O F F I G U R E S 
Figure Contents Page 
1 Percentage three-way contests at Inner-London Borough 63 
elections 1956-1978 
2 Percentage wards Liberal contested at Inner-London Borough 64 
elections 1956-1978 
3 Percentage two party share o f the total vote at Inner-London 67 
Borough elections, 1956-1982 
4 Liberal Party percentage share of the total vote at Inner-London 68 
Borough elections, 1956-1978 
5 Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive Borough elections 70 
(Inner-London), 1959-1982 
6 Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive Borough elections 72 
(Inner-London), 1959-1982, all boroughs mean contrasted with 
each individual borough's net volatility. 
7 Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive Borough elections 73 
(Inner-London), 1959-1982, all boroughs mean contrasted with 
each individual borough's net volatility 1959-1982. 
8 Percentage three-way competitions at LCC/GLC elections 75 
(Inner-London), 1955-1981. 
9 Percentage two-party share of the total vote LCC/GLC elections 78 
(Inner-London) 1955-1981. 
10 Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive LCC/GLC (Inner- 80 
London), elections 1958-1981 
11 Two-party percentage share of the total UK vote and two party 82 
share percentage share of the total vote Inner-London 
constituencies only, at General elections 1955-1983. 
XIU 
12 Two-party percentage share o f the total vote at Borough, 83 
LCC/GLC and Parliamentary elections (Irmer-London) 1955-
1981. 
13 Pedersen index of dissimilarity at Borough, LCC/GLC and 84 
Parliamentary elections (Inner-London) 1958-1982 ( February 
1974 general election only). 
14 Percentage three-way contests Birmingham County Borough 89 
and Birmingham District Council elections 1959-1979. 
15 Percentage wards Liberal Party contested at Birmingham 90 
County Borough and Birmingham District Council elections 
1959-1979. 
16 Two-party share of the total vote at Birmingham County 92 
Borough and Birmingham District Council elections 1959-1979. 
17 Pedersen index of net volatility at successive Birmingham 94 
County Borough 1959-1972, and Birmingham District Council 
elections 1973-1979. 
18 Two-party share of the total vote Birmingham County Borough 99 
elections 1959-1972 and Birmingham District Borough 
elections 1973-1979, and two-party share of the total vote at 
general elections 1959-1979 Birmingham constituencies. 
19 Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive Birmingham 99 
County Borough elections 1959-1972 and Birmingham District 
Council elections 1973-1979, and Pedersen index of 
dissimilarity at successive general elections 1959-1979 
Birmingham constituencies contrasted. 
20 Percentage turnout in individual boroughs contrasted with mean 102 
turnout all Inner-London boroughs at lower-tier elections 1945-
1998. 
21 Percentage turnout in individual boroughs contrasted with mean 103 
turnout all Inner-London boroughs at lower-tier elections 1945-
1998, 
22 Mean percentage turnout in all Inner-London boroughs 106 
contrasted with mean percentage turnout in Liberal contested 
wards only, at lower-tier elections 1945-1998. 
23 Mean percentage turnout in all inner-London boroughs 106 
contrasted with mean turnout Camden London Borough only, 
and mean turnout Liberal contested wards only Camden London 
Borough, at lower-tier elections 1945-1998. 
24 Mean turnout all inner-London boroughs, contrasted with mean 107 
w v 
turnout Islington London Borough only, and mean turnout 
Liberal contested wards only Islington London Borough, at 
lower-tier elections 1945-1998. 
25 East Islington Constituency: Parliamentary and Borough 110 
electoral turnout in coterminous wards 1949-1970 contrasted. 
26 North Islington constituency parliamentary and borough 111 
electoral turnout in coterminous wards 1949-1970 contrasted. 
27 Islington South West constituency parliamentary and borough 111 
electoral turnout in coterminous v^ds 1949-1970 contrasted. 
28 Hampstead constituency pariiamentary and borough electoral 112 
turnout in coterminous wards 1949-1970 contrasted, 
29 Holbom and St Pancras constituency and borough electoral 112 
turnout in coterminous wards 1949-1970 contrasted. 
30 St Pancras North constituency and borough electoral turnout in 112 
coterminous wards 1949-1970 contrasted. 
31 Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive borough elections 113 
in wards coterminous with Islington Parliamentary constituency 
London Borough of Islington, 1951-1970. 
32 Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive borough elections 113 
in wards coterminous with Camden Parliamentary constituency 
London Borough of Islington, 1951-1970. 
33 Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive Sutton Coldfield 115 
County Borough Council elections 1959-1972 and Sutton 
Coldfield wards at Birmingham District Council elections 1972 
to 1982, contrasted with Pedersen index at successive Sutton 
Coldfield Constituency at Pariiamentary elections 1959-1979 
34 Party percentage share of the total vote at Sutton Coldfield 115 
lower-tier elections (County Borough Council elections 1959-
1972 and Sutton Coldfield wards at Birmingham District 
Council elections 1972 to 1982), contrasted with party 
percentage share of the total vote at Sutton Coldfield 
Constituency Parliamentary elections 1959-1979 
35 Mean percentage turnout all Sutton Coldfield wards at council 116 
elections 1958-1971, (no figures for 1970 available, wards 
contested over whole period only) contrasted with mean 
percentage turnout in individual wards wards. 
36 Party percentage share of the total vote at Birmingham County 117 
XV 
Council elections 1959-1972 contrasted with party percentage 
share of the total vote at Parliamentary elections 1959-1970 in 
the Birmingham Ladywood Constituency ( coterminous local 
electoral units). 
37 Party percentage share of the total vote at Sutton Coldfield 170 
municipal elections 1958-1972. 
L I S T O F MAPS 
Map Page 
1 Birmingham ward boundaries 1950-1962 122 
2 Birmingham ward boundaries 1962-1982 123 
3 Birmingham Metropolitan District ward boundaries 164 
4 Islington Borough ward boundaries, constituency and GLC 212 
boundaries 1978 
5 London Metropolitan Boroughs pre 1964 reorganisation 212 
6 Camden Borough wards at the 1964 London Borough elections 240 
XVI 
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S 
The research for this thesis was made possible by a research studentship grant from 
the Economic and Social Research Council (Award NumberR00429934259). The 
machine- readable local electoral data came from the Local Government Chronicle 
Election Centre at the University of Plymouth and my thanks go to Dawn Cole, and 
Brian Cheal for all their work in its production. Many thanks go to Dr Lawrence 
Ware for always being happy to advise me regarding the mysteries of statistical 
analysis. However, a special debt of gratitude is owed to Alan Willis and John 
Woollard in respect of the London electoral data and to Christopher Phillips in respect 
of the Birmingham electoral data, for their sterling work in the collection of this data 
and its publication in a series of extremely useful volumes of twentieth century local 
election results. Thanks also go to the UK Data Archive at the University of Essex 
and the Manchester Information and Associated Services (MIMAS) at the University 
of Manchester for allowing me access to and supply of the census data, especially 
their ever-helpful advice line operators. 
I am particularly grateful to my supervisors. Professor Colin Railings and Professor 
Michael Thrasher of the Politics Department, and Professor Kevin Jefferys of the 
History Department for their invaluable comments, sound advice and foresight to 
encourage such interdisciplinary research as this. 
Immense gratitude to my wife Jo, and my sons, James and Stephen for their patience 
and support. 
Paul Lambe 
University of Plymouth 2003 
xvu 
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION 
At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the 
author been registered for any other University award. 
This study was financed by the aid of a studentship grant from the Economic and 
Research Council and carried out in collaboration with the Politics Department, and 
History Department, University of Plymouth. 
A programme of advanced study was undertaken, which included a Post-Graduate 
Diploma in Social Research Methods and a supervised ESRC summer-school 
statistics course. 
Relevant political science and political history seminars/conferences were attended. A 
paper was presented to the ECPR Conference at Marburg, Germany and a number of 
papers prepared for publication. Forthcoming publication, 'An Introduction to 
Quantitative Research Methods in History' Journal of the Association for History and 
Computing. 
Signed 
Date rTTT-*. Oc^fer.PooT 
CHAPTER 1 
WHY LOOK AT DEALIG^fMENT AGAIN? 
l.ltlntroduction 
The aim of this thesis is to gain a greater insight into the relationship between local 
and parliamentary elections in a crucial period of political dealignment in Britain 
between 1959 and 1979. In this critical period of British electoral history the two-
party system, long considered closed to outside penetration, underwent radical 
change: change marked by the erosion of the foundations of Conservative and Labour 
party support and the emergence of the Liberal and Nationalist parties, posing a 
challenge to the major party duopoly. Political scientists have offered macro 
explanations of the dynamics of this shift in class and party allegiance. However, 
dealignment has rarely been looked at from the micro level and its local determinants 
revealed. This thesis will bridge the interdisciplinary terrain between the quantitative 
approach of the political scientist and the qualitative approach of the historian. The 
thesis will analyse voting behaviour by use of aggregate borough and ward level 
electoral data and will examine how contextual and institutional factors impact upon 
the calculus of voting at local elections. 
At the local government level the process of dealignment became entangled with an 
equally powerful process of increased politicisation as candidates with party labels 
contested more elections. These two events, political dealignment in patterns of 
voting behaviour in parliamentary elections and increasing party politicisation at the 
local government level, reflect a fascinating period in our electoral history. Yet, little 
or no research has been conducted which systematically examines the relationship, i f 
any, between these two strands. Indeed there is a distinct absence of study of this area 
by both historians and political scientists. The basic explanation for this apparent 
oversight has been the lack of comprehensive and reliable local electoral data for the 
period in question. The Local Government Chronicle Election Centre, University of 
Plymouth, has now gathered a sufficient amount of these data to permit a systematic 
and rigorous analysis of the relationship between national and local patterns of party 
competition and electoral behaviour between 1959 and 1979. 
The erosion of the predominant two party system characterised by class and party 
dealignment has been the focus of much macro political science study at the 
parliamentary level. This has combined aggregate voting data with evidence from 
survey research. However, there are problems that thwart the accepted methods of 
electoral analysis. For example, there is an anomaly in the relationship between class 
and voting preference. The influence of class at the individual level has declined and 
yet 'at the aggregate level class influences and constituency results remain closely 
matched, or have even become more associated Similarly, the problem of 
adequately analysing 'two-way causation flows between voting behaviour and a wide 
range of correlated variables*, such as that between political alignments and mass 
media, exemplify these current methodological limitations (Dunleavy 1990:456 see 
Appendix C, interpretation of correlation coefficients). 
Voting studies needs a broader vision to take account of the process, context and 
meaning of the determinants of voting behaviour: factors that are intrinsically difficult 
to measure. The way in which contextual and institutional features impact on the 
calculus of voting at the local government electoral level; the role of party 
organisation, competition, finance, political activists and council politics inter alia; 
and their relationship with party fortunes at national level: all need to be examined 
(Devine 1995; Railings and Thrasher 1997). This research will attempt to shed new 
light on the role of local government elections and their relationship, i f any, with 
national electoral outcomes. It will attempt to unravel some of the determinants of 
voting in local government elections that remain obscured from the solely quantitative 
perspective. 
Recent political science studies have reinforced the view that as the influences of 
class and party identification have weakened the electorate has become more open to 
the blandishments of party and that active constituency level campaigns during a 
general election exert a significant impact on the local vote ( Seyd and Whiteley 
1995). Given the decisiveness of marginal seats throughout the period from 1959 to 
1974, constituency campaigns and local party organisation may have proved critical 
(Butler and Duschinsky 1971; Butler and Kavanagh 1974,1975). Constituency parties, 
however, have functioned not only at parliamentary level but also, in the main, have 
organised campaigns for local government elections. Insights into the nature of party 
competition and fluctuations in the level of electoral support can be gained from the 
study of local elections. Any sense of the rise and fall in party support over the period 
of this study would provide a useful additional device for charting the general state of 
electoral intentions: The study will attempt to explain the process of dealignment and 
the factors that influenced it, rather than just reveal its existence at the local electoral 
level. It will also attempt to reveal any interconnection between local government 
electoral behaviour and parliamentary electoral behaviour, and thereby broaden the 
explanation of the determinants of dealignment at pariiamentary elections in the 
period 1959-1979. 
1.2:Political science and electoral change : stability to volatility 
The period from 1950 to 1970 is generally regarded as characterised by aligned 
voting. Class and partisan alignment were, in David Denver's w o r d s , t h e twin 
pillars ... which supported and sustained stable party support on the part of the 
individual voters and a stable two-party system overall' ( Denver 1994:32). Survey 
studies of reported voting behaviour point up the extent and strength of party 
identification within the electorate ( Sarlvik and Crewe 1983: 334-335). Among 
political scientists such as Butler, Stokes, Sarlvik, Crewe and Berrington, the evidence 
of a weakening of traditional connections between the electorate and the major 
political parties, provided by these measures of party identification, is 'usually 
accepted as incontrovertible' (Farrell.McAUister and Broughton: 1995:110). It is 
argued that the clear alignment between class and party was such, that, 'of all the 
possible social characteristics that might have influenced party choice social class was 
consistently found to be the most important" (Denver 1994: 34). Nevertheless. Butler 
and Stokes had detected an emerging trend of 'a weakening of the class alignment' 
(Franklin 1985:5) and subsequently most commentators have agreed that class, both 
as a social and a political force, has been steadily declining in Britain. 
The 1950s and 1960s then, are presented as a period of class and partisan alignment 
with party choice explained in terms of political socialisation. Electoral change was 
slow, small and short-term. Electoral change in this period can be accounted for by a 
small minority of voters who switched party and by non-voting traffic. However, 
issue voting is considered to be the exception rather than the rule as ' overall, floaters 
were less concerned and less knowledgeable about politics and less interested in the 
outcome of elections than were those whose voting pattern was stable' (Denver 1994: 
50). 
In contrast, from the 1970s onward electoral volatility rather than stability has 
characterised British party politics. Explanations of partisan dealignment impinge 
upon explanations of class dealignment. Increased political awareness through 
education and television; the paucity of achievement that both major parties 
experienced in office; and in reference to the Labour party, an ideological disjuncture, 
are cited (Denver 1994: 55-59). The decline in Labour support up until 1979 has been 
attributed to the reduced appeal of Labour to the groups that had traditionally 
supported it [and a]. . . similar decline in Conservative support among traditional Tory 
social groups made this a quite general phenomenon of declining class voting" 
( Franklin 1985: 176). Some political scientists such as Sarlvik and Crewe regard 
class dealignment as a key determinant of changing electoral behaviour. According 
to this view, fragmentation of the working class, with former Labour supporters more 
readily able to identify with Conservative and third party policies and more willing to 
vote rationally on issues, is regarded as the major determinant of partisan dealignment 
and the growth of other parties. However, class dealignment is a controversial issue 
that rests largely upon the definition of class voting. Disagreement exists, both over 
rival definitions and whether class voting should be measured relatively or absolutely. 
Advocates of the dealignment hypothesis,' have argued that absolute measures are the 
best way to represent class voting and consequently conclude that class voting has 
declined' (Weakliem 1995: 254). 
Others reject class dealignment as a cause of partisan dealignment. Franklin has 
argued that the electorate remained class aligned but the Labour Party failed to offer 
class-based policy choices and thus the leakage of the working class vote. The class 
dealignment hypothesis has been rejected by Anthony Heath and his colleagues who 
claim that, 'the evidence that class has withered away is very thin [and] has largely 
been inferred from the political volatility of the last twenty years rather than the other 
way round' (Heath et al. 1985:8). The relationship between class and voting 
behaviour is at the nub of explanations for the decline in the Labour party's share of 
the vote during the period of 1959 to 1979. Party dealignment is not in doubt. 
However, Heath et al. argue that there has been no class dealignment and that 
Labour's difficulties stem from the contraction of the working class and political 
explanations, rather, than as Crewe argues, a weakening of class loyalties. Heath et al. 
contend that 'Crewe and others ... have confused the decline of Labour with the 
decline of class voting* (Kavanagh 1996: 131). 
Our point... is that political explanations ... the 
number of seats contested by the Liberals, the extension 
of the franchise, the failure of Labour governments to 
satisfy their supporters - are in many ways more 
plausible than those which focus on changes in the 
character of the social classes (Heath et al. 1991: 81). 
Furthermore, Heath et al. have argued that less than half of the fall in Labour's share 
of the vote between 1964 and 1983 can be accounted for by changing class structure 
and the remainder was due to Labour's political failings (Heath et al. 1985:37). There 
is however, a consensus among analysts that the electorate has become unpredictable 
and volatile and, with the exception of Heath et al., most believe that the level of 
unpredictability is greater than it was in the era of alignment (Denver 1994:78). 
What has prompted voters in their decisions as to which party to support if party 
identification and class loyalties have weakened, is a question that has been addressed 
by political scientists. Kavanagh argues that 'there has been greater electoral volatility 
between and during election campaigns [while] stabilising factors ... have weakened, 
[giving] more scope for the influence of short-term factors, including events 
associated with the build-up to the election' (Kavanagh 1996:134). There is, though, 
disagreement over the measurement of issue voting and the extent to which it is 
independent of party identificatioa It is complicated further by the fact that voters' 
policy preferences can cross party boundaries. Butler and Stokes have shown that 
voters in the 1960s failed to meet the conditions for issue voting: i.e. that, the issue 
should be salient, it should be integrated into the party system with one party 
opposing the other on the issue and, that opinions should be skewed such that one 
party gains an electoral advantage from the position it takes (Franklin 1985 b: 40-1. 
Butler and Stokes 1974). However, researchers in the 1970s began to examine the 
relationship between party choice and a voter's assessment of the parties* policies and 
performances. In their study of the 1979 general election Sarlvik and Crewe argued 
that the electorate in the 1970s * became more ready to sway in response to short-term 
factors, especially the issues that were the cause of immediate concern* (Sarlvik and 
Crewe 1983: 337). Furthermore, they have argued that, 'a comparison of the effect of 
policy opinions and assessments with the effect of social characteristics on party 
choice reveals that "voters" opinions on policies and on party performance in office 
"explain" more than twice as much as all social and economic characteristics put 
together* (Denver 1994: 97). Franklin has argued that issue voting has increased in 
step with the decline in class voting and that British voters are more open to rational 
argument than in the past (Franklin 1985 b:52-3), but, he also found that 'after 1970 
there was no clear trend in levels of issue voting' (Denver and Hands 1992: 171). 
Heath, Jowell and Curtice have criticised the view that issue voting has increased. 
They argue that the commonly accepted version of the issue voting model has serious 
theoretical problems and in its stead have proposed an ideological voting model 
whereby voters choose a party not on the basis of policy preference * as a consumer in 
the market place' but on the basis of their 'general values and their overall perception 
of what the parties stand for* (Heath et al. 1985:107). Rose and McAllister also reject 
the view that issues are an important influence on voting behaviour and have argued 
that peoples' opinions go together in distinctive ways and share common underiying 
political principles, that is,' underlying judgements and preferences about the 
activities of government [which] are general enough to be durable [and] concern 
persisting problems of public policy* (Rose and McAllister 1986: 117). However, 
Denver and Hands have argued that there is Insufficient grounds for dismissing the 
issue voting model and replacing it with models based on ideology or principles' 
(Denver and Hands 1992:173). Indeed, Denver concludes that there is a general 
consensus 'as the electorate has become more dealigned, voters have become 
increasingly likely to base their vote upon judgements - w4iether about current issues, 
ideologies, leaders or government performance* (Denver 1994:102). 
The water is muddied further by Dunleavy who has argued that dealignment is 
explicable in tenms of the growth of new social cleavages, specifically the changes in 
consumption patterns in housing and transport (Dunleavy 1980:409). Crewe in 1976 
argued that Mt is difficult to think of any social cleavages or fundamental changes in 
the social structure in the last twenty years that could have affected partisan 
aligrmients in any way' (Crewe 1976:46). Dunleavy, however, in regard to changes in 
consumption patterns argues that in the post-war period Tar from being glacially slow 
the change in consumption patterns could hardly have been more dramatic' (Dunleavy 
1980:410). In addition, Dunleavy contends that in the cases of housing and transport 
'the large scale organisation and management of these services, the directly politicised 
context of provision, and their independent effect as bases for social cleavage, create 
favourable conditions for the emergence of collective consciousness and action' 
(ibid:418). Indeed, housing in the mid 1960s was one of the few subjects that Butler 
and Stokes identified as being of such public concern, and which divided both public 
opinion and party policy to such an extent that it met their criteria of 'issue 
voting'(Butler and Stokes 1974). Dunleavy argues that local conflicts influence party 
differentiation and political aligrunent and thus Mocal conflicts in fact have an 
important structuring influence on the electorate's alignment towards national politics 
and on party differentiation at various points in time'(ibid:432). 
As will be outlined in the next chapter, political scientists discount the influence of 
local factors in any explanation of either parliamentary electoral behaviour or local 
government electoral behaviour. In regard to municipal elections the views of many 
political scientists are encapsulated in such phrases as Miller's 'Irrelevant Elections' 
orNev^on's 'Annual General Election' (Miller 1988. Newton 1976). Those interested 
in understanding mass political behaviour are left to decide between competing 
quantitative models of similar explanatory value. The insights generated by a micro 
study of local authority electoral behaviour, using a multi-theoretical approach and 
melding both qualitative and quantitative evidence, could add to one or more of these 
competing arguments. 
1.3:Political historians and electoral change 
The historian's approach to the study of elections is, naturally enough, conditioned by 
the aim to locate them in a historical context. Historians have, generally, studied 
elections in the wider context of a narrative and descriptive survey of developments in 
British politics. The rise and decline of party fortunes have in general, been explained 
from the standpoint of Tiigh politics' eis a product of the rhetoric and manoeuvre of 
elite groups. Until the late 1960s much of a generalised nature served to account for 
patterns of parliamentary politics (Pellingl967:vii). Increasingly, however, from the 
1970s, in detailed studies, monographs and general surveys, broader questions were 
addressed. These changes in the approach to political history were perhaps a 
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consequence of elections becoming of serious academic interest to social scientists in 
the 1960s as ecological and sociological approaches were developed. Although 
historians acknowledged the importance of economic and social factors in politics, 
there were few books until the 1970s *about the relationship between social and 
economic factors and British elections' ( Kinnear 1981:9). This indifference to the 
social background of politics in Britain extended also to any recognition of local and 
regional variations in electoral behaviour. In contrast the systematic study of elections 
by social scientists has been carried out in a series of studies covering general 
elections since 1945, sponsored by Nuffield College, Oxford The studies have 
evolved from a 'simple narrative of the election campaign' to include constituency 
case studies, data from survey analyses of the electorate and statistical analysis of the 
results (Lawrence and Taylor 1997:4). However, this approach has been criticised by 
historians. Stuart Ball sums up the ambivalence of historians towards such works. 
'The lack of perspective which inevitably follows from writing hard on the heels of 
events, as well as restricted range of sources, means that such works are valuable and 
ground breaking, but cannot be definitive' (Ball 1998:6). 
Nevertheless, in the history of British electoral behaviour the concepts and methods of 
electoral sociology of the 1950s and 1960s have predominated. Pioneering work by 
McKenzie (1955), Hanham (1959), Comford (1963), Felling (1967, 1968), Vincent 
(1967), McKenzie and Silver (1968), Bufler and Stokes (1969), Clarke (1971), and 
Mc Kibbin (1974) inter alia, virtually all informed by a sociological perspective, have 
left an abiding influence. From this perspective historians have interpreted electoral 
behaviour as a function of underlying social forces and the success of a party 
measured against the benchmark of its ability to adapt to social change. Social 
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structural and attitudinal change has been considered the key to understanding the 
developments of modem British electoral history. Many mainstream histories of 
modem politics have assimilated the view of the sociological approach that electoral 
behaviour acts as a barometer of social change and that parties are essentially 
pluralistic institutions capable of channelling and neutralising conflict" (Lawrence and 
Taylor 1997:2). The influence of the systematic study of voting pioneered by Nuffield 
College, is apparent in the methods of such historians as Hanham, Morgan, Nossiter, 
Cook and Ramsdea The methods of the psephological approach were adopted to 
interpret the corpus of British electoral statistics back to the eariy nineteenth century. 
In terms of these new approaches adopted by historians to the history of British 
electoral politics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, J.Comford 
exemplified the influence of the sociological approach in the argument that 'there was 
a need to distinguish between specific election issues and the more continuous social 
basis of popular support which rested on changes in the uii)an class structure' (ibid: 
12). Felling took a more ecological approach and highlighted the persistence of local 
and regional influences in the period accepted by others as the onset of national class 
politics. Peter Clarke, however, while adopting a sociological approach took a top-
down view of class politics shaped by party political influence. 
In general British historians have focused attention on location of the onset of class 
politics and the response of parties to a class based electoral system in terms of party 
organisation and appeal. Social structure and its shifts were shown to bring about 
changes in British politics that parties either adapted to or lost support. The issues of 
psephology, the pluralist approach, and electoral sociology have endured in the 
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mainstream of British history, *the nature of two party politics, the neutral role of the 
state, the non-ideological nature of party rhetoric, the pragmatic concerns of voters 
and the national nature of election campaigns' ( ibid: 16) among the most enduring. 
Historians have nevertheless, began to reconsider the relationships between party, 
social change, changes in the franchise, locality, party propaganda and rhetoric. Like 
the political scientist, the historian is pointed toward the context in which voter and 
party interact Indeed, as Davies and Morley argue in the past 'there has been a 
peculiar hostility to the importance of the local dimension in British political history, 
especially in relation to the twentieth century'. However, attitudes have changed and a 
'degree of consensus exists that local histories should play some part in the uider 
understanding of British politics and society'(Davies and Morley 1999:1-6). More 
explicitly Stevens, in a critique of the electoral sociology of modem Britain has 
argued that i f 'partisan alignment and dealignment [were] examined through long-
term local studies, a completely different picture may emerge' (Stevens 1999:85). 
Criticism of historian's methods by behaviouralists has focused on the historian's 
claims to explanation. Historical interpretations compete with one another and each 
interpretation is defended by a subjective prioritisation of one causal factor over 
others. However, judgements carmot be explicitly justified and behaviouralists 
question the case for the objectivity and reliability of historical explanation and 
knowledge. The status of historical findings is a contentious issue that divides 
historians. Few, however, would defend a 'hard-line concept of historical objectivity* 
(Evans 1997:3). Fewer would agree with Theodore Zeldin's view that all any historian 
can offer 'is his personal vision of the past which corresponds to their own aspirations 
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and sympatiiies* (Tosh 1994:130). The study of history has both an idealist and 
positivist tradition that no doubt colours each historian's view of objectivity. 
The incorporation of the methods of economics, sociology, geography and statistics 
into historical approaches in order to make history more objective and scientific has 
been applied not with the intention to develop ' particular explanations but general 
hyix)theses which could be statistically tested' (Evans 1997:39). In political history, 
Ian Kershaw's Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich, was a 
successfril melding of traditional historical approach and quantitative method, in an 
empirical study of the political mentality of Germans and the extent to which Nazism 
was able to transform social and political values (Kershaw 1983:2). Work by the 
Cambridge Group of demographic historians has employed statistical models 
extensively to revise interpretations in social history. The application of scientific 
statistical methods has produced 'major advances in knowledge' (Evans 1997:40) in 
economic history. Although some areas of historical research employ quantitative 
methods and traditional historians make many qualitative judgements and descriptions 
that are implicitly quantitative, this of course does not mean that all aspects of human 
behaviour can be measured. 
Nevertheless, quantitative and qualitative evidence are complementary. Furthermore, 
neither approach 'can pretend to comprehend the whole of historical study* (Floud 
1979:3). If it is accepted that the exclusion by the historian of the consideration of 
quantitative evidence diminishes an already inadequate ability to grasp all available 
evidence, then it is equally plausible to argue that methodological prescription 
diminishes the evidence available to the political scientist for the study of the calculus 
of voting. History, however, has contributed to political science more as a body of 
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knowledge than as a set of methods and it is evident that nowadays it is 'rarely used 
except as a dignified background' (Kavanagh 1991:481). The break from history in 
political science is probably most complete in the study of voting where the historian's 
impressionistic explanation and refutation of ideas of universal laws seem to oppose 
the notion of a science of politics. However, some kind of common rationale would be 
productive both for political historians and behaviouralists in the study of elections. 
'Each uses the elections and their statistics in tune with the objectives of their work; 
both offer analysis that is useful to the other* (Brivati 1991:382). Any synthesis that is 
not a Procrustean enterprise must first however, overcome epistemological 
prescription. Indeed, a resort to methodological pluralism behoves acknowledgement 
of the concerns and consideration of the beliefs about the nature of knowledge, the 
respective theories of knowledge that underpin the approaches of political science and 
history. 
The nature of the interdisciplinary terrain to be crossed between the study of history 
and political science is perhaps less daunting than in the past. Political history's 
centrality to history curricula in higher education, its increasingly modem focus and, 
indeed the advance of contemporary history, all signal a convergence of history and 
political science towards an 'area most likely to find commonality* 
(Ramsden 1992:555). While there is much distance to travel, the relationship between 
the disciplines of history and political science in the realm of electoral studies can be 
a more productive one, as this thesis will attempt to show. 
The resolution of many of the questions concerning the role of local government 
elections and their relationship with national parliamentary outcomes requires a 
qualitative approach. Political science is dominated by quantitative methodology and 
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consequently fails to address the process, context and meaning of the determinants of 
voting behaviour Furthermore, the top-down perspective towards the understanding 
of mass political behaviour adopted by both political science and political history 
affords only a partial view. It is at the micro-level that determinants of voting 
behaviour can be unravelled, in the milieu of local party organisation, local party 
competition, campaigns and personalities, that both local goverrunent and national 
party politics interact. The determinants of national electoral outcomes may be as 
prosaic as the cumulative effects of party efficiency or inefficiency at constituency 
level, or as mundane as the rivalries between constituency association and local 
council members of the same party. This does not deny the importance of class and 
party attachments, national issues, the pull of leaders, the modem media, the 
instruraentalism of the voter or ideology; rather, it is their mediation through the local 
context that needs to be taken into account and thereby the wider debates conceming 
political dealignment will be better informed. 
The thesis will map voting behaviour at local and parliamentary electoral levels in 
two locations over a period of twenty years in order to attempt to show how the 
different kinds of evidence traditionally used by historians and political scientists can 
actually complement each other and lead to a more nuanced explanation of mass 
political behaviour. Having introduced the rationale for and the subject matter of this 
study, the next section will outline its structure chapter by chapter and briefly 
expound how the thesis will go about achieving its stated aims. 
1.4:Thesis structure 
In Chapter 2 a review of the literature surrounding local electoral voting behaviour 
will identify the gaps in knowledge that the multi-disciplinary approach of this thesis 
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will endeavour to close. The chapter will begin with a discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the various sources of data available to the researcher o f local 
elections. This wi l l be followed by a focussed analysis of previous local electoral 
studies that wil l reveal the limitations of present approaches. The chapter v^ l l 
conclude with an assessment of the various explanations forwarded to account for 
voting behaviour in local elections and its relationship with parliamentary electoral 
behaviour and present an argument that qualitative methods could facilitate a greater 
understanding of local political behaviour. 
Chapter 3 wil l outline the methodology of the thesis. It v^ l l begin with a brief 
consideration of the methodological implications of the thesis's multi-disciplinary 
research and then turn more specifically to the generalisability of the case study 
method and its use in this thesis. The methods, sources of the data, problems of 
collection and analysis and how these wil l be overcome wil l then be expounded, as 
wil l the rationale for the choice of case studies, the coextensiveness of electoral units, 
and the local electoral cycles of London and Birmingham during the 1959-1979 
period. The chapter concludes with a summary of the methodology employed. 
Chapter 4 will use borough electoral data to examine trends in local government 
electoral behaviour and contrast them with parliamentary electoral behaviour in 
selected areas of London and Birmingham. I f as political science orthodoxy argues 
local elections are just national referendums then the expectation would be that trends 
in local authority voting behaviour would in general approximate the voting trends of 
parliamentary elections. The hypothesis that there is no difference between the trends 
and patterns of voting behaviour at the local electoral level, in terms of the rate and 
the extent that voters deserted the two-party system, than at the parliamentary 
17 
electoral level in the period 1959-1979, wi l l be tested. In addition, the general 
research question: did any changes in local electoral party attachments precede 
changes in parliamentary electoral party attachments wi l l be posed. Indeed, the 
expectation would also be that inter- and intra- authority voting trends would 
approximate one another. Data on local authority level electoral behaviour is, 
nevertheless, limited by the fact that it is an aggregation of individual ward electoral 
behaviour and thus what is true of voting behaviour at the local authority level may 
not be true of voting behaviour in its constituent wards. Thus the focus wil l narrow to 
ward level electoral trends at municipal and parliamentary elections in coterminous 
electoral units of the four case study locations of Islington, Camden, Ladywood and 
Sutton Coldfield . Thereby, any variations in the trends in electoral behaviour 
between coterminous municipal and parliamentary electoral units, variance in inter-
and intra-authority electoral behaviour can be more accurately scrutinised. How the 
findings of this quantitative research tie into the theoretical framework of studies of 
parliamentary electoral dealignment and with existing studies of voting behaviour in 
Britain will then be addressed, and an argument will be presented that the quantitative 
evidence points to explanations of variance in electoral behaviour at individual 
borough and ward level. Furthermore, it will be suggested that the investigation into 
which factors influence local electoral behaviour and their relationship to 
parliamentary electoral behaviour in coterminous electoral units can be taken forward 
by the qualitative approach of the historian. To this end the next four chapters will 
then turn. 
Chapters 5,6,7 and 8 will examine the case study locations of Ladywood, Sutton 
Coldfield, Islington and Camden, respectively. In each of these chapters qualitative 
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evidence will be presented to argue that local factors are important determinants of 
local authority electoral outcomes, and that local factors influenced partisan and 
class dealignment at both the local electoral and parliamentary electoral level. 
In chapter 9 multivariate regression analysis will be employed to determine how far 
variation in the voter's calculus can be explained by socio-economic factors peculiar 
to the locality. Aggregate models of constituency level voting behaviour at general 
elections 1959-1979 in Birmingham and London constituencies, and of ward level 
voting behaviour at local elections in wards which comprise these constituencies, will 
seek to test the hypothesis that the probability that support for a particular party in a 
constituency at general elections, and in a ward at local elections, is partially 
determined by the socio-economic context of the area. The analysis wil l also seek to 
test the hypothesis that there is no significant difference in the effect of ward level 
socio-economic variables upon voter's electoral calculus at local and national 
elections. The aim of the analysis is to make some inferences about the relationship 
between local and national voting behaviour, and between upper- and lower-tier 
elections in the same authority. In addition, the analysis wil l facilitate an insight into 
the effects of social class variables over time at local/national elections and thereby 
engage with the wider debate concerning class dealignment. Data sources, variables 
used in the regression analysis, regression techniques, problems concerning multi-
coilinearity, aggregation bias and ecological fallacy wil l be explained. Finally, tables 
of findings and analyses of those findings will be presented and conclusions drawn. 
Chapter 10 will take the statistical analysis a stage further and employ logistic 
regression, a statistical technique that permits the analysis of the impact of contextual 
political and structural variables upon the calculus of the voter at these elections. The 
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primary goal of this chapter is determine how far local electoral environment 
influenced the prospects and performance of the Liberal Party at these municipal 
elections and whether this in turn had any impact upon class/party alignment at the 
parliamentary level in coterminous electoral units. 
Chapter 11 wil l comprise a comparative analysis of the quantitative evidence from 
chapters 4,9 and 10 with the qualitative evidence of chapters 5-8. It is hoped that this 
analysis wil l provide more robust explanations for any variations in the ward level of 
party support that individually the quantitative approach of political science or 
qualitative approach of the political historian are hitherto unable to provide. 
Chapter 12 wi l l conclude the thesis and review its findings and place them in the 
context of existing literature on the study o f local electoral and parliamentary electoral 
behaviour, the wider debate of dealignment and consideration of future research. 
1.5:Conclusion 
In this chapter it has been argued that there is a significant gap in knowledge 
concerning local electoral behaviour that neither political science nor political history 
has so far been able to close. The questions that need to be answered are; was there 
dealignment at the local electoral level, i f so what shape did it take, when did it 
happen, what were its determinants, and what effect i f any did it have upon mass 
political behaviour at the parliamentary level? It has been argued that a combination 
of the quantitative methods of the political scientist and the qualitative methods of the 
historian can increase our understanding of these issues. The next chapter, in a 
detailed analysis of the literature surrounding local electoral behaviour wi l l narrow 
the focus to assess what is known about specific aspects of local electoral behaviour 
and why this partial view can be broadened by resort to a multi-disciplinary approach. 
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C H A P T E R ! 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON L O C A L ELECTIONS 
2.1;Introduction 
The methods employed in the study of local elections include the use of survey 
samples, statistical analysis of aggregate data from electoral returns and official 
censuses, and case studies. Each has a legitimate role to play. However, each has 
specific problems and limitations that must be understood and respected i f 
misrepresentation of findings is to be avoided. Similarly, a complexity of local 
government structure, electoral cycles and boundaries compound these constraints and 
we vAW treat with these issues in chapter 3. This chapter wil l commence with a 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the various sources of data 
available to the researcher of local elections. A review of the literature surrounding 
local electoral research wil l then follow paying particular attention to orthodox views 
of the determinants of local electoral behaviour, and the extent to which it is 
considered that local politics has been politicised and nationalised. The evidence for 
contextual voting, and whether the electorate make contradictory local and national 
choices will be assessed, whilst highlighting the problems of identifying local as 
opposed to national influences. Turnout bias, and the difficulties in assessing the 
impact of turnout and its variance over time wil l be examined. The relative effects of 
local/national influences upon voting in local elections and how far any variance in 
local electoral choice can be explained by national issues will explored. The chapter 
will conclude with an assessment of the various explanations forwarded to account for 
differences beUveen voting behaviour in local and national elections and present an 
argument that qualitative methods could facilitate a greater understanding of local 
political behaviour. In short, through a focussed literature review of local electoral 
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Studies this chapter wilt reveal and examine more closely the gaps in our knowledge 
concerning local electoral behaviour. 
2.2;Survev research 
Survey research is a source of data largely denied to the study of local politics. 
Though used extensively at parliamentary electoral level by political scientists to 
explore voting behaviour and individual attitudes, in the main opinion polls have 
rarely been used at the local level. The efficacy of the survey method in providing 
useful data for the study of local politics was illustrated by the Widdecombe 
Committee of Inquiry into the Conduct of Local Authority Business 1986. Inter alia, 
the report found that partisanship, for a sizeable minority of about twenty per cent of 
respondents, varied between local and national elections (Railings and Thrasher 
1997:4). In such cross-sectional surveys individual people are the unit of analysis, and 
data, in the form of facts, perceptions, opinions, attitudes and behavioural reports are 
collected from a representative sample that enables inferences to be made about some 
wider population. Although 'populations and relationships between variables in those 
populations can be described at a given time, it does not allow us to say how the 
characteristics or relationships have developed or wil l develop over time' (Manheim 
and Rich 1981: 132). A stronger survey design that escapes the time bound limitation 
of the cross-sectional survey is the panel survey that looks at the same sample at 
different times. The panel survey, although usually consisting of a much smaller 
sample of respondents, can, for instance, be employed 'to ensure that explanations of 
voting choice are based upon attitudes and opinions measured before the vote' (Miller 
1995:167). 
However, criticisms of the survey method in general question its reliability, 
representativeness and validity. Indeed,' how can we find out what a mass public 
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really thinks about issues, when we know that people's responses are highly sensitive 
to different forms of question wording?' (Dunleavy 1990:457). Furthermore, survey 
respondents can adjust their memory. This is significant considering many surveys 
carried out some considerable time after particular elections are used to explain the 
voting behaviour at those elections. As Miller argues, 'attitudes and opinions after the 
election are used to predict behaviour in it - a causal process that apparently runs 
backwards in time' (Miller 1995:166). Nevertheless, the survey method, though a 
useful addition to the armoury of local electoral study, reveals little ' about local 
election results, the nature and state of party competition, the characteristics of 
candidates and councillors, the nature of the electoral cycle, the operation of the 
electoral system and much else '(Railings and Thrasher 1997:5). 
2.3:Aggregate data 
Clearly survey methods have limited utility. A more productive approach to electoral 
studies has been based on the analysis of aggregate data, from electoral returns and 
census reports. Election returns from the electoral unit under scrutiny are analysed 
and patterns of voter turnout and preference identified. These patterns are identified 
'along the spatial dimension of differences concerning various areas or the temporal 
dimension of change over time within particular areas or a combination of both' 
(Ranney 1962: 93). The aggregate electoral data are synthesised with aggregate 
political, social and economic data peculiar to the electoral unit being studied 
provided by census reports. Explanations o f electoral behaviour are then posited as 
correlations between ecological factors and the patterns identified in aggregate voting 
returns. There are many advantages to the use of aggregate data in electoral studies, 
not least their relative cheapness and availability that facilitate replicative and 
comparative studies. A major advantage of aggregate data, especially electoral 
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returns, is that' for finding answers to many questions about electoral behaviour, they 
are the "hardest" data we can get, in the sense that their meaning and comparability 
vary less from area to area, fi-om time to time, and fi-om study to study than do most 
survey data* (Ranney 1962: 96). 
In the context of the study of local elections the use of aggregate data has proved an 
invaluable tool of analysis. The state of party competition, turnout, ward marginality, 
swing, and the distortion of votes/seats ratios by the electoral system are opened to the 
analytic scrutiny of aggregate data research. It has facilitated the detailed analysis of 
the impact of the various local authority electoral cycles and, the effects of single, 
multimember and mixed electoral divisions. Aggregate data has allowed detailed 
analysis of the impact on turnout of dominant electoral issues, candidates, party 
organisation, local campaigns, ward marginality, ecological characteristics, electoral 
size and much more. 
However, the use of aggregate data, both electoral returns and census reports, has 
some drawbacks. Secondary analysis of data such as official censuses has to be 
regarded in the light that * supposedly complete enumeration gives data great 
authority but does not guarantee accuracy in practice' (Miller 1995: 156). 
Furthermore, the boundaries of census districts do not always coincide with the 
electoral unit under scrutiny and thus can prove an unreliable source of the 
characteristics of the particular electoral population. Aggregate electoral data can 
disguise variations in the lower level electoral units that make up its whole. The 
extent of party competition for instance can be exaggerated i f account is not taken of 
the mix of single and multimember wards and of whether parties field the full slate of 
candidates. There are also more general methodological concerns about the use of 
aggregate data to make inferences about individual voting behaviour. Correlations 
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between aggregate voting returns and aggregate census data do not necessarily 
correspond with correlations derived fi-om individual data from the same population. 
Indeed, researchers using aggregate data ' risk committing one of several types of 
ecological fallacy anytime they attempt to generalise to one level of analysis from 
data collected at another' (Manheim and Rich 1981: 228). Wrong conclusions can be 
obtained from seriously misinterpreted data as ' analyses of individuals justify 
conclusions only about individuals, analyses of places justify conclusions only about 
places, and analyses of times justify conclusions only about times' ( Miller 1995:163). 
Furthermore, the causal complexity of local electoral behaviour cannot be addressed 
by the sole reliance upon aggregate data. Correlation does not necessarily imply 
causation. Indeed, much of the explanation of variation in isolated variables hinges on 
probabilistic argument as only part of the variation can be explained by statistical 
methods and, researchers into local political behaviour often ask questions that cannot 
be answered by quantitative methods. 
Nevertheless, aggregate data analysis makes a valuable contribution to the study of 
electoral behaviour. As Ranney argues,' electorates no less than individual voters, are 
significant units for political analysis' (Ranney 1962: 99). Aggregate data analysis can 
identify the ebb and flow of electoral behaviour, point up the relationship with social, 
economic and political characteristics of the electoral unit under scrutiny, and 
overcome the time-bound and place-bound limitations of most surveys. For the study 
of local electoral behaviour where surveys are few, aggregate data analysis is an 
essential and invaluable tool. 
2.4:Local electoral research 
The significance of local factors to the outcome of municipal elections, has been 
encapsulated by Ken Newton in the much quoted term 'annual general election'. 
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Newton, in his case study of Birmingham local elections fi-om 1966 to 1972, is 
unequivocal in his assertion that local factors have very little impact on local 
elections. The term local election is considered by Newton to be a misnomer because 
' there is little that is local about them, and they tell us practically nothing about the 
preferences and attitudes of citizens to local issues and events. They are determined 
overwhelmingly by national political considerations'. Indeed, Newton argues that 
'neither election turnout nor voting patterns ... are associated with any local factors* 
(Newton 1976: 13-16). Using aggregate turnout figures for English county borough 
elections 1945-1970 and aggregate percentage swing to the Conservatives in a sample 
of cities and towns 1945-1970, Newton made comparison with the equivalent patterns 
of turnout and swing at the Birmingham municipal elections in the same period. He 
thereby illustrated how aggregate national trends in voting behaviour at local elections 
were virtually mirrored at the individual authority level. From these comparisons 
Newton concluded that at most only 10% of the variance in municipal election results 
could be ascribed to local factors and as far as turnout is concerned, approximately 
4% of variance could be explained by local factors. These conclusions were given 
added weight when the patterns of party voting and turnout in individual Birmingham 
wards over the same period were found to correspond closely to their national 
aggregate counterparts. Furthermore, a major part of the disparity between national 
patterns and those of the individual case of Birmingham was explained by Newton as 
the Tjig city effect', in that, 'it is well established that turnout is generally lower in 
large cities than small ones', and that 'any city of this size is likely to have a slightly 
better Labour vote than the country as a whole'. Thus. Newton diminished ftirther the 
explanatory role of local factors to the point where, in his words, they 'are too small to 
be worth considering* (Newton 1976:16-17). 
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Newton's case study of Birmingham examined the proposition that the electorate at 
local elections hold local politicians to account. He challenged the theory of electoral 
accountability and its assumption, that politicians are made accountable by the 
electorate's consideration of their actions, rather than the actions of others. Newton 
contends that the close correspondence between national patterns of local electoral 
data and those of Birmingham undermines the assumption of electoral accountability 
and points up national considerations as the major factor in determining local electoral 
outcomes. The electorate is thus apparently giving a verdict on the actions of national 
politicians rather than those of local politicians. Hence his conclusion that 'whoever 
is being held accountable on local election day, it is not the local politicians and 
parties' (Newrton 1976:17). 
Indeed, a survey by Butler and Stokes of British voters in 1963 found that the strength 
of attachment to parties was a powerful influence upon voting behaviour at local 
elections and that the vast majority of the electorate voted in line with their expressed 
national party self-image. Furthermore, the survey found that eighty per cent of 
respondents were not motivated by any local issues at the 1963 local elections and 
that the remainder expressed national political concerns (Butler and Stokes 1975: pp 
40-44). Fletcher's 1964 study of local electoral behaviour in eleven boroughs found 
that the influence of party and national party-politics not only dominated local 
electoral results, but party fortunes in those elections mirrored closely Gallup Poll 
trends in parliamentary voting intentions (Fletcher 1967). In contrast. Green's study 
of local voting in Leeds and Sheffield, whilst attributing a large national component to 
the variance in electoral swing at local elections, nevertheless ascribed the remaining 
influence to a small city-wide component and ward-level local factors and concluded 
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that previous studies had 'over-estimated the relative importance of the national 
factor' (Green 1972:53). Gyford concluded that in 'modem times there is 
considerable evidence that local election results - tended to reflect the general 
standing of the national parties at the time' (Gyford 1984:115). Further research into 
the question as to whether local elections reflect local or national politics conducted 
by Miller reinforced the orthodoxy that local electoral choice reflected to a large 
extent partisanship and contemporaneous national political influences. However, as 
Green had eadier alluded. Miller did concede that 'overlaid on these national 
influences and trends will be other, local influences - some reflecting local party 
outputs, some reflecting the influence of local personalities, local scandals, local 
organisation' ( Miller 1988:148). 
Clearly, contention concerns the extent not the existence of local influences upon 
local electoral behaviour. Recent studies however, seem to: 
support the propositions that a proportion of electors hold 
contradictory local and national voting preferences at one and 
the same time; and that there is significant variation in party 
performance both between and within local authorities 
(Railings and Thrasher 1993:366). 
The differential between local and national voting behaviour at coterminous 
parliamentary and municipal elections, held on 3 May 1979, was investigated by 
Waller in terms of turnout and popular support for the parties. Waller found that ' In 
borough constituencies... little splitting of the vote took place ... and no differences 
in turnout ... [were] discovered'. However, Waller did find a divergence in party 
support between local and parliamentary elections in rural areas, and that: 
the Liberals did consistently better in local elections... [and 
that] it might be suggested that voters actually do perceive a 
difference between local and national government, and are 
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prepared to cast their vote in local elections for candidates of 
parties which have little chance of forming a national 
government (Waller 1980:445-446). 
Although Cox and Laver in their study of the 3 May 1979 pariiamentary and local 
elections found that 'municipal voting in big cities is a product of whatever factors 
happen at the time to be salient nationally', they nevertheless found 'unequivocal 
evidence of a tendency of some electors to "split their tickets" and to vote Liberal 
locally while not supporting the party at the general election (Cox and Laver 
1979:382). 
Analyses of recent elections, employing a variety of indicators, have examined the 
orthodoxy that local elections are no more than 'annual general elections'. Survey 
data have provided an insight into the extent of the disparity between respondents' 
voting intentions at local and forthcoming general elections. Railings and Thrasher, 
using data from the British Election Study 1997 England and Wales cross-section 
survey have shown that 'perhaps a quarter of all voters did not cast both their 
available ballots for the same party' at the 1997 British general and local elections. In 
an examination of national and local opinion polls Railings and Thrasher have also 
shown that a disparity exists between a party's national electoral support and its local 
electoral support expressed by respondents' intentions at an imminent hypothetical 
general election and an actual imminent local election. They have also evidenced a 
disparity between local electoral voting intention expressed in opinion polls taken in 
the run up to local elections 1985-1991. and the actual national equivalent vote at 
these elections so highlighting the Liberal Democrats'(Alliance) consistent ability in 
the period to exceed opinion poll data ratings at the ballot box (Railings and 
Thrasher 1993:371-372; 1999:12). Furthermore, survey studies by Miller point to a 
disparity of as much as 20 per cent between voters' parliamentary and local electoral 
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choices in the late 1980s (Miller 1988,1990). Analysis of seat gains and losses has 
shown that the degree of disparity between local and parliamentary electoral 
behaviour varies geographically, and that this evidence, which points towards 
contextual voting at local elections, is compounded by evidence of the variance in 
changes in the parties shares of the vote over time amongst different types of local 
authorities (Railings and Thrasher 1993:373). Cleariy recent studies and their 
evidence of vzuiance in change and the heterogeneity of British local electoral 
behaviour militates against the annual general election thesis. 
The question of what motivates local electoral voting behaviour has been the subject 
of a variety of studies, many of which throw more light upon the heterogeneity of 
local electoral behaviour and facilitate further insights into the local and 
parliamentary electoral relationship. Studies of the relationships between turnout, 
voting and diverse socio-economic and political variables, employing in some cases 
survey methods and in others aggregate data analysis, have revealed much about the 
dynamics of local electoral behaviour. Davies and Newton found that class, housing 
tenure and age are closely related to voting patterns and that housing tenure, 
particularly owner-occupation, was more closely related to turnout than class. They 
also found that owner-occupation is associated positively with turnout and 
Conservative Party support, and that local authority tenancy had a weaker association 
with turnout. Their study of local electoral behaviour in Birmingham from 1945-1965 
found little evidence that the marginality of a contest was associated with high 
turnout, but their analysis did suggest a positive relationship between Liberal 
candidate contestation and increased turnout. Furthermore, their study added weight 
to the 'annual general election' thesis in that over these local elections in the 1945-
1965 period they observed that,' Liberal candidates are relatively more successful in 
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Labour wards when Labour is less popular than the Conservative Party and more 
successful in Conservative wards when the tide of public opinion is running against 
the Conservatives'. The explanation of the Liberal vote according to their study, 
'appears to be something of a protest vote at the expense of one of the two major 
parties'. However, they also found evidence that 'the particular kind of voter attracted 
by the Liberal Party seems to differ from one [local] election to another according to 
the political climate' (Davies and Newton 1974: 213-228). 
Indeed, Miller, using survey data, found that 'local turnout varies over time and that 
the electorate is not divided into regular local election voters and regular local 
election abstainers'. This points towards a degree of fluidity in local electoral voting 
behaviour. Evidence of an ebb and flow of voters between engagement with local 
politics and abstention, which, when added to the evidence of the studies so far 
outlined of the temporary protest-motivated attachment of former Labour and 
Conservative voters to the Liberals, reinforces the importance of contextual influences 
upon local electoral behaviour. Miller also found that housing tenure, residential 
mobility and age are closely related to local electoral voting behaviour. However, 
unlike Davies and Newton, Miller found that local authority tenants had a greater 
propensity to turn out and vote in local elections than owner-occupiers. Adding more 
weight to the case for contextual influences Miller found that there was a strong 
association between turnout and an elector's knowledge of, and interest in, politics 
and the ability to successfully identify his or her local councillors. Nevertheless, 
Miller observed that local electoral voters ' are almost perfectly representative of the 
full electorate in terms of partisanship and issue attitudes' (Miller 1986:143, 1988 91-
98, see also Miller 1990). 
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In more recent studies Railings and Thrasher have found that a number of exogenous 
political factors affect the level of turnout at local elections. Coincident general 
elections, the proximity of general elections, voter fatigue caused by a rapid 
succession of various types of election, and salient national political issues such as the 
poll-tax, were observed to have affected the level of turnout at local elections. In 
addition, they argue that comparison of turnout performance between authorities of 
the same type showed a uniformity in their levels of turnout, and that the level of 
turnout in an individual authority varied little over time. Thus in an hierarchy of 
turnout performance there was little change in each individual local authority's 
position, observations that compounded the evidence for the influence of external 
factors. Nevertheless, as Railings and Thrasher contend, there is variance in the 
turnout performance of local authorities and where these 'changes do take place there 
is usually a prima facie explanation readily available... [which] would appear to be 
related to specifically local political events in those authorities' (Railings and 
Thrasher 1997:55). 
Rowley's study of the Greater London Council elections of 1964 and 1967, found that 
in general, lower turnouts are associated with the inner-Labour controlled boroughs, 
with a gradual increase in level of turnout through the marginals to the Conservative 
boroughs (Rowley 1971:126). Further, it was suggested that lower turnout was 
associated with the safety of a seat and larger turnouts with marginal boroughs. 
Rowley pointed towards an explanation of spatial variation in patterns of voting 
support and turnout by greater understanding of the relationship between the socio-
economic characteristics of an area and its electoral behaviour (ibid 129). Indeed, a 
study of the factors that might influence turnout at local elections, and an assessment 
of the relative impact of various structural, political and socio-economic and spatial 
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factors on turnout in elections at each local government tier between 1978 and 1991, 
found that for 'every type of authority it appeared that turnout was associated with the 
social character of the area and that such factors explained more of the variance in 
turnout than structural/political ones'. Moreover, Railings and Thrasher claim that in 
order to understand turnout in habitually atypically performing local authorities 'one 
is forced back on to qualitative, almost cultural explanations' (Railings and Thrasher 
1994a, 1994b). 
Analysis of data at the local authority level of aggregation naturally conceals variance 
between wards within a local authority and it has been to the ward level that many 
studies have turned in order to decipher further the determinants of local electoral 
behaviour. The effects of party organisation, campaign activity, especially Liberal 
Party intervention and local electoral strategies, and that of marginality, incumbency, 
council policy and candidate have been examined. At the parliamentary electoral level 
the effects of marginality, constituency campaigns, party finances, party membership 
and local activism, upon electoral outcomes are well documented and are generally 
accepted as significant determinants (see Whiteley and Seyd 1992, Johnson and Pattie 
1997, Denver and Hands 1974). Constituency parties, however, have functioned not 
only at the parliamentary electoral level, but also in the main have organised, financed 
and manned campaigns for local government elections and thus many of the 
assumptions accepted about the influence of such factors upon parliamentary electoral 
behaviour may be true for local electoral behaviour. 
Pimlott has argued that 'local [party] organisation can have a major effect in raising a 
party's vote in the low-turnout situations o f a local election and that changes in party 
organisation may often affect changes in turnout' (Pimlott 1973:254) Fletcher found 
that marginality increased party activity and thereby the ward electorate's interest and 
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propensity to vote; further, that turnout was higher in non-marginal wards when 
contested by the Liberal Party. Dyer and Jordan found that the strength of a voter's 
party attachment and the level of party activity were significant factors in influencing 
electors to cast a vote in local elections. Bruce and Lee have found evidence of a 
relationship between local elector's perceptions of candidates and party campaign 
activity in wards. Furthemiore, Gibson and Stewart argue that local issues such as rate 
poundage level affect local electoral results (Fletcher 1967,Hill 1967.Gregory 1969, 
Bochel and Denver 1971,1972, Bruce and Lee 1982, Dyer and Jordan 1985, Gibson 
and Stewart 1992). There is then considerable evidence that the behaviour of local 
government voters can be affected by the activity o f local parties. 
However, the blandishments of local party activity address a disparate electorate 
composed of voters living in diverse environments. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, the decline in the relationship between an individual's occupational class 
location and voting behaviour is generally accepted as incontrovertible. Survey 
analysis has shown that at the individual level voters are increasingly inclined to 
abandon the constraints of occupational class influence. Paradoxically, Miller, using 
ecological analysis of election results and social data at the constituency aggregate 
level found no evidence of a decline in the influence of occupational class on voting 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Miller 1978,1979 and 1984). To throw light on this 
contradiction Warde et al., by use of ward level results from the 1980 local elections 
and social data from the Small Area Census of 1981, examined the variation in spatial 
patterns in local electoral voting behaviour to assess the effect of class, consumption 
locations and local political cultures upon local electoral outcomes. Warde et al., 
found that: 
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Measures of class provide the best basis for the statistical 
prediction of local election results', and that 'class variables 
... contribute most to the statistical explanation of the share of 
the two-party vote and least to the Conservative share of the 
poll ... [but] nothing to the statistical explanation of the 
Liberal share of the vote (Warde etal., 1988 343-345). 
Housing tenure, although much weaker than class, was found to be the second most 
powerful predictor of local election results and the percentage of council house tenure 
was a stronger predictor than that of owner-occupatioa Thus, according to Warde et 
aL, social class and the socio-economic character of a ward are of primary importance 
in any explanation of the variance in ward level local electoral behaviour. 
However, it has been shown that measures of class cannot adequately explain the 
Liberal share of the vote at elections. Indeed, Dunleavy asserts that 'the social bases 
and dynamics of third-party voting remain almost as enigmatic now as they were 20 
years ago' and that the Liberals show 'stubborn resistance to interpretation in terms of 
class/socialisation models' (Dunleavy 1990:461, see also, Johnston and Pattie 
1998:315, Laver 1984:243, Doriing et a/., 1998:45). Nevertheless, intermittently at 
the parliamentary level and increasingly at the local government electoral level the 
Liberal Party, and its prefixed and suffixed progeny have succeeded in reducing the 
two-party duopoly of electoral support, and are thus at the crux of any explanation of 
partisan dealignment at both levels of political activity. 
A variety of studies have examined how and why the Liberal Party was able to 
establish a foothold in local politics, its pariiamentary electoral revivals, the electoral 
strategies used at both levels, and in some cases pointed up the relationships between 
each level of political activity (Wallace 1968,Cyr 1977, Pinkney 1983,1984, Joyce 
1989, Cook 1989, Stevenson 1993). Doriing el a/., found that Liberal Democrat 
success at the 1997 general election was to a certain extent 'built on the pattern of 
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their successes in local elections since 1992' (Dorling ei a/., 1998:46). However, any 
explanation of Liberal Party support in terms of the socio-economic character of a 
ward, or any identification of the type of ward susceptible to them has remained 
elusive. Indeed, Dorling et al, found distinct differences in the party's electoral 
support among wards of very similar socio-economic character, noting that 'Liberal 
Democrat gains took place in widely different circumstances and often involved a 
straight move from third to first place' (ibid:64). Tactical campaigning by the Liberals 
was found to be a significant factor to their local electoral success, a logical strategy 
when the post-war financial and organisational weaknesses of the party, and an 
absence of class-based core support, are taken into consideration. In tandem with the 
Liberal's focus upon local issues at local elections the party has thereby been able at 
times to cut across traditional partisan lines and attract sufficient local electoral 
support to provide the organisational structure to launch challenges at the 
parliamentary electoral level in the same area. Recent work has shown that such 
'Local issues and concerns can influence the vote over either the entire area of the 
council; or in individual wards, [and that] campaigns ... and the personality of the 
candidates can have a clear impact on the result' (Railings and Thrasher 1993:380). 
Nevertheless, little has changed since the geographer Ron Johnson observed that in 
'most psephological writings in Britain only scant regard is paid to the role of place 
as a context in which political attitudes are learned and voting decisions are 
made'(Johnson 1986:573). 
The conventional political science view of revivals in Liberal Party fortunes at the 
local electoral level affords little explanatory value to the influence of local issues. 
The orthodoxy, as established by Nev/ton, is one of national political issues 
dominating the electoral calculus of the municipal voter. Furthermore, political 
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science gives little credence to the explanation of parliamentary constituency electoral 
outcomes in terms of the 'politics of place'; the activities of the parties at the local 
government electoral level and behaviour of the voter at the local electoral level. 
There is then, no connection between these two levels of political activity and thus no 
role for local politics in any political science account of the revival of Liberal 
electoral fortunes at the parliamentary level. Clearly, parliamentary electoral level 
partisan dealignment, of which movements in and out of Liberal Party support is a 
significant element, is - according to political science- divorced from local 
government electoral activity. 
In contrast however, national political issues and the cloistered world of high politics 
have to some extent loosened their explanatory grip upon accounts for the revivals in 
Liberal fortunes posited by political historians. This is especially true of the Liberal 
revival of the 1970s. For example, the historian John Stevenson argues that: 
' there was a relationship between Liberal involvement 
in local politics and national politics which was almost 
unique; areas where Liberals built up support on the 
basis of community politics were often turned into 
winnable parliamentary seats. Even i f that had not been 
true, a key feature of the Liberal revival was the re-
emergence of the Party at local level, one which could 
withstand downturns in the Party's national fortunes 
and provide some kind of ballast to the Parliamentary 
Party' (Stevenson 1993:66). 
How far the votes of the electorate at the local government level were crucial to the 
Liberal Party revivals at the Parliamentary level, and to what extent those votes were 
cast in consideration of local issues, will be explored in the case studies. 
2.5:Conclusion 
There is a great diversity of idiosyncratic factors that defy systematic analysis but 
nevertheless need to be identified and examined i f a more adequate explanation of 
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local electoral behaviour is to be found, and its relationship with parliamentary 
electoral behaviour understood. Indeed, as Railings and Thrasher have concluded: 
Any proposition which now sought to describe local elections 
purely as a form of national referendum would need to explain 
away some cleariy contrary findings (Railings and Thrasher 
1997:154). 
The relationship between local and national electoral behaviour is by no means an 
obvious one. It is evident that greater methodological pluralism is needed and that as 
Dunleavy has argued there needs to be a recognition in voting studies that 
quantatitive data capture only part of complex social phenomena (Dunleavy 
1990:469). Furthermore, as Devine in response to Dunleavy has argued, 'qualitative 
methods could facilitate a greater understanding of political behaviour' because of 
the failure of political science to 'examine how contextual issues influence voting 
behaviour' (Devine 1995:215-216). It is then to qualitative evidence that the case 
studies of chapters 5-8 turn However, firstly the next chapter must expound the 
methodological underpinning of the thesis and the multi-disciplinary approach to be 
adopted 
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C H A P T E R S 
M E T H O D O L O G Y 
3.1:Introduction 
An underlying premise of this thesis is that in voting studies of electoral behaviour 
between 1959 and 1979 the effect of local influences upon local electoral outcomes 
has been greatly underestimated. Indeed, that local electoral behaviour was connected 
to national electoral behaviour and has a part to play in any explanation of 
dealignment, and at times and in places the local elector's voting calculus was 
influenced to such a degree by local political context at ward and borough level that 
the expectations assumed by the influence of class and the socio-economic 
characteristics of a ward were not realised. 
In order to examine these contentions voting studies need to take account of those 
factors 'that are intrinsically difficult to measure* in order to better explain the calculus 
of voting (Sandersl995:65). However, to gain purchase on variables that quantitative 
methods fail to grasp implies the resort to a multi-theoretical research strategy and the 
introduction of qualitative methods. The barrier to overcome is the 'prejudice against 
concepts and ideas which are not immediately operationalizable but which can none 
the less be worked up in stages to achieve empirical application' (Dunleavy 
1990:469). Any approximation of adequate explanation of voting behaviour has to 
take account of many more of the unobservable processes that make up the 
phenomena, and thereby an election study becomes 'more than a complex incident 
detached from the evolving political conditions of ... society' (Johnson 1989:75). 
This, for behaviouralists, seems to point towards a choice between 'exaggerated 
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empiricism, untestable generalisations or a much less intellectually satisfying middle 
way where much of the procedure wil l be based on forms of intuitive inductions of 
hazardous character* (Blondel 1976:76). Furthermore, any qualification of empiricism 
by the introduction of a multi-theoretical approach explicitly accepts that there are 
diverse routes to knowledge and so raises the question of what kind of organised 
knowledge is attainable by doing so. 
The way we perceive the world and how we perceive our relation to that world, 
ontology, is closely connected to what knowledge we consider valid or invalid, our 
assumptions about the basis for knowledge: the theory of knowledge, or 
epistemology. In turn these influence methodology, the research practices, broad 
principles of research, theoretical analysis defining a research problem and how 
research should proceed. There is a direct link between ontology and epistemology, 
through methodology to methods and the way in which data eu-e collected and 
analysed. In short 'the gathering, analysis and interpretation of data are always carried 
out within some broader understanding of what constitutes legitimate enquiry and 
warrantable knowledge' ( Henwood 1996; 28). 
Such epistemological prescription is expressed in the view that quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to research are based upon incommensurable philosophical 
presuppositions. According to this viewpoint the two approaches are internally 
coherent and fundamentally different research paradigms. The relationship between 
theory and research is emergent in the qualitative approach as opposed to 
confirmatory in the quantitative. Quantitative research is structured and nomothetic, 
while qualitative is unstructured and ideographic. Social reality is considered static 
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and external to the.actor by the quantitative approach whereas the qualitative view is 
that social reality is processual and socially constructed. Quantitative research 
produces Tiard', reliable numerical data. Qualitative produces rich data in words of 
questionable descriptive precision, and problematic in terms of reactivity for wider 
generalisation. The quantitative and qualitative paradigms are considered 
philosophically opposed in terms of'realism versus idealism, naturalism versus anti-
naturalism, and deductivism versus inductivism' (Hammersleyl996:164). 
Nevertheless, it is true to say that there has been a weakening of the grip of 
positivism. However, i f multi-theoretical approaches, such as combining the 
interpretive approach of history and behaviouralism to areas of electoral study, are to 
be employed then a 'methodologically aware eclecticism' (Hammersley 1996: 174) is 
needed. Clearly, the use of case studies in this thesis necessitates an explanation of 
what kind of knowledge and how the knowledge they produce is arrived at. In the 
next section the methodology of case study research used in this thesis will be 
expounded. 
3.2:Case studies 
The method adopted in this thesis is a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of four case study locations. How then, given the above account of positivist 
prescription can the case study method generate information of general validity rather 
than information of relevance only to a particular study? Indeed, what at all can be 
learned from a single case study or for that matter, multiple case studies of a limited 
number? Critics of the case study method have argued that 'Case studies never 
"prove" anything, their purpose is to illustrate generalisations which are established 
othervidse, or to direct attention toward such generalisations' (Eckstein 1960:15). 
Lijphart went further and argued that the case study 'can constitute neither the basis 
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for a valid generalisation nor the grounds for disproving an established generalisation' 
(Lijphart 1971:691). More recently, Sartori has conceded that whilst case studies 
'cannot confirm a generalisation ... they can ... disconfirm a regularity to a limited 
degree' (Sartori 1994:23). 
However, it is generally accepted that case studies are able to reveal additional 
information and variables that can erode the strength of propositions about a political 
phenomenon. Deviant case studies can challenge established generalisations and lead 
to the refinement and sharpening of hypotheses. Stakes argues that by use o f such 
instrumental case study the choice of the case is made because it is expected to 
advance our understanding of the theorising that underpins grand generalisations and 
thereby lead to refinement of a theory. This instrumental use of case study can of 
course be extended to several case studies and although a small number of case 
studies cannot provide a legitimate foundation for generalisation to a wider population 
they can, nevertheless, refine theories and 'suggest complexities for further 
investigation, as well as helping to establish the limits of generalisability' (Stakes 
1994:237-245, 1995). The use of multiple case studies does not however deny that the 
primary interest and objective is to understand the uniqueness of each particular case, 
for it is through differentiation between what is particular and what is common that 
the limits of the generalisability of such as the 'Annual General Election' thesis can 
be established and theories of local electoral behaviour refined. 
The above suggests the utility of the case study as a research method of evaluation of 
contextual influences that can contribute to the refinement of hypotheses, which, 
when tested by further quantitative methods can result in the generation of alternative 
explanations. The methodological chasm between the positivist's notion of valid 
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causal inference and, by this bench-mark, the historian's inability to make inferences 
that go beyond the particular, nevertheless remains. However, Dunleavy contends 
that 'the basis of generalisation fi-om a ...case study is not the typicality of the case in 
any sense, but the logicality of the analysis of the case'. At the heart of this argument 
is the intended use of the case study to: 
penetrate beyond surface correlations to detect the more 
fundamental and general processes involved...to establish the 
existence of structural relations which can be taken to operate 
in other areas in substantially the same form. [Furthermore, 
that] this view of case studies means that detailed, narrative 
accounts are necessary' (Dunleavy 1982:199). 
Indeed, RJiodes, more recently, has argued that the case study method is 'capable of 
fostering the link between the historian and the political scientist, it can relate the 
historian's "what questions" to the political scientist's "why questions" (Rhodes 
1994:183). King et al. have gone much further and argue that 'comparative case 
studies can yield valid causal inference' and that historical research can be analytical 
and thereby seek to 'evaluate alternative explanations' (King et a/., 1994:5-45). 
King et al. argue that quantitative and qualitative research can be synthesised by 
'applying a unified logic of inference to both' (ibid:3). Valid inferences about political 
behaviour can be produced by the incorporation of scientific inference into qualitative 
research design. There is, according to this view, a fundamental logic that underpins 
all social scientific research and that the methodological differences between the 
quantitative and the qualitative traditions are unimportant. There are rules of scientific 
inference that i f followed by qualitative researchers wil l produce reliable results. King 
et al., by focusing on empirical research argue that they can circumvent many of the 
philosophical concerns of the debate. Their guiding assumption is that 'it is possible to 
have some knowledge of the external world but that such knowledge is always 
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uncertain' (ibid:6). Consequently, whatever research design is applied to a topic where 
very little information is available the conclusions will be relatively uncertain. 
Nevertheless, the reliability of the quantitative approach can be more readily assessed, 
whereas evaluation of the logic by which conclusions are drawn in qualitative 
research is more froublesome because principles of selection and the process of 
observations is hidden. This failure by qualitative research to account for the 
uncertainty of its inferences is regarded as its most serious weakness. It is argued that 
these limitations can be overcome by an explicitness that' addresses the concerns of 
the community of scholars and uses public methods to arrive at inferences that are 
consistent with the rules of science and the information at our disposal' (ibid:9). The 
upshot of their argument is that in order for comparative case studies using qualitative 
methods to produce valid causal inferences, research must be carried out 
systematically so that the same information, the same data on the same variables 
across the units is compiled and analysed in a 'structured-focussed comparison' led by 
theoretically relevant questions (King 1994 et aiA5). Indeed, Yin has argued that 'like 
other research strategies [the case study] is a way of investigating an empirical topic 
by following a set of pre-specified procedure' (Yin 1994:15). 
He argues that theory plays a pivotal role in the design of case studies and in any 
generalisation from them and is, 'the main vehicle for generalising the results of the 
case study' (ibid 32). However, for Yin, construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity, and reliability are the quality benchmarks of any research design. How then, 
can the research methods of the historian conducting case studies of local electoral 
behaviour shape up to these benchmarks and thereby allow claims to valid analytical 
generalisations from one case study to another? 
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In terms of construct validity the qualitative case study method employed in this 
thesis could be criticised for its failure 'to develop sufficiently operational sets of 
measures and that subjective judgements are used to collect data' (ibid 34). Yin 
suggests tactics to overcome these criticisms. They are the use of 'multiple sources of 
evidence in a manner encouraging convergent lines of inquiry' and the creation of a 
'chain of evidence'. As far as internal validity is concerned, Yin's benchmark requires 
that 'all rival explanations and possibilities' be considered and that the evidence 
gathered should be congruent External validity, that is whether a study's findings are 
generalisable beyond that particular case, is overcome according to him by the fact 
that, unlike survey research which 'relies on statistical generalisation', the case study 
researcher is attempting to 'generalise a particular set of results to some broader 
theory'. Furthermore, he compares the use of multiple case studies to the use of 
multiple experiments or multiple surveys and argues that 'under these circumstances, 
the method of generalisation is "analytical generalisation", in which previously 
adopted theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of 
the case study'(ibid 34-36. In this way the criticisms concerning replication and 
reliability are weakened. Reliability depends upon whether future researchers would 
arrive at the same conclusions i f the same procedures described by a case study 
researcher were followed. It requires explicit and well documented procedures a clear 
'audit trail' of how claims to knowledge have been arrived at. Thus, in each case 
study of this thesis multiple sources of evidence will be sought through convergent 
lines of inquiry in an attempt to build a chain of evidence. Wherever possible rival 
explanations wil l be considered and 'each case's conclusions [will be] considered to 
be the information needing replication by other individual cases'. In each case study 
'how and why a particular proposition was demonstrated (or not demonstrated) wil l 
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be indicated. Across cases 'why certain cases were predicted to have certain results, 
whereas other cases... were predicted to have contrary results' wil l be indicated (Yin 
1994:1-49). The qualitative case study methodology employed in this thesis wi l l be 
conducted upon the premise that studies 'at the micro-level ... have their proper and 
legitimate place, i f their specific problems and limitations are well understood and 
respected' (Ragin 1996:765). In this next section the sources of data to be used will 
be outlined as will the methods used to analyse the data, and in the section that 
follows how specific problems of data collection and manipulation are overcome. 
3.3:Methods and sources of data 
The thesis uses the machine-readable data base of local election results assembled by 
Colin Railings and Michael Thrasher at the Local Government Chronicle Election 
Centre, University of Plymouth. The data used in this thesis relate to local electoral 
behaviour at: London Metropolitan Borough elections 1959-1962, London Borough 
elections 1964-1979, London County Council elections 1955-1961, Greater London 
Council elections 1964-1981 (Willis and Woollard 2000), Birmingham County 
Borough elections 1959-1972, Birmingham District Council elections 1973-1979, 
West Midlands County Council elections 1973-1981 (Phillips 2000), Sutton 
Coldfield County Borough election results 1959-1972 (Sutton News). The sources of 
parliamentary electoral data will be referenced in the text. 
The thesis will also employ statistical analysis of this local electoral data and socio-
economic data. The sources of this socio-€conomic data are outlined in Table 1 
below. 
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Table 1; Sources of Socio-economic data. 
General Register Office Census 1961 England and Wales (various publications, listed 
in bibliography), HMSO. 
SN 1488 - General Register Office Census 1966, Small Area Statistics: 10% 
Population, Great Britain. * 
SN 1182 - General Register Office Census 1971, Small Area Statistics: 100% 
Households Aggregated to Ward Level, Great Britaia* 
SN 1178 - General Register Office Census 1971, Small Area Statistics: 100% 
Population Aggregated to Ward Level, Great Britain.* 
SN 1191 - General Register Office Census 1971, Small Area Statistics: 100% 
Households Aggregated to Post-1974 Parliamentary Constituency Boundary 
Definitions.* 
SN 1190 - General Register Office Census 1971, Small Area Statistics: 100% 
Population Aggregated to Post-1974 Parliamentary Constituency Boundary 
Definitions.* 
SN 1893 - General Register Office Census 1981, Small Area Statistics: 100% 
Households and Population Aggregated to Ward Level, Great Britain.* 
• Supplied by Manchester Information and Associated Services, via UK Data Archive 
University of Essex. 
The combination of local election data, and socio-economic data from the censuses 
whose small area statistics are formulated by ward, wil l allow the analysis of the 
impact of socio-economic and demographic characteristics of a ward upon voting 
behaviour. A regression equation or model v^ l l be generated that assumes that the 
probability support for a particular party in a given ward is significantly affected by 
the political and socio-economic context of the ward in which that voter casts his or 
her vote. This analysis will enable the determination of how much variation in certain 
variables, such as a party's percentage share of the vote, can be explained by 
individual variables in a regression equation. This analysis, the rationale for the 
choice of particular socio-economic variables, and hypotheses to be tested, and 
problems of ecological fallacy, will be outlined in Chapter 9. 
However, in Chapter 4 summary descriptive statistical techniques will be employed 
to discern the trends and patterns in local electoral behaviour over time at the local 
authority level and establish any variance in electoral behaviour between authorities 
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of the same type and within authorities at upper and lower tier elections, and between 
these and general trends of parliamentary electoral behaviour. Differences in the 
patterns of electoral behaviour over time wil l also be examined by a measure of 
dispersion - the standard deviation- which for instance, can indicate how much on 
average the scores in a borough's turnout over time, or a particular party's percentage 
share of the vote at consecutive elections, differ from the mean and thereby indicate 
atypical, period specific highs or lows. The statistical technique of correlation will be 
employed to explore possible relationships between variables, such as the relationship 
between Liberal contestation and turnout generally, and specifically in non-marginal 
wards. 
Correlation is a statistical technique that can be used in a descriptive capacity or as a 
means of drawing inferences. It is a teclmique that can establish whether variables are 
related to each other. I f one variable implies a change in another variable and there is 
information about how the first variable changes, then it can be estimated how much 
of this change can affect the value of the second variable. If , for instance, two 
variables are in perfect association there is said to be a perfect positive correlation 
which corresponds to the number +1. If, conversely, there is no association between 
two variables then the correlation coefficient is 0. Dependent upon how strong the 
association between the two variables is the correlation coefficient will lie between 0, 
no association, and +1 a perfect positive correlation. Negative correlations, where an 
increase in one variable results in a decrease in the other, an inverse relationship, is 
indicated by a minus coefficient between 0 and - 1 . Correlation, however, does not 
mean causation, it only describes a relationship between two variables, irrespective of 
whether one causes the change in the other. Al l the above applies to the second 
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section of Chapter 4, when the examination of variance wil l focus upon ward level 
variance in voting behaviour. 
3.4:Problems with the data 
The interpretation of local electoral results can be problematic not least because of 
how it has originally been collected and recorded. Before the widespread use of 
computers electoral registration officers updated the electoral register at best annually 
and at worst in many areas infrequently, thus posing problems for the reliability of 
measures of turnout. The consequence of infrequent updating of the electoral register 
was an exaggeration of the magnitude of the electorate, as the deceased or those that 
had moved out of the electoral unit remained on the register beyond eligibility. The 
effect of this is that turnout in some areas may have been underestimated. 
Further problems are the calculation of turnout and of the party share of the vote in 
multi-member wards. The elector may or may not cast all of his or her allotted votes 
and thus an accurate figure for turnout is only calculable i f the number of ballot 
papers is available. Unfortunately the ftirther back in time the less likely their 
availability. However, it is possible to estimate turnout by use of an algorithm that 
first calculates the total vote for each party. The algorithm calculates: 
turnout as the number of votes cast as a proportion of 
the total votes available. This assumes, therefore, that 
every voter used their full quota of votes in a multi-
member ward. In some cases, therefore, where voters 
have not used their full quota the level of turnout wil l be 
slightly depressed (Railings and Thrasher 1993). 
The algorithm facilitates the calculation of the average number of votes for a party, 
ceteris paribus, in a multi-member ward contest and when this figure is divided by the 
sum of the average number of votes per party and multiplied by one hundred each 
party's percentage share of the vote is arrived at, i.e. an estimate of each party's top 
vote. The situation arises when party competition is uneven, for example when a three 
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member ward is contested by three Labour Party candidates, one Conservative and no 
others. Electors may or may not use their full allocation of votes. The problem affects 
the London borough elections, pre and post reorganisation as all ward contests were 
multimember, as were LCC and GLC elections (1973 to 1981 apart when single 
member seats prevailed). However, this problem only affects the 1973 Birmingham 
District Council election, which was an all-out post-reoganisation multimember 
election. At all other Birmingham and Sutton Coldfield elections multi-member 
elections were a rare occurrence. 
Change in each party's share of the vote is believed to emanate from a weakening of a 
voter's previous stable commitment to a political party. As outlined in Chapter I , 
voters are considered to have become more volatile in their electoral behaviour and 
have developed a seemingly increasing propensity to desert the two major parties in 
often temporary and erratic changes of support for minor parties. Surveys have 
provided the evidence of weakening of the strength of party identification and shown 
that rather than a linear decline in the strength of party identification, there was a 
dramatic fall in the 1970s before this trend stabilised and levelled out at a lower rate. 
In Chapter 4 of the thesis trends and patterns in local electoral behaviour at upper and 
lower-tier authority elections wil l be examined to see i f a similar shift in partisan ties 
occurred at the local electoral level, and indeed, the timing and trends of any shift 
compared to those at the parliamentary level. 
The parliamentary level of voting behaviour in the 1950s and 1960s is characterised 
as a period of stable and habitual attachments to the two major parties. The majority 
of voters expressed partisan identification with one or the other of the two major 
parties and many electors expressed a strong attachment. Party identification is 
considered to have anchored voters over a series of contests to the Labour or 
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Conservative parties. For dealignment theorists any erosion of the strength of partisan 
identification must result in increasing levels of electoral volatility. Survey data are 
not available for us to measure gross electoral volatility at these local elections, that is 
the proportion of voters in successive elections who change their minds. However, it 
is possible to gauge the declining influence of party identification, to track the trends 
in partisan dealignment by measuring the level of net volatility at successive 
comparable local elections. 
In order to assess the extent that party attachments at local elections were eroded, or 
otherwise, changes in the distribution of the vote between successive comparable 
elections in the 1959-1979 period will be measured. To measure these changes in net 
volatility the 'Butler Swing' of the vote, and the Pedersen Index of Dissimilarity wil l 
be employed The 'Butler Swing', or two-party swing, is measured by adding the 
percentage loss for one party to the percentage gains for the other and dividing by two 
to arrive at an index of net volatility that can be used to chart change over time. The 
index, however, only considers the Conservative and the Labour parties (Butler1963). 
The 'Butler Swing' can be misleading in a multi-party contest and a more suitable 
measure of net volatility is the Pedersen Index of Dissimilarity which sums the 
proportion of voters who change their votes for each party between successive 
comparable elections and divides this figure by two (Pedersen, 1979). Patterns of local 
electoral net volatility at upper- and lower tier elections within a local authority, and 
those between local authorities can then be examined for any variance, as can local 
and national electoral net volatility over time in coterminous electoral units. Thus, in 
chapter 4 a variety of measures of electoral behaviour will test the hypothesis, that in 
coterminous electoral units at local and national elections in the period of interest of 
this study there was no difference in patterns and trends in voting behaviour. Cleariy, 
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the expectation according to orthodox political science views such as Miller's 
^Irrelevant Elections', and Newton's 'Annual General Election' theses, wil l be that 
there indeed wil l be little or no difference. 
3.5:Criteria for selecrion of case study locations 
The choice of case study locations can have an arbitrary feel to it. However, 
notv^thstanding that this thesis is limited to comparisons between four case studies, 
their selection has been determined by a number of criteria. The most important 
determinants of the choice of London and Birmingham were the existence of a 
complete data set of local electoral results going back to 1900 for these cities and the 
availability of a range of compatible socio-economic data that was unavailable for 
many other cities in this period of interest, (e.g. 1966 census 10% samples). 
The choice of the two particular London boroughs, Islington and Camden, has been 
made because despite constituency boundary changes and rewarding over the 1959-
1979 period, as will be evidenced below, the constituencies that made up these 
boroughs and their component local electoral units remained remarkably coterminous. 
Hence, comparison of local electoral data from the pre- and post-1964 reorganisation 
periods, and comparison between parliamentary and local electoral behaviour is 
possible. 
Another criterion for their selection was the political complexion and past political 
control of the boroughs. In the case of Islington and its pre-1964 metropolitan 
boroughs -Islington MB and Finsbury MB- electoral apathy. Labour Party control and 
absence of Liberal Party intervention characterise its local electoral history. In the 
case of Camden and its pre-1964 metropolitan boroughs -St Pancras MB, Holbom 
MB, and Hampstead MB- St Pancras had a history of mixed electoral fortunes for the 
two major parties and an absence of Liberal Party intervention and a similar degree of 
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electoral apathy. In contrast local elections in Holbom had been dominated by the 
Conservative Party in straight fights with the Labour Party. While in Hampstead, 
though dominated by the Conservatives in contention with Labour Party, the Liberal 
Party had intervened, albeit intermittently. In general it would be safe to say that, 
Hampstead apart, these boroughs were derelict as far as the Liberal Party were 
concerned, and had little or no Liberal intervention or organisational activity prior to 
1959. Furthermore, Camden and Islington are contiguous. Their selection then, wil l 
facilitate an examination of the spread of Liberal support at the local electoral level 
and its relation to Liberal electoral strategies, policies, candidate qualities and 
organisation inter alia. Moreover, Camden and Islington, as will be evidenced in the 
case studies, had very similar socio-economic characteristics, and it will thus be 
possible to examine why and how across boroughs of similar socio-economic 
character different political outcomes may arise. 
The choice of Ladywood and Sutton Coldfield as the Birmingham case study 
locations was made in the light of their respective electoral histories. They both fit the 
criterion of being derelict constituencies as far as Liberal organisation and Liberal 
intervention in local and parliamentary elections was concerned. The Ladywood 
Constituency and the local electoral wards that comprised it were an inner-city 
impoverished Labour heartland whose socio-economic character throughout the 
period would lead to the expectation of continuous Labour support and success. Yet, 
in 1969 at a parliamentary by-election the constituency returned a Liberal MP. 
In contrast the Sutton Coldfield Constituency was a prosperous and staunchly 
Conservative seat, and Sutton Coldfield Borough Council was dominated by 
Conservative councillors. The Liberals after challenging successfully at the local 
electoral level replaced Labour as the contender for both local and parliamentary 
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electoral power in the constituency. Sutton Coldfield had no recent history of Liberal 
Party organisation or intervention at local or pariiamentary elections in the 
constituency. Therefore these locations are ideal electoral units to trace the revival of 
Liberalism at the local level and its connections, i f any, with parliamentary electoral 
outcomes. The questions of how and why in two locations of very different socio-
economic character the Liberals were able to break the two-party duopoly at both the 
local and parliamentary electoral level can thereby be examined. 
Each of the four case study locations provide the opportunity to answer the questions 
why and how can fixed socio-economic characteristics in individual boroughs lead to 
different political outcomes at two different types of elections? 
3.6:Coterminous electoral units. 
The aggregation of local election results into parliamentary constituencies in order to 
make comparisons with national outcomes, poses problems for researchers. 
Parliamentary constituency boundaries as a rule do not dissect ward boundaries, 
however, a parliamentary constituency can encompass wards from two or more 
districts and thus, the local elections in those wards need not be coincident. 
Furthermore, although district ward boundaries are contained by parliamentary 
constituency boundaries, the county electoral divisions that make up the electoral 
units of shire counties (non-metropolitan county councils) in England and Wales can 
and do cut across parliamentary constituency boundaries. Hence, ' in those years ... 
when only elections to the non-metropolitan county councils are being held, the set of 
constituencies to which the local results can be aggregated is curtailed yet further' 
(Curtice and Payne 1991:11). Cross-time analysis is frustrated by the regular changes 
of constituency boundaries that have been made in order to obtain a reasonable 
uniformity in constituency electorates and also by the restructuring of local 
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government in the 1970s that resulted in the abolition of some rural authorities and the 
enlargement of the average size of wards Clearly, when aggregate data analysis is 
employed in the study of local electoral behaviour the unit of analysis under scrutiny 
must be clearly defined and thereby the limits of data collection and analysis 
determined. The integrity of the unit of analysis has implications for any 
interpretations, not least of which specificity and universality of those explanations. 
A prime consideration of case study methodology, no matter how reliable one's 
method of measurement of an electoral phenomenon, is of course that like has to be 
compared with like. In order to make legitimate comparison between local and 
national voting behaviour the relationship over time between each borough's local 
government electoral units and their respective pariiamentary electoral units in the 
light of boundary changes must be considered. Despite local goverrmient 
reorganisation of boroughs and subsequent rewarding, and constituency boundary 
changes that came into effect at the February 1974 General Election, the local and 
parliamentary electoral units, as will be evidenced below, have remained remarkably 
coterminous and thus provide reliable electoral data for analysis of any associations 
between these levels of voting behaviour. 
The Metropolitan Borough of Islington up until and including the 1970 general 
election was divided into three pariiamentary constituencies; Islington East, Islington 
North, and Islington South West. At general elections from 1945 to 1970 inclusive the 
ward level electoral units of these constituencies, despite the reorganisation of 
London's local government by dint of the 1963 Local Government of London Act, 
continued to be made up of their old metropolitan borough wards (as wi l l be 
explained in more detail below). Thus, only at the general elections and borough 
elections in the 1945 to 1962 period inclusive, do the Islington East. Islington North, 
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and Islington South West constituencies' parliamentary electoral results represent the 
voting behaviour of the coterminous borough ward electorates that made up these 
constituencies. Hence, comparison between these two levels of electoral activity can 
justifiably be made froml945 tol962. 
Similarly, the revised parliamentary constituencies (Boundary Commission for 
England : Second Periodical Report 1969, changes enacted for February 1974 general 
election) of Islington Central, Islington North, and Islington South and Finsbury (see 
maps 4 and 5 on page 207), are coterminous with their component post 1964 
Islington London Borough wards. Hence, parliamentary constituency results and 
borough election results in Islington are coterminous and comparable in two discrete 
periods: 1945-1962, and 1974-1979. The same applies to the London Borough of 
Camden (see map 6 on page 240), in that comparison can be made between 
parliamentary constituency and local government borough electoral behaviour in 
coterminous electoral units 1945-1962, and 1974-1979. 
There is, however, a problem with such intra-constituency comparison of 
parliamentary and local government voting behaviour at London elections between 
1964 and 1970 inclusive. For instance in the case of the London Borough of Camden 
the transformation of the Hampstead, Holbom and St Pancras, and St Pancras North 
constituencies in 1974 into Camden Hampstead, Camden Holbom emd St Pancras. and 
Camden St Pancras North did not involve the import or export of wards or their 
electorates to or from any other boroughs, but merely a direct transfer. However, the 
Camden London Borough and the Islington London Borough council election results 
of 1964,1968 and 1971 are based upon their post 1964 borough wards, but, the 1964. 
1966 and 1970 general elections results of Camden, and Islington, are based upon the 
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pre 1964 wards. In the case of Hampstead Constituency its transition to Camden 
Hampstead Constituency involved no ward changes. In the case of the transition of St 
Pancras North Constituency into Camden St Pancras North Constituency the four 
northern wards of St Pancras MB became the six wards of the Camden St Pancras 
North Constituency. Furthermore in the case of the transition of Holbom and St 
Pancras South Constituency into Camden Holbom and St Pancras South 
Constituency, the four southern wards of St Pancras MB and the nine wards of 
Holbom MB became the six wards of the Camden Holbom and St Pancras South 
Constituency. Clearly, wards were resized and renamed and are problematic when 
parliamentary/local electoral activity is compared in the period 1964-1970. Similarly, 
comparison of parliamentary/local electoral behaviour in the case of Islington is 
problematic. The transition from Metropolitan to London Borough involved the 
incorporation of Finsbury MB and the resizing and renaming of some wards. For 
example, the borough election results for 1964, 1968 and 1971 of the Highbury, 
Canonbury and Mildmay wards represent the voting behaviour of the resized 
Highbury,Canonbury,and Mildmay Islington M B wards which after 1964 have ward 
electorates some 15 - 34 per cent smaller. Hence the parliamentary constituency 
electorates of these wards are different in size from the borough ward electorates. 
Notwithstanding the discrepancies of the 1964-1970 period, (i.e. comparison of the 
electoral behaviour at the 1964,1966 and 1970 general elections, with electoral 
behaviour at the 1964,1968 and 1971 borough elections), the local and parliamentary 
electoral data for the two London Borough case studies are in the main coterminous. 
The boundaries of the Birmingham Borough Constituency of Ladywood underwent 
minor alterations by virtue of the First Periodical Report of the Boundary Commission 
for England presented to Parliament in November 1954. However, the total electorate 
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of its component local electoral units the Ladywood, Duddeston and St Paul's wards 
of the County Borough of Birmingham was reduced by 5%. The Borough 
Constituency of Sutton Coldfield, an all purpose authority in its right at the time, 
which comprised ten local electoral wards and the Erdington ward of the County 
Borough of Birmingham, also underwent minor boundary change. However, its 
electorate was only increased by a mere 0.5% (First Periodical Report: Boundary 
Commission for England, Cmd.,931 l,London:HMSO). These constituency boundary 
changes remained in place up until and including the 1970 general election, but were 
changed in time for the February 1974 general election by the Boundary 
Commission's Second Periodical Report presented to Parliament in June 1969. Thus, 
during the 1959-1974 period the local electoral and pariiamentaiy electoral units of 
the two Birmingham case study locations are virtually coterminous (see maps 1 and 2 
on pages 123 and 124 for Birmingham wards - map 3 on page 163 Sutton Coldfield). 
There were nevertheless, minor alterations to the ward boundaries of the Birmingham 
County Borough during this period. The thirty-eight wards that comprised the 
Birmingham County Borough at the 1959,1960 and 1961 local elections were 
increased to thirty-nine wards for the 1962 local elections, but the impact upon the 
case study locations was negligible. Small boundary changes to wards that comprised 
the Birmingham County Borough came into effect in January 1966 (West Midlands 
County Order 1965) but did not affect directly the wards of interest to this study. 
The implications of the Second Periodical Report of the Boundary Commission are 
however, a little more problematic. The Borough Constituency of Ladywood 
underwent major boundary revision in time for the February 1974 general election. 
Formerly made up of the Ladywood, Duddeston and St Paul's wards, the new 
Ladywood Constituency was reconstituted from the Ladywood ward and the Al l 
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Saints, Rotton Park and Soho wards. The Duddeston ward and the Newtown ward 
(formerly St Paul's up until the 1961 elections) were subsumed by the Small Heatii 
Constituency. However, the greater part of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
data relating to the Ladywood case study concerns only the 1959-1974 period and 
thus problems of reliability are largely avoided. 
The impact of the Second Periodical Report upon the Sutton Coldfield case study is 
minimal and manageable for the whole period. The Erdington ward of the County 
Borough of Birmingham formeriy part of the Sutton Coldfied Constituency, was 
returned to the Birmingham fold and with other contiguous Birmingham wards 
formed the Erdington Constituency in time for the February 1974 general election. 
However, the 1972 Local Government Act amalgamated the ten local electoral wards 
of Sutton Coldfield into three new wards without dissection or rewarding of existing 
wards, and the Sutton Coldfield Borough ceased to exist, having been swallowed up 
by merger into the new Birmingham District Council. These changes however do not 
present a problem as the local electoral and parliamentary electoral units remain 
coterminous notwithstanding the loss of the Erdington ward. 
3.7:Local electoral cycles 
There are features of the local electoral system that ftirther constrain the use of 
aggregate data analysis. Local election study is far from straight forward, indeed, a 
complexity of local authority electoral cycles means that, although elections take 
place in a variety of locations every May, they do not cover all the country. The data 
used in this thesis are derived from: London borough, LCC and GLC, county borough 
(Birmingham and Sutton Coldfied), metropolitan borough, and metropolitan district 
council elections. It is their particular electoral cycles over the 1959-1979 that 
concern this study. 
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In London, borough council elections were held once every four years for all the seats 
on the councils, and in the same year for all the seats on the LCC. Following the 
reorganisation of local government in London, borough elections were held over a 
four year cycle as were GLC elections, albeit not in the same years (1964 apart). 
Before the 1972 Local Government Act, Birmingham County Borough and the 
County Borough of Sutton Coldfield held annual elections for one-third of the seats 
on their respective councils. After reorganisation and the merger of Sutton Coldfield 
with Birmingham, annual elections over a three year period were held to the 
Birmingham District Council and every fourth year was left fallow for elections to the 
West Midlands County Council .There is in any one year a comparable pattern of 
returns from elections held four years previously. Indeed, despite differing electoral 
cycles, London, the metropolitan districts and the counties 'are internally consistent 
within each category' (Railings and Thrasher 1994:16). 
3.8:Conclusion 
Having outlined the data and its sources, how problems with analysis of that data can 
be overcome, the theoretical contentions over the case study method and how these 
can be circumvented, it is now appropriate to summarise how this thesis wi l l conduct 
its quantitative analysis. In Chapter 4 local electoral data at the local authority 
aggregate level wi l l be subject to summary statistical and bivariate analysis to 
examine the extent of any variance in the electoral behaviour between local 
authorities of the same type, and the extent of any disparities in local electoral 
behaviour at upper- and lower-tier elections in the same authority. Furthermore, 
variance in local and national electoral behaviour in coterminous local and 
pariiamentary electoral units wil l be assessed. The analysis will reveal any authorities 
that defy the general trends in voting behaviour. Analysis of ward level local electoral 
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data wil l then reveal any atypical ward level voting behaviour that is concealed by 
analysis of electoral data at the local authority aggregate level. Regression analysis of 
ward level local electoral data and ward level socio-economic data in the four case 
study locations wil l examine how far contextual factors influence local electoral 
behaviour. Comparisons between local and national electoral behaviour in 
coterminous local and parliamentary electoral units wil l explore the relationship 
between local and national voting behaviour. 
Thus, descriptive and inferential statistics wil l be used to consider how the movement 
of one variable of voting behaviour over time may be related to another variable or a 
whole series of variables, and thereby identify, isolate and measure the degree of 
association between two or more variables considered to affect local electoral 
behaviour. 
However, it is perhaps prudent at this point to remember that inferential statistics only 
indicate the probability of a relationship between one or more variables being present, 
indicate the weakness or strength of a possible relationship but not that a causal 
relationship exists between one or more variables. As Hudson has argued: 
Identifying and assessing the relationship between variables in 
a historical context involves historical judgement... It cannot 
be accomplished simply by using statistics ... The historian 
must choose when to apply statistical techniques and how to 
interpret the significance of the statistical results ... It is 
important from the outset to form hypotheses about the 
possible relationship ... on the basis of sound historical 
judgement... variables may by chance move or vary in 
seemingly related fashion ... only i f sound reasons why there 
might be a relationship between two or more variables should 
we indulge in statistical identification and measurement of 
that relationship (Hudson 2000:138). 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF E L E C T O R A L DATA 
4.1:Introduction 
In this chapter local electoral data for Inner-London and Birmingham wil l be analysed 
to assess the extent of any variance in electoral behaviour between local authorities of 
the same type, the extent of any disparities in electoral behaviour at upper- and lower-
tier elections in the same authority, and the extent of any variance between local and 
national electoral behaviour in coterminous local and parliamentary electoral units. 
The general hypothesis that there is no difference beUveen local and parliamentary 
electoral behaviour wil l be tested. In the light of orthodox explanations of local 
electoral behaviour the expectation would be that there are no significant differences 
in electoral behaviour at these two types of elections, and therefore no significant 
differences in trends of partisan dealignment. 
There are different ways of measuring the extent of party politicisation of elections. 
The changing nature of party competition can be indicated by: the percentage contests 
featuring candidates from the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties (3-way 
contests); the percentage wards contested by the Liberal Party; the level of 
contestation for seats as measured by candidate to seat ratio; the percentage 
Independent candidates; percentage two-party share of the total vote; aggregate 
Liberal Party share of the total vote and Liberal Party share of the vote in contested 
wards only; and measures of net inter-election volatility. All of these measures will be 
used in the examination of Inner-London and Birmingham elections. 
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4.2:lnner-London 
Trends in local government voting and party competition at the London Borough 
elections during the period 1959-1979 wil l now be examined. Data for this analysis, 
up until and excluding the 1964 borough elections, refers to the London Borough 
elections i.e. the 28 boroughs of the L.C.C. area. Post-1964, and including the 1964 
borough elections the data pertains to the 12 Inner London boroughs only at the 
London borough council elections and the greater London Council (GLC) elections. 
Table 2 profiles the changing nature of party competition in the London Borough 
elections from 1956-1978. Electoral contests featuring candidates from the 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties (3-way contests) show an increasing trend 
from a mere 9.8% of the wards in 1956 to 41.2% in 1964. From this high point of 3-
way contests in 1964 the Liberal Party's ability to fight the London Borough elections 
steadily declined and in 1971 only 17.2% of the 244 wards had 3-way contests. 
However, 1974 saw a resurgence of 3-way contests with 64% of wards contested by 
candidates from the three main parties. This increase in 3-way contestation was 
however, followed by a decline to 49.7% in the elections of 1978. Over the period 
-I, 
1956-1978 the pattern of party competition for the London Borough elections reveals 
an increasing trend of 3-way contestation to 1964, followed by a decreasing trend 
to 1971, a high point in 1974 and a decreasing trend from 1974 to 1978. 
Clearly, the increasing trend of party politicisation of the London Borough elections 
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s gives way to a fluctuating pattern in the 1970s 
rather than a continuing steady linear increase. The high points of party competition in 
1964 and 1974 are therefore more period specific than part of any overall trend (see 
Figurel). The pattern of 2-way competition, that is contests between Conservative and 
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Labour, reflects the fluctuatmg ability of the Liberals to fight the London Borough 
elections in this period. 
Table 2: Structure or party competition, 
Inner-London Borough elections, 1956-1978 
London Borough Election 3 Way 2 Way 
1956 9 8 77 
1959 15.5 74,6 
1962 26 1 662 
lv'64 41 2 506 
30.2 620 
1971 17.2 79.5 
1974 64.0 29.2 
1978 49.7 503 
Figure 1: Percentage three-way contests 
at Borough elections (Inner-London), 1956-1978. 
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Indeed, the percentage of wards contested by the Liberals at the London Borough 
elections (Table 3) increased from 11.5% in 1956 to a high point of 45.1% in 1964. 
The total number of wards in the Inner London area had decreased from 355 in 1956 
to 257 in 1964 with the reorganisation of local government in London and the 
Liberals were able to contest 116 wards in 1964, compared to 41 in 1956. However, 
between 1964 and 1971 there was a marked decline in the percentage of wards 
contested by the Liberals. By 1971 the Liberals were able to contest only 17.2% of the 
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244 wards. There was a revival in Liberal contestation in 1974 when 64.0% of 250 
wards were Liberal contested, only to be followed by a decline to 49.0% in the 1978 
round of elections when 286 seats were available. Over the period the number of 
wards contested by the Liberals increased. However, the pattern is one of increased 
Liberal contestation to a high point in 1964, followed by a decline, a revival in 1974 
and a further decline. Liberal contestation rather than a steady linear increase is 
characterised more by fluctuation and period specific high points (see Figure 2). 
Table 3: Liberal Party percentage share of the total vote and contestation, Inner-London 
Borough elections, 1956-1978. 
London Liberal share Liberal share Number of Percentage Total number 
Borough of the vote of the vote wards Liberal wards Liberal of wards 
Election contested 
wards only 
contested contested 
1956 1.9 11.1 41 11.5 355 
1959 2.9 12.9 56 15.8 355 
1962 10.5 24.8 100 28 356 
1964 5.9 11.1 116 45.1 257 
1968 4.1 10.5 79 32.2 245 
1971 1.6 7.3 42 17.2 244 
1974 8.8 11.9 164 64.0 250 
1978 4.4 8.6 142 49.0 286 
Figure 2:Percentage wards Liberal contested at Borough elections (Inner-London), 1956-1978. 
LBE1956 LBE1959 LBE1962 LBE1964 LBE1968 LBE1971 LBE1974 LBE1978 
year 
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Table 4 reveals an increasing trend in the ratio of candidates to seats in the London 
Borough elections from 1956 tol964. The first post-reorganisation election of 1964 
had a candidate to seat ratio of 2.6 and was followed by decreasing ratios for 1968 
and 1971, and then by an increase in contestation in 1974 and 1978. However, the 
overall pattern of candidate to seat ratios is characterised by fluctuation rather than 
any steady linear increase. The elections of 1964, 1974 and 1978 are high points in 
the extent of party politicisation as measured by ratios of candidate to seat. Changes 
in the level of contestation for seats when measured by the ratio of Liberal candidates 
to seats show a similar pattern of increase from 1956 to 1964, decrease between 1964 
and 1971, increase in 1974 and decrease in 1978. The elections of 1964 and 1974 are 
once more high points in an otherwise fluctuating pattern of post-reorganisation 
Liberal contestation. 
The number of Independent candidates contesting these Inner-London elections is 
also set out in Table 4. The number of Independent candidates declined from 24 in 
1956 to 15 in 1964. However, their numbers increased to 21 in 1971. There was 
nevertheless, a steady decline thereafter through the 1970s indicating that 
Independents had to take on party labels and therefore to a degree of increased party 
politicisation of local elections. 
London Ratio Independent Liberal Liberal Seat/ Total seats Total 
Borough candidate to candidates candidates Candidate candidates 
Elections seats ratio 
1956 2.0 24 154 0.1 1356 2756 
1959 2.0 17 197 0.2 1336 2655 
1962 2.2 15 374 0.3 1336 2969 
1964 2.6 15 324 0.4 720 1843 
1968 2.4 19 215 0.3 720 1747 
1971 2.3 21 125 0.2 720 1649 
1974 2.8 16 436 0.6 721 2020 
1978 3.0 7 353 05 703 2123 
Table 4: Candidate/seats ratios, Inner-London Borough elections, 1956-1978. 
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Local elections in this period are reputed to have provided an increasingly volatile 
electorate with the opportunity to express its newly found freedom from party ties. An 
indication of any weakening of party ties, partisan dealignment, can be revealed by 
the pattern of three party contestation (Table2). The increasing trend in 3-way 
competition to a high point in 1964, was followed by a decrease in 1968 and 1971, a 
ftirther high point in 1974, and then decreased. 
Any change in party competition and weakening of party ties would of course have 
impacted upon voting patterns. The extent and rate that voters deserted the two-party 
system can be gauged from the pattern of any change in the two-party share of the 
vote over the period (see Table 5). The two-party share of the vote decreased from 
95.1% in 1956 to a low point of 85.6% in 1962. However, through thel960s the two-
party share of the vote climbed and by 1971 had risen to 95.6%, falling back in 1974 
to 88.2% and finally rising again in 1978 to 90.4%. The two-party share of the vote in 
the Lx)ndon Borough elections 1956-1978 therefore reveals a pattern of increasing 
desertion by the voters of the two main parties up to and including the 1962 election. 
This was followed by a fluctuating pattern from 1964 to 1978. The pattern thus does 
not reveal an inexorable decline in the 2-party vote share. Rather than a steady 
decline, the voting pattern points up 1962 and 1974 as election specific nadirs in the 
two-party share of the vote (see Figure 3). 
Table S: Party percentage share of the total vote, Inner-London Borough elections 1956-1978. 
London 
Borough 
Elections 
Conservative 
share of vote 
Labour share 
of vote 
Liberal share 
of vote 
Independent 
and Other 
share of vote 
Two-party 
share of vote 
1956 42.5 52.6 1.9 3.0 95.1 
1959 44.4 50.1 2.9 2.6 94.5 
1962 35.7 49.9 10.5 3.9 85.6 
1964 36.6 54.4 5.9 3.1 90.1 
1968 56.5 35.8 4.1 3.5 923 
1971 33.8 61.8 1.6 2.7 95.6 
1974 34.3 53.9 8.8 3.1 88.2 
1978 43.4 47.0 4.4 5.2 90.4 
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Figure 3: Percentage t\*o-party share of the total vote at Borough elections (Inner-London) 
1956-1982. 
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This pattern is reflected in the fortunes of the Liberal party in these elections. From 
1956 to 1962 the party's share of the vote increased, only to fall away again, revive in 
1974 and fall away again in 1978. Once more a pattern of increase was followed by 
one of fluctuation with the elections of 1962 and 1974 as period specific high points 
However, a much less volatile pattern is revealed if the Liberal vote in contested 
wards only is considered (Table 6). The 1971 figure of 7.3 increased to 11.9 in 1974 
and decreased to 8.6 in 1978. Thus, the percentage share of the Liberal vote 
calculated over all wards whether contested or not masks not only the extent of actual 
Liberal share of the vote, but also distorts any notion of the rate and pace voters were 
entering or exiting the Liberal camp. For example, at the 1962 diet of borough 
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election in Inner-London the Liberal Party mean percentage share of the total vote 
over all boroughs was 10.5%. Yet, the mean percentage share of the total vote for 
contested wards only was 24.8%, almost a quarter of the votes cast in these wards (see 
Figure 4). 
Table 6: Liberal Party percentage share of the total vote/ Liberal Party percentage share of the 
total vote contested wards only, Inner-London Borough elections, 1956-1978. 
London Borough Election Liberal share of the vote Liberal share of the vote contested wards only 
1956 1.9 111 
1959 2.9 129 
1962 105 248 
1964 5.9 111 
1968 4 1 105 
1971 16 7.3 
1974 8.8 119 
1978 4,4 8 6 
Figure 4: Liberal Party percentage share of the total vote 
at Borough elections (Inner-London), 1956-1978. 
CortaatBd wards only 
Aggregoto Voto ihm 
1956 1959 1962 1964 1968 1971 1974 1978 
London Borough Section 
However, if party attachment was eroded in this period then levels of net volatility 
should have increased. In Table 7 the change in the distribution of the vote between 
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successive elections, using the 'Butler Swing* as a measure, has been outlined. There 
were landslide swings of 19.3% in 1968 and 24.4% in 1971. Furthermore, compared 
to the modest swings of 2.2% in 1959 and 1.8% in 1964, the swings of 4.2% and 8% 
in 1974 and 1978 respectively are major swings. The pattern from the 1964 elections 
to the 1971 election shows a trend towards ever increasing volatility. Although the 
pattern for the 1970s is one of fluctuation, albeit composed of a landslide swing in 
1971 and major swings in 1974 and 1978, the pattern is not one of ever increasing 
volatility. 
Table 7; 'Butler SwinfC indei of volatility Inner-London Borough elections, 1959-1982. 
London Borough Elections •Butler swing" 
1959 (1956 and 1959) + 2.2 
1962 (1959 and 1962) -4.3 
1964 (1962 and 1964) -1.8 
1968 (1964 and 1968) + 19.3 
1971 (1968 and 1971) -24.4 
1974 (1971 and 1974) + 4.2 
1978 (1974 and 1978) + 8 
1982 (1978 and 1982) + 0.2 
Net inter-election volatility in a multi-party system is perhaps more appropriately 
measured by use of Pedersen's index of dissimilarity, which takes into account the 
changes in the Liberal and Other shares of the vote as well as those of the 
Conservative and Labour shares. Table 8 sets out the trends in net volatility, that is the 
changes in the parties* shares of the vote in successive comparable London Borough 
elections. As the table shows, net volatility was low in the mid to late 1950s, a mere 
2.9. However, net volatility had increased over three fold by the 1962 London 
Borough elections and, post-reorganisation, the index increased in 1968 to 20.4. Net 
volatility, however, fluctuated through the 1970s, firstly, declining to 14.3 for 1971 
and then to 8.0 for 1974. This decline was followed by an increase at the 1978 
elections to 11.3. Clearly the 1970s in general was not a period of increasing electoral 
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volatility at the London Borough elections. Electoral volatility in these elections, as 
measured by the Pedersen index, like that measured by the Butler swing, does not 
show the 1970s as a period of ever increasing volatility. Furthermore, the Pedersen 
index, like the Butler swing, points up the period 1964-1971 as characterised by a 
much more volatile electorate (Figure 5). 
Table 8: Pedersen index of dissimilarity, all boroughs aggregate at successive Inner-London 
Borough Elections, 1956-1982. 
Elections Pedersen's Index 
1956-1959 2.9 
1959-1962 8.9 
1962-1964 54 
1964-1968 204 
1968-1971 14.3 
1971-1974 8 
1974-1978 113 
1978-1982 166 
Figure 5: Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive Borough elections (Inner-London) 
1959-1982. 
1859 1862 1 
London Borough Election 
1971 1874 1878 1862 
The indices of net volatility referred to above are of course derived from aggregate 
borough voting data. However, in Table 9 a Pedersen index for each individual 
borough of Inner London at successive borough elections from 1956-1982 is set out. 
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The Pedersen indices for successive elections before reorganisation have been 
calculated using electoral data from the component Metropolitan Boroughs that went 
to make up each of the 12 new London Boroughs of Inner London at the 1964 
borough elections. For example, in the case of Camden the pre-1964 electoral data of 
its components (Hampstead, Holbom and St Pancras) have been aggregated. It is clear 
from Table 9 that in each of the individual boroughs the Pedersen index does not 
show the 1970s as a period of ever increasing net volatility. From a landslide 
highpoint at the 1971 elections the indices fall dramatically in each borough at the 
1974 elections, then rise again at the 1978 elections. Furthermore, the Pedersen 
indices for each individual borough also point up the 1964-1971 period as being 
characterised by a much more volatile electorate. 
Table 9: Pedersen index of dissimilarity, individual boroughs at successive Inner-London 
Borough elections, 1959-1982. 
Borough 1955-59 1959-62 1962-64 1964-68 1968-71 1971-74 1974-78 1978-82 
Camden 4.4 12.7 8.2 13.3 20.9 6.8 10.7 20.9 
Greenwich 2.8 9.3 2.2 19.8 35.4 9.8 23.5 18.8 
Hackney 5.7 5.5 12.8 26.6 30.9 9.8 18.8 16.5 
Hammersmith 
&Fulham 
3.7 4.4 2.8 23.3 23.1 6.0 14.4 15.8 
Islington 3.9 13.2 7.4 28.4 30.3 10.5 16.1 15.2 
Kensington 
&Chetsea 
4.4 18.3 14.2 14.2 21.6 11.0 3.9 13.5 
Lambeth 2.2 10.6 7.3 22.8 28.5 7.7 8.5 23.9 
Lewisham 2.8 13.6 8.6 24.8 26.9 8.4 11.8 21.9 
Southwark 3.0 5.3 5.7 26.5 30.6 10.6 14.6 23.5 
Tower 
Hamlets 
8.5 10.0 7.7 11.9 21.1 U.8 19.8 26.8 
Wandsworth 1.9 15.6 7.1 21.2 25.4 10.0 15.5 13.5 
Westminster 3.4 8.8 6.2 16.5 21.1 4.1 10.0 16.4 
There are general trends in net volatility across the twelve boroughs of Inner -London 
and the changes in the distribution of the vote between the parties at successive 
borough elections in individual boroughs ostensibly rise and fall in unison across 
time. However, on closer inspection it is apparent that there is both variance in the 
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degree of net volatility at successive elections between boroughs at the same 
elections, and in the timing of changes in the distribution of the vote In figures 
6 and 7, mean net volatility for all the twelve boroughs over successive borough 
elections from 1955 to 1982 has been plotted against the trends in net volatility for 
individual boroughs. Clearly, even at the borough aggregate level of analysis there is 
evidence of variance in the rate and extent of erosion of party attachments. 
Figure 6: Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive Borough elections (Inner-London) 1959-
1982, all boroughs mean contrasted with each individual borough's net volatility, Camden to 
Kensington. 
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Figure 7: Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive Borough elections (Inner-London) 1959-
1982, all boroughs mean contrasted with each individual borough*s net volatility, Lambeth to 
Westminster. 
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In section 4.2, contrary to orthodox views of electoral behaviour that have 
characterised the 1960s as a period of electoral stability and the 1970s as one of 
increasing electoral volatility, voting behaviour at the London Borough elections has 
been shown to be much more volatile in the 1960s than in the 1970s. Furthermore, it 
has also been shown that the 1970s cannot be characterised as a period of increasing 
net electoral volatility. 
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4.3:LCC and G L C elections (Inner-London only) 
An examination of trends in local government voting and party competition at the 
LCC and GLC (Inner London only) elections in the period 1959-1979 will be 
examined and in section 4.4 below the voting trends at borough level and these upper-
tier elections will be contrasted with electoral trends at inner-London parliamentary 
elections. 
Table 10 profiles the changing nature of party competition at LCC and GLC (Inner 
London only) elections. Three-way contests show an increasing trend from 31% of 
the LCC electoral divisions in 1955 to 54.8% of the electoral divisions in 1961. At the 
first three post-reorganisation elections for the GLC the trend of increase in 3-way 
contestation continued, climbing to 75% of the electoral divisions in 1964. and then to 
100% at the 1967 and 1970 elections. At the 1973 GLC election 3-way competition 
fell to 51.4% of the electoral divisions, however, at the 1977 GLC election 3-way 
contestation increased to 97.0%. This increase was followed by a decline to 94% of 
the electoral divisions at the 1981 GLC election (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8;Percentage three-way competition at LCC/GLC(lnner-London) 
elections 1955-1981. 
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Over the whole period from 1955 to 1981 there was an increasing trend in the party 
politicisation of the L C C and GLC elections that reflected the Liberal Party's ability to 
contest a greater number of the electoral divisions at the upper-tier local elections in 
London. In 1955 the Liberal Party contested in only 13 of the 42 LCC electoral 
divisions and fielded 37 candidates. At the 1958 LCC election the number of 
candidates fielded by the Liberals was reduced to 30 and they contested only 11 of the 
42 divisions. At the 1961 L C C election the Liberal Party were able to increase the 
number of candidates fielded to 69 and contest 23 of the 42 divisions. It was, 
however, at the first post-reorganisation election to the GLC in 1964 and thereafter 
that there was a marked increase in the number of electoral divisions contested by the 
Liberal Party. In 1967 and 1970 the Liberals were able to contest all forty seats of the 
now 12 electoral divisions in the Inner London area The number of electoral 
divisions of the GLC in Inner London, which had been 12 for the first three elections 
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of 1964.1967 and 1970. was increased to 35 divisions for the 1973.1977 and 1981 
elections. The original electoral divisions had each corresponded to one London 
Borough with the City of London included within Westminster, and each division had 
returned between two and four councillors. From 1973 to 1981 the electoral divisions 
were coterminous with a Parliamentary constituency and returned one member. There 
was a decline in the number of Liberal candidates and hence divisions contested at the 
1973 GLC election, when the party put forward a candidate in just 18 of the 35 
electoral divisions. However, the party was able to contest 34 of the divisions in 1977 
and 33 in 1981. 
Election % 3-way contests % 2-way contests Electoral divisions Divisions Liberal 
Party contested 
1955 L C C 31 69 42 13 
1958 L C C 26.2 73.8 42 11 
1961 L C C 54.8 45.2 42 23 
1964 G L C 75.0 25.0 12 9 
1967 G L C 100 0.0 12 12 
1970 G L C 100 0.0 12 12 
1973 G L C 51.4 48.6 35 18 
1977 G L C 97.0 3.0 35 34 
1981 G L C 94.0 6.0 35 33 
Clearly there had been a steady increase in the party politicisation of the upper-tier 
local authority elections in London between 1955 and 1981. The ratio of candidates to 
seats at the LCC and GLC (Inner London only) elections is set out in Table 11. There 
was an increasing trend in the ratio of candidates to seats at these elections over this 
period. The candidate to seat ratio of 2.4 in 1958 rose more than twofold to 5.9 by 
1981, albeit with a decline in 1973 in an otherwise steady increase. Similarly, changes 
in the level of contestation for seats when measured by the ratio of Liberal Party 
candidates show a steady increase over the period from a 0.2 Liberal candidate to seat 
ratio in 1958 to 0.9 ratio in 1981, with a marked decline fi-om the overall trend in 
1973. The number of Independent candidates contesting at LCC and GLC level 
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elections though never large nevertheless declined over the period. There was 
however a steady increase in contestation by candidates from minor parties at these 
elections through the 1960s 
Election Seats Total 
number of 
candidates 
Cand/seat 
ratio 
Total 
Liberal 
Candidates 
Liberal 
cand/seat 
ratio 
Number 
Independent 
candidates 
Number 
Minor Party 
Candidates 
1955 
L C C 
126 315 2.5 37 0.3 4 21 
1958 
L C C 
126 300 2.4 30 0.2 7 6 
1961 
L C C 
126 340 2.7 69 0.5 2 9 
1964 
G L C 
40 132 3.3 29 0.7 5 16 
1967 
G L C 
40 169 4.2 40 1.0 4 34 
1970 
G L C 
40 205 5.1 40 1.0 3 72 
1973 
G L C 
35 127 3.6 19 0.5 5 35 
1977 
G L C 
35 191 5.5 34 0.9 0 88 
1981 
G L C 
35 208 5.9 33 0.9 2 109 
The increasing trend in 3-way competition at the LCC and GLC (Inner London only) 
elections is an indication of the weakening of party ties, partisan dealignment, 
throughout the period. However, the extent and rate that voters deserted the two-party 
system at these upper-tier authority elections can be gauged from the pattern of any 
change in the two-party share of the vote. The two-party share of the vote at the LCC 
elections of 1955, 1958 and 1961, and the GLC (Inner London only) elections of 1964 
through 1981, is shown in Table 12. The two-party share of the vote at the LCC and 
GLC (Inner London only) elections shows a decline from 97.5% in 1955 to 87.4% in 
1967. This pattern of decline is reversed most notably at the 1970 and 1973 elections 
when the two-party share of the total vote rose to 91.6% and 91.7% respectively. The 
two party share of the vote declined to 86.8% in 1977 and down to 81.6% in 1981. 
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FIGURE 9: Percentage two-party share of ttie total vote at Inner-London LCC/GLC elections,1955 
1981. 
Iij5 
— • ^ 1 . 7 
• ,^9 8 
^ « 82.6 
1955 LOG 1958 LOG 1961 LCC 1964 GLG 1967 GLG 1970 GLC 1973 GLG 1977 GLG 1981 GLG 
Thus the pattern for the 1970s is one of fluctuation rather than a linear trend of decline 
(Figure 9). This pattern is reflected in the fluctuations in the Liberal share of the 
vote as ties to the two major parties weaken and strengthen. However, the extent of 
the actual Liberal share of the vote and its fluctuations can be illustrated best when the 
Liberal share of the vote in contested divisions only is examined, as in Table 13 
Table 12: Part\ percentage share of the total vote, L C C and G L C (Inner London) elections, 
1955-1981. 
Election Conservative % 
share 
Labour 
% share 
Liberal 
% share 
Independent + 
Other 
% share 
Two-party 
% share 
1955 L C C 47.2 50.3 1.4 1.1 97.5 
1958 L C C 37.5 58.4 3.0 1.0 95.9 
1961 L C C 42.0 50.4 6.0 1.7 92.4 
1964 G L C 360 53 8 4.8 5.5 89.8 
1967 G L C 46.7 40.7 7.2 5.4 87.4 
1970 G L C 41.5 50.1 2.9 5.4 91.6 
1973 G L C 32.2 59.5 6.2 2.1 91.7 
1977 G L C 45.5 41.3 5.0 8.3 S6.S 
1981 G L C 33 2 49.4 110 65 S2.6 
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Table 13:Liberal Party percentage share of (he total vote and Liberal Party percentage share of 
the total vote in contested only, L C C / G L C (Inner-London) elections, 1955-1981. 
Election Liberal % share of the total vote 
all divisions 
Liberal % share of the total vote 
contested divisions only 
1955 L C C 1.4 4.7 
1958 L C C 3.0 10.9 
1961 L C C 6.0 10.1 
1964 G L C 4.8 6.7 
1967 G L C 7.2 7.2 
1970 G L C 2.9 2.9 
1973 G L C 6.2 9.0 
1977 G L C 5.0 5.1 
1981 G L C U.O 11.5 
Theories of partisan dealignment predict that electoral volatility should increase i f 
party attachments have declined. Table 14 sets out the change in the distribution of 
the vote between successive pairs of comparable elections; that is net volatility as 
measured by the 'Butler Swing*. The index of net volatility at comparable successive 
LCC and GLC (Inner London only) elections records major swings throughout the 
period. These measures indicate that LCC and GLC elections in this period are 
characterised by high levels of net volatility and that the GLC (Inner London only) 
elections of the 1970s show an increasing trend in net volatility: 7.3 in 1970,9.4 in 
1973 and 15.8 in 1977. However the index for 1981 shov^ a decline in this trend. 
Table 14: 'Butler Swing* indei of volatUity, L C C / G L C (Inner London) elections, 195S-198L 
Eleaion (elections 
compared) 
'Butler Swing' 
1958 (1955 & 1958) -8.9 
1961 (1958 & 1961) + 6.3 
1964 (196I&1964) -4.7 
1967 (1964 & 1967) + 11.9 
1970 (1967 & 1970) -7.3 
1973 (1970& 1973) -9.4 
1977 (1973 & 1977) + 15.8 
1981 (1977 & 1981) - 10.2 
Furthermore, measures of net inter-election volatility by use of the Pedersen index of 
dissimilarity, as outlined in Table 15, also show the GLC elections in the 1970s as 
characterised by an increasing volatility and hence partisan dealignment. Although the 
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elections to the LCC and GLC (Inner London only) throughout the period are 
characterised by high electoral volatility as measured by the Pedersen index, the 
elections of 1970, 1973, 1977 record an increasing trend in net volatility through the 
1970s (Figure 10). This trend of increasing net volatility through the 1970s is shown 
clearly at the lower level of aggregation in Table 16 that outlines the Pedersen index 
of net volatility for individual boroughs at the GLC elections 1964-1981 in Inner 
London. However, this trend is reversed at the 1981 elections when the index decline. 
Table 15: Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive L C C / G L C (Inner London) elections, 1958-
1981. 
Elections Pedersen Index 
1955 and 1958 L C C 9.8 
1958 and 1961 L C C 8.1 
1961 and 1964 7.2 
1964 and 1967 G L C 13.2 
1967 and 1970 G L C 9.5 
1970 and 1973 G L C 12.7 
1973 and 1977 G L C 19.7 
1977 and 1981 G L C 14 1 
Figure 10: Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive L C C / G L C 
elections (Inner-London) 1958-1981 
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Tablel6 Pedersen index of dissimilarity for individual boroughs at successive G L C (Inner-
London) elections 1964-1981. 
Borough 1964-67 1967-70 1970-73 1973-77 1977-1981 
Camden 8.8 6.7 13.2 16.6 12.7 
Greenwich 16.8 8.8 12.0 19.6 16.8 
Hackney 16.7 16.3 11.1 24.3 15.6 
Hammersnuth 15.1 8.6 10.4 21.7 14.0 
Islington 22.6 12.6 15.4 25.2 18.2 
Kensington& 
Chelsea 
8.5 6.5 11.9 14.3 12.9 
Lambeth 12.5 9.4 15.2 19.8 9.5 
Lewisham 15.9 7.6 14.5 19.5 18.6 
Southwark 16.4 9.4 12.6 19.9 14.7 
Tower 
Hamlets 
15.2 12.7 14.0 32.2 22.3 
Wandsworth 13.7 10.5 12.1 20.8 14.9 
Westminster 10.1 7.0 13.5 15.0 12.7 
4.4;Borough, L C C / G L C and parliamentary voting behaviour Inner-London 
Table 17 sets out the distribution of the vote at each parliamentary election 1955-
1979, the two-party share of the vote, the number of constituencies, the number of 
constituencies contested by Liberal candidates and the percentage share of the vote for 
the Liberal Party in contested constituencies only. 
Table 17: Party percentage share of the total vote and Liberal Party contestation at General 
Election Con% Lab% Lib% Oth% 2-party% Seats Number 
Liberal 
contested 
Lib% 
contested 
only 
1955 44.8 53.0 1.5 0.7 97.8 42 8 7.6 
1959 45.1 49.2 4.8 0.9 94.3 42 16 11.5 
1964 39.3 52.1 7.5 1.1 91.4 42 24 12.3 
1966 36.9 56.7 5.2 1.2 93.6 42 20 10.2 
1970 42.0 53.7 3.4 1.0 95.7 42 17 7.7 
1974 32.9 48.4 18.1 2.3 81.3 35 34 18 
1974 31.4 52.9 13.8 1.9 84.3 35 35 13.8 
1979 39.8 47.2 9.6 3.3 87.0 35 35 9.6 
The weakening of support for the two major parties over the 1959-1979 period at 
parliamentary elections in the Inner London constituencies is clearly evidenced by the 
fall in the two-party share of the vote. However, there is no clear linear trend in the 
weakening of party support, rather a fluctuating pattern. Although the two-party share 
of the vote fell at the 1964 election to 91.4%, it climbed in 1966 and, at the 1970 
s: 
election surpassed its 1959 level. At the February 1974 election the two-party share of 
the vote plummeted to its lowest for the period, falling to 81.3%. However, at the 
October 1974 election it rose to 84.3%, and at the 1979 election to 87%. The 1970s 
then are characterised by a fluctuating pattern in the two-party share of the vote, with 
penod specific lows at the two 1974 elections rather than any inexorable decline. 
Furthermore, the increase in the two-party share of the vote in 1966 and 1970 reflects 
the inability of the Liberals to field candidates. Clearly, at the two 1974 elections and 
at the 1979 election the electorate in virtually all the constituencies of Inner London 
were given the opportunity to express any new found freedom from party ties by 
virtue of the presence of a Liberal candidate. However the increase in the two-party 
share of the vote, from its low at the February 1974 election to its level in 1979, and 
the decreasing Liberal share of the vote, do not indicate a trend in the weakening party 
ties. Fluctuation, rather than any linear decline in party attachments as measured by 
the two-party share of the vote, characterises parliamentary elections in Inner London 
1959-1979 (Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Two-party share of the total vote UK Parliamentary constituencies and Inner-
London constituencies at General Elections, 1955-1983. 
1955 
Inner-London 
Constituencies 
UK Constituencies 
1959 
1964 1970 Oct1974 1983 
1966 Feb1974 1979 
83 
In Figure 12 trends in the two-party share of the vote are contrasted. Clearly, 
irrespective of differences of timing of elections, there is variance between upper-and 
lower tier electoral behaviour in terms of the degree of partisan dealignment. 
Similarly, there is variance in the degree of partisan dealignment between local 
authority level voting and parliamentary level voting in Inner-London. 
Figure 12:Two-party share of the vote at Borough,LCC/GLC and Parliamentary elections, 
(Inner-London), 1955-1981. 
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Similarly the indices of net volatility for successive elections, as measured by the 
Pedersen index, do not show the 1970s as a period of increasing volatility at these 
Inner London parliamentary elections (see Figure 13). In 1970 the index recorded a 
level of 5.1, then a peak in net volatility occurred at the February 1974 election. 
However, this peak of 15.2 declined to 5.4 at the October 1974 election and rose again 
to 9.9 at the 1979 election. Rather than steady increase, net volatility in the 1970s is 
characterised by periodic shift. 
Figure 13: Pedersen index of dissimilarity at Borough, L C C / G L C and Parliamentary elections 
(Inner-London) 1958-1982 ( February 1974 general election only). 
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Indeed, i f the trends in changes \n the distribution of the vote between successive 
elections at borough, upper-tier and parliamentary constituencies in Inner-London 
over the period are compared it is clear, irrespective of differences in electoral cycles 
that there were substantial differences in electoral behaviour at different types of 
elections (Figure 13). Electoral behaviour at the borough level in the 1960s and early 
1970s was much more volatile than at upper-tier local elections and both were more 
volatile than parliamentary electoral volatility. However, there is a marked change 
from the early 1970s as electoral behaviour at upper-tier local elections and 
parliamentary level elections become increasingly volatile and that of borough 
elections diminishes somewhat. 
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4.5: Summary of Inner-London voting behaviour at local authority aggregate 
leveK and comparison with Inner-London parliamentary constituency voting 
behaviour. 
We are now in a position to review the findings of this study of electoral trends at 
local government elections in Inner London 1959-1979. Over the 1959-1979 period 
local government elections in Inner London at both borough and LCC/GLC level 
underwent an increase in party politicisation. At both levels 3-way competition 
increased. However, the increase in 3-way competition was far greater at the upper-
tier authority elections to the LCC and GLC than at the lower-tier borough council 
elections. At the borough council electoral level a steady increase in 3-way 
competition fi-om the late 1950s through to the mid-l960s gave way to a fluctuating 
pattern of decline and then resurgence. In contrast, at the upper-tier authority level of 
elections to the LCC and GLC, 3-way competition in Inner London increased to a 
much higher level as the Liberals contested virtually all divisions at elections from 
1964 onwards. Three-way competition, apart from the 1973 GLC election when it 
declined to 51.4%, remained high, at 97% and 94% in 1977 and 1981 respectively. 
Though the pattern of 3-way competition at the upper-tier authority level fluctuated in 
the 1970s its peaks and troughs were not as extreme as those at the borough council 
level elections. Clearly this was a function of the fewer number of candidates that the 
Liberals needed to field at the upper-tier elections. 
Over the 1959-1979 period there was an increasing candidate to seat ratio 
(candidates from all parties) and a decline in Independent candidates at both levels of 
authority elections that points up the increasing party politicisation of local 
government elections in Inner London. Although the Liberal candidate to seat ratio 
increased over the 1959-1979 period at both levels of authority elections, at the 1968 
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and 1971 borough elections, and the 1973 GLC election the Liberal candidate to seat 
ratio declined. Perhaps the increased difficulty for the Liberals to field candidates at 
the borough council electoral level had by 1973 impacted at the upper-tier level. 
Indeed, at the 1970 parliamentary election the Liberals had only been able to contest 
17 of the 42 Inner-London constituencies. 
Although the voting patterns at both levels of authority elections show a weakening of 
party ties over the 1959-1979 period, there was a much steadier decline in the two-
party share of the vote at the LCC/GLC level, albeit with slight resurgences in 1973 
and 1977. In contrast, at the borough council elections, a much more fluctuating 
pattern prevailed. At this level the two-party vote does not show an inexorable pattem 
of decline in the 1970s, rather a pattem of election specific nadirs in the two-party 
share of the vote. Thus, at both levels of authority elections the two-party share of the 
vote does not indicate a linear decline in party attachments. However, the variance 
between upper- and lower tier voting behaviour points towards the significance of 
context in the calculus of the local electoral voter. 
The difference between the patterns of net volatility at the upper and lower tier 
elections is perhaps explained in part by the greater degree of Liberal contestation at 
the LCC/GLC elections than at the borough council elections in the 1970s. However, 
this does indicate a variance in voting behaviour benveen upper- and lower tier 
elections that points towards electoral context. Furthermore, the variance between 
borough council, upper- tier, and pariiamentary electoral levels of volatility adds 
weight to the significance of context in voting behaviour. Moreover, despite general 
trends there is much variance between the electoral behaviour of individual boroughs. 
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The findings of this study of local authority voting in Inner London indicate that local 
elections in the 1959-1979 period can be characterised by increased party 
politicisation and a weakening of party attachments. However, the loosening of party 
attachments occurred in period specific phases and not in a smooth and uniform 
decline. There are marked differences in the rate and extent that the voters deserted 
the two major parties at the upper and lower tier authority elections as indicated by 
their respective patterns of net volatility. Nevertheless, all indicators show patterns of 
trendless fluctuation rather than linear trends. Thus, at the local government elections 
and parliamentary elections in Inner London 1959-1979 there was not any inexorable 
decline in party attachments. However, there is evidence of a substantia! variance in 
voting behaviour between different tiers of local authority elections, and between 
individual boroughs at both levels of local elections. Moreover, there is evidence of 
substantial variance between local authority voting behaviour and parliamentary 
constituency voting behaviour in Inner-London. 
Clearly, there are patterns of electoral behaviour at the local authority level that 
complement the view that the 1970s was a period of trendless fluctuation in partisan 
dealignment. However, even i f the disparity in electoral cycles of different levels of 
local authorities, and between the local electoral and the parliamentary electoral 
cycles is taken into account, there are significant differences between all levels in the 
occurrence of periods of partisan dealignment and of the extent and rate at which the 
voter deserted the two- party system. It is evident that even at this level aggregation of 
voting data the findings of this study are at variance with accepted views of British 
politics in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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4.6:Birmingham County Borough elections 1959-1972, and Birmingham District 
Council elections 1973-1979. 
Table 18 profiles the changing nature of party competition in the Birmingham 
County Borough elections 1959-1972, and the Birmingham District Council elections 
1973-1979 (Figure 14). Three-way contests show a fluctuating pattern through the 
1960s and early 1970s. Three-wray competition increased through the early 1960s to 
reach 56.4% of all contests at the 1963 Birmingham County Borough elections. 
However, the level of three-way competition steadily declined through the mid-1960s 
and into the early 1970s. The decline in three-way competition was reversed at the 
1972 elections and the 1970s saw a dramatic increase in three-way competition. At 
the first post-reorganisation elections to the new Birmingham District Council 54.8% 
of contests featured candidates from the three major parties. At the 1975 Birmingham 
District Council elections 100% of contests featured candidates from the three main 
parties, and at the 1976 elections 85.7% of contests were three-way. The 1976 
elections however, marked the beginning of a decline in three-way competition. By 
1978 only 45.2% of contests were three-way, and at the 1979 Birmingham District 
Council elections only 40.5% featured candidates from the three major parties 
contesting together. Clearly the 1970s, from 1972 onwards saw increased party 
politicisation of these elections. However, rather than a steady linear increase in party 
competition, the 1970s are characterised by a steady increase to a high point inl975 
followed by a marked decline. The high points of party competition in 1963, 
1973,1975 and 1976 are period specific rather than any overall trend. Indeed, the 
pattern of two-way competition, that is contests between Labour and Conservative 
candidates, points up the fluctuating ability of the Liberals to contest the Birmingham 
County Borough and Birmingham District Council elections. 
Table 18: Structure of party competition, Birmingham County Borough elections 1959-1972, and 
Election 3-way 2-way 
1959 42.1 57.9 
289 71.1 
1%1 39.5 60.5 
1962 51.3 43 6 
1%3 564 436 
1964 53.8 46.2 
1965 51.3 487 
1%6 41.0 590 
1967 46.2 53 8 
1968 51.3 48.7 
1969 43.6 56.4 
1970 385 61.5 
1971 30.8 69.2 
1972 38 5 61.5 
1973 all out election 54.8 45.2 
1975 100 
1976 85.7 14.3 
1978 45.2 548 
1979 40.5 59.5 
FIGURE 14 : Percentage three-way contests Birmingham County Borough and Bimiingham District 
Council elections 1959-1979. 
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Figure 15 shows the percentage of wards contested by the Liberals at the Bimiingham 
County Borough elections and subsequent Birmingham District Council elections. 
Overall there are period specific highpoints in the Liberal's ability to contest these 
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elections rather than any steady linear increase. The highpoint of 1962 when the 
Liberals were able to contest 24 of the 39 wards was followed by steady decline until 
a resurgence in the 1970s to a highpoint of contesting all 42 wards in 1975. 
Thereafter, however, the pattem is one of steady decline. Liberal contestation, rather 
than a steady linear increase, is characterised by period specific highpoints 
FIGURE 15: Percentage wards Liberal Party contested at Birmingham County Borough and 
Birmingham District Council elections, 1959-1979. 
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The ratio of candidates to seats at these elections is set out in Table 19. The overall 
pattem of candidate to seat ratios for these elections is characterised by fluctuation 
and period specific highpoints rather than any steady linear increase. The elections of 
1964 and 1975 are highpoints in the extent of party politicisation as measured by 
ratios of candidates to seats. Changes in the level of contestation for seats when 
measured by the ratio of Liberal candidates to seats show a similar pattem of 
fluctuation and period specific highpoints. A fluctuating pattem of Liberal candidate 
to seat ratios, rather than a steady linear increase characterised the elections in this 
period. The marked increase in Liberal contestation at the 1975 election, when the 
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Liberals contested every seat, was however, followed by a sharp decline in the Liberal 
candidate seat ratios. Thus, party politicisation, as measured by candidate to seat 
ratios, does not indicate that the Birmingham elections in the 1970s were 
characterised by a linear increase in party competition. 
Table 19: Candidate /seat ratios at Birmingham County Borough elections 1959-L972^nd 
Birmingham District Council elections 1973-1979. 
Eleaion Candidate/ Independent Liberal Liberal Total No. Total No. 
seat ratio Candidates candidates candidate/ 
seat ratio 
seats candidates 
1959 2.8 0 14 0.4 38 105 
1960 2.6 0 13 0.3 39 102 
1961 2.8 2 16 0.4 38 108 
1962 2.9 1 25 0.5 47 135 
1963 3.1 3 24 0.6 41 135 
1964 3.2 3 21 0.5 39 123 
1965 3.0 3 21 0.5 43 129 
1966 2.8 1 16 0.4 39 111 
1967 3.0 2 18 0.4 41 124 
1968 2.9 1 20 0.5 39 113 
1969 2.9 1 17 0.4 39 112 
1970 3.0 0 18 0.4 39 117 
1971 2.6 1 12 0.3 43 112 
1972 2.7 0 15 0.4 41 109 
1973 2.5 0 59 0.5 126 321 
1975 3.6 0 42 1.0 42 153 
1976 3.4 1 36 0.9 42 143 
1978 3.5 1 22 0.4 49 173 
1979 3.2 1 17 0.4 44 142 
Indeed as Table 19 indicates there were few Independent candidates even in the 
1950s and 1960s. At the 1963, 1964 and 1965 elections three Independents stood. 
However, by the 1970s Independent candidates were a rare feature of these elections. 
In Table 20 the two-party share of the vote is outlined. Though the two-party share of 
the vote declined from 94.2% in 1959 to 80.9% in 1962, throughout the 1960s it 
climbed and reached 94.7% by 1971. The two-party share of the vote declined to 
84.5% at the 1973 elections and fell further to 81.9% at the 1975 elections, however, 
thereafter it climbed in 1976, and 1978 to reach 91.8% by 1979. Desertion of the two 
main parties by the voters at these elections was period specific and overall the two-
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party share of the vote was consistently over 90%. There was then, no inexorable 
decline in the two-party share of the vote at these elections in the 1970s (Figure 16). 
This pattern is reflected in the Liberal party's share of the vote, which is characterised 
by period specific highs and declines. 
Table 20: Party percentage share of the total vote, Birmingham County Borough elections 1959-
1972, and Birmingham District Council elections 1973-1979. 
Election Con % share Lab % share Lib % share Ind& 0th % Two-partY% 
1959 47.4 46.8 5.1 0.7 94.2 
1960 55.1 38.6 5.2 1.1 93.7 
1961 42.7 47.4 7.6 2.3 90.1 
1962 40.5 40.4 15.9 3.2 80.9 
1963 39.1 47.4 11.6 1.9 86.5 
1964 44.7 46.2 7.5 1.6 90.9 
1965 55.9 34.9 7.3 1.9 90.8 
1966 49.8 44.1 5.0 1.1 93.8 
1967 57.9 35.6 5.1 1.4 93.5 
1968 64.7 26.3 8.0 1.0 91.0 
1969 60.3 30.1 75 2.1 90.4 
1970 47.7 45.3 5.9 1.1 93.0 
1971 37.7 57.0 4.3 1.0 94.7 
1972 43.3 50.9 5.1 0.7 94.2 
1973 41.7 42.8 13.2 2.3 84.5 
1975 49.7 32.2 16.4 1.7 81.9 
1976 53.8 34.7 9.6 1.9 88.5 
1978 49.9 41.0 5.5 3.6 90.9 
1979 48.1 43.7 5.6 2.6 91.8 
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FIGURE 16: Two-party share of the total voteat Birmingham County Borough and 
Birmingham District Council elections 1959-1979. 
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In Table 21 the change in the distribution of the vote between successive elections, 
using the 'Butler Swing" as a measure, has been outlined. Clearly the elections of the 
1970s are characterised by a general decline in the level of net volatility. Rather than a 
pattern of ever increasing volatility the Birmingham elections in the 1970s show a 
fluctuating but declining trend in net volatility. Furthermore, high levels of net 
volatility are period specific as in 1961,1970 and 1971. 
Table 21: 'Butler Swing' index of volatility at successive Birmingham County Borough elections 
Successive elections Butler swinft 
1959-1960 +7.9 
1960-1961 -10.6 
1961-1962 +2.4 
1962-1963 -4.2 
1963-1964 +3.4 
1964-1965 +11.3 
1965-1966 -7.7 
1966-1967 +8.3 
1967-1968 +8.1 
1968-1969 -4.1 
1969-1970 -13.9 
1970-1971 -10.9 
1971-1972 +5.9 
1972-1973 +3.3 
1973-1975 +6.3 
1975-1976 +0.8 
1976-1978 -5.1 
1978-1979 -2.3 
Table 22 sets out net inter-election volatility as measured by use of Pedersen's index 
of dissimilarity. The Pedersen index, like the Butler swing, points up periodic highs of 
net volatility; in 1960-1961, 1964-1965, 1969-1970 and 1970-1971. Similarly, the 
Pedersen index like the Butler swing does not show the 1970s as a period of 
increasing net volatility, but a fluctuating pattern of decline, (Figure 17). 
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Table 22: Pedersen Index of dissimilarity at successive Birmingham County Borough elections 
1959-1972, and Birmingham District Council elections 1973-1979. 
Successive elections Pedersen Index 
BOB 1959-1960 8.2 
BCB 1960-1961 12.4 
BCB 1961-1962 9.2 
BCB 1962-1963 7.0 
BCB 1963-1964 5.6 
BCB 1964-1965 11.5 
BCB 1965-1966 9.2 
BCB 1966-1967 8.5 
BCB 1967-1968 9.7 
BCB 1968-1969 4 9 
BCB 1969-1970 15.2 
BCB 1970-1971 117 
BCB 1971-1972 64 
1972-1973 9.7 
BDC 1973-1975 11,2 
BDC 1975-1976 6.8 
BDC 1976-1978 80 
BDC 1978-1979 2.8 
Figure 17: Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive Birmingham County Borough 1959-1972, 
and Birmingham District Council elections 1973-1979. 
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Once again the expectation that local voting behaviour would closely resemble the 
orthodoxy of national voting trends has not been borne out by examination of 
Birmingham lower tier local government elections. Whether the trends in 
Birmingham upper-tier local government elections conform to orthodox expectations, 
to the patterns of their lower-tier counterparts, or are determined by their own peculiar 
dynamics will be examined next, then both will be contrasted with Birmingham 
parliamentary constituency voting trends. 
4.7:West Midlands County Council elections 1973,1977 and 1981. 
The extent of party competition at these upper-tier Birmingham elections to the West 
Midlands County Council can be gauged by the changes in the structure of party 
competition. Table 23 profiles the changes in the structure of party competition over 
the three elections of 1973,1977 and 1981. 
Tabic 23:Structure of party competition at West Midlands County Council elections 1973,1977 
and 1981. 
Election 3-way 2-way 
1973 45.2 44.8 
1977 59.5 38.0 
1981 66.6 33.4 
Three-way contests show a steady increase from 45.2% of wards in 1973, 59.5% of 
wards in 1977, to 66.6% of wards at the 1981 elections. This increase is in marked 
contrast to the fluctuating pattern of 3-way competition at the lower-tier Birmingham 
District Council elections in the 1970s. Indeed, the increasing ability of the Liberals to 
field candidates at the upper-tier West Midlands County Council elections is in 
contrast with the decreasing number of candidates that the Liberal Party is able to 
field at the lower-tier Birmingham District Council elections from 1975 onwards. 
Table 24 sets out the number and percentage of the 42 Birmingham wards contested 
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by the Liberals at these West Midlands County Council elections. Although there was 
an increase in the Liberal's ability to contest the upper-tier elections of 1973,1977 and 
1981 when the party contested 45.2%. 59.5% and 66.6% of the wards respectively, 
the level of contestation by the Liberals was still nevertheless much lower than their 
100% ward contestation and 85.7% ward contestation at the lower-tier Birmingham 
District Council elections in 1975 and 1976. 
Table 24:Liberal Party percentage share of the total vote. Liberal Party percentage share of the 
total vote contested only, and Liberal Party contestation at West Midlands County Council 
elections 1973,1977 and 1981. 
Election Liberal % Liberal % No. wards % wards Liberal Total 
share of vote contested wards Liberal contested contested No. 
only wards 
1973 12.3 28.9 19 45.2 42 
1977 7.0 11.7 26 59.5 42 
1981 12.4 18.4 28 66.6 42 
In Table 25 the candidate to seat ratios (all candidates) at these elections show an 
increasing trend from 2.8 in 1973 to 3.3 at both the 1977 and 1981 elections, 
nevertheless these ratios are marginally lower than those at the lower-tier Birmingham 
District Council elections in the same period. 
Table 25:Candidate/seat ratio and Liberal Party candidate/seat ratio. West Midlands County 
Council elections 1973,1977 and 1981. 
Election Candidate/ Independent Liberal Liberal Total No. Total No. 
seat ratio candidates candidates candidate/ 
seat ratio 
seats candidates 
1973 2.8 0 19 0.4 42 118 
1977 3.3 1 26 0.6 42 140 
1981 3.3 5 28 0.7 42 141 
Similarly, the ratios of Liberal candidates to seats show an increasing trend at the 
1973,1977 and 1981 West Midlands County Council elections, rising from 0.4 in 
1973 to 0.6 in 1977 and 0.7 in 1981. However, they are clearly much lower than the 
Liberal candidate seat ratio of 1.0 at the 1975 Birmingham District Council elections 
and the 0.9 of 1976 Birmingham District Council elections. 
Though increased party competition is a feature of the 1973,1977 and 1981 West 
Midlands County Council elections the two party grip on the electorate remained 
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firm. In Table 26 the two-party vote is outlined and the extent and rate that voters 
deserted the two-party system can be gauged. Though increasing from 86.8% in 1973 
to 89.7% in 1977, the two-party share of the vote declined to 84.8% in 1981. 
Table 26: Party percentage share of the total vote, West Midlands County Council 
elecUons.1973-1977. 
Election Con% share Lab% share Lib% share Ind & Others% 
share 
Two-party 
% share 
1973 41.6 45.2 12.3 0.9 86.8 
1977 58.0 31.7 7.0 3.3 89.7 
1981 35.1 49.7 12.4 2.8 84.8 
The findings of this study of the 42 Birmingham wards at the 1973,1977 and 1981 
West Midlands County Council elections indicate that despite a pattern of increased 
party competition the two party grip on the electorate remained firm. In short, the 
electoral pendulum may have swung to and fro and there was an increase in party 
competition, however, as these elections demonstrate, the overall two party share of 
the vote need hardly alter as a result. 
4.8:Parliamentarv and local electoral voting behaviour contrasted 
Trends in voting at parliamentary elections in the Birmingham constituencies 1959-
1979 will now be examined and contrasted with those at the local electoral level. 
Table 27 sets out the distribution of the vote at each election, the two-party share of 
the vote, the number of seats contested by the Liberals, and the percentage share of 
the vote in Liberal contested constituencies only. Clearly the Liberals were unable to 
break the grip that the two major parties had over the Birmingham electorate at the 
parliamentary electoral level. Only at the two 1974 general elections were the Liberals 
able to challenge this duopoly. However 1974 apart, there was no significant 
weakening of party support, or increase in net volatility during the 1970s. Period 
specific fluctuation in the two-party share of the vote and in net volatility characterise 
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parliamentary electoral voting behaviour in 1970s Birmingham, rather than any linear 
trends in increasing partisan dealignment or volatility. Furthermore when the trends in 
two-party share of the vote at local and parliamentary elections are contrasted, as 
shown in Figure 18, irrespective of the differences of timing of these two types of 
elections, there is a significant degree of variance. Indeed, from 1959-1970 two-party 
support at the Birmingham County Borough elections was to a significant degree, and 
consistently, much lower than its parliamentary counterpart, an indication of a much 
higher degree of partisan dealignment at the local electoral level than at the 
parliamentary. Furthermore, as Figure 19 illustrates, i f the trend in change in the 
distribution of the vote between successive local elections, and that at parliamentary 
elections is compared, it is clear, irrespective of differences in electoral cycles, that 
there were significant differences in electoral behaviour. Electoral behaviour at the 
Birmingham County Borough elections and the post-reorganisation Birmingham 
District Council elections was much more volatile than at the parliamentary electoral 
level, especially in the 1960s. 
Table 27:Party percentage share or the total vote all constituency contests, Liberal Party 
percentage share of the total vote contested constituencies only, and Liberal Party contesation at 
General Elections, Birmingham 1955-1983. 
Election Con% 
Vote vote 
Lib% 
vote 
Oth% 
Vote 
Two-
party% 
Vote 
Seats Number of seats 
Liberal contested 
Liberal% 
vote 
Contested only 
1955 49.5 49.9 - 0.6 99.4 13 0 0 
1959 52.0 45.9 1.1 1.0 97.8 13 1 14.2 
1964 46.7 50.1 4.2 - 96.8 13 3 14.7 
1966 41.4 53.4 3.9 1.3 94.8 13 4 14.9 
1970 47.4 49.6 2.2 0.8 97.1 13 4 11.7 
Feb1974 39.6 48.4 11.0 I.O 87.9 12 9 15.2 
Oct 1974 34.7 49.8 14.3 1.2 84.5 12 12 14.3 
1979 43.7 47.4 7.5 1.4 91.0 12 11 7.5 
1983 39.0 43.0 8.5 8.5 81.2 11 4 17.3 
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Figure 18: Two-party share of the total vote Birmingham County Borough elections 1959-1972 
and Birmingham District Borough elections 1973-1979, and two-party share of the total vote at 
general elections 1959-1979, Birmingham constituencies 
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Figure 19: Pedersen Index of dissimilarity at successive Birmingham County Borough elections 
1959-1972 and Birmingham District Council elections 1973-1979, and Pedersen index of 
dissimilarity at successive general elections 1959-1979 Birmingham constituencies. 
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4.9: Summary of Birmingham local electoral voting behaviour at local authority 
aggregate level, and comparison with Birmingham parliamentary constituency 
voting behaviour. 
At local government elections although party competition expanded during the early 
1970s in the wake of local government reorganisation, in general over the 1959-1979 
period the level of three-party competition points up the failure of the Liberals to 
decisively break the dominance of the two main parties. Clearly, any expansion of 
party competition was period specific and reflected the Liberal's fluctuating ability to 
field candidates. Indeed, the Liberal candidate to seat ratio at these elections, apart 
fi-om 1963,1975 and 1976, shows the Liberals contesting between only a third and a 
half of the seats available throughout the period. However, where the Liberals did 
contest, their average share of the vote in contested wards at each election never fell 
below 11%. The candidate to seat ratio (candidates from all parties) at these elections 
indicates that even before reorganisation party politicisation was a feature of 
Birmingham elections. Between 1959 and 1970 the candidate to seat ratio averaged 
2.9. Furthermore, there were few Independent candidates contesting these elections in 
the 1950s and 1960s, and even fewer in the 1970s. Although party poiiticisation of the 
Birmingham elections expanded, there was no inexorable increase throughout the 
1970s, and changes in the two-party share of the vote over the period do not indicate 
increasing desertion of the two main parties by the Birmingham electorate. Indeed, 
fi-om 1975 the grip of the two major parties increased as party ties were reasserted as 
evidenced by both the Butler and Pedersen indices that show a decline in net volatility 
at the Birmingham elections in the !970s. 
The findings of this study of local authority voting at the Birmingham County 
Borough elections 1959-1972, and the Birmingham District Council elections 1973-
1979, demonstrate that local elections in the period cannot be characterised by any 
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linear increase in party politicisation and inexorable decline in party attachments. The 
loosening of party attachments occurred in period specific phases and overall party 
attachments, as indicated by the two-party share of the vote, remained strong. Party 
politicisation of local government elections was already a feature of Birmingham 
elections well before reorganisation, as comparison between Birmingham's level of 3-
way competition at the elections from 1959-1970 and the London boroughs level of 3-
way competition illustrates. At the parliamentary electoral level the two-party 
duopoly was maintained, however there were significant differences between local 
electoral voting behaviour and parliamentary electoral behaviour. 
4.10:Electoral trends in coterminous electoral units. 
As evidenced above, at the local authority aggregate level, there are significant 
variations in voting behaviour; between local authorities of the same type, v^nthin 
local authorities at upper- and lower tier elections, and between a local authority area 
and voting behaviour at parliamentary elections in the constituencies within that local 
authority area. However, this level of aggregation can conceal variance in voting 
behaviour at ward level within boroughs. In order to reveal any such variance we will 
now examine voting behaviour at a lower level of aggregation in the case study 
boroughs and their coterminous parliamentary electoral units. Rather than examine a 
raft of indicators of voting behaviour this section will examine turnout. I f local issues, 
candidate, campaigning, marginality and political control of the council are important 
in the calculus of the individual elector's decision to turn out and vote it is more likely 
that it is at the ward level that these factors are influential, as the voter has the 
opportunity to determine the outcome in his or her ward. In order to *zoom-in' to the 
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ward level of analysis, it is necessary, however, to begin briefly at the higher 
aggregate level of borough turnout. 
Railings and Thrasher, in their seminal study of British local elections, found that 
'when turnout rises in a tier of local government it does so across the board and when 
it falls it does so across all the constituent authorities'. At the borough aggregate level, 
as Figure 20 and Figure 21 illustrate, the trends in turnout of the inner-London 
boroughs examined broadly conform to a similar overall trends, and thereby rise and 
fall almost in unison (Lambeth and Wandsworth have been excluded because they are 
not made up of whole former electoral units). 
Figures 20: Percentage turnout individual boroughs contrasted with mean turnout all Inner-
London boroughs, 1945-1998. Source: Willis,A., and WoolIard,J., 2000 
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Figures 21: Percentage turnout individual boroughs contrasted with mean turnout all Inner-
London boroughs, 1945-1998. Source: Willis»A., and WoollardJ., 2000 
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Furthermore, as Ralhngs and Thrasher point up, the level in turnout of individual 
councils 'tend to occupy a largely unchanging position in any league table of turnout'. 
Indeed, mean turnout in the London Borough of Camden (pre-1964 turnout figures: 
Hampstead MB, Holbom MB, and St Pancras MB composite) at the sixteen borough 
elections from 1945 to 1998 was consistently higher than the average turnout for all 
inner-London boroughs, and has a standard deviation of 4.47 per cent that reflects a 
reasonably stable and consistent level of turnout. However, in contrast, although 
turnout in the London Borough of Islington (pre-1964 turnout figures: Finsbury 
MB,and Islington MB composite) was consistently lower than the average for all the 
mner-London boroughs (except after 1982) the standard deviation of 9.45 in turnout 
in Islington reflects a much more erratic pattern in electoral behaviour than in 
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Camden. Clearly, Camden, like most of the other inner-London boroughs (see SDs 
Table 28) conformed much more closely to the findings of Railings and Thrasher 
Table 28: Turnout in the Inner-London Boroughs, Borough Elections 1945-1998 (excludes 
Lambeth and Wandsworth which were not composites or whole former MB electoral units). 
Source: Original turnout figures from Willis«A., and Woollard, J . , 2000. 
London Borough London Metropolitan Borough Mean 
Turnout 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
Camden Hampstead,HoIbom ,StPancras MBs all wards. 39.8 4.4 16 
Islington Finsbury,Islington MBs alt wards 31.4 9.4 16 
Greenwich Greenwich, Woolwich MBs all wards 42.3 5.7 16 
Hackney Hackney,Shoreditch,Stoke Newington MBs all 
wards 
29.4 6.5 16 
Kensington and 
Chelsea 
Kensington ,Chelsea MBs alt wards 32.6 5.3 16 
Lewisham Lewisham,Deptford MBs all wards 39.3 5.2 16 
Tower Hamlets Bethnal Green, Poplar.Stepney MBs all wards 29.2 11.4 16 
Westminster Westminster, Paddington, St Marylebone 
MBs all wards 
34.6 5.8 16 
Hammersmith Hammersmith,Fulham MBs all wards 43.0 6.9 16 
Southwark Southwark,Bermondsey,CamberweU 
MBs all wards 
30.5 5.6 16 
concerning turnout in authorities of the same type. Whereas Islington, as its standard 
deviation indicates, is atypical and has much more erratic fluctuations in its level of 
turnout. Islington rather bucks the trend of stability in levels of turnout for individual 
councils that Railings and Thrasher have identified. Thus, even at this level of 
aggregation where differences tend to be smoothed out, these two politically and 
socio-economically very similar boroughs show a clear variance in their patterns of 
turnout at borough elections. 
However, Railings and Thrasher also found that Mocal authorities may find their 
position in the league table of turnout rises or falls' as indeed is the case in Islington, 
and that 'where changes do take place there is usually a prima facia explanation 
readily available ... related to specifically local political events in those authorities'. 
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Indeed, i f the mean turnout in Liberal contested wards at London Borough elections is 
contrasted with the mean turnout for all contests, turnout in Liberal contested wards in 
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in the inner-London boroughs was consistently higher 
than the mean for all wards and periodically much higher (see Figure 22). 
Furthermore, in Liberal contested wards only, that were non-marginal wards at 
London borough elections, that is wards in which the majority is equal to or greater 
than 5%, between 1964 and 1998 (1363 cases of 2111) the mean turnout was 44.02%. 
However, in non-marginal wards which were not contested by the Liberals in the 
same period (748 cases of 2111), the mean turnout at these inner-London borough 
elections was 36.6%. Thus, turnout in non-marginal wards contested by the Liberals 
was almost a quarter higher than turnout in non-marginal wards uncontested by the 
Liberals. This, as Railings and Thrasher point out, may just indicate no more than the 
fact that the local electorate, even in non-marginal wards, 'are marginally more 
interested when the range of parties to choose from is greater and when a potential 
voter is not faced with choosing between either voting for an alternative party because 
their 'own' has not fielded a candidate or staying at home'. Indeed, as Figure 23 
illustrates in the London Borough of Camden the mean turnout at borough elections in 
Liberal contested wards only, from 1959 to 1986 was consistently higher than the 
mean turnout for all Camden wards. In contrast, as Figure 24 illustrates, in the 
London Borough of Islington the mean turnout at borough elections in Liberal 
contested wards only, was only slightly above the mean for all Islington wards from 
1962 to 1968, and again to a larger degree in the period 1974 to 1982. 
106 
Figure 22^Mean percentage turnout all Inner-London boroughs contrasted with mean 
percentage turnout in Liberal contested wards only, at lower-tier elections 1945-1998. Source: 
Willis,A., and \Voollard,J., 2000 
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Figure 23: Mean percentage turnout in all inner-London boroughs contrasted with mean turnout 
Camden London Borough only, and mean turnout Liberal contested wards only Camden 
London Borough, at lower-tier elections 1945-1998. Willis^., and Woollard^., 2000 
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Figure 24: Mean turnout all inner-London boroughs, contrasted with mean turnout Islington 
London Borough only, and mean turnout Liberal contested wards only Islington London 
Borough, at lower-tier elections 1945-1998 Source of turnout figures: Willis^., and WooIlard,J., 
2000. 
o 
O) 
05 
a) 
u 
CL 
All Boroughs 
Islington all wards 
Islington Liberal 
Contested wards only 
^ ^ ^ ^ V (^^ ^ / v- ^ V ^ ^ ^ 
Indeed, as Railings and Thrasher point up, there are: 
'those authorities and wards which either defy the trends 
or whose turnout differs markedly from that in similar 
areas. Regardless of the scale of party competition, 
regardless of the state of the council and ward 
marginality voters ... appear to turnout in greater 
numbers than we might expect' (passim Railings and 
Thrasher 1997 pp 46-63). 
Clearly, there are factors other than marginality, party competition and socio-
economic status influencing turnout at local elections in these two boroughs. Indeed, 
Newton has argued that the impact of national politics on turnout and voting at local 
elections has a predominant explanatory role (Newton 1976 : 13-16,1972: 251-255). 
Electoral behaviour at local elections would then, be expected to closely resemble 
parliamentary electoral behaviour, and if Miller's argument is accepted, that those 
who vote at local elections are * almost perfectly representative of the full electorate 
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in terms of peutisanship and issue attitudes', the case for similarity in trends at both 
levels of voting behaviour is given more weight ( Millerl986:143). 
The expectation then would be that over time turnout and voting trends at borough 
elections would closely resemble trends in their coterminous parliamentary units. 
However, i f a comparison between trends in turnout at general elections in the 
Islington East, Islington North, Islington South West, Hampstead, Holbom and St 
Pancras South, St Pancras North constituencies, with trends in turnout in their 
coterminous wards at borough elections 1949-1970 is made, this expectation is not 
realised. There was a clear disparity between national and local electoral tumout 
trends (see Figures 25-30 below). In the East Islington Constituency, parliamentary 
electoral tumout was in steady decline from 1955 to 1970, however tumout at 
borough elections in coterminous wards was increasing steadily from 1962 to 1968. 
To a lesser degree in the North Islington Constituency tumout was increasing from 
1962 and then showed a steady increase after 1964, at a time o f steady decline in 
parliamentary electoral tumout. Similariy, at a time of steady decline in parliamentary 
electoral tumout in the Islington South West Constituency, there was an increase in 
tumout at coterminous borough ward elections from 1956 to 1962, and similarly after 
1964. The same trends of increasing borough electoral tumout at times of decreasing 
trends in parliamentary electoral tumout in coterminous wards are apparent in the 
Hampstead, Holbom and St Pancras South, and St Pancras North Constituencies. 
Indeed, in both the Islington North and the Islington South West constituencies 
support for the Labour and Conservative parties, as measured by party percentage 
share of the vote remained remarkably stable throughout the 1949 to 1970 period. The 
standard deviation of the Labour Party share of the vote at general elections in the 
Islington North constituency was a mere 1.91 and that of the Conservative Party 4.84. 
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However, at the borough elections in coterminous wards the standard deviation for the 
Labour Party was 8.64, and that of the Conservative Party 10.77. Similarly in the 
Islington South West constituency the standard deviation of the Labour Party share of 
the vote at general elections 1949-1970 was 2.45 and at borough elections in 
coterminous wards 11.34, and for the Conservative Party 3.57 and 9.21 respectively 
(see Table 29 below, the standard deviations in the two major parties' share of the 
vote in coterminous parliamentary and borough electoral units are outlined). Support 
for the Labour Party in the coterminous wards of the Islington North and Islington 
South West constituencies at borough elections, though stronger than at parliamentary 
electoral level is nevertheless characterised by periodic fluctuation. Interestingly, a 
downtum in both Labour and Conservative party percentage share of the vote at 
borough elections in the Islington South West wards from 1959 to the mid-1960s is 
mirrored in the rise of the Other vote. By contrast, a decline in the Conservative party 
percentage share of the vote in coterminous wards in borough elections in the North 
Islington constituency is mirrored in the rise of Liberal Party percentage share of the 
vote 1959-1964. In further contrast, a decline in both the Labour and Conservative 
percentage share of the vote at borough elections in the East Islington constituency 
is mirrored in the rise of the Liberal percentage share of the vote 1959-1962. 
However, at the parliamentary electoral level in the same wards over the same period 
the Labour Party maintained a stable level of support, as the Conservative Party's 
support declined and the Liberal Party's parliamentary level support increased. 
Similarly, the decline in Conservative local electoral support in the St Pancras North 
Constituency in 1959-1964 was reflected in the steady rise in the Other vote, whereas 
decline in the Conservative level of local electoral support in the Holbom and St 
Pancras South Constituency is reflected in Labour Party support at borough elections. 
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In addition over in the Hampstead Constituency there was a sudden and dramatic 
decline in Conservative support at borough elections to the benefit of the Liberals , 
however the Conservative decline at the parliamentary electoral level in the same 
period in the main benefited the Labour Party. Not only are there differences in net 
volatility between these coterminous electoral units at the parliamentary and borough 
levels, but also variance in net volatility between groups of wards within the same 
borough (see Figures 31 and 32). There are then clear disparities in the trends of both 
turnout and distribution of the party share of the vote between borough elections and 
parliamentary elections in these coterminous electoral units. There are also disparities 
in voting behaviour between constituencies within the same borough, and differences 
between boroughs of very similar socio-economic and political characteristics. 
Figure 25:East Islington Constituency: Parliamentary and Borough electoral turnout in 
coterminous wards 1949-1970. 
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Figure 26: North Islington Constituency: Parliamentary and Borough electoral turnout in 
coterminous wards 1949-1970 
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Figure 27: Islington South West Constituency: Parliamentary and Borough electoral turnout in 
coterminous wards 1949-1970. 
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Figure 28: Hampstead Constituency: Parliamentary and Borough electoral turnout in 
coterminous wards 1949-1970. 
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Figure 29: Holbom and St Pancras South Constituency : Parliamentary and Borough electoral 
turnout in coterminous wards 1949-1970. 
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Figure 30: St Pancras North Constituency:Parliamentary and Borough Electoral Turnout in 
Coterminous Wards 1949-1970. 
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Table 29: Standard Deviations in Labour and Conservative Party share of the vote at Borough 
and Parliamentary elections in coterminous wards 1949-1970 
Constituency SD Labour 
Parliamentary 
S D Labour 
Borough 
SD Conservative 
Parliameniap, 
SD Conservative 
Borough 
Islington East 3.08 10.01 5.52 12.05 
Islington North 1.91 8 6 4 4 84 10.76 
Islington South 
West 
2.45 11.34 3.57 921 
Hampstead 7.44 3 94 5.69 7.86 
Holbom 
St Pancras South 
4.09 5 89 3.11 601 
St Pancras North 3.49 5 59 2.87 6 64 
Figure 31: Pedersen index of dissimilarity- at successive borough elections wards coterminous 
with Islington Parliamentary constituency London Borough of Islington, 1951-1970. 
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Figure 32: Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive Borough elections in coterminous 
electoral wards of the C amden constituencies, 1951-1970. 
St Pancraa South 
1953 1955 1 956 1 959 1962 1964 1966 1! 
114 
Comparisons of indicators of electoral behaviour in coterminous local electoral wards 
and the parliamentary constituency of Sutton Coldfield reveal significant variance 
between the two types of elections. In Figure 33 it is clear that ward level net 
volatility, especially in the early 1960s, late 1960s and early 1970s, was at a much 
higher pitch than its parliamentary counterpart in the same wards. These period 
specific shifts in the distribution of the vote at successive local elections do not reflect 
the general pattern of partisan alignment at the parliamentary level. In Figure 34 the 
variance between local electoral party attachments and parliamentary electoral party 
attachments is clear. Support for the Labour Party in Sutton Coldfield was much 
stronger at the parliamentary level than at the municipal electoral level, \^*ereas the 
reverse was true for the Liberal Party. In contrast the Conservative Party's 
parliamentary support was reasonably constant whereas its local electoral support was 
subject to periodic shifts. Indeed, the standard deviation in the Conservative share of 
the vote at Sutton Coldfield local elections was 9.0, in contrast with a standard 
deviation of 5.6 at pariiamentary elections over the same 1958-1979 period. It would 
seem that the context of an election was important to the calculus of voters when it 
came to deciding which party to cast a vote for. Furthermore, as Figure 35 illustrates 
there was great variance in turnout levels between wards at individual council 
elections, and great variance in each individual wards turnout over a series of 
elections. In particular wards at particular times it seems that turnout could fluctuate 
dramatically from the mean turnout of all wards in the borough. Indeed, in individual 
wards turnout could fluctuate dramatically as in the case of Boldmere East at the 1958 
and 1959 elections when ward turnout was almost two standard deviations above the 
ward's mean turnout at these elections over the whole period. 
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Figure 33:Pedersen index of dissimilarity at successive Sutton Coldfield County Borough 
Council elections 1959-1972 and Sutton Coldfield wards at Birmingham District Counci l 
elections 1972 to 1982, contrasted with Pedersen indei at successive Sutton CoidHeld 
Constituency at Parliamentary elections 1959-1979 
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Figure 34 above: Party percentage share of the total vote at Sutton Coldfield County Borough 
Council elections 1959-1972 and Sutton Coldfield wards at Birmingham District Counci l 
elections 1972 to 1982, contrasted with party share of the total vote in Sutton Coldrield 
Constituency at Parliamentary elections 1959-1979. 
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Figure 35 below: Mean percentage turnout all Sutton Coldfleld wards at council elections 1958-
1971, (no figures for 1970 available, wards contested over whole period only) and mean 
percentage tumout all wards. 
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Similar variance between national and local voting behaviour is apparent at elections 
in the Birmingham Ladywood constituency and its coterminous local electoral units 
(general elections 1959-1970, and Birmingham County Council elections 1959-1972 
Duddeston, Ladywood and Newtown [previously St Paul's wards up to 1961 
election]). Over the 1959 to 1972 jjeriod in coterminous local electoral wards at 
Birmingham County Council elections the standard deviation in Labour's share o f the 
vote at these elections was 14.1, in contrast to a standard deviation of 9.1 at 
parliamentary elections. Indeed, the Labour Party's support at the local level declined 
swiftly from the early 1960s, preceded its parliamentary counterpart, and suffered a 
much greater rate of attrition. 
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Figure 36: Party percentage share of the total vote at Birmingham County Council elections 
1959-1972 contrasted with party percentage share of the total vote at Parliamentary elections 
1959-1970, for the Ladywood Constituency and its coterminous local electoral wards 
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4.11:( onclusion 
In this chapter measures of party politicisation, contestation, partisan dealignment and 
net volatility at local elections and parliamentary elections in London and 
Birmingham 1959-1979 have evidenced significant variance in electoral behaviour; at 
different types of elections within an authority, between authorities of the same type, 
and between trends in local and parliamentary electoral behaviour in coterminous 
electoral units The evidence supports the propositions that a proportion of the 
electorate in inner-London and Birmingham at elections in the period 1959-1979, at 
certain times and in particular places concomitantly held contradictory local 
government and parliamentary voting preferences, and that there was a significant 
degree of inter- and intra-authority variance in electoral behaviour. Thus, the evidence 
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adds weight to the case for the influence of contextual factors upon voting behaviour 
at local elections and erodes the 'annual genera! election' thesis. 
Further support for contextual voting was provided by comparison of trends between 
local and parliamentary electoral dealignment Denver has argued that there is a 
consensus among analysts that the electorate has become more unpredictable and 
volatile. Indeed, there is no dispute among political scientists that party attachments in 
Britain declined in the 1970s. However, the evidence of inner-London and 
Birmingham local electoral data presents a slightly different picture. Except for period 
specific elections the two-party grip over the electorate at the lower-tier Birmingham 
elections remained firm and actually increased in the 1970s. In irmer-London, 1962 
apart, the 1960s was a period of increasing partisan alignment at lower-tier local 
elections, while at the upper-tier the 1960s was a period of declining party 
attachments. In contrast the parliamentary elections in coterminous constituencies of 
inner-Lx)ndon show a general pattem of decline in partisan support over the 1959-
1979 period, though, from 1974 this trend was sharply reversed. 
The evidence throws up some contradictions to the orthodox view that pre-1970 
elections are characterised by partisan alignment At the 1962 and 1963 lower-tier 
elections in Birmingham, Denver's 'twin pillars' were seriously undermined in many 
inner-city wards as voters turned to the Liberals at local elections. Indeed, net 
volatility at the Birmingham lower-tier elections was as period specific in its extremes 
and of the same magnitude or more, as that of the 1970s. This weakening of 
traditional connections between part of the electorate and in this case the Labour 
Party, albeit short lived, clearly predates the emerging trend of dealignment at the 
parliamentary electoral level detected by Butler and Stokes. 
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Furthermore, the evidence suggests that in some locations at certain times the 
electorate at local elections in the 1960s were just as ready sway in response to short 
term factors as was Sarlvik and Crewe's 1974 parliamentary electorate. 
The evidence of this chapter has identified the existence of contextual voting 
behaviour; the next step is to attempt to explain why the electorate are at times 
influenced by the context they vote in. Railings and Thrasher have concluded that: 
The identification of such potential sources of variation 
is important... the possibility that aggregate national 
trends are at least in part the product of the smoothing 
out of contradictory local forces must not be neglected' 
(Rallings,C.,andThrasher,M., 1997:168). 
However, these sources of variation in electoral behaviour remain elusive to 
quantitative research methods. Nevertheless, the investigation into which factors 
influence local government electoral behaviour and the relationship between this level 
of electoral behaviour and parliamentary electoral outcomes in coterminous electoral 
units can be taken forward by the qualitative approach of the historian, and to this end 
the next four case study chapters must turn their attention. 
The four case studies, in detailed narrative accounts, will try to identify and assess the 
relationships and processes involved in local electoral behaviour in their historical 
context. These findings will provide the foundation of hypotheses about the 
relationships between local electoral behaviour and contextual socio-economic and 
political variables which can then be tested by inferential statistical techniques in 
chapters 9 and 10 and thereby corroboration or otherwise established. In this way it 
intended that convergent lines of evidence from the two disciplines will reveal the 
existence and significance of influences upon local electoral behaviour and its 
relationship with pariiamentary electoral behaviour that have hitherto been 
overlooked or underestimated. 
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C H A P T E R 5 
BIRMINGHAM LADYWQOD 
S.lilntroduction 
From 1945, and throughout the period of interest of this study, the Birmingham 
municipal electoral pendulum oscillated between the Labour and Conservative parties 
in a two-party duopoly that maintained a vice-like grip upon the city's local politics. 
The Liberals had not contested in a single ward at the 1952,1953 and 1954 
Birmingham County Borough elections, and the party from 1955 to 1959 had put up 
candidates in less than a third of the wards. At the 1955 County Borough elections the 
Birmingham Liberals had taken just 2.2% of the vote. In contrast, at the 1962 
municipal elections the Liberals contested in 26 of the 43 wards and took 16% of the 
Birmingham vote. At the 1962 elections Wallace Lawler became the first Liberal 
candidate to be elected to the city council since John Fryer had won, unopposed in the 
King's Norton ward, in 1938.In fact Lawler had won the first Liberal victory in a 
three-cornered contest since 1919. At the 1975 Birmingham District Council elections 
the city's Liberals were able to contest in all wards and took 16.4% of the 
Birmingham vote (Phillips 2000:passim). The elections of 1962 and 1975 are 
milestones in what are usually considered two distinct phases of Liberal revival at the 
local electoral level in Birmingham. They are also, respectively, parts of the two 
national upsurges in Liberal Party support at the municipal level and the 
pariiamentary electoral level, especially by-election, in the late 1950s to early 1960s, 
and the early 1970s. How far the votes of the electorate at the local government level 
were crucial to the Liberal Party revivals at the Parliamentary electoral level, and to 
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what extent those votes were cast in consideration of local issues will now be 
explored in the Birmingham case study of Ladywood. 
5.2:Ladvwood, its boundaries and electoral history 
The inner-city constituency of Ladywood was comprised of the Duddeston, St Paul's 
and Ladywood wards at parliamentary elections up to and excluding the February 
1974 general election. In the 1962 ward boundary revisions a part of the St Paul's 
ward and a part of the Market Hall ward were subsumed by the Ladywood ward (see 
maps 1 and 2 below). A part of the remainder of St Paul's was included into an 
expanded Duddeston ward and the rest combined with the Lozells ward to create a 
new ward called Newtown (see explanatory notes map 1). Thus, the 1962 ward 
revisions have a minimal impact upon the integrity of a comparison of local and 
parliamentary electoral behaviour in the Ladywood constituency. The revised 
parliamentary constituency of Birmingham Ladywood at the February 1974 general 
election is somewhat more problematic, (see Table 30 below) however the focus of 
our concern in this case study is primarily upon the Birmingham Ladywood 
constituency and its component local electoral wards up tol974. 
Table 30: Birmingham Ladywood constituency and component local electoral 
wards 1959-1979 and contiguous constituencies. 
C O N S T I T U E N C Y 1959-1970 wards at general elections 
L A D Y W O O D Duddeston, St PauPs, Ladywood 
A L L S A I N T S All Saints, Rotten Park, Soho 
H A N D S W O R T H Handsworth, Lozells,SandweU 
S M A L L H E A T H Deritend, Saltley, Small Heath 
Revised wards from May 1962 
Ladywood = Ladywood + part St Paul's + part Market Hall 
Duddeston = Duddeston + part St PauPs 
Newtown = Lozells + part St Paul's 
C O N S T I T U E N C Y 1974 -1979 wards at general elections 
Ladywood Ladywood, AllSaints, Rotton Paric,Soho 
Handsworth Aston ,Handsworth, Sandwell 
Small Heath Duddeston, Newtown, Saltley, Small Heath 
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Mapt :B inn ingham ward boundaries 1950-1962. Source. T h e Birmingham Post Y e a r Book. 
Ladywood Constituency = Duddeston ward + St Paul's ward + Ladywood ward at 
General Elections 1959-1970 inclusive. 
In May 1962 the Birmingham ward boundaries were changed and the Ladywood ward 
subsumed part of the St Paul's ward and part of the Market Hall ward. However, the 
Ladywood Constituency was still defined by its pre-1962 ward boundaries. Therefore, 
at the 1964, 1966 and 1970 General Elections more than half the local government 
electorate of the NEWTOWN ward (see map 2 overleaf) voted in the Ladywood 
Constituency. 
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M a p 2:Binningham ward boundaries 1962-1982. Source, T h e Birmingham Post Y e a r Book 
Note: SuUon Cofafneld Warda addod 1973 
Y 
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Table 31: Lowei^tier municipal election data, 19S9-1973, the wards that comprised the 
Birmingham Ladywood Constituency at General Elections 1959-1970, (Newtown ward included) 
Year Ward Seats Electorate Turnout Majority C O N % L A B 
% 
L I B 
% 
O T H 
% 
1959 Duddeston 1 14708 24.31 56.58 21.71 78.29 0 0 
1959 Ladywood 1 11453 26.85 38.86 30.57 69.43 0 0 
1959 St PauPs 1 13115 25.59 27.84 36.08 63.92 0 0 
1960 Duddeston 1 13668 19.78 41.4 27.34 68.74 0 3.92 
1960 Ladywood 1 10395 21.82 24.58 37.71 62.29 0 0 
19 AO S I Paiirs 1 12449 19.76 21.96 39.02 60.98 0 0 
1961 Duddeston I 12847 25.35 47.81 24.1 71.91 0 3.99 
1961 LadyvNwd 1 10395 25.61 39.82 28.55 68.37 0 3.08 
1961 St Paul's I 11733 23.31 20.96 39.52 60.48 0 0 
1962 Duddeston I 17706 20.6 41.14 27.28 68.42 0 4.3 
1962 Ladywood I 14472 21.56 16.31 39.07 55.38 0 5.55 
1962 Newtown 1 17341 26.88 9.42 15.32 37.63 47.05 0 
1963 Duddeston 1 17144 23.05 49.45 23.29 72.74 0 3.97 
1963 Ladywood 1 13473 21.93 14.22 42.01 56.23 0 1.76 
1963 Newtown 1 16714 29.68 1.93 12.66 43.92 41.99 1.43 
1964 Duddeston 1 16500 22.03 42.48 23.49 65.97 7.54 3 
1964 Ladywood I 12104 25.55 14.32 40.32 54.64 3.49 1.55 
1964 NewtowTi 1 15693 30.06 10.76 16.28 47.24 36.48 0 
1965 Duddeston 1 16253 20.29 9.7 43.68 53.38 0 2.94 
1965 Ladywood I 11236 24.8 10.66 55.33 44.67 0 0 
1965 Newtown 1 14268 33.97 32.83 13.29 26.94 59.77 0 
1966 Duddeston 1 16046 24.78 27.31 23.11 52.1 24.79 0 
1966 Ladywood 1 10716 24.59 7.82 40.38 48.2 11.42 0 
1966 Newtown 1 12718 31.4 17.93 10.59 35.74 56.67 0 
1967 Duddeston 1 14594 25.16 27.83 24.62 52.45 22.09 0.84 
1967 Ladywood 1 10666 28.1 7.11 48.28 41.17 10.54 0 
1967 Newtown 1 11564 32.02 21.74 13.5 32.38 54.12 0 
1968 Duddeston I 13800 29.02 24.02 26.54 22.9 50.56 0 
1968 Ladywood 1 9723 23.93 32.31 62.91 30.6 6.49 0 
1968 Newtown 1 9462 33.34 59.53 8.21 16.13 75.66 0 
1969 Duddeston 1 12877 31.23 20.57 25.44 22.71 5.84 46.01 
1969 Ladywood 1 8373 30.71 18.9 45,39 26.49 24.78 3.35 
1969 Newtown 1 7257 32.4 31.35 12.68 27.99 59.34 0 
1970 [>uddeston 1 12873 25.69 12.83 18.87 46.98 34.15 0 
1970 Ladywood 1 7754 36.72 19.88 21.18 42.08 22.2 14.54 
1970 Newtown 1 7546 34.35 1.85 22.69 37.73 39.58 0 
1971 DuddesLon I 11851 30.54 10.72 13.62 48.55 37.83 0 
1971 Ladywood I 8173 33.79 39.28 20.89 60.17 18.94 0 
1971 Newtnwn I 7763 42.11 6.27 10.46 47.9 41.63 0 
1972 Duddeston I 10646 32.5 11.19 14.25 37.28 48.47 0 
1972 Ladywood I 9714 30.34 33.15 31.15 64.3 4.55 0 
1972 Newtown 1 9341 37.64 2.39 12 42.8 45.19 0 
1973 Duddeston 1 10073 29.42 11.15 10.13 39.36 50.51 0 
1973 Ladywood 1 9729 33.84 10.52 14.11 46.73 36.21 2.95 
1973 NewtowTi 1 9889 35.61 0.31 9.61 45.04 43.35 0 
The Newtown ward was the location for the election of the first post-war Liberal 
Party candidate, Wallace Lawler, to the city council in 1962 (Table 31), and the 
Ladywood constituency was the seat Lawler won at a parliamentary by election in 
I969.Much of the Newtown ward, before the 1962 ward boundary alterations, had 
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been the Labour stronghold of the St Paul's ward, thus at parliamentary elections the 
majority of Newtown ward's local government electorate were part of the Ladywood 
Constituency electorate. Labour had won a seat in the St Paul's ward at the 1945 
municipal elections and made a further gain in in 1946 when Dennis Howell, the 
future Labour Minister, took just over 60 % of the votes cast. Labour, apart from 
temporarily losing a seat to the Conservatives at the 1947 municipal elections, had 
won every electoral contest in the ward up until Lawler's triumph. In the inter-war 
period the ward had been dominated by the Conservatives. 
Lawler had, however, first contested in the neighbouring Lozells ward in 1957. 
Lozells had been a Labour Party stronghold throughout the 1950s, and a Conservative 
redoubt in the 1930s and 1940s. and had little history of Liberal intervention. 
Similarly, the Ladywood ward last had a Liberal presence in 1914 and the ward had 
been dominated by the Conservatives from 1929 to 1939. The Duddeston ward 
(Duddeston and Nechells 1911-1950) had been dominated by the Labour Party since 
1911 and had no regular Liberal intervention or presence untill963. Clearly, the 
electoral history up until the 1960s, of the wards that made up the Ladywood 
constituency, evidences a state of virtual dereliction as far as the Liberal Party was 
concerned. 
5.3:Inner-city Birmingham and Liberal Party electoral strategy 
In 1956, on television and radio and in the local and national press a Birmingham 
Liberal had revealed the 'city's festering sore of homelessness', and by 1961 the 
Liberal News could laud the Birmingham Liberals as having a 'proud and unequalled 
record in their long fight for the homewaiters' (Liberal News 27 April 1961). On the 
back of local community discontent over housing issues Wallace Lawler, at his sixth 
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attempt at office, won the Labour inner-city stronghold of the Newtown ward, and 
thereby the Liberals had gained a voice in local government for the first time since the 
1930s. Lawler's success at the March 1966 general election, when he came second in 
the contest for the Ladywood Constituency, confirmed the efficacy of his brand of 
community politics and brought about a complete change in the electoral strategy of 
the Birmingham Liberals. Despite opposition fi-om some elements of the Birmingham 
Liberal party, Dennis Minnis, the local party's full-time organiser 'pushed through a 
plan for high concentration on a few central wards rather than a dissipation of energy 
fighting a large number of suburban wards as had been the case until then' (Liberal 
News, April 1970). This revised electoral strategy of 'putting candidates forward in 
the Inner-Wards of the City where they [considered] the Labour Party most 
vulnerable' (Birmingham Mail 25 April 1966) quickly paid off (see Table 31). 
Success followed for the Liberals when their candidate Ken Hardeman took a second 
seat from Labour in the Newtown ward at the May 1966 Birmingham County 
Borough Elections. Labour lost their third and final seat at Newtown in 1967 when 
the Liberal candidate Gordon Herringshaw took 54 % of the vote. At the 1968 local 
elections the Liberals took seats from Labour in the two adjoining wards of 
Duddeston and Aston. At Duddeston the Liberal candidate, R.A.Coms took 50.5 % of 
the vote, which gave him a resounding overall majority of over one thousand votes, a 
swing fi-om Labour to the Liberals of almost 28% (see Table 31). Similarly, in the 
Aston ward the Liberal candidate, Paul Tilsley, took 52% of the votes cast, with a 
swing of 25.4% from Labour to the Liberals. At the May 1969 municipal elections the 
Liberals made further gains in Duddeston and Aston, with their Aston ward candidate, 
G.A.Gopsill the regional party treasurer, taking 58.2% of the vote. In the Duddeston 
ward, Dennis Minnis ran as an Independent Liberal against Roy Hammersley the 
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official Liberal candidate who was endorsed by the Ladywood Constituency 
Association and the national leadership, but not by the Duddeston Ward Liberal 
Association. Despite this party schism between ward and constituency level that 
exemplifies Liberal Party local autonomy, and fielding two candidates in a four-
cornered contest against a Labour and a Conservative candidate, Minnis took 46 % of 
the vote and with it the seat from Labour (see Table 31). 
Thus, in May 1969 the Liberals had seven councillors, five of them from wards within 
the Ladywood Parliamentary Constituency and thereby a much broader electoral base 
fi-om which to launch their parliamentary by election campaign that elevated Lawler 
into the Commons. It prompted The Birmingham Post to speculate that 'An apparent 
hardening conviction among the working-class voters in the city centre wards of 
Birmingham that the Liberals are their true allies could make the Liberal Party the 
main opposition group on Birmingham City Council this time next year' (20 May 
1969). 
S,4:lnner-citv housing and Lawlerism 
The explanation for this partisan dealignment by traditional Labour supporters cannot 
be found in any sudden conversion of the local electorate to Liberalism. The 
Birmingham Post observed of the electorate in these wards the fact that 'they are 
largely ignorant of official Liberal policy' (ibid). Indeed, 'Lawler... admits that 
hardly any of the electorate could tell you what the Liberal party policies are, and . . 
some of them would not even know what party he represented' (The Birmingham 
Post ,4 May 1968). The newspaper located the reason for the swing from Labour to 
the Liberals in the much more prosaic and pragmatic, but nevertheless pertinent, 
issues of 'Damp bedrooms, blocked drains and cracked plaster [as] the hidden 
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persuaders behind the continuing success of the Liberal Party in Birmingham' (The 
Birmingham Post, 20 May 1969). The Liberal candidates, mostly younger people, 
had built up a reputation for being 'dedicated to getting repairs done, for getting 
results', indeed, the 'electorate obviously believes these men will pursue any 
complaint - no matter how trivial' (ibid). The Birmingham Post regarded the voting 
trends in these inner-city wards as a 'refreshing situation of people voting not on 
national trends but very definitely on local issues - on problems they could see from 
... [their]... windows' (ibid). The phenomenon of grass roots Liberalism, from the 
party's single success in 1962 until their expanded presence on the city council and 
voice in local politics was termed 'Lawlerism' by the local press. Other prospective 
Liberal candidates had adopted his 'controversial brand of Liberalism' and the interest 
of the electorate was maintained by 'advice bureaax and regular newsletters and 
leaflets' in what was described as 'an all-year round election campaign which had 
created a loyalty to the established candidates' (ibid). 
Indeed, the recognition of housing as a potent electoral issue was not confined to its 
salience to inner-city municipal elections, or just a concern of the Birmingham 
Liberals. As Brian Walden, the Labour candidate for the neighbouring inner-city 
Parliamentary Constituency of Al l Saints observed, 'housing [is] a problem no 
politician in Birmingham can ignore' (Birmingham Planet, 9 Jan. 1964). Walden's 
warning echoed eariier concerns expressed by Dennis Howell MP, at a meeting of the 
Birmingham Labour Group and Labour MPs in 1962 when Howell observed that the 
'long delay between clearance and rebuilding [was ] creating serious problems for the 
Party' (Birmingham City Council Labour Group Minutes;Vol.6, 24 Oct. 1962). The 
remarks also reflected a concern from a different perspective, expressed by the then 
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Conservative cx)unciIlor and future MP of a neighbouring inner-city ward, Anthony 
Beaumont-Dark, that local councils 'were flagrantly abusing the charity of the 
ratepayers' (Aston Conservative and Unionist Association Minutes 12 June 1963). 
Nevertheless, the Labour Party were successful in Birmingham at the 1964 general 
election and rightly claimed that 'Throughout the City, in practically every 
Constituency, we have exceeded our expectations in the Owner-Occupier areas' 
(Report on October 1964 General Election; Birmingham Joint Trade Union and 
Labour Party Liaison Committee). 
Paradoxically, however. Labour's 'vote [had] declined in the strong traditional areas' 
(ibid). As Howell and Walden had intimated, the fall in Labour support could 'be 
explained in certain areas ... where clearance areas have not been redeveloped, in pre-
war Municipal estates where the Rent issue is still with us' (ibid). The potential for 
political exploitation of housing issues is apparent in a report from the Housing 
Management Committee of the controlling Labour Group to the Birmingham Borough 
Labour Party Municipal Policy Conference in March 1962. In 1962 excluding existing 
council houses the council controlled 14,960 properties in redevelopment areas and 
14,162 properties designated for slum clearance. However, in 1961 there were 49,000 
families on the Housing Register, and the rate at which the Housing Register was 
increasing outpaced that of homes available. There were also approximately 30,500 
privately owned slum properties in the city's central areas. Although by 1962 some 
21,576 of these properties had been 'reconditioned' and 'first-aid repairs' carried out 
on thousands more, the Borough Labour Party deemed the situation a 'colossal 
problem facing the Housing Management Committee' (Birmingham Borough Labour 
Party Minutes:Municipal Policy Conference Report of the City Labour Group 
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Housing Management Committee March 1962). The pro-Conservative Birmingham 
Mail, the most popular local daily newspaper, put the waiting list in December 1961 
at 50,000 families (Birmingham Mail, 13 April 1962). Wallace Lawler, the Chairman 
of the city's Liberals, put the figures at 60,000 families on the waiting list and a 
further 40,000 families living in slum clearance areas, and described the 
redevelopment of the commercial centre of Birmingham as a *multi-million facade 
...side by side with... indescribable housing cx)nditions... and misery in the back 
streets' (Liberal News 27 April 1961). 
The grievances of the voters in these inner-city wards of the Ladywood Parliamentary 
Constituency and the responses of prospective Liberal candidates that enabled them to 
translate that discontent into electoral support, will now be assessed. 
S.SiHousing conditions, voter discontent and Liberal responses. 
The houses of the inner-city wards of Birmingham were predominately squalid 
slums, many designated for eventual clearance. They comprised a mixture of council 
owned properties, owner-occupiers, private sector rental tenants renting houses, flats 
or rooms, furnished or unfurnished. Housed within these disparate tenures was a 
growing population of young married couples, with or without offspring, generally 
living-in with parents. The relative proportion of each category of tenure in these 
wards was of course constantly, i f very slowly, changing over the period of this 
study's interest. However, squalid, overcrowded slum conditions persisted to a greater 
or lesser degree over this period in these wards, as did discontent about the speed of 
the re-housing programme. Exacerbating this discontent was anger over the levels of 
rents in both the public and private rental sectors. 
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This dissatisfaction was compounded by the local authority's housing policy. The 
tenants of slum properties taken over by the council were subject to rent rises whilst 
waiting for re-housing, or eventual council financed repair and modernisation, that is 
installation of an inside toilet, a bathroom, a hot water system and in some cases a 
kitchen. In the private rental sector 'thousands ... had their rents increased as a result 
of the 1957 Rent Act'. To counter the potential adverse effect of the Act upon local 
voters the Conservatives ran a concerted campaign to 'prove that the Rent Act is not 
the landlord's charter as alleged by the Socialists' (Birmingham Mail, 2 May 1958). 
Indeed, it was considered that the result in a neighbouring inner-city ward, where 
seven out of ten voters privately rented, would be 'a measure of reaction' to the Act 
(The Birmingham Post 3 May 1958). 
Added to this disquiet was an alarming threat to security of tenure, in that landlords 
after the lapse of a three-year lease could evict in order to sell a property. Rent rebates 
were non-existent in the private rental sector until 1973, and in both the public and the 
private rental sectors rent-rebate schemes and fair rent schemes in the period excluded 
ail but the very poorest of tenants by dint of an income threshold qualification. In the 
main the employed tenant on vi^ges much lower than the so-called national average 
wage did not qualify for rent rebate or assistance. Indeed, in 1960 a survey by The 
Birmingham Post at the May local elections found that the rent rise affecting 73,000 
council tenants in the city and a rate rise of 2s 6d affecting the owner-occupiers of the 
city to be 'by far the most unpopular measures among the voters' (The Birmingham 
Post 10 May 1960). Such was the differential between the earnings of many of those 
in the inner-city wards and the level of rent in the newly constructed council houses 
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that were available, that *many tenants ... are having to refuse tenancies because the 
rents are too high' (Birmingham Mail 29 March 1968). 
A l l of these problems and the discontent that they generated continued to colour local 
elections in these wards into the 1970s. In the 1970s inflation and unemployment, and 
increasingly vociferous demands from tower block tenants to be re-housed in homes 
more suitable for families with young children, added to voter discontent. 
Liberal policy in the city was a two-pronged strategy that focused upon housing 
conditions, and its economic corollary rising rate and rent burdens. A local electoral 
conundrum that Lawler suggested could only be resolved by reform of the rating 
system. More practically Lawler set up a Liberal Advice Centre that helped residents 
with a raft of problems not just solely housing. Lawler, some years later at the party's 
Eastbourne Assembly of 1970, outlined his brand of community politics and his 
proposal that the Liberal Party should develop it nationally. 
His tried and tested tactics were based upon the establishment of a Liberal Advice 
Centre, in practice a housing surgery, at ward level in a derelict constituency to attract 
Liberal sympathisers. Lawler related how a local community centre or hall was 
booked, a leaflet sent to every house in the ward and the local Citizens Advice Centre 
and other bodies 'alerted to our activities' (Liberal News Thurs. 15 Oct., 1970). Tea, 
posters, literature and the prospective Liberal local electoral candidate welcomed the 
visitors. Set aside was a private room where the Liberal Adviser and a secretary dealt 
immediately with a visitor's grievance, be it about housing, health, education or 
whatever. As Lawler related,' cases are dealt with on the spot... a typist, types the 
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letter... to the appropriate body or authority and gives the same to the applicant, to 
read, approve... and post, a copy being kept in the file for future reference' (ibid). As 
well as being a housing surgery the Advice Centre was also an informal meeting place 
where visitors discussed local and national political issues and were invited to ' join 
the party, join the tote, or even i f they desire, join in the planning of some militant 
campaign' (ibid). 
The success of these tactics in former derelict wards was commented upon in the local 
press. The Birmingham Mail observed how 'Some parts of Birmingham had a 
longstanding Liberal aura about them, others have ac^^uired one [and] Newtown 
[ward's] has been acquired recently. This is Lawler country and modem Liberalism 
has really put its back into ... propaganda there' (Birmingham Mail 27 April 1964). 
The popularity o f the housing surgeries reflected the problems of the Newtown ward 
and explained why ' i t had been possible for Lawler to win it at all ' (The Birmingham 
Post. 6 May 1965). Indeed, the explanation for the revival in Liberal Party fortunes in 
this 'solid Labour ward [where] traditional party allegiances had become blurred' was 
tenant discontent over the inability o f the council ... to do repairs quickly or 
satisfactorily enough... [and] the personality of the candidate' (ibid). The Labour 
Party candidate, Joe Harvey was in no doubt: 'About the issue in Newtown there is no 
argument. It is housing. People don't want to talk about economics. They want to talk 
about bathrooms, running water and good facilities and places where children can 
play' (ibid). The electorate also wanted to talk about health issues caused by the 
adverse effects of slum-land living. The extent of the problem can be gauged by 
Wallace Lawler's comments to the Liberal Party Council in London in 1966: 'In 
Birmingham last year over 7,000 families asked to be re-housed from unfit houses 
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because of acute medical conditions, the net number who were found new homes 
were 23' (Liberal Nevys. 27 May 1966). Indeed, in 1967 the council re-housed 29 
families from the inner-city wards because of an outbreak of infective tuberculosis, a 
fiirther 17 in 1968 and 11 in 1969 before the outbreak was controlled (Birmingham 
Statistics Vol.,14:119) Clearly, Lawler and his Liberal colleagues had found a niche 
in the local electoral market. 
The Liberal Advice Centres were an integral part of an electoral strategy to win the 
Birmingham central wards as a springboard for parliamentary electoral success. More 
than half of the electorate of the Ladywood Constituency up until the February 1974 
general election lived in the Duddeston ward, and thus, the capture of its local 
electorate's support was regarded as a vital stepping-stone in order to win the 
parliamentary seat. In 1967 the Liberals contested Deritend, a contiguous ward that 
bordered both the Duddeston and Ladywood wards. Deritend, with equally dire 
housing conditions, was regarded as 'a link through Ladywood and Duddeston to 
Newtown where their two councillors [sat]' (Birmingham Mail 2 May 1967). At the 
May local elections, Gordon Herringshaw the Liberal candidate for Newton ward, 
was able to crow to the press that, 'our advice bureaux are crowded with people who 
may not be Liberals but come to us because we get things done for them' 
(Birmingham Mail, 6 May 1967). The centrality of these Advice Centres was 
acknowledged in 'Party Platform' an annual local electoral feature in the Birmingham 
Mail where the major parties expressed their views during the local electoral 
campaign. In 1972 the Liberal candidate for Duddeston, Dennis Minnis, the Deputy 
Leader of the Liberal Group, explained how 'These families have the sort of problems 
which are typical of the hundreds I deal with at my Advice Centre each Wednesda
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evening' (Birmingham Mail 27 April 1972). Among the problems Minnis alluded to 
was the discontent of many Duddeston tenants who 'all have lived in flats and 
maisonettes and each has the same wish - to move to a house' (ibid). Duddeston was 
a forest of multi-storey tower blocks and 'annually [provided] Birmingham's most 
extraordinary display of election posters [an] impressive show of orange and black 
banners and slogans slung from balconies' (Liberal News, 29 April 1970). The 
problems of housing loomed large in both the local electorate's voting calculus and 
the tactics adopted by prospective Liberal candidates to benefit from this groundswell 
of discontent. 
Furthermore, inextricably linked with housing conditions and rent levels were the 
issues of rates and council spending. Although the issue of rates may not have had the 
same electoral purchase in these inner-city wards where much of the electorate were 
dependent upon public housing, it was nevertheless important to those owner-
occupiers who lived there. The issue of rates and council spending was a substantial 
plank in the Liberal Party's local electoral appeal throughout the city. For those in 
public housing in these wards the consequence of the council's decision to keep the 
level of rates down was an inevitable rise in their rent. For those in the private rental 
sector and owner-occupiers more directly, increases in the rates meant an increase in 
household expenditure and resentment towards the city council, which up to the 1972 
Housing Finance Act, provided a blanket subsidy from the rates towards council rent 
irrespective of a tenants level of earnings. 
The slum clearance programme, the building of new council estates, the repair and 
modernisation of slum properties, and the vast reconstruction of Birmingham's 
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commercial centre, comprised an ambitious and costly scheme. Notwithstanding 
central government subsidy a great deal of the cost had to be borne by the local 
electorate. For instance, the cost of repairs to the thousands of inner-city substandard 
houses was recouped fi-om council rents, rates and the government subsidy meant for 
council house building. For every £1 spent by the council on these repairs, 12s 3d was 
recouped in rent, 5s was recouped from the rate fund and only 2s 9d from the central 
government Exchequer Grant Birmingham's civic debt had grown from £79 million 
in 1951 to £180 million by 1962, and the expenditure of rate assisted committees had 
more than doubled in the same period from £21 million to £45 million (The 
Birmingham Post. 13 April 1962). 
Understandably, without the constraints of office, or its likelihood, the Liberals could 
make much of the issue of rates, as indeed did both the major party groups when not 
controlling the council. At the 1965 local elections the Liberals pointed to the fact that 
'Birmingham's total rate demand has gone up nearly two-and-a-half times that of 
comparable cities which have Socialist controlled councils' (Birmingham Mail 27 
April 1965). Indeed, by this time, Wallace Lawler, the sole Liberal on the council 
representing Newtown ward, 'had made a tremendous impact in the ward [and had] 
paid particular attention to ... demands for cost-cutting methods in municipal 
departments that would cut the rates' (Birmingham Mail 4 May 1965). At the 1970 
Birmingham municipal elections the Liberal leader Jo Grimond led an attack on both 
council party groups in the city press for having placed an excessive financial burden 
on the rate and rent payers of the city (Birmingham MaiL 21 April 1970). 
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The predominant electoral refrain in local election campaigns in 1960s and 1970s 
Birmingham, expressed in the Liberal, Conservative and Labour manifestos, cited by 
columnists in the local press, pedalled by prospective candidates and of concern to the 
local electorate, were the issues of housing, rents, rates and council spending. In 
addition to these issues, from the mid 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the debate 
over comprehensive education increasingly became an important local electoral issue, 
(the impact of which wi l l be discussed in a following section). However, some 
explanation of how the Birmingham Labour Party came to lose control of these inner-
city wards is necessary. How and why a local electoral political vacuum was created 
in these traditionally Labour voting wards that gave the political space to Liberal 
candidates needs to be expounded. As the Birmingham Borough Labour Party 
pondered in the wake of the May 1962 local elections, 'Newtown should be a Labour 
safe seat... to have lost by over 400 votes needs some explanation' (Secretary's 
Report to the Executive Committee On Municipal Elections May 1962: B.B.L.P. 
Ex.Com Minutes Vol., 12, 1962-1963). 
S.6:Birmingbam Labour Group and political pragmatism. 
In this section it will be argued that the electoral opportunity that opened up for the 
Liberals in the inner-city wards was a consequence of the Labour Group's often 
tenuous grip on council control, and an electorally pragmatic housing policy 
implemented by the Labour Group in order to remain in contention with their close 
rivals for the Birmingham vote, the Conservatives. In 1961 the Labour and 
Conservative groups on the council both had fifty-seven seats. However, the Labour 
group had twenty-one Aldermen and the Conservatives sixteen, thus, Labour 
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controlled with a small majority of five. Despite further Labour gains in 1963 and 
1964, the Conservative group established a clear majority in 1966 and maintained 
control until 1972, when the Labour group, in what was a national local electoral 
phenomenon, were swept back into power with gains of nineteen seats. In 1973, the 
year the Aldermanic system was discontinued. Labour with seventy-three seats, had 
an overall majority of twenty, with the Conservatives on forty-four and the Liberals 
on nine. However, overall control was soon lost when, in 1975, the Labour group 
were reduced to sixty-three, the Conservatives increased to fifly-five, and the Liberals 
with eight, thus, having a voice in a hung council. 
This alternation in council control by the two major parties, characterised by very 
brief periods of overall control and longer periods of tenuous control and even 
minority control, was in part a product of the marginal nature of a number of the 
Birmingham wards. In 1962 the Birmingham Borough Labour Party had identified 
fifteen wards as marginal and in need of 'special organising and financial assistance' 
(Report of a Special Meeting of Ward Secretaries, 19 Feb. 1962, B.B.L.P. Exec. 
Comm. Minutes,Vol 12). The same committee in 1969 identified sixteen marginal 
wards, however, the report recommended 'a drive on the Liberal slanted seats ... and 
a special meeting of [candidates and agents] to consider a special approach to combat 
the challenge from the Liberals in those wards* (B.B.L.P. Exec.Comm. Minutes 1969-
1971). In addition to the threat posed by Conservative candidates the Labour group by 
the late 1960s were faced with a battle on two fronts: in the marginals, historically 
fought over by Labour, the Conservatives and occasionally by the Liberals, and by 
increasing Liberal intervention in wards considered by Labour as strongholds. 
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Electoral pressure on the Labour Group emanating from owner-occupiers and council 
house tenants was expressed both in the local press and at the ballot box in the late 
1950s and 1960s. The pro-Conservative Birmingham Mail took the part of the rate-
payers who, it claimed 'can no longer afford the cost of Socialism ... which... made 
Birmingham one of the most highly rated County Boroughs' (Birmingham Mail, 6 
May 1958). At the 1960 Birmingham municipal elections Labour's share of the total 
votes cast was its lowest since the Second World War, and the controlling Labour 
Group lost seven seats, all to Conservative candidates. Surprise was expressed in the 
press at the loss of the Sheldon ward with its huge municipal housing estates, as was 
the loss of the Balsall Heath ward with its large number of back-to-back slum 
properties. In the other five wards lost to the Conservatives, each a mixture of owner-
occupiers and council estates, losses were also ascribed to the 'stay at home Labour 
supporters'. In October 1960 at two by elections, one in Hall Green, a Conservative 
voting owner-occupier ward where the Liberals took one third of the vote, and the 
other in Handsworth, an inner-city ward, the Labour candidates were pushed firmly 
into third place (Evening Despatch 13 May 1960, Birmingham Mail 13 May 1960, 
Birmingham Post 28 October 1960). At the same time in Lozells the Liberal candidate 
Wallace Lawler had taken 30% of the vote. The Birmingham Borough Labour Party 
not only expressed concern 'at the reaction ... to... rent increases and the organised 
opposition [to the increases] from numerous quarters' but were also aware of the 
variance in electoral volatility across the city's wards caused by their inability to 
satisfy the demands of two sectors of the electorate whose economic self-interests 
were incompatible. 
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In a report to the B.B.L.P.'s Executive Committee on the 1960 municipal elections in 
the city, Harold Nash, the Area Organiser, observed how 'Local Policy affects the 
results in no uncertain manner in varying degrees in different parts of the city'. Nash 
blamed the 'considerable abstention' of Labour voters upon 'the bad way in which 
we presented our case for an increase in the rents of Municipal Houses '. Furthermore, 
Nash concluded that 'rents [and] rates ... made many of our supporters abstain' 
(B.B.L.P. Exec.Committee Minutes Vol.,11, I960-I961).ln four Birmingham local 
government by elections in 1961, half-way through the parliamentary term of the 
boom and bust 1959-1964 Conservative Government, at a time when, ' i t might have 
been expected that the Socialist vote would be higher' (The Birmingham Post 23 June 
1961), the Conservatives retained all four seats, with the Liberals taking second place 
in all four wards and taking over 30 % of the vote in two of the wards. To combat the 
loss in electoral support among erstwhile Labour voting owner-occupiers, in the 
preparations for the forthcoming 1962 diet of local elections, the B.B.L.P. Executive 
Committee 'agreed to allow the officers to spend what they considered necessary in 
the production of literature concerning the Rate issue, because the [electoral] position 
at the moment was extremely delicate because of the proposed increase in the rates' 
(B.B.L.P. Exec.Committee Minutes 31 Jan. 1962). 
The controlling Labour Group on Birmingham City Council had, however, pre-
empted the concerns expressed by Nash and the B.B.L.P., over the rent/rate electoral 
conundrum. Indeed, in April 1961 The Birmingham Post reported that the Labour 
Council had become ' less doctrinaire in its approach [and had] shown greater 
readiness to respect the feelings of the voters [and] greater independence in relation to 
the party outside the council' (Birmingham Post 14 April 1961). The article 
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adumbrated the Labour Group's shift to the right in its policies regarding public 
housing provision, rents and rates. It had become increasingly apparent to many 
Labour councillors and prospective Labour councillors campaigning in those wards 
with a high proportion of council tenants and the inner-city wards, that the burden had 
shifted in this rent/rate electoral balancing act, towards the council rent payer. 
In eariy 1963 this rightward shift in policy provoked rumblings of discontent within 
the Birmingham Labour Party. However, it got positive support in the local press. The 
Birmingham Post asked the Labour Group Leader, Harry Watton, ' i f co-operation 
with the Conservative Group ... increasingly apparent in recent years would 
continue'. Watton was optimistic that 'both parties could work ... in the interests of 
the city' although he vehemently denied that this meant 'that the Socialists had moved 
to the Right' (Birmingham Post 21 May 1963). The denial did not, however, convince 
every Labour councillor, especially those whose wards were predominately council 
tenanted. In July 1963 the Labour Group's Working Party on Housing Finances met 
with the Labour Group to consider housing subsidies from the rates. A large deficit on 
the Housing Revenue Account was anticipated due to a shortfall in rental revenue 
from the council's stock of recently built multi-storey flats. On each dwelling there 
was a loss of £90 per annum. However, Alderman Watton, the Labour Group leader 
was adamant that he 'was not prepared to put the whole of the deficit from tall flats on 
the Ratepayer' (Birmingham City Labour Group Minutes, Vol.,6, 1962-1964, Minutes 
of Meeting with Working Party on Housing Finances, 8 July 1963). 
This, of course, threatened further increases in the level of council rents and provoked 
a revolt by a number of Labour councillors despite the fact that any decision 
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concerning municipal policy was subject to the party whip. The nine dissident 
councillors addressed protest meetings on the city's council estates and, in due course, 
with much ward level and B.B.L.P. member support, voted against increasing rents. 
The dissidents had the whip withdrawn, nevertheless they had the support of the 
Birmingham Trades Council which accused the Labour Group of foisting the decision 
to increase municipal rents on the party and 'urged' a socialist rent policy' (The 
Journal No.,204, Nov., 1963). The dissidents had the support of many in the wider 
party at ward level, at constituency party level and at Borough Party level. Indeed, the 
Handsworth Constituency Labour Party, put forward a motion that the Birmingham 
Borough Labour Party convene a special Municipal Policy Conference to decide upon 
the party's policy on the rents and rates issue. Their refusal to convene a meeting 
sparked a petition from thirty-four members of the Birmingham Borough Labour 
Party and the behind the scenes dispute between the Labour Group and the B.B.L.P. 
'exploded in public' (Birmingham Planet No.2.12 Sep. 1963), with much in the local 
and national press and the current affairs television programme 'Panorama'. The 
dispute resulted in an enquiry by the National Executive Committee of the Labour 
Party led by Reg Gunter M.P. which supported the decision of the Birmingham 
Labour Group (Birmingham City Labour Group Dispute Over Municipal Rents 1963, 
B.B.L.P. report to the National Agent, V o l l , Vol.2). 
At the 1963 local elections in seven of the eight wards involved in the revolt the 
Labour majority averaged 23% and the Conservatives were second placed. Clearly, 
Labour candidates in these wards, whose councillors revolted against the Labour 
Group decision over rents, were not particularly pressurised at that time by Liberal 
intervention. However, in the main these councillors represented wards with huge 
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council estates where they maintained the support of these traditional Labour voters 
by campaigning against increases in rent, even to the extent of losing the party whip. 
Centra! to the dissidents decision to revolt was discontent in their wards over rent 
levels brought about by the city council's controlling Labour Group's shift to the right 
in Municipal Policy. 
During the 1960s, as the Birmingham Labour Group wrangled with internal division 
over housing and as the Conservative's eroded their council majority, the Libera! 
Party had ousted Labour in many of the inner-city wards. Additionally, membership 
of the Birmingham Borough Labour Party and its finances liad plummeted. At the 
end of the 1960s the B.B.L.P. had an annual deficit of £2,500 and faced a 'critical 
problem' in that it was unable to finance much needed improvements to party 
organisation in the constituencies and ' raise money for the General Election' due 
some time in 1970 (B.B.L.RExec.Comm. Minutes, Treasurers Report 23 Oct. 1967). 
Additionally, pressure upon the Labour Group was exerted by the local press on 
behalf of the ratepayers and by the B.B.L.P. on behalf of council tenants and private 
renters throughout the 1960s. The tone of the press attack is perhaps encapsulated in a 
question posed to the Birmingham electorate by the Sunday Mercury in an article 
accompanied by a photograph of a packed car park in the foreground of a council 
tower block. The headline ran 'Are we subsidising cocktails and cars?' The article, in 
Birmingham's most popular local Sunday newspaper, explained how 'the taxpayer 
and the ratepayer through the Exchequer and local rate subsidies are helping to pay 
the rents of the homes of these people' and alluded to a typical workers earnings of 
£20- £30 per week (Sunday Mercury 7 April 1963).In contrast, in the preparations for 
the 1966 local elections Labour councillors were warned that 'The problems of 
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housing, rents and rates will be crucial issues [and that] every candidate needs 
therefore to be familiar with the progress already made by the Labour Government in 
tackling these problems' (Partnership: A Newsletter for Labour Councillors.Vol. 1. 
No.2. April 1966, Local Elections Special Supplement No. 1). 
As evidenced in the newsletter to Labour councillors, by 1966 the importance of the 
issues surrounding housing had become apparent at the national level of party 
organisation, however, the advice was rather too late for Birmingham's Labour 
Group which lost control of Birmingham Council at the 1965 local elections after 
fourteen years at the helm. The Labour Group's electoral post-mortem determined 
that the reasons why control was lost was 'not because of anything the Conservatives 
did, but because we failed to retain the loyalty of many of our supporters'. Indeed, the 
Birmingham Post lauded Labour's term in office for having 'kept a sharp eye on 
spending [and having] instituted a basically Conservative cut-your-coat-according to 
your cloth system of priorities (IBirmingham Post 24 April 1966). In regard to the 
ratepayers the Labour Group acknowledged its own failure to 'counteract 
successfully the Tory appeal to self interest as opposed to the good of the whole'. In 
the case of the council tenants, the failure was blamed upon the 'attitude of Municipal 
tenants who stayed away from the polls because their rents increased'. Furthermore 
the Labour Group acknowledged the breach between itself and the wider party in 
Birmingham, 'which as a whole [had] become lukewarm in its support of the Labour 
Group'. A lack of confidence in the Labour Group brought about by its 'failure to 
have effective consultation' regarding housing policy (Birmingham City Council 
Labour Group Minutes, Vol.7, 1965-1967, Document 91, Why Labour Lost Control). 
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At the 1966 local elections the Conservatives gained control of the council at an 
election with a record low poll of 31.7%. They pushed up council rents, began to sell 
off council houses, council land and properties owned by the council. Furthermore, at 
the 1968 local elections the Birmingham Conservatives could boast that after two 
years in control 'rates had been held down to a minimum ... Corporation spending 
given its biggest ever pruning'. At the same time they had produced a 'tremendous 
increase in the rate of house building', re-housed 22,000 from the slums, moved 
almost a thousand families with young children from unsuitable flats to houses and 
enabled 3,600 council tenants to become owner-occupiers by purchasing their council 
houses (Birmingham Post 19 April 1968). 
Although there was much discontent among the council tenants because of rent rises 
imposed by the Conservative council and equal dismay in the inner-city wards as cut 
backs in council spending slowed down the rate of repairs and slum clearance, it was 
far from clear that Labour in Birmingham would, or even could, benefit electorally 
from the situation. Indeed in 1968 amidst rent protest meetings across the city, the 
B.B.L.P. held an extraordinary meeting. 'The main purpose of the meeting [was] to 
associate the Labour Party with Municipal Tenants - to seek to re-establish the 
relationship which used to exist when tenants automatically looked to us as their 
champions' (B.B.L.P. Housing Rent Protest Meeting 29 June 1968). It was this void 
that had been filled by the Liberal candidates in the inner-city wards. 
The Birmingham Borough Labour Party and the Labour Group on the council had 
identified their electoral vulnerability and determined to rectify it. However, local 
policy in the 1970s would continue to be shaped by calculation of the impact any 
146 
change to the rent/rate balance could have upon support. At the 1970 local elections 
the Birmingham Borough Labour Party were determined to 'halt the Liberal rise in 
the city's inner-ring wards' v^ch they considered 'as a much more serious threat 
than [that of] the Conservatives in these areas' (Sunday Mercury 12 April 1970). 
Indeed, Labour since 1968 had paid more attention to the needs of these areas, 
distributing leaflets to tenants inviting them to public meetings to protest against the 
Conservative controlled council's retrenchment that meant tenants 'Get Less Repairs 
For More Rent' (B.B.L.P. Leaflet). Nevertheless, Labour were also aware that in 
order to threaten their position as opposition on the council, the Liberals needed to 
v^n a substantial number of the outer-wards where housing conditions were not an 
electoral issue. Labour's electoral calculation would no doubt have been informed by 
the thirteen gains that Labour made from the Conservatives at the 1970 local elections 
when the wards dominated by huge council estates, returned to the Labour fold. 
Furthermore, just as Labour's electoral stock was rising so that of the Liberal Party 
appeared to be falling. At the 1970 Birmingham local elections the Liberals had hung 
on to the seat in the Newtown ward by a margin of 1.8% of the vote, only forty-eight 
votes more than the Labour candidate (see Table 31) and although they had gained a 
seat in Aston ward from Labour it had been with a margin of only twenty-three votes. 
The total Liberal vote at these elections had slumped by around 30 per cent. At the 
equivalent elections in 1968 the Liberals had a total Birmingham vote of 16,137, in 
contrast to a total vote of 13,172 in the city at the 1970 elections. It was a 
development that did not escape the notice of the press that considered the Liberal's 
'much trumpeted advance halted' fBirmingham Mail, 7 May 1970). At the June 1970 
General Election Wallace Lawler had lost his seat at the Ladywood Constituency to 
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Labour only a year after he had so spectacularly gained it at a parliamentary by 
election. Although the Liberals had gained another seat in the Newtown ward at a 
local government by election in July 1970 the Birmingham Post considered that the 
Liberal 'glitter may have dulled a little' and explained how Labour 'by emulating 
some of the Liberal tactics, has been able to regain some ground lost during the 
decade' (Birmingham Post 6 July 1970). 
In 1971 John Hannah, the Labour candidate for the neighbouring All Saints ward 
encapsulated Labour's change of focus and attitude towards the inner-city wards with 
the campaign promise that 'Birmingham's vast resources under Labour will be 
directed towards the eradication of squalor in our neglected inner-city wards' 
(Birmingham Mail 5 May 1971). At the 1971 local elections in Birmingham there was 
a massive swing back to Labour and the Conservative majority was cut back from 
sLxty-six to six. Nevertheless, the Liberals were still able to pull off a resounding 
victory in the inner-city Aston ward where their candidate took the seat with a 
majority of over one thousand votes, defying any influence from national trends. 
However, at these elections the Liberal's total vote in the city had slumped again. 
At the 1972 Birmingham local elections Labour swept back into power after gaining 
nineteen seats. In contrast, the Liberals just managed to hang on to the Newtown, 
Duddeston and Aston seats by slender majorities. The Liberal 'glitter' however, had 
been rekindled in the All Saints ward where the housing issue 'was still dominant' 
(Birmingham Post 23 June 1972), as their candidate converted a 923 Labour majority 
into a 192 majority for his party. Success in the All Saints ward was short lived. At 
the all-out 1973 post-reorganisation election to the new Birmingham District Council. 
Labour took all three seats that they held right up to the next round of local authority 
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ward reorganisation in 1982. However, the Liberals took all three seats in the 
Duddeston ward, and were to lose only one of these seats to a Lib/Lab candidate at 
the 1978 elections. In the Newtown ward the Liberals had taken two of the three seats 
in a close contest with Labour. The Liberals took 45.4% of the vote and Labour 
45.0%. In the Ladywood ward the Labour candidates swept the board taking all three 
seats. Labour, in 1973, had increased their majority on the Birmingham District 
Council to twenty. 
However at the next round of District Council Elections in 1975, the party lost overall 
control of Birmingham City Council. The 1976 local elections were crucial for 
Labour as a loss of one seat would push them into minority rule. In the event the 
Conservatives gained nine seats and regained control of the city council with an 
overall majority. The Liberals managed to maintain their hold upon Duddeston ward 
in 1975 and in 1976, whilst Labour in the Ladywood ward increased their majority 
over the Liberals in 1975 and took the seat again in 1976 with the Liberals coming a 
poor third to the Conservatives. 
Clearly, Labour had made some ground in the inner-city wards and in the outer wards 
with large council estates. The party had kick-started the city's council house building 
programme when they had regained council control in 1972, and began an extensive 
programme of irmer-city renewal. However, the revitalised housing policy 'had come 
at a cost. Rates and the number of council employees [had] risen sharply at a time 
when inflation [had] also pushed up costs' (The Birmingham Post 30 April 1976). The 
tide of local electoral opinion, dependent upon the private / public balance of tenure, 
had ebbed away from the Labour Group as it had in the 1960s, when the Liberals had 
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benefited from a groundswell of housing discontent in the inner-city wards. The cycle 
had begun again by the 1978 local elections when a minimal rate rise of 3% 
introduced by the Conservative controlled council, was considered by the press 'to 
hardly amount to a local issue'. The Birmingham Mail, nevertheless, thought that 
'Labour hope to pick up some protest votes on the council estates from the rent 
increase averaging 80p a week' (Birmingham Mail 27 April 1978). 
The Liberals at the 1978 Birmingham local elections were only able to field twenty-
three candidates and retained Newtovm with only seven votes, came a poor third in 
Ladywood, but held on to Duddeston with a 49.6% share of the total vote. Their 
winning candidate in Duddeston, George Minnis, had ran on a Lib/Lab ticket. Minnis 
had been very active in housing issues, including public/private joint ventures with 
housing associations and self-build programmes for young married couples of the 
area, and hence, had a very significant personal following, illustrated when he ran as 
an Independent Liberal and defeated the official Liberal candidate in Duddeston in 
1969. However, Liberalism in Birmingham at the end of this study's interest was 
back at its electoral position of the late 1950s with 5.8 % of the total Birmingham 
vote. Indeed, the former organiser of the Young Liberals asked 'is the Liberal Party 
still around? The Party that many of us joined for its commitment to helping the poor 
and powerless and its ideal of giving power to the people has almost disappeared' 
(The Liberal News 30 Jan 1979). The reasons for this precipitous fall in electoral 
support for the Liberal Party will now be examined below. 
5.7:Changing salience of the housing issue. 
The rise and decline of the Liberals in the inner-city wards of the Ladywood 
Parliamentary Constituency appears to have mirrored the rise and decline in the 
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salience of the issues of housing to its electorate. Liberal electoral decline from the 
'golden era' of Lawlerism also appears to have mirrored the decline in the number of 
each ward's electorate over the same period. In 1963, Ladywood had 13,473 electors, 
Nev^own 16,714, and Duddeston 17,144 (see Table 32). At the 1970 local elections 
Ladywood v ^ d had 7,754 electors, Newtown 7,546 and Duddeston 12,873. At the 
1979 local elections Ladywood had risen marginally to 8,759 electors. Newtown had 
also risen slightly to 8,124 electors and Duddeston 8,124. The decline in Newtown 
was almost 50%, in Ladywood over 40% and in Duddeston over 50%. The 
immediate grievances of these missing electors had been resolved. Throughout the 
mid 1960s to late 1970s they had been re-housed on council estates throughout the 
city and most of the homes of those remaining electors had been modernised. Other 
local issues, such as education and the sale of council houses came to the fore, and the 
perennial problems of rates and rent levels persisted. However, the electoral niche of 
housing conditions had for the Liberals lost much of its purchase and the party's grip 
on the inner-city electorate had thereby loosened. 
The transformation in housing conditions in these inner-city wards is shown in the 
stark contrast between the ratio of residents of old to new properties in 1963 to that of 
1972, illustrated by the figures of Table 32. Furthermore, the diminishing number of 
residents in the three wards over the period is apparent in the figures of Table 34. The 
severity of the housing problem and indication of its electoral salience is evidenced by 
the magnitude of the council housing list, the rate of new applications per year and the 
number of council and private homes available each year to ameliorate the problem 
(see Table 33). Cleariy, the demand far outweighed the supply and for the majority of 
those resident in the inner-city wards, private housing no matter what its rate of 
provision, was not an economic option. 
151 
Table 32.Estimated resident populations of central redevelopment areas: persons dwelling in old 
and new properties mid-year 1963-1969. Source: Birmingham Statistics, Birmingham Abstract of 
Statistics Number 14, Vols., 14 and 15,1969-1970. pl7; and Vols., 17 and 18,1972-1975, p29,City 
of Birmingham Central Statistics Office. 
YEAR Type of Property Ladywood Ward Newtown Ward All wards 
1963 OLD 15,900 19,900 56,400 
NEW 2,500 1,700 14,500 
1964 OLD 14,000 17,600 47,500 
NEW 2,500 1,600 16,200 
1965 OLD 12,000 14,000 46,000 
NEW 2,800 2,000 17,700 
1966 OLD 10,100 11,300 31,500 
NEW 3,600 3,100 20,300 
1967 OLD 7,500 7,600 22,000 
NEW 3,900 3,600 22,000 
1968 OLD 2,100 1,200 6,500 
NEW 4,300 4,800 24,100 
1969 OLD 800 200 3,200 
NEW 4,900 5,900 26,700 
1970 OLD 700 200 No figures 
NEW 5,300 6,500 No figures 
1971 OLD 500 300 No figures 
NEW 5,500 8,500 No figures 
1972 OLD 600 300 No figures 
NEW 5,900 10,100 No figures 
Table 33: Applicants for council accommodation 1963-1969, families re-housed by corporation 
1963-1969, new dwellings completed by type 1963-1969, Birmingham Statistics. Birmingham 
Abstract of Statistics, Number 14, Vol., 14 and 15, ppl 11-122, 1969-1970, City of Birmingham 
Central Statistics Office. 
Year Council New Re-housed New New Housing 
Waiting list Applicants by Council Dwellings Dwellings Association 
Council Private Built 
Built Enterprise 
built 
1963 46.574 6,567 6,842 2,160 1,644 38 
1964 39,188 4,927 6,986 2,407 1,436 123 
1965 37,966 4,781 7,797 4,036 1,254 135 
1966 38,828 8,351 9,340 4,717 1,532 101 
1967 31,506 8,784 13,020 8,006 1,583 296 
1968 27,883 7,774 13,965 4,103 1,843 182 
1969 26,140 8,387 11,559 2,520 1,839 466 
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Table 34: Estimated annual net migration by ward mid-year 1964-1969,1971-1973, 1974-1978, 
Birmingham Statistics, Birmingham Abstract of Statistics. Number 14, Vol., 14,15,17,18,21 and 
22, City of Birmingham Central Statistics OfTice. 
Year Duddeston Ladywood Newtown 
1964-1965 -700 -1,300 -3.100 
1965-1966 -3,300 -1,000 -3,100 
1966-1967 -1,300 -1.500 -3,800 
1967-1968 -2,200 ^,300 -5,200 
1968-1969 -1,300 -500 -400 
1969-1970 * * 
1970-1971 * 
1971-1972 -2,400 +400 + 1800 
1972-1973 -1.500 + 100 -300 
1973-1974 
1974-1975 -700 -700 -200 
1975-1976 +200 -100 -700 
1976-1977 +200 -600 -1,200 
1977-1978 -900 -100 -100 
The pattern of housing tenure changed significantly during the period of this study's 
interest. In 1951 council houses accounted for only 18% of the housing tenure in 
Great Britain. However, by 1961 this had risen to 27?/o and reached 32% in 1979, 
before declining steadily to 18% again in 1996. Clearly, in the 1959-1979 period 
public rental tenure, the condition of public housing and the level of rent was an 
important factor in the lives of an increasing proportion of the electorate. In contrast, 
the percentage of all households privately rented fell dramatically from 53% in 1951 
to31% in 1961 and down to 13% by 1979. A 22?/o percentage point drop in private 
rental accommodation between 1951 and 1961, and a further fall of 18 percentage 
points between 1961 and 1979 indicates the severity of the housing crisis in cities 
such as Birmingham. Furthermore, the increase in owner-occupation from 29?^  of all 
households in 1951 to 55% in 1979 is indicative of the increasing importance of the 
rate level to the electoral calculus of both this new class of owner-occupier and local 
authority councils. (Adonis.A., and Pollard,S., 1997:193). 
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5.8:Voting and issues of immigration and education 
It would be remiss to exclude from consideration upon the calculus of the local voter 
in the inner-city wards of Birmingham during the 1959 to 1979 period the effect, i f 
any, of immigration. Birmingham City Council had a five-year residence qualification 
that applied to all immigrants into the city seeking social housing, whatever their rac .^ 
Once on the waiting list a points system came into operation and then an arbitrary and 
discriminatory selection procedure by Housing Officers determined the suitability of 
an applicant for new, old or 'patched' council housing. The waiting period before 
immigrant applicants could go on to the active housing list was reduced from five 
years to two years in 1977, however the selection procedure ensured the vast majority 
of immigrant applicants were destined for the inner-city (see Rex and Moore 1967:19-
41). 
Thus, all immigrants, including Commonwealth immigrants that were arriving in 
increasing numbers from the late 1950s were left with a choice between owner-
occupation and private rental tenure. The concentration of immigrants in the inner-
city areas where private rental predominated, such as Aston, was a direct consequence 
of the Labour controlled city council's decision to introduce the five-year residence 
rule, this was not a national party political policy, but a locally determined policy. It is 
no surprise then, that in wards such as those that comprised the Ladywood 
constituency - those with a large proportion of council owned properties and 
properties taken over by the council for slum clearance or repair and re-modernisation 
- that any grievance over competition from immigrants for social housing was 
electorally insignificant in the early 1960s. Indeed, as Rex and Tomlinson point up, 
'before 1965 whites were moving into council built properties as their houses were 
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demolished, whereas immigrants rarely got council houses at all because of the 
residential qualifications' (Rex and Tomlinson 1979:143). A British Movement 
candidate had contested the Ladywood vmd at the 1969 municipal elections and took 
a mere 3.4% of the vote. Furthermore, in Aston a predominately private rental sector 
vrard, a British Movement candidate at the 1970 local elections had taken only 4.6% 
of the vote. These were, at this time the only two candidates at Birmingham local 
elections representing overtly racist political parties. An upsurge in National Front 
candidates at local elections in Birmingham occurred in the mid-to-late 1970s. These 
National Front candidates contested a small number of wards intermittently over that 
period and rarely took more than 5% of the vote in any particular ward, and never 
reached double figures in their percentage of the poll in any ward at any election. A 
National Front candidate at a parliamentary by election held in the Ladywood 
constituency in 1972 did however beat the Liberal candidate into fourth place, 
nevertheless, 7% of the votes cast was hardly an electoral endorsement of racism or 
evidence of a high level of conflict between whites and immigrants over social 
housing. 
Another locally determined issue that may have influenced electoral events in the 
period was that of education. Education as an issue at the parliamentary and local 
government electoral level was neither a priority for the governments nor the 
electorate in the 1950s and early 1960s. The vote winner was housing. Although 
criticism of the tripartite system, introduced by the 1944 Education Act, had grown in 
the 1950s and some Local Education Authorities (LEAs) had by the early 1960s 
ended selection and introduced comprehensives, 'the process had not gone far' 
(Jefferys 1999:103). 
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At the local electoral level in Birmingham the main issues of contention between the 
parties at the 1962 local elections were 'Rates, city finances and housing' 
(Birmingham Post 2 May 1962). The Birmingham Liberal's manifesto at the 
following year's diet of local elections directed at the inner-city wards included 
'education, social services, youth clubs, transport, finance and rates', just as the 
National policy of the Liberal Party had 'singled out for attack ... the Labour attitude 
to education, housing and pensions' (Liberal News. 4 May 1963; 10 Oct. 1963). The 
Liberals cited inner-city London as an example of how' where you live [determined] 
how good an education your child got' and called for an end to the 11+, for non-
selection in secondary education and improvement in primary schools (Liberal News 
13 Feb. 1964). Clearly, education as an electoral issue was increasing in significance 
compared to the 1950s. 
So much so that at the May 1965 Birmingham local elections the Conservative 
manifesto, although giving primacy to housing policy and rates, made a commitment 
to defend grammar schools. Nevertheless, The Birmingham Post observed of the three 
main parties' manifestos at these elections that 'housing, rates and traffic problems 
figure prominently [and] Education [in contrast] is dealt with in a mild maimer' 
(Birmingham Post 28 April 1965). Thus, before the Labour Government's Secretary 
of State for Education, Anthony Crosland, issued the 10/65 circular requesting all 
LEAs to 'prepare and submit to him plans for reorganising secondary education in 
their areas on comprehensive lines' (Jefferys 1999:104) education did not have the 
electoral salience it arguably assumed at elections after the edict. 
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The main themes of the Conservative manifesto at the Birmingham local elections of 
1968 were 'value for rates ... council spending, slum clear£mce, sale of council houses 
and the safeguarding of grarrmiar schools', whilst the Labour opposition, criticised the 
Conservative controlled council for its 'scandalous ... refiisal to end the 11+ 
examination and reorganise on comprehensive lines' fBirmingham Post 19 April 
1968; Birmingham Mail 29 April 1968). At the 1969 and 1970 local elections the 
campaigns focused upon housing, rates and education. 
Education continued to be a contentious local electoral issue. Its economic impact 
upon the ratepayer added to that of the costly requirements of the 1972 Housing 
Finance Act. The increasing rate burden imposed by the Labour controlled council 
from 1972 to 1976 as it revitalised the public housing programme and reorganised 
much of secondary education on comprehensive lines meant that 'public spending 
and the need for pruning' favoured the Conservatives at the 1976 Birmingham District 
Council elections (The Times 4 May 1976). At the 1978 and 1979 local elections in 
Birmingham the issues of rents, rates, housing and social services had come to the 
fore, and education seems to have been relegated to the electoral backbumer. In the 
inner-city wards that comprised the Ladywood constituency education, as a local 
electoral issue, had not figured largely in the revival of Liberalism before the 1965 
Labour circular, and there is little evidence that the middle of the road education 
policy carved by the Liberal candidates was of any electoral benefit to them in these 
wards post 1965. 
5.9:Conclusion 
However much weight is attached to the issues of housing it is still recognised that the 
act of voting at local and national electoral levels in this inner-city area of 
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Birmingham was influenced by a multiplicity of factors originating both locally and 
nationally and that no monocausal explanation can or should be posited. It is a matter 
of prioritising factors and when warranted including factors hitherto overlooked or 
excluded as inconsequential. The qualitative evidence regarding electoral dealignment 
in these inner-city wards and their coterminous parliamentary constituency adds 
weight to the assertion that the influence of locally determined factors in the outcome 
of elections at both the municipal and parliamentary level has been underestimated by 
existing political science literature. As the case study of Ladywood shows there was a 
connection between local electoral activity and issues, and parliamentary electoral 
outcomes in this particular location during the 1959-1979 period. The revival of the 
Liberals in these inner-city wards and, however temporarily, at the parliamentary 
constituency level was based primarily upon housing issues. Housing policy had its 
origins in the sphere of national party politics and parliamentary legislation. However, 
housing policy was implemented at the local authority level and thereby mediated 
through the particular political, social and economic milieu of Birmingham. Local 
authority housing policy was, in the case of the Birmingham Labour Group shaped by 
consideration of the marginality of council control and the potential impact upon the 
owner- occupier electors through rates. National economic and political influences 
such as the 'stop and go' economic policy of the Macmillan era, the inflationary and 
counter inflationary measures of the govenunents of the day in terms of interest rate 
and bank rate throughout the period all impacted at the coal face of local authority 
provision. How the burden of these national economic factors impacted upon the 
council rent payer and the owner-occupier ratepayer, and how they impacted upon 
municipal house building and slum cleeuance programmes, thus on the quality of life 
of the electorate, was largely determined by the controlling council group and its 
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pragmatic electoral calculation of the impact of housing policy upon its support at the 
voting booth. 
The Labour Group's internal division over housing policy and neglect in addressing 
electoral discontent over housing conditions resulted in a loss of support in the inner-
city v/ards of the Ladywood constituency. This electoral vacuum was filled by the 
Liberal's opportunistic and ad hominem policies that addressed the disparate 
grievances of the inner-city municipal electorate. It has been shown that partisan 
dealignment in these traditionally Labour voting wards provided a foundation for a 
revival, albeit temporarily, in Liberal fortunes at the parliamentary electoral level in 
the coterminous constituency based upon local issues concerning housing. Thus, 
municipal electoral and local party political activity and local government partisan 
dealignment in these wards was interconnected with parliamentary electoral level 
dealignment. 
An integral part of the explanation for partisan dealignment at both electoral levels in 
these Birmingham wards were the factors of candidate personality, following, and 
electoral strategy and tactics, as exemplified by the Liberal, Wallace Lawler. 
Personality and following were also a factor in the electoral strategy of the 
Birmingham Labour Group, particulariy under the leadership of Harry Watton. In 
both the Birmingham Liberal Party and the Labour Group on Birmingham Council 
there was a large degree of individualism and autonomy from the influences of their 
respective national party organisations. The Birmingham Labour Group also 
successfully resisted forces of change from the wider membership at ward, 
constituency and borough organisational level and thereby implemented a locally 
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determined municipal policy. Similarly, the Birmingham Liberals, under the influence 
of Lawler, developed an electoral strategy to concentrate upon the inner-city wards, 
and campaign tactics to address specific local problems, all of which, though adopted 
by many Liberal Constituency Associations in the 1970s as 'community politics' was, 
at the time, a locally determined variant of Liberal Party policy. 
The parameters of this locally determined Liberal electoral appeal to the inner-city 
ward voters was both facilitated and constrained by the political space afforded to 
them by the electoral strategies of the two major parties. The Birmingham 
Conservative's electoral campaign focus upon the marginal wards and the Labour 
Group's shift to the right to compete with them in these marginals for an ever 
increasing number of owner-occupier voters, to the detriment of their traditional 
supporters in the inner-city v/ards gave the Liberals the opportunity to reap electoral 
benefit firom discontent over housing. However, the strategy produced ever 
diminishing returns as the electorate of the inner-city wards was re-housed and re-
located, or had their homes refurbished and thereby their electoral grievances 
remedied. Indeed, 'by 1975 it was clear that the slum clearance programme which 
Birmingham had began in the immediate post-war period was coming to an end' (Rex 
andTomlinson 1979: 133). 
The evidence of this case study of the inner-city wards of the Birmingham Ladywood 
Constituency supports the contention that local factors have an explanatory role in 
both local level and parliamentary level electoral outcomes and in the explanation of 
partisan dealignment at both levels. The evidence has shown that housing conditions, 
rent and rate levels, and state subsidies were important factors in the electoral calculus 
of the municipal voter. It has also been shown that the housing policy implemented by 
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Birmingham council was conditioned by the marginality of council control and 
housing policy changed with the changes to the political control of the local authority 
as each of the major parties implemented its own micro political-economy at the 
local authority level. The evidence from the Ladywood case study illustrates how over 
time local authority housing policy impacted differently across its wards in relation to 
the spatial variations in tenure and the temporal changes in conditions of tenure. 
However, categories of tenure were not only changing in proportion to one another 
over time and space but also within categories of tenure there were vast differences in 
housing conditions and possibilities for tenants to improve their lot. The tower block 
council tenant with small children was as different to the tower block tenant without 
small children, as the owner-occupier in a run down inner-city ward was from his 
suburban counterpart, or, as a council tenant in a compulsory purchased irmer-city 
slum was from his counterpart in a recently built council estate, or, as different from a 
tenant in the private sector in receipt of rent assistance post 1973 was from a pre-1973 
private rental tenant without state assistance living in a damp, overcrowded room. 
Tenure as a category over the period of the study is a rather blunt instrument that fails 
to capture much of the reality of what it is supposed to measure and imply in terms of 
voting intentions. 
The historian Martin Daunton has questioned the validity of 'housing class' 
(Dauntonl987:pp70-97), and quotes Rex and Moore in concluding that 'men in the 
same labour market may come to have differential degrees of access to housing' and 
that ' in addition to classes defined by economic factors at the level of industry and 
production, there are housing classes defined by bureaucratic or political factors*(Rex 
and Moore in Daunton 1987: 71). Daunton argues that a large proportion of the 
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housing stock of Birmingham was controlled by local government, and that the 
selection process for re-housing was dependent upon certain criteria, such as length of 
residence, the number of children in the family. The outcome, Daunton argues, was a 
'struggle between members of these housing classes over the use of the scarce 
housing stock in the city,' (ibid). Thus, in the inner-city wards the alienation of 
traditional Labour supporters who did not qualify to join the ranks of the selected and 
had to remain confined to the private rental sector throughout the 1960s and most the 
1970s. Instead, they joined the ranks of other dissatisfied residents of the area and 
became susceptible to the blandishments of the Liberal candidates. 
It would seem however that the centrality of housing to local elections in Birmingham 
is an enduring feature, as this quote fi-om the Astonia, a monthly journal circulating 
in Birmingham and Sutton Coldfield in the 1890s, exemplifies : 'there is no question 
that the... increase of the surveyor's salary cost the members their seats... Even a 
Town Council must have some regard for the strongly expressed convictions of its 
ratepayers' (Astooia Vol.,1, No.,9. 1895) 
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Chapter 6 
SUTTON CQLDFIELD 
6.1:Introduction 
There is much about Sutton Coldfield that is different from the previous case study 
location, not least in terms of its political complexion and socio-economic character. 
This wealthy, middle-class and staunchly Tory heartland had little in common with 
the inner-city wards that comprised the Ladywood Constituency. Yet. just as the 
Labour Party were challenged by the Libera! Party in some of its heartland inner-city 
wards, so the Conservative Party was challenged in its suburban redoubt of Sutton 
Coldfield by the Liberal Party during the same period. In two very different local 
electoral contexts the outcomes were similar, as were some of the issues and the 
processes involved in the elevation of the Liberal Party's support from dereliction to 
contender for both municipal and parliamentary political power. 
The Parliamentary Constituency of Sutton Coldfield and Erdington was comprised of 
the ten municipal electoral wards of the Borough of Sutton Coldfied and the 
Erdington ward of the County Borough of Birmingham (see Table 35 below). Under 
the 1972 reorganisation of local government, the County Borough of Sutton Coldfield 
was abolished and its now three municipal electoral wards amalgamated within the 
city of Birmingham (see Map 3 below). These were, Sutton Four Oaks (comprising 
Hill West, Hill East and Trinity wards), Sutton Vesey (comprising Banners Gate, 
Boldmere West, Boldmere East and Wylde Green wards), and Sutton New Hall 
(comprising Maney, Walmley North and Walmley South wards). Each returned three 
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councillors, one seat contested in each ward annually over a three-year electoral cycle, 
to the new Birmingham District Council and quadrennially returned one councillor 
each to the new West Midlands County Council. 
Table 35:Suttan ColdPield wards and constituencies 1945-1979,( tenure in 1981) Sources, 
Wards 1958-1972 Constituency Wards 1973-82 Constituency 
Banners Gate Borough 
Constituency of 
Sutton 
ColdHeld 
(Includes the 
Erdiiigton ward 
of the County 
Borough of 
Biimingham) 
Hill East Sutton Four 
Oaks (Sutton 
Coldfield 1) 
Borough 
Constituency of 
Sutton 
Coldneld 
Boldmere East Hill West 
Boldmere West Trinity 
WyWe Green 
HUl East Banners Gate Sutton Vesey 
(Sutton 
Coldfield 2) 
HiUWest Boldmere East 
Trinity Boldmere West 
Maney Wylde Green 
Walmley South 
Walmley North Maney Sutton New 
Hall (Sutton 
Coldfield 3) 
Walmley South 
Walmley North 
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Map 3: Birmingham Metropolitan District ward boundaries as at 1"* April 1974. Source: Sutton 
Coldfield Local Study Centre, Sutton Coldfield Library. 
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Sutton Coldfield was a commuter town bordering on the city of Birmingham and the 
seat had rarely been contested by the Liberals, even in the 19* century. At the 
municipal electoral level the party first contested a single Sutton Coldfield ward in 
1956, and in May 1959 contested four of the then ten wards. Astonishingly, the Sutton 
Coldfield Liberals contested the constituency at the 1959 general election and came a 
creditable third, taking 7,543 votes, with Labour taking a little over 11,000 votes and 
the Conservatives a massive 33,000 votes. Remarkably, this was at a time when the 
Liberals were organised in only two of the eleven wards of the constituency. The 
Liberals retained their deposit at the 1959 general election and by 1964 there were 
eleven Liberals on the Borough Council and four on the then upper-tier Warwickshire 
County Council. At the 1964 general election the Liberal candidate almost doubled 
the party's 1959 vote in the constituency, and at the 1966 general election, though in 
third place, virtually tied with the Labour candidate. At the first elections to the new 
upper-tier West Midland County Council in April 1973, the Liberals took two of the 
three Sutton Coldfield seats and came second in the other, with Labour in third place 
in them all. In the May elections to the new lower-tier authority, the Birmingham 
District Council, the Conservatives swept the board with the Liberals taking over a 
third of the vote and coming in second place in each ward. In the local elections, of 
1975-1979 all three wards at both levels were in the hands of the Conservative Party, 
however, the Liberals had replaced the Labour Party as the contender for political 
power in Sutton Coldfield and pushed them into a distant third place. Why and how 
this electoral dealignment was possible in this constituency and the municipal 
electoral wards that comprised it will now be examined in detail. 
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Table 36: Lower-tier municipal election data, 195S-1972, the wards that comprised the Sutton 
ColdHeld Constituency at General Elections 1959-1970. Asterisk denotes unopposed. Source: 
Sutton Coldfield Municipal Diary,SDtton ColdHeld Library(1970 electorate figures missing). 
Year Ward Seats Electorate Turnout Majority CON LAB LIB IND 
1958 Banners Gate 1 4282 * 
1958 Boldmere East 1 4065 55.5 13.6 43.7 100 57.3 
1958 Boldmere West 4314 50.4 1.3 37.6 100 23.6 38.9 
1958 Hill East 4360 33.7 40.2 70.1 29.9 100 
1958 Hill West 1 4601 * 
1958 Maney 1 4100 54.2 2.3 39.4 23.5 37.1 
1958 Trinity 1 3546 * 
1958 Walmley North 5380 82.6 2.8 31.6 32.8 35.6 
1958 Walmley South 1 4523 * 
1958 Wylde Green 1 4743 • 
1959 Banners Gate 1 4343 * 
1959 Boldmere East 1 4125 55 16.6 58.3 100 41.7 
1959 Botdmere West 1 4357 47.6 35.2 67.6 100 32.4 
1959 Hill East 1 4988 * 
1959 Hill West 1 5135 • 
1959 Maney 1 4061 53.4 1.1 42.2 16.7 41.1 
1959 Trinity 1 3863 * 
1959 Walmley North 1 5698 48.4 0.6 49.7 50.3 100 
1959 Walmley South 1 4708 40.1 29.6 64.8 100 35.2 
1959 Wylde Green 1 5011 * 
1959 Erdington 1 21343 46.2 15.1 52.5 37.42 10.08 
1960 Banners Gate 1 4417 • 
1960 Boldmere East 1 4156 49.1 13.4 56.7 100 43.3 
1960 Boldmere West 1 4396 39 25.2 62.6 100 37.4 
1960 Hill East 1 5798 31.2 4 52 100 48 
1960 Hill West 5609 * 
1960 Maney 1 4081 46.2 5.4 47.5 10.4 42.1 
1960 Trinity 1 4172 * 
1960 Watmley North 1 5853 51.2 5.4 52.7 47.3 
1960 Walmley South 1 4822 36 50 75 100 25 
1960 Wylde Green 1 5271 • 
1960 Erdington 1 21585 36.23 25.81 55.63 29.82 14.55 
1961 Banners Gate 1 4397 • 
1961 Boldmere East 1 4208 • 
1961 Boldmere West 1 4422 * 
1961 Hill East 6460 41.6 1.6 42.8 47.2 
1961 Hill West 1 6119 * 
1961 Maney 1 4059 49.6 22.2 38.9 100 61.1 
1961 Trinity 1 4395 * 
1961 Walmley North 1 6060 46.8 15.4 57.7 42.3 
1961 Walmley South 1 4805 4 
1961 Wylde Green 1 5562 * 
1961 Erdington 1 22265 44.27 17.52 46.77 29.25 23.98 
1962 Banners Gate 1 4369 * 
1962 Boldmere East 1 4300 * 
1962 Boldmere West 1 4418 51.4 9.4 54.7 45.3 
1962 Hilt East 1 6630 44.6 22.6 38.7 61.3 
1962 Hill West 1 6253 39.2 10.8 55.4 44.6 
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Year Ward Seats Electorate Turnout Majority CON LAB LIB IND 
1962 Maney 1 4041 46.3 18.2 40.9 59.1 
1962 Trinity 1 4401 * 
1962 Walmley North 1 6175 33.1 13 56.5 43.5 
1962 Walmley South 1 4878 46.6 17.6 33.1 16.2 50.7 
1962 Wytde Green 1 5654 48.8 36.6 68.3 31.7 
1962 Erdlngton 1 17111 39.96 4.76 38.61 27.54 33.85 
1963 Banners Gate 1 4372 59.7 3.4 46.2 10.8 42.8 
1963 Boldmere East 1 4452 51.4 3.4 51.7 48.3 
1963 Boldmere West 1 4377 51.4 15.2 57.6 42.4 
1963 Hill East 1 6700 45.4 21.2 39.4 60.6 
1963 Hill West 1 6403 45.6 3.6 44.4 7.6 48 
1963 Maney 1 3880 48.2 0.3 45.1 10.1 44.8 
1963 Trinity 1 4506 * 
1963 Walmley North 1 6167 39.2 4.6 52.3 47.7 100 
1963 Walmley South 1 5011 46.3 0.5 41.7 16.1 42.2 
1963 Wylde Green 1 5647 49.4 22.8 61.4 38.6 
1963 Erdinqton 1 17055 41.82 9.17 39.62 29.93 30.45 
1964 Banners Gate 1 4416 56.4 3.6 48.2 51.8 
1964 Boldmere East 4701 52.7 0.4 49.8 50.2 
1964 Boldmere West 1 4411 * 
1964 Hill East 1 6755 38.1 30.2 34.9 65.1 
1964 Hill West 1 6663 44.5 3.2 51.6 48.4 
1964 Maney 1 3744 41.8 33.2 33.4 66.6 
1964 Trinity 1 4618 49.7 16.2 58.1 41.9 
1964 Walmley North 1 6255 42.1 7.2 52 44.8 100 
1964 Walmley South 1 5248 48.3 17.7 47.7 22.3 30 
1964 Wylde Green 1 5720 47.4 14.6 57.3 42.7 
1964 Erdlngton 1 16907 40.13 11.14 45.04 33.9 21.06 
1965 Banners Gate 1 4441 • 
1965 Boldmere East 1 4826 49.3 18.6 56 6.6 37.4 
1965 Boldmere West 1 4455 50.6 39.8 66.4 7 26.6 
1965 Hill East 1 6776 41 5 48.6 7.8 43.6 
1965 Hill West 1 6871 49.7 20.9 57.4 6.1 36.5 
1965 Maney 1 3750 44.2 12.1 39.9 8.1 52 
1965 Trinity 1 4697 45.1 28.2 64.1 35.9 
1965 Walmley North 1 6267 39.5 21.3 48.2 26.9 24.9 
1965 Walmley South 1 5550 45.9 10.5 49.5 11.5 39 
1965 Wylde Green 1 5749 46.7 55.2 77.6 22.4 
1965 Endington 1 17024 37.98 28.78 54-46 25.68 19.86 
1966 Banners Gate 1 4434 45.9 2.8 51.4 48.6 
1966 Boldmere East 1 4931 45.3 18 55.4 7.2 37.4 
1966 Boldmere West 1 4475 40.8 41.1 66.4 8.3 25.3 
1966 Hill East 1 6913 35.4 12.9 37.4 12.3 50.3 
1966 Hill West 1 6820 47.6 19.8 56.9 6 37.1 
1966 Maney 1 3737 42.3 11.9 39.2 9.7 51.1 
1966 Trinity 1 4721 37.9 38.2 69.1 30.9 
1966 Walmley North 1 6489 34.3 17.6 45.2 27.2 27.6 
1966 Walmley South 1 5862 37.3 22.2 50.4 21.4 28.2 
1966 Wylde Green 1 5980 37.7 20.6 65.3 34.7 
1966 Erdington 1 17045 31.4 27.41 55.51 28.1 16.39 
1967 Banners Gate 1 4440 42.5 3.6 51.8 48.2 
1967 Botdmere East 1 5073 43.3 6.6 49.2 8.2 42.6 
1967 Boldmere West 1 4399 • 
1967 Hill East 1 7061 30.8 12.5 51.3 9.9 38.8 
1967 Hill West 1 7085 38 42.8 71.4 28.6 
1967 Maney 1 3750 47.3 25.4 37.3 62.7 
1967 Trinity 1 4854 34.1 56.4 78.2 21.8 
1967 Walmley North 1 6520 29.4 27.6 53.9 26.3 19.8 
1967 Walmley South 1 5946 30.2 22.7 54.4 13.9 31.7 
1967 Wylde Green 1 6166 35.7 41.2 70.6 29.4 
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Year Ward Seats Electorate Turnout Majority CON LAB LIB IND 
1967 Erdington 1 19113 31.29 33.84 59.35 25.51 15.13 
1968 Banners Gate 1 4666 • 
1968 Boldmere East 1 5039 47.6 17 58.5 41.5 
1968 Boldmere West 1 4404 40.8 66.8 83.4 16.6 
1968 Hill East 1 7012 39.8 24.4 62.2 37.8 
1968 Hill West 1 7525 40.4 48.4 74.2 25.8 
1968 Maney 1 3674 46.4 0.4 49.8 50.2 
1968 Trinity 1 4983 * 
1968 Walmtey North 1 6554 31.4 46 64.8 16.4 18.8 
1968 Walmley South 1 6056 34.4 50.2 70.6 9 20.4 
1968 Wylde Green 1 6100 • 
1968 Erdinton 1 23230 24.94 51.72 69.5 17.78 12.72 
1969 Banners Gate 1 5054 48.1 6.8 46.6 S3.4 
1969 Boldmere East 1 5361 48.1 7.4 53.7 46.3 
1969 Boldmere West 1 4642 * 
1969 Hill East 1 7371 42.4 17.6 58.8 41.2 
1969 Hill West 1 7384 * 
1969 Maney 1 3819 39.4 25.8 37.1 62.9 
1969 Trinity 1 5347 * 
1969 Walmley North 1 7154 29.8 54.2 77.1 22.9 
1969 Walmley South 1 6503 * 
1969 Wylde Green 6423 • 
1969 Erdington 1 24611 22.48 43.28 71.64 28.36 
1970 Banners Gate 1 2.6 48.7 51.3 
1970 Boldmere East 1 9.8 54.9 45.1 
1970 Boldmere West 1 62 100 19 
1970 Hill East 1 5.2 47.4 52.6 
1970 Hill West 1 * 
1970 Maney 1 24.4 37.8 62.2 
1970 Trinity 1 * 
1970 Walmley North 1 31.8 65.4 34.6 
1970 Walmley South 1 • 
1970 Wylde Green 1 
1970 Erdinqton 1 27272 27.26 5.56 47.22 52.78 0 
1971 Banners Gate 5287 * 
1971 Boldmere East 1 5363 40.2 13.8 56.9 43.1 
I97I Boldmere West 4938 29.4 24.6 62.3 37.7 
1971 Hill East 1 7427 33.9 26 63 37 
1971 Hill West 1 8038 33.8 29.4 64.7 35.3 
1971 Maney 1 3830 26.7 36.6 31.7 68.3 
1971 Trinity 1 5498 31.4 30 65 35 
1971 Walmley North 1 7210 31.6 9 54.5 45.5 
1971 Walmley South 1 6723 30 22.4 61.2 38.8 
1971 Wytde Green 6296 * 
1971 Erdington 1 27667 34.32 27.28 36.36 63.64 0 
1972 Banners Gate 1 - - * 
1972 Boldmere East 1 - - 21 39.5 60.5 
1972 Boldmere West - - 15.5 40.9 56.4 
1972 Hill East 1 - - 11 55.5 44.5 
1972 Hill West 1 - - * 
1972 Maney 1 - - * 
1972 Trinity 1 - - 28.2 64.1 35.9 
1972 Walmley North 1 - - 40.8 69.5 28.7 
1972 Walmley South 1 - - 17.4 58.7 41.3 
1972 Wylde Green 1 - - 40.4 70.2 29.8 
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6>2:Labour^s displacement by the Liberals 
A week after the Conservative Party's victory at the 1959 general election the heavily 
defeated Labour Party parliamentary candidate for the Sutton Coldfield and Erdington 
Constituency Roy Hattersley, was asked by the local press i f Sutton was a safe 
Conservative seat? Hattersley replied 'yes ... but in time with building development 
this might change' (Sutton Coldfleld News 16 Oct. 1959). Hattersley's prediction was 
accurate as far as voting behaviour was concerned but highly inaccurate in its 
implication that Labour might be the beneficiary of any future change. The Sutton 
Coldfield Labour Party had been formed in 1945 amidst a national sea change in 
electoral attitudes, however, thereafter, 'faced an uphill struggle against a powerful 
local Conservative machine' (Roberts 1980:4). Labour's victory in the Walmley ward 
at the 1957 local elections gave the party, and Sutton, their first Labour councillor. 
Indeed, despite the election of a second Labour councillor in the now Walmley North 
ward in 1959, Labour were unable to break out of Walmley and make any progress in 
the remaining wards of this solidly Conservative constituency. At the 1960 local 
elections Labour lost a council seat and later that year their sole representative on the 
council resigned from the party, though he continued to represent Walmley North as 
an Independent. Perhaps aware of the changing local political climate, he joined the 
Liberals and in 1962 contested the Hill West ward. Thus, at the 1962 local elections 
Labour had no representation on the town council. Nationally Labour had performed 
very well at the 1962 local elections. However, the Labour Party in Sutton Coldfield 
was being displaced by the Liberals. Sutton Coldfield Borough Council after the 
1962 local elections comprised: ten Aldermen, of whom three were Conservatives and 
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seven were Independents, twenty-one Conservative councillors, seven Liberal 
councillors and two Independent councillors. 
From the earlyl960s any real challenge to the Conservative Party's local electoral 
hegemony had come from the Liberals (see Table 36 above and Figure 37 below). In 
the 1970s the Sutton Labour Party went into a virtual terminal decline, indeed, 
increasingly contesting elections without any campaigning, and at the February 1974 
general election the Labour candidate lost his deposit. In fact by the mid-1970s, 'as an 
electoral force the party was of negligible importance' in Sutton Coldfield (Roberts 
1980:36). How and why the Liberals were able to mount this challenge, and reap 
electoral success where Labour failed miserably, will be assessed below. 
Figure 37: Party percentage share of the vote at municipal elections Sutton Coldfield 1958-1972 
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6.3:Sutton*s socio-political backdrop 
Rather than a detailed description of each of the ten wards an overview of the three 
post reorganisation wards is a much more efficient method to convey the barrenness 
of the ground that Labour's local electoral blandishments fell upon. The Sutton Four 
Oaks vrard was a well-established residential area comprised, in the main, of low 
density inter-war and post-v^ ovmer-occupied housing and upon its incorporation 
into Birmingham immediately became the city's most prosperous ward. Similarly. 
Sutton Vesey was made up predominantly of inter-war and post-war owner-occupied 
housing, (8,832 owner-occupiers, 670 local authority rented in 1981). The Sutton 
New Hall ward, which encompassed the town centre, had mainly inter-war and 
recently built private housing, and a high percentage of professional and managerial 
workers (6,129 were owner occupied. 2.104 were local authority rented and 474 were 
privately rented in 1981). Sutton New Hail was the only Sutton ward with a council 
estate of any significant size, the Falcon's Lodge estate. Arguably the Erdington ward 
had a tenurial mix slightly more favourable towards the Labour party with around 
26% of tenure council rented (passim: Birmingham City Council Economic 
Development Information Centre). 
Clearly, issues concerning social housing conditions, re-housing, and council rents 
would not loom large in the electoral calculus of the majority of the residents of 
Sutton Coldfield and. where such considerations did. the spatial distribution of this 
minority of voters in small enclaves within largely owner-occupied wards meant that 
even i f Labour could mobilise all council tenant support it still had an enormous 
electoral hill to climb. However, this is not to argue that such considerations regarding 
public housing provision and rents did not have any electoral salience in Sutton 
Coldfield. 
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Indeed much of Sutton Coldfield's public housing was by the late 1950s falling into 
disrepair and its provision unable to satisfy the demands of a rapidly growing town 
population. Moreover, on Sutton's only significantly sized council estate, the Falcon 
Lodge Estate in Walmley ward, complaints over defects, the inadequacy of provision, 
and rent rises due to the impact of the 1957 Rent Act, had provided the foundation of 
the Labour party's albeit temporary local electoral success in the ward. The town's 
public housing situation in July 1960 was described as being in a 'tragic state ... [with] 
1,031 people requiring housing. Added to this growing waiting list were, by 1963, six 
hundred people over the age of sixty-five on a waiting list for council built bungalows 
for the elderiy which were being built at a rate of fifty per year CSutton Coldfield 
News. 16 Oct. 1959, 8 July 1960,24 May 1963). 
Sutton Coldfield council's response to the town's social housing needs was however, 
constrained by a number of factors, not least the dearth of council owned building 
land, a mere twenty acres in 1960, and the spiralling price of land in the borough, 
from seven to ten thousand pounds per acre. The cost of raising money for housing 
projects had, furthermore, been increased considerably by the impact of the 1957 Rent 
Act, in that local authorities could no longer raise comparatively cheap loans from the 
centrally funded Public Works Commission but had to resort to the free market. A 
consequence of this was an unpopular hike in the rate poundage from 18s 6d to 20s 6d 
in 1959. Housing construction costs rose by over 40% during the 1959-1968 period, 
and more than fourfold in the inflationary economic climate from 1968-1979 
(Mitchell 1988: 395). Thus, any proposed social housing programme would be both 
costly of itself and a further burden on Sutton council's existing housing debt loan 
that stood at £3.5 million in 1961. 
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Concomitantly, the costs of the national programme of expansion and improvement in 
educational provision impacted upon Sutton's electorate as a consequence of the 
ever-increasing county council precept -contribution demanded from the borough 
ratepayer. Although central government provided the \^4ierewithal for most of local 
authority expenditure through the rate support grant, local authorities, nevertheless, 
differed considerably in 'how fast and how far ... the level of expenditure [was] 
allowed to rise' and 'Individual local authorities each went through their own 
particular agonies' over how their contribution would impact upon rates ( Kogan 
1975:99-222). 
It is perhaps then, unsurprising that Kogan argues that at the local authority 
association level, interaction with the national decision making process was 
characterised by a 'dependency on party political majorities' that' may ... become 
more responsive to general political movements within their areas' (ibid ;78). Clearly, 
Kogan identifies individual local authority responses to a national policy (education) 
which were to some extent determined by local electoral considerations. These locally 
determined responses subsequently had influence in the decision making process of 
such bodies as the Association of N4unicipal Councillors, and the Association of 
County Councils, and thereby impacted upon national policy. Kogan's argument 
about local authority influence upon educational policy is not the point at issue here. 
What it does highlight, however, is that the battleground of the education debate was 
at the local level, in the municipalities and the counties. It substantiates the argument 
for the salience of the issue of educational provision and the increasing cost of that 
provision to the local electors of places such as Sutton Coldfield and points towards a 
variance in one of the manifold determinants of local electoral behaviour dependent 
upon location. 
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A further constraint upon the latitude of the Conservative dominated Sutton Coldfield 
tovm council was the presence of a phalanx o f Independent councillors whose 
common purpose was the defence of the rate payer interest In the main throughout 
the 1960s these Independent councillors were aldermen, however, in the Barmers Gate 
and the Boldmere West wards, they were in the vanguard of local electoral activity 
and, indeed, elected to council rather than appointed to council. Thus, dissatisfaction 
with the Tory dominated town council could find an agreeable refxige in support for 
Indep>endent candidates in a small number of wards for that part of the electorate 
disinclined to vote Liberal or Labour over such issues as the escalation in rates, the 
development of both public and private housing within their wards, the costly 
redevelopment of Sutton town centre, the political merger with Birmingham, and the 
cost and direction of education policy. Some of these Independents were official 
representatives of ward Resident Associations and others the self-appointed guardians 
of the ratepayer interest of their particular ward. In 1962, of the forty members of the 
Sutton Coldfield council (comprised of thirty councillors and ten aldermen) nine were 
Independents. At the first post renDrganisation elections in 1973 only one 
Independent, a Resident Association candidate for Sutton New Hall, contested at the 
Birmingham District Council Elections, and thereafter Independents and Resident 
Association candidates were noticeable by their absence from the Sutton local 
electoral scene. The gradual demise of the Independent candidate is perhaps indicative 
of the increasing politicisation of local government elections in this period, and the 
impact of merger with Binmingham. 
Furthermore, the amalgamation in July 1961 of the many individual ward resident 
associations under one umbrella organisation, the Sutton Coldfield Federation of 
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Associations of Residents (S.C.F.A.R.), gave the association the resources to contest, 
or threaten to contest, as Independents in any ward where its members were 
dissatisfied with council policy that affected them, and thereby the potential to divide 
the Conservative vote. In 1964 the membership of the S.C.F.A.R. was 3,000 (Sutton 
Coldfied News, 8 May 1964). In contrast, in 1965 the total Labour party membership 
of all thirteen Birmingham constituencies was only 8,830 (Birmingham Borough 
Labour Party, Report to Executive Committee, I Jan. 1965, Document 85). Although 
the de jure influence of the Independent councillors was limited by the large 
Conservative majority on the council during the period, the local electoral strategies 
employed on their behalf by the S.C.F.A.R., amplified the de facto influence of these 
Independents in disproportion to their numbers. The threat to put up an Independent 
candidate against an incumbent Conservative councillor, petitions to and lobbying of 
the constituency's Conservative MP and of the Minister of Town and Country 
Planning, public meetings and protests, surveys of electoral opinion and threatened 
rates rebellions, were among the tactics employed by the S.C.F.A.R. during the 1960s. 
Although, local politics in Sutton Coldfleld was dominated by the Conservatives, their 
hegemony did not go unchallenged by Independent candidates. 
6.4:Liberal strategy 
It was then, in this milieu that Ken Hovers and a couple of friends decided to contest 
the Maney ward at the 1956 local elections in Sutton Coldfield in what was the first 
move in an optimistic plan of action to establish a Liberal presence on the 
Conservative dominated town council. Hovers finished only seventy-two votes behind 
the successful Conservative candidate. At a municipal by election in the October of 
the same year. Hovers took the seat for the Boldmere East ward, and in the same ward 
at the following year's elections a Liberal candidate was returned, and thus the party 
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had two seats on the town council. Such was the growing support in the Maney ward 
that the Sutton Coldfield Divisional Liberal Association established a ward branch in 
Maney. In May 1959 the Liberals contested four Sutton wards, including Boldmere 
East and Maney, and despite the failure to secure a seat in any of them it was decided 
to contest the Sutton Coldfield and Erdington Parliamentary Constituency at the 1959 
general election. In reality the Liberals in Sutton in terms of party organisation had a 
presence in 'one ward only ... a few friends in two others and one member [the 
association's treasurer] in a fourth and nothing else' (Liberal News l,Oct. 1964), The 
association's coffers held £75, the appointed electoral agent had no experience of 
municipal elections let alone parliamentary, they 'had no HQ ...no adequate record of 
their 100 or so members ... [and all activists] were part-timers' (ibid). Hovers and a 
small number of activists had to underwrite the costs of a public appeal for fiinds in 
order to convince the majority of the association's executive to agree to allow him to 
contest. The cash raised provided the wherewithal to contest and persuaded the 
executive to approve Hover's candidature. The appeal had also attracted almost three 
hundred volunteers to help in the electoral campaign and Hovers, although in third 
place did not lose his deposit. Moreover, the press coverage and campaign activity 
had elevated the public profile of a hitherto small group o f Sutton Liberal activists. 
Importantly, the election had required that, a working relationship be established with 
the Erdington ward organisation, and thereby Sutton Coldfield and Erdington Liberal 
Association was properly formed. Although Erdington at the time had a small 
organisation and little electoral support, its local electoral fortunes were transformed, 
when in the early 1960s, albeit temporarily, the Liberals displaced Labour as the 
challenger in this hitherto Tory stronghold. The significant factor of a particular 
activist's leadership quality, determination and following, in influencing local 
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electoral outcomes is exemplified by Ken Hovers who had taken a leading part in the 
revival of Liberalism in Sutton and Erdington, 
The local electoral strategy employed by the Sutton Coldfield Liberals from the late 
1950s was a concentration upon a narrow electoral front, 'while widening the front 
year by year' ( Sutton Coldfield Liberal Party Coordinating Secretary, R Whorwood, 
Sutton Coldfield News 15 May 1964). At the heart of Liberal campaign was the 
promise to keep the electorate informed of council decisions, indeed, that 'Residents 
must be informed how their money is being spent and the developments affecting 
them' ( Sutton Coldfield News 5 May 1967). A natural campaign corollary of this 
intention was the demand that the press and public be admitted to council committee 
meetings or, failing this, that all information regarding such meetings be released as a 
matter of course rather than as an exceptional event. The Liberals' local electoral 
appeal was pitched at the dissatisfied of the electorate who regarded the council as 
remote and unresponsive, and who also viewed the Independent councillor, or Labour 
councillor, i f they had one, as an inadequate conduit for their particular grievances. 
Symptomatic of this change in electoral attitudes was the rapid decline in the number 
of Independent candidates, some retiring from local politics and not being replaced, 
many others being co-opted on to the Conservative dominated council as Aldermen, 
and others swapping the camouflage of neutrality for the Conservative party colours 
at local elections. Also in one case a Labour councillor crossed the council floor to the 
Liberal benches. 
The Sutton Liberals, with the help of Erdington ward activists, canvassed the Maney 
and Boldmere East wards in 1956 and promised the electorate of those wards that 
once elected they would introduce report-back meetings and produce quarterly letters 
to keep residents informed of all council decisions that affected their lives. The 
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methods employed in Sutton Coldfield were very similar to the 'community poUtics* 
approach of the Ladywood Liberal Party activists but campaign policy was shaped by 
and pitched at a very different type of electorate. With the election of Libera! 
councillors in Boldmere East in 1956 and 1957, the ward electorate was kept 
informed in an all-year round campaign of council policy decisions or decision 
making that could affect their lives, and more importantly had a readily accessible 
representative to listen to and voice their particular grievances. These electoral tactics 
were employed in contiguous wards and as support grew branch associations were 
formed in the Maney ward in 1959. Walmley South in 1962 and Banners Gate in 
1963. Strong canvassing, constant accessibility and effective channels of 
communication between elector and elected seem to be the pre-requisites for Liberal 
party success in these and other wards in the borough during this period. However, the 
success of Liberal electoral tactics, it wi l l be argued below, was both facilitated and 
limited by a number of local issues, some of which were of importance to the electors 
of a particular ward and others of pertinence to all wards but varying in degrees of 
electoral resonance. 
A factor that conditioned the impact of some local issues upon the electorate of each 
ward was the presence or absence of an Independent candidate. A l l of the Sutton 
wards, except Waimley, had a strong tradition of voting Conservative, and in some 
wards such as Boldmere West and Walmley (1945-1957), the electorate had an 
equally strong tradition of voting for Independent candidates, who, more often than 
not were Resident Association representatives. In other wards, such as the Hill ward, 
Maney, Trinity and Boldmere East there was not a strong history of Independent 
candidate contestation. It was in this latter group of wards that the Liberals tapped 
into an electoral discontent that could not find a suitable vehicle for expression. 
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Nevertheless, the Liberals were able to challenge and to either erode or to usurp 
completely the electoral support formerly in the hands of the Independent candidates 
in Boldmere West and Walmley. 
6.5:Sutton Liberals and local issues 
The catalyst for Liberal success in the Boldmere area was the council plan to build a 
multi-storey social housing development of six hundred units on church land that the 
council had compulsorily purchased in the area. A protracted protest campaign 
against the plan was organised by the Boldmere Residents Association, the Residents 
Association's councillor, N.Lampert, and the Independent councillor G.Broadhist, 
both of whom represented the Boldmere West ward throughout the period. The fear of 
devaluation of their property appeared to be the prime motivation of the Boldmere 
owner-occupiers fSutton Coldfied News 11 March, Dec 1960) Moreover, Sutton 
Coldfield did not have, nor did the majority of its residents want, the type of multi-
storey council development that blighted nearby Birmingham's skyline (Sutton 
Coldfied News 27 May 1960,25 Aug 1961).. Added to this, and of significance to all 
owner-occupiers of Sutton Coldfield was the fear of an escalation in their rate 
demands. Sutton's rates were lower than those paid by the owner-occupiers of nearby 
Birmingham and Sutton ratepayers were well aware that Birmingham. City Council 
were making a significant loss on multi-storey developments. The Sutton Coldfield 
electorate had been aware of the multi-storey social housing plan since it was first 
mooted in the mid 1950s, and in 1960 amid protest and petitions against the plan in 
terms of situation, size, design and cost, Sutton Coldfield council felt it necessary to 
assure the electorate that the town's Housing Revenue Account was distinctly 
separate from the rest of the council's finances and that the flats would be financially 
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self-supporting ( Sutton Coldfied News 11 March 1960). The controversy over the 
plan to build multi-storey social housing in the Boldmere area vras of particular local 
electoral significance in both the East and West wards, and in the Banners Gate ward 
which had been created in 1958 by the division of the old Boldmere West ward. The 
council's final decision and announcement to go ahead with the development came in 
October 1962 and rather than a development of eleven storey buildings the protests 
and petitions had resulted in a compromise plan for a number of six storey flats. 
Nevertheless, the die had been cast in these wards in particular and in Sutton 
Coldfield in general, that voting Conservative and Independent was no guarantee 
against property devaluation or increased rate levels. Furthermore, in 1962 the council 
announced plans for at least a thousand new homes to be built in the town by 1968, 
and a costly plan for a major redevelopment and modernisation of the town's 
commercial centre. 
In the Conservative stronghold of the Boldmere East ward, which had not been 
contested by an Independent candidate since 1947, the Liberals, in straight fights 
with Conservatives at the elections of 1958-1963 had averaged 47% of the vote, had 
won their first seat on the upper-tier Warwickshire County Council in April 1962 and 
at the 1964 W.C.C. elections had taken 53.7% of the vote with the ward recording the 
highest poll of all Sutton wards at these elections. Despite a brief national revival and 
intervention by Labour candidates 1964-1967, by the mid-1960s the Liberals had 
established a firm electoral grip in this former Conservative stronghold to a large 
extent on the back of distinctly local issues. 
In contrast any dissatisfaction in the Conservative stronghold of Boldmere West could 
be vented by support for an Independent candidate representing the Boldmere West 
Residents Association. The ward had a history of Conservative or Independent 
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candidates standing unopposed and, 1958 apart, the Liberals never fielded a candidate 
against an Independent The only real challenge to Conservative hegemony in the 
1960s came at the elections of 1962 and 1963 at the height of the ward electorate's 
disapproval over the council's decision to build social housing in the area and at a 
time of protest over rate increase. Turnout in the ward declined through the 1960s and 
perhaps as many Conservative voters stayed at home to express their disapproval as 
those that temporarily transferred allegiance to the Liberals. 
Similarly, in the Barmers Gate ward Conservative or Independent candidates had 
stood unopposed. However, in 1962 the ward's long-time Independent candidate took 
up the Conservative party colours and it was not until 1965 that the residents 
association could field another independent candidate. This candidate, a member of 
the council's finance committee who had organised an SCFAR petition against the 
ever-increasing rate burden faced by the town's owner-occupiers, won unopposed in 
1965, 1968 and 1971. However, in 1963 in addition to disquiet over social housing 
and rates the Conservative councillors that represented the borough came under fire 
for the County Council decision to locate a residential mental health unit in the ward. 
The ward electorate were angered that their Conservative councillor had neither 
informed them at the plarming stage nor fought hard enough on their behalf to prevent 
the scheme. It was then in this turbulent electoral climate that the Liberals in 1963 
first contested Banners Gate and came a close second. The Liberals had once again 
established a significant foothold in a new territory on the back of electoral discontent 
over local issues and had been the beneficiary of a protest vote that had haemorrhaged 
from the Conservative camp at a time when the alternative of an Independent was 
unavailable. In subsequent straight fights with Conservative candidates the Liberals 
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were able to retain this following and come v«thin 3 percentage points of the 
Conservatives in 1966 and 1967, and finally take seats in 1969 and 1970. 
The Liberals first contested the Hi l l East ward in 1960 and in a straight fight with a 
Conservative took 48% of the vote. Hitherto the Conservative candidates had been 
returned virtually unopposed since 1946. In straight fights with the Conservatives at 
municipal elections of 1961,1962, and 1963 the Liberals had taken every seat and at 
the 1964 election had extended their winning majority over the second placed 
Conservative candidate to 30.2% of the total vote. Intervention by Labour candidates 
at elections between 1965 and 1967 eroded Liberal support somewhat and the 
Conservatives regained the seat in 1965 and 1967. However, in straight fights 
between 1968 and 1972, the 1970 election apart, the Conservatives defeated the 
Liberals. The Liberal campaigns in the ward, in addition to the rancour concerning 
rate levels, focused upon two interrelated issues. Overcrowding in the local school, 
due in part to an increase in the local population, but blamed on the influx of people 
from the declining suburbs of Birmingham, and the council's decision to grant outline 
planning permission to build high-density affordable housing on a green-field site in 
the ward to accommodate this demand. The proposed site straddled both Hill East and 
Trinity wards. The irate residents of the affluent Moor Hall estate, which overlooked 
the site, by-passed their Conservative councillors and petitioned directly to the 
Minister of Town and Country Planning to halt the development which they 
considered would devalue their properties and exacerbate overcrowding at the school. 
The controversy dominated local elections in Hill East and Trinity wards from the 
early 1960s and provided the Liberals with an electoral window to benefit from anti-
council feeling in both wards. 
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In contrast the Liberals, although able to push Labour firmly into third place, were 
never able to break the Conservative hold over the Hi l l West electorate. At the 
fourteen elections between 1959 and 1972 the Conservatives took all but one ward 
seat, six of them unopposed. The Liberals had first contested the ward in 1962 local 
election and the issue of contention at this and subsequent local elections was the 
proposal for a social housing development in the ward made public in March 1962 
(Sutton Coldfield News 23 March 1962). At the 1963 elections the Liberal candidate 
took the seat with a 48% share of the vote in a three-cornered contest that saw turnout 
in the ward increase to 45.6% of the electorate. The Liberals canvassed and 
campaigned the ward intensely. In 1965 alone 6,000 report-back letters had been 
delivered to the electorate of the ward that was also the location of the Hi l l Ward 
Ladies Liberal Club (Sutton Coldfield News 2 April 1965). 
However, the return to the Conservative fold in this staunchly Conservative ward 
once a Labour government had come to power in 1964 was quite rapid. It cannot be 
ignored that Libera! support in Hill West and many of Sutton's wards had increased as 
dissatisfaction with the 1951-1964 Conservative goverrmients mounted. As the 
Labour activist and chronicler of Labour party activity in Sutton Coldfield observed: 
*The Liberals ... have never been a really serious threat to Conservative stability in 
the town and their most spectacular successes have always occurred during periods of 
Conservative government when disillusionment had set in among that party's 
supporters' (Roberts:4).The explanation for these 'spectacular successes' nevertheless 
also had a local dimension which should not be ignored 
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The Labour Party had a significant following in the Maney ward 1945-1958 when the 
party averaged a 32.4% share of the vote. Independent candidates had not contested 
since 1945 and the ward had returned a Conservative at each election until 1961. The 
Liberals had first contested the seat in 1956 and their candidate had pushed the 
Labour candidate into third place and had come within four percentage points of the 
Conservative victor. Indeed, the Conservative share of the Maney ward vote had 
fallen from 72.8% in 1946 to 38.7% in 1956. In 1961 the Liberals, in a straight contest 
with the Conservatives, took the seat with a 21.2% majority and, 1963 apart, won all 
ensuing contests up to and including 1972. Without the alternative of an Independent 
candidate or a Labour presence on the town council, a significant element of the 
Conservative and the Labour support in the Maney ward had shifted to the Liberal 
camp. 
Support for the Liberals in the Maney ward was such that in 1959 the party 
established a ward branch and the Liberal campaign format of all-year round 
canvassing was put into action. The decline in support for the Labour party in the 
Maney ward had two clear symptoms. Firstly, in terms of voter apathy as fewer and 
fewer Labour supporters bothered to vote at all, and secondly, in terms of traditional 
Labour supporters transferring their allegiance to the Liberal party. The Sutton Labour 
party had found it increasingly difficult to mobilise former Labour voters in the early 
1960s in Maney in particular and in the other wards of the borough in general. 
Indeed, at a Sutton Coldfield Labour Party meeting held in 1966 the conclusion was 
reached that 'the disillusioned had turned to the Liberals for comfort' and that the 
Liberals had become * the repository of the protest vote'fSutton Coldfield News 28 
Jan. 1966). 
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Despite being staunch defender of the ratepayer interest and guardians against council 
profligacy the Liberals had also campaigned against what they regarded as unfair 
increases in coimcil house rents. Their solution to escalations in both rates and council 
rents was a proposed change in the rating system whereby local taxation would be 
replaced by direct taxation of income, a policy that their 1964 prospective 
parliamentary candidate for the Sutton and Erdington Constituency was to make much 
of at both the local and parliamentary elections of that year (Sutton Coldfield Nevys 1 
May 1964). Under this scheme any social housing development felt necessary would 
be wholly funded by central government and council rents would become a national 
rather than locally determined issue. Council house rents had increased considerably 
in the early 1960s and electoral discontent over the issue mirrored that of the owner-
occupiers concerning the ever-increasing cost of the rates. In 1961 council rents 
increased by Is to 3s dependent upon type of accommodation, and in 1963 at a time 
of a government pay-pause another above inflation rent rise was imposed. Liberal 
candidates in Maney, as in the rest of the borough, campaigned throughout the period 
for a council rent system that differentiated between the income of tenants and thus 
their ability to pay. 
Furthermore, in an appeal to the socially mobile Labour vote in the ward, and the 
borough in general, the Liberals campaigned to make the first purchase of a house 
affordable by the abolition of stamp duty, the availability of 100% mortgages and the 
reintroduction of government loans for the purchase of pre-1914 properties (Sutton 
Coldfield News 20 Sept. 1963). Indeed, the Liberals of Maney ward in the early 
1960s had carried out an extensive survey of the housing conditions of the centra! area 
of Sutton Coldfield of which the Maney ward comprised a major part, and the author 
of the report, a local journalist and Liberal activist. J. Gallagher, contested and won 
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the Maney seat at the 1966 municipal elections ( Sutton Coldfield News 15 April 
1966). In 1970, when Sutton Council introduced a new housing points scheme that 
awarded extra points to those on the housing list dependent upon the condition of their 
present accommodation, the Liberals were quick to argue that the scheme would 
discriminate against those who had looked after their property and who had been on 
the housing list for a long time. The Liberal policy was pitched at the large number of 
older people living either in unsuitable council owned property or private rental 
sector in the borough, who felt that points should be awarded for the length of time in 
unsuitable accommodation rather than a scheme that fast-tracked those considered to 
by the Council Medical Officer to be living in conditions normally considered unfit 
for human habitation ( Sutton Coldfield News 6 Feb.,1970). 
The Liberals with much publicity were also quick to jump to the defence of the 
private renter, especially those in the town's central area covered by the Maney ward 
who were faced with eviction. Sutton Coldfield council had a residential qualification 
that excluded all those not bom in the borough from the right to be put on the housing 
list. In a number of much publicised cases the Liberals took up the cause of those 
facing eviction who did not qualify for council housing despite having resided in 
Sutton Coldfield virtually all their working lives ( Sutton Coldfield News 20 
December 1961). In the late 1960s as the redevelopment of the town centre 
progressed and compulsory purchase orders by the town council became more 
frequent so did the occasions on which the Liberals jumped to the defence of the 
Maney ward private sector tenants. The electoral appeal of the Liberals to the owner-
occupiers of the Maney ward, like that to the borough in general, was pitched at 
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dissatisfaction with the Conservative controlled council over rates and the Liberals 
reaped the reward of dealignment. 
At elections in the Walmley North ward 1945-1958 Independent candidates 
representing Walmley Residents Association had, 1957 apart, taken every seat. 
Labour, who had taken seats in 1957 and 1959, had a significant following in the 
ward, as did the Conservatives. The ward's long-standing Independent representative 
retired in 1961 and the SCFAR were unable to field a candidate until the 1964 
elections when their Independent received a derisory 78 votes. The 1959-1964 
elections were contested by the two major parties with the Conservatives winning five 
of the SLX seats but with Labour taking a respectable average of 45.9% of the vote. 
Falcon's Lodge council estate had provided a consistent level of support for the 
Labour Party. Nevertheless, over the 1965-1968 municipal elections Labour's average 
share of the vote plummeted to 24.2% in what were three-cornered contests that 
included the Liberal Party. Indeed, Labour had taken only 16.4% of the Walmley 
North vote at the 1968 election. However, the Labour share of the vote rallied in what 
were straight fights with Conservative candidates at elections between 1969 and 1972 
inclusive, when the Liberals were unable to contest the ward. 
Clearly, the electoral lacunae created by the abstention of Independent/Resident 
Association contestation between 1959 and 1963 had been filled by the 
Conservatives, with Labour support in the ward remaining fairiy steady. However, 
with Liberal intervention, a once reasonably stable level of Labour support declined, 
and the Conservative share of the vote at Walmley North elections, although enough 
to take the seat, also declined, fi*om an average of 53.8% at the 1959-1963 ward 
elections, to an average of 43.8% share of the vote at the 1964 to 1968 elections. In 
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part, the decline in Labour support can be explained by stay at home Labour 
supporters. At the 1962 Walmley North ward election a 33.7% turnout was described 
as 'very slack' and Labour officials bemoaned the fact that 'we know there is more 
support ... than was shown in the voting'. At the 1963 Walmley North ward election 
the 'poll [was] very low* and Labour officials observed that' a high percentage of 
those that did not vote are people with Labour sympathies who thought we could not 
win' . At the W.C.C. elections in Walmley North in 1964, the ward recorded the 
lowest poll at the elections and Labour officials remarked upon 'the worsening of the 
Labour position in Walmley North'. At the 1964 municipal elections the same Labour 
officials remarked how 'Labour supporters admitted to voting Liberal in an attempt to 
keep the Conservatives out' ( Sutton Coldfield News 18 May 1962,17 May 1963, 17 
April 1964,15 May 1964). Clearly tactical voting is not as modem an electoral 
phenomenon as some commentators would have us believe (see Johnson et al 
2001:204). Voters were making rational decisions concerning how to cast their votes 
in the most effective way. Labour support was declining because of voter apathy, the 
perception that voting for Labour was a wasted vote, and tactical voting by Labour 
supporters to keep the Conservatives out was the desired effect. The Sutton Coldfield 
electorate's perception of the local Labour party in the mid to late 1960s would have 
been one of a pzirty on the wane, a party without any representation on the council, 
that contested fewer and fewer wards, whose ward parties had folded up and whose 
Young Socialist branch had disbanded. The party only had a residual following in the 
Walmley area, however, this had been eroded by apathy and support for the Liberals. 
The causes of the erosion in Conservative support in Walmley North will be assessed 
below in the section on Trinity ward. 
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The Liberals first contested the Walmley South ward in 1962 and in three-cornered 
contests against Conservative and Labour candidates, up to and including the 1968 
election, had replaced Labour as the credible opposition to the Conservatives in the 
ward . In 1962 and 1963 the Liberals took the Walmley South seat. The Labour share 
of the vote, which had been 35.2% and 25.0% in straight fights with Conservative 
candidates at the 1959 and 1960 elections was much reduced with Liberal intervention 
and apart from the 1964 and 1966 municipal elections when Labour made a slight 
recovery, the party only took an average of a 15,8% share of the vote in Walmley 
South from 1962 to 1968 inclusive. 
It would appear that Labour had a small but consistent core vote in the ward and a 
transient support that either failed to turnout at times or plumped for the Liberals. 
With many fewer council tenants than Walmley North, Liberal success in Walmley 
South was more dependent upon the electoral behaviour of the ward's traditional 
Conservative voter. Conservative support in the ward, which had given the party a 
64.8% and 75.0% share of the vote at the 1959 and 1960 elections, fell to 33.1% in 
1962 and despite a slight recovery in 1963 was not enough to fend o f f the Liberal 
challenge at these elections. Conservative support, however, gradually returned to its 
former level and by 1968 it was such that the party took a 70% share of the vote in the 
ward. Nevertheless, in straight fights with Liberal candidates at the 1971 and 1972 
municipal elections the Liberals were able to retain the support of 38.8% and 41.3?/© 
of those electors that voted. 
Clearly, by the eariy 1970s the Liberals had established a core support in the Walmley 
South ward. The party had opened a ward branch in Walmley South in 1962 and, as in 
other wards, implemented their own brand of community politics and electoral tactics 
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that focused upon anti-council feeling amongst both ratepayer and council tenant. The 
major determinant of Liberal success in Walmley South was the Conservative protest 
vote and in the section below on Trinity ward this vAW be assessed. 
The Wylde Green ward, from 1946 to 1961 inclusive, was invariably won by the 
Conservatives unopposed The Liberals contested the ward at the 1962 to 1967 
municipal elections and on average took a 33.3% share of the vote and contested 
again in 1972 when their candidate took a 29.8% share of the vote in this staunchly 
Conservative ward. Why this electoral realignment from the Conservative to the 
Liberal party came about here and, indeed, throughout Sutton Coldfield vAW be 
assessed below. 
The Trinity ward was a Conservative Party stronghold which the Liberals contested 
intermittently from 1964 and at six of nine elections contested by the Liberals, 1964-
1972, the party averaged a 33.6% share of the vote. It wil l be argued below that an 
explanation of how the Liberals were able to significantly loosen the Conservative's 
grip on the Trinity ward electorate is located in the widespread dissatisfaction over the 
ever-increasing rate burden imposed on the owner-occupiers of Sutton Coldfield. This 
explanation also impinges upon and adds weight to previous explanations of Liberal 
success in the other wards. 
6.6:Sutton Coldfield's Conservative dealignment and realignment 
In 1965 the rates demand that hit the doormat of the vast majority of the borough 
electorate, was an increase of 51.2% upon that demanded in 1959. The cumulative 
effect of annual above inflation hikes in the rate poundage of between ten and fifteen 
per cent, this sharp rise came about as the national economy entered 'the "stop" part 
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of the "stop-go" cycle which had become a feature of the post-war economy'. In July 
of 1960 the bank rate had been raised from 5% to 7%. In July of 1961 a nine-months 
pay-pause, which pinned down wage increases below 5% was introduced, and in 1962 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Selwyn Lloyd announced a '2-2.5% guiding light 
for pay settlements' (Childs 1997: 100). This gloomy economic climate continued 
under the 1964-1970 Labour administration, indeed, the crisis budget of November 
1964 increased income tax, national insurance contributions, the cost of petrol and 
private pensions. Furthermore, in the autumn of 1966, with the agreement of 
management and trade unions alike, statutory controls on prices and incomes were 
introduced, which pinned down pay increases to 3-3.5% at a time of a bank rate of 
7%. Thus, an escalation in rate demands, and rising interest rates that impacted as a 
sharp increase in mortgage repayments, occurred at a time of wage restraint and 
increasing prices. Indeed, the initial mortgage payment before tax relief as a 
percentage of earnings had climbed to 21% by 1963 and gradually increased 
thereafter to reach 43% by 1974 (Daunton 1987:109). Symptomatic of the electoral 
disquiet in this period was the Liberal victory in the safe Conservative seat at the 1962 
Orpington by-election. Indeed in the 1961 to 1962 period the Liberals came in as 
nmners-up at eight parliamentary by-elections, however, 'where the Liberals seemed 
best able to capture new votes was as an alternative middle-class vote in suburban 
Tory-held seats' (Stevenson 1993; pp51-53). Nevertheless, as the Ladywood case 
study has shown this political phenomenon occurred in other types of places as well. 
At the local government electoral level the impact of this macro-economic change 
was determined to some extent by the micro-political economy of individual local 
authorities. In the case of Sutton Coldfield macro economic change was mediated 
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through and exacerbated by a number of local issues that were, it will be argued, of 
influence upon the voting behaviour of the town's electorate. 
In many wards the electorate was already somewhat disaffected by the council's 
proposal for both private and social housing developments. Added to this was a 
groundswell of antipathy towards the council over the increasing rate burden. 
Symptomatic of this rancour was the formation of the S.C.F.A.R. in 1961, which 
thereafter kept the issue of rates on the front burner of local politics. In 1962 the 
S.C.F.A.R. had appealed in the local press 'to stop the rises' and by 1969 feelings 
over rates still ran very high as that year's rate increase was 'greeted as a bitter pill... 
throughout the town'. In the intervening years the S.C.F.A.R. had petitioned, 
protested, brought the town to the brink of a rates revolt, and threatened to compete in 
a safe Conservative ward. Indeed, in 1963 the S.C.F. A.R. threatened to contest the 
Walmley North ward, a Conservative seat where Labour had a strong following and, 
in a history of straight fights with the Conservatives, Labour had won the seat in 1959 
and had taken over a 40% share of the vote at elections in the ward thereafter. The 
threat to intervene would not have been taken lightly as the then Whitehouse 
Common Residents Association in Walmley North had fielded candidates at the 1949, 
1952 and 1955 elections, and with other Independent candidates had until 1957 kept 
the Labour voters of the ward at bay. In the run up to the 1964 local elections the 
S.C.F.A.R. held protest meetings and threatened a much publicised rates revolt. 
Furthermore, the Federation demanded that Geoffrey Lloyd, the Conservative M.P for 
the constituency, take up the issue with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 'such was 
the bitter feeling over rates'. In March 1965 the S.C.F.A.R. held a Rates Forum to 
protest at the inadequacy of the Rates (Interim) Relief Act and by 1966 it seems the 
message had hit home at least at the parliamentary electoral level, when the 
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encumbent Lloyd focussed his 1966 general election campaign upon reform of the 
rating system (Sutton Coldfield News 16 Mar., 1962,25 Jan..20 Sept., 1963, 28 
Feb.,1 May,8 May, 24 April 1965). However, Lloyd's party was at the time safely out 
of office. 
At the local electoral level however, the window of electoral opportunity had widened 
for the Liberals. With the Conservative dominated council discredited, the 
Independents regarded as ineffectual and Labour without any representation on the 
council, the disaffected of the electorate turned to the Liberals. Indeed, at the 1962 
diet of municipal elections in Sutton Coldfield *never before had the outcome of the 
... contests been so uncertain' ( Sutton Coldfield News 23 March 1962). 
Furthermore, such was the increased politicisation of Sutton Coldfield's local 
elections that in 1966, for the first time in the borough's history all wards were 
contested simultaneously. Paradoxically, despite increased contestation and many 
more marginal results, by 1968 turnout had fallen in what the Chairman of the 
Borough Labour Party described as a 'shattering blow for the democratic system' with 
under one third of the borough electorate bothering to vote in 1968 (Sutton Coldfield 
News 17 May 1968). Clearly, by 1968 in many wards the Sutton Coldfield electorate 
had become increasingly apathetic and disaffected. 
A number of local issues had been the focus of the ratepayer's anti-council sentiments 
and can in part explain both the decline in turnout and the local electoral realignment 
that characterised municipal voting behaviour in 1960s Sutton Coldfield. Firstly, there 
was the controversies over social housing developments in terms of depreciation in 
house values and the impact on the rate poundage of their cost, and also the pressure 
on already overcrowded local schools that both private and social housing 
development imposed. Secondly, there was the escalation in rates incurred through 
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increases in the County Council precept due to expansion of the education system. 
Thirdly, there was the controversy over the planned redevelopment of the commercial 
area of the town centre, an issue that divided the electorate across party lines into 
those that wanted modem shopping, entertainment and leisure facilities including a 
much needed swimming baths, and those against modernisation because of aesthetic 
and financial reasons, although the potential impact upon the rates seems to have been 
of some concern to all. Fourthly, there was the increase in rates when Solihull was 
granted County Borough status in 1963 and the remaining local councils in the 
Warwickshire County Council had to make up the W.C.C.'s shortfall in revenue by an 
increase in the county precept. Much criticism was directed at the Sutton Coldfield 
council's inability to conduct its affairs to the advantage of its ratepayers as Solihull 
had clearly done. Furthermore, and of major concern to the Sutton Coldfield 
electorate, their council had failed to avoid the eventual merger with Birmingham as 
recommended by the RedclifFe-Maud Commission. 
The commission had been set up in 1966 to undertake a comprehensive review of 
local government in England. The local inquiry procedure employed by the 
commission gave local authorities ample opportunity to present and argue counter 
proposals. The possibility of major boundary change had been public knowledge since 
the Conservative government's 1958 Redistribution of Seats Act. The act had set the 
wheels in motion with local inquiries into parliamentary constituency reorganisation 
to be finalised and the recommendations presented to parliament by 1969. The 
electorate of Sutton Coldfield via the local press were thus aware throughout the 
1960s of the potential implications of any boundary changes at both local government 
and constituency level. It was feared that merger with Birmingham at the local 
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authority level would result in even higher rates, loss of control over planning and 
hence more high density private estates and more social housing, and the subsumption 
of the Royal Borough into the anonymous Birmingham conurbation. In 1970 a 
Govenmient White Paper supported the findings of the RedclifFe-Maud Commission 
and in 1973 the Conservative controlled council and the Conservative voting majority 
of the town's electorate 'had the merger forced down their throats by their own 
government' (Roberts 1980:33). However, to the disappointment and anger of the 
Sutton Coldfield electorate the battle against merger had been lost by the ineptitude 
of the Conservative dominated town council, and the recommendations of the 
commission when published in 1969 had been 'received with contempt by Sutton 
peopled Sutton Coldfield News 13 June 169). 
In addition to these cross-pressuring local electoral influences upon the Sutton 
Coldfield electorate was the divisive issue of comprehensive education. In response to 
the Secretary of State's 10/65 circular the Sutton Coldfield Council Education 
Committee had submitted a plan endorsed by the Warwickshire County Council 
Education Committee that set out future educational provision in the borough. The 
chairman of the borough educational committee was Alderman A.Gunby, the former 
Independent/Resident Association councillor of Walmley ward. Gunby's 1966 plan 
had proposed little change to the town's educational status quo. Existing secondary 
schools would establish their own sixth-forms and the existing grammar schools 
would continue undisturbed. This 1966 plan had been approved by the Secretary of 
State for Education, and Sutton Coldfield council had appeared to have resolved a 
potentially divisive issue with a compromise that appealed to most local electors. 
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However, the economic climate was not favourable towards such a costly compromise 
that would involve capital expenditure on each secondary school to provide facilities 
that could accommodate the requirements of the A-level curriculum. In 1968, without 
consultation with Sutton Coldfield Council, Warwickshire County Council Education 
Committee submitted an alternative plan to the Secretary of State for Education. The 
county plan abolished sixth forms altogether and recommended that a sixth form 
college be established at Bishop Vesey's Grammar School which would 
accommodate all pupils wishing to stay on and take A-levels, whether from secondary 
schools or grammar schools including Bishop Vesey. The county plan, more 
controversially, proposed the abolishment of the 11-plus examination. The argument 
forwarded by the county officials was based upon the cost that county ratepayers 
would have to bear to create sixth forms in every secondary school. However, such 
pragmatism was the source of a cross-pressuring influence upon the majority of the 
Sutton Coldfield local electorate, which looked to the borough council to defend the 
interests of the ratepayer and to keep the rate burden low, and at the same time for 
their Conservative representatives on the County Council to defend the pre-10/65 
educational status quo. 
Sutton Coldfield Borough Council Education Committee with the support of the 
S.C.F. A.R. rejected the county plan. They argued that it would mean an end in the 
town to existing grammar schools that had a reputation for academic excellence, and 
would lead to a decline in educational standards. At a public meeting organised by the 
S.C.F.A.R. and attended by county and borough education officials the large audience 
voted by an overwhelming majority against the county plan and for Sutton Coldfield 
to be given special status as an exceptional area ( Sutton Coldfield News 29 March 
1968). 
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The Labour party in Sutton Coldfield had continually criticised the council for its 
prevarication over and 'irrational hostility to comprehensive education'. The Liberals 
whilst' very concerned that proper facilities should be made available in all parts of 
Sutton Coldfield for a child to receive comprehensive education', nevertheless made it 
very clear that a reform of the rating system - one that shifted the cost of education 
from the local to the national exchequer - was an essential concomitant of such 
changes to the educational system, and thereby pursued a middle course (Sutton 
Coldfield News l,May 1970). The Conservative dominated council, however, were 
faced with the dilemma of maintaining local fiscal prudence and maintaining the 
educational status quo. The inevitable merger with Birmingham, where party political 
control alternated between the Conservative and Labour groups, compounded the 
electorate's unease about the future of educational provision in Sutton Coldfield, 
Furthermore, it added another dimension to anti-council feeling over the Conservative 
council's mishandling of the local government reorganisation negotiations. It is then 
unsurprising that 'the dominant issue in the politics of Sutton Coldfield in the early 
1970s was the proposed merger with Birmingham as a result of the Local Government 
Bill of 1972 '(Roberts 1980:32). 
The Conservative group on Birmingham City Council had maintained a clear majority 
from 1966 to 1972. But at the 1972 Birmingham County Borough elections Labour 
had been swept back into power. The now seventy-three Labour, forty-four 
Conservative and nine Liberal councillors meant that Labour had an overall majority 
often at this last pre-reorganisation election. The amalgamation of the three Sutton 
wards into the newly formed Birmingham Metropolitan District Council, though 
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unwelcome by the majority of the Sutton Coldfield electorate, was nevertheless a 
turning-point in the local electoral fortunes of the Birmingham Conservative group. 
As Phillips has pointed out, the Liberal party's challenge in Birmingham, 'and the 
inclusion of new wards from the more Conservative inclined borough of Sutton 
Coldfield led to an erosion of Labour's overall vote share' (Phillips : xxiv). A key 
ingredient of this erosion of Labour's council control, it will be argued here, was the 
change in the electoral calculus of the Sutton Coldfield protest voting Conservative, 
who had at various elections and for various motives either voted Liberal or abstained. 
A new dependent variable, control of Birmingham District Council, came to be a 
crucial consideration of the Sutton voter. Much more sensitive to shifts in support 
than the big majority that had cushioned Conservative control over the former Sutton 
Coldfield Council, Conservative fortunes on Birmingham District Council and thus, 
decisions that would affect the lives of Sutton residents, now depended upon 
Conservative hegemony over all the nine seats that the three new Sutton wards could 
deliver. 
Symptomatic of the effect on the Sutton electorate's voting behaviour brought about 
by the structural changes to the electoral system by the 1972 Local Government Act 
was the rapid return of erstwhile recusants to the Conservative fold. At the 
Birmingham District Council elections the Sutton Conservatives won all seats in all 
three wards at all elections between 1973 and 1979 inclusive, generally with large 
majorities, and at times with landslide majorities over their nearest rivals the Liberals. 
Indeed, at elections between 1973 and 1979 inclusive, only on two occasions was a 
Sutton ward not in first place in a hierarchy of Birmingham ward turnout for both 
upper and lower tier local elections. Although at the *all out' elections to the upper-
tier West Midland County Council in April 1973 the Liberals had taken two of the 
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three seats, there was a massive swing back to the Conservatives at the 1977 
W.M.C.C. elections and the party took all three seats which they held on to at the 
1981 diet of Birmingham upper-tier elections. Clearly, the resort to a protest vote or 
abstention by traditional Conservative supporters in Sutton Coldfield from 1973 had 
become a much less attractive local electoral strategy, with an increased risk of 
handing council control over to the Birmingham Labour group than was the case at 
the pre-1973 local elections when a protest vote was just a signal of dissatisfaction 
rather than a strategy that risked a palace revolution. 
Despite this seismic shift in local government election voter alignment, and despite 
the dramatic decline in support for the party in the constituency at the 1970 general 
election, the Liberals in Sutton Coldfield were able to retain a core support of electors 
in the 1970s. Indeed, the cross-pressures that help explain the protest voting at these 
local elections in the 1960s were as forceful, if not more forceful in the national 
economic climate of inflation and industrial unrest that characterised the 1970s. Issues 
of rate levels, education and housing loomed large in Sutton Coldfield at local 
elections in the 1970s 'and a bitter rivalry' developed between the Conservative and 
Liberal parties for control of the now three wards (Sutton Coldfield News 2 Feb. 
1973, 18 April 1975). At the February 1974 general election the Liberals had taken 
their highest percentage share of the vote in the constituency at a parliamentary 
election and the Labour candidate had lost his deposit. However, at the coal-face of 
local electoral decision making, the electorate of Sutton Coldfield realigned itself 
behind the Conservatives in order to end Labour control of the Birmingham District 
Council. In 1975 the Labour group had maintained control of Birmingham council by 
the casting vote of the mayor. Furthermore, at the 1976 Birmingham District Council 
Elections the Labour group had campaigned on electoral promises to build 20,000 
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new council houses, to purchase more land in Sutton Coldfield for social and private 
housing developments, and increase spending upon education and social services. In 
contrast the Conservative group promised its Birmingham supporters, including the 
much needed Sutton support, a policy of retrenchment, and repair of any damage done 
to the educational system by the socialists (Sutton Coldfield News 30 April 1976). 
Compounding this local electoral compulsion upon former Conservative protest 
voters was the reaction against the Liberal Party's decision to prop up the ailing 
Callaghan administration. It is then, somewhat paradoxical that at a time of national 
political dealignment, characterised by a shift to third party support, the exact 
opposite was happening in Sutton Coldfield as the electorate, motivated by local 
issues and considerations, increasingly realigned with the party they had traditionally 
voted for, the Conservatives. Clearly, this phenomenon undermines the case for local 
elections to be regarded as no more than annual general or irrelevant elections. 
6.7:Conc!usion 
It is clear that in the late 1950s and eariy 1960s at the local electoral level in Sutton 
Coldfield, party alignment changed quite dramatically. The evidence of the individual 
ward analysis indicates that the alignment between class and party was significantly 
weakened among former traditional supporters of Independent, Conservative, and 
Labour candidates by contentious local issues and Liberal intervention. 
However, the 1950-1970 period is generally regarded as a period of electoral stability, 
of party and class alignment at the parliamentary electoral level, and of electoral 
change that was slow, small and short-term (Denver 1994:32-50, Sarivik and 
Crewe 1983: 332-335, Farrell,McAllister and Broughton 1995:110). This clearly was 
not the case at the local electoral level in Sutton Coldfield. Thus, the evidence 
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challenges the view that local electoral behaviour mirrors that of parliamentary 
electoral behaviour and responds solely to national electoral determinants (Newton 
1976). There was a significant disparity between the level of local electoral support a 
party attracted and the level of pariiamentary electoral support the same party 
attracted in these coterminous electoral units of Sutton Coldfield Furthermore there 
were distinct differences in the degree and incidence of electoral volatility between 
municipal and parliamentary electoral behaviour. From 1959 until the late 1970s the 
Sutton Labour party consistently attracted a higher level of parliamentary electoral 
support than that at the local electoral level. Conversely, the Sutton Liberal party, 
from 1959 to 1973 consistently attracted a higher level of local electoral support than 
parliamentary electoral support. The level of local electoral support for the 
Conservatives fell sharply after 1959 and did not surpass the level of parliamentary 
support the party enjoyed in the borough until after the Labour government came to 
power in 1964. However, Conservative municipal support waned in 1969 and 1970, 
but recovered somewhat with the election of the Heath government and then slumped 
8 percentage points between 1971 and 1973, and finally rose above the parliamentary 
electoral support from 1975. Clearly, there were local elections when the 
Conservative party failed to mobilise the ftill extent of its support in the borough. In 
all, three distinct periods of local electoral decline for the Conservatives in Sutton are 
apparent. Two of these declines occur under Conservative govermnents, and the other 
during the twilight years of the 1966-1970 Labour administration. These often rapid 
and significant changes in partisan alignment resulted in the almost complete 
disappearance of support for Independent candidates as Sutton local elections became 
increasingly politicised. Furthermore, not all of those voters who had previously 
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supported the Conservative party at the local elections in the 1950s returned to them 
in the 1970s indeed, the Liberals were able to maintain a significant core support. 
The evidence also contradicts the view that voters in the 1960s failed to meet the 
conditions for issue voting. That is, for the electoral issue to be salient it should be 
integrated into the party system with one party opposing the other on the issue, and 
that opinions should be skewed such that one party gains an electoral advantage from 
the position it takes (Butler and Stokes 1983, Franklin 1985:37-56). The evidence 
suggests that the Sutton Coldfield electorate voted on issues that were salient to them, 
and that these issues exerted cross pressures that did not divide the electorate cleanly 
along party lines. It also suggests that the issues were integrated into the party system, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Conservative, Independent and Liberal candidates 
had only subtle differences of emphasis over many of the issues rather than polarised 
views. Escalation in rate levels, the prejudice against social and private housing 
developments, the merger with Birmingham, the redevelopment of the town centre, 
and educational reforms, focussed the electorate's attention on the Conservative 
dominated council's inability to adequately defend the interests of the ratepayer who 
made up the majority of the electorate. Transfer of partisanship to Labour was out of 
the question for the majority of the borough electorate who traditionally voted 
Conservative or Independent. Furthermore, in many wards the Independents either did 
not contest, or were increasingly considered ineffectual conduits of electoral 
discontent, and in former Labour strongholds support for a party without 
representation on the council or its likelihood, was increasingly considered a wasted 
vote. However, it has been shown above that the ad hominem electoral appeals of the 
Liberal candidates addressed many of their grievances in terms of fair rents and re-
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housing opportunities. It has also been shown how the spatial distribution of the 
Labour vote induced not only electoral apathy and abstention, but also tactical voting 
and is indicative of the complex relationships between voting behaviour and tenure. 
Aldiough in accord over many issues, the Conservative and the Liberal parties in 
Sutton Coldfield differed fundamentally in one respect. The former had political 
power and a large core support, the latter had little realistic chance of usurping that 
power and thereby became a temporary safe haven for the protest vote of a significant 
proportion of the electorate who regarded these largely locally determined issues as 
electorally salient. The disaffected found either a temporary, or, indeed for some, as 
voting trends show a permanent home in the Liberal camp. 
The evidence of issue voting thus contradicts Franklin's view that the electorate was 
more open to rational argument in the 1970s than it was in the past (Franklin 1985a 
:52-53). It has been shown that Sutton Coldfield's electorate were just as open to 
rational argument in the 1960s. The Liberals in Sutton Coldfield had built up a core 
support, albeit small, of habitual Liberal voters in the 1960s that sustained them at 
local and parliamentary elections through the 1970s and into the 1980s. This support 
had its origins in electoral conflict over local issues. Furthermore, the evidence of 
tactical voting by Labour supporters for a Liberal candidate in order to keep out a 
Conservative candidate undermines the implication of Franklin's argument as to the 
insusceptibility to rational argument of the 1960s British electorate. 
The evidence regarding electoral dealignment in Sutton Coldfield in the 1959-1979 
period substantiates the assertion that the influence of locally determined factors in 
the outcomes of elections at both municipal and parliamentary levels has been 
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underestimated by existing political science literature. The evidence indicates a 
connection between local electoral issues and activity, and pariiamentary outcomes in 
coterminous electoral units. Indeed, the establishment of a foothold in the local 
government electorate, based largely upon local issues, was the stepping-stone to the 
establishment of a core support at the parliamentary level for the Liberal party in 
Sutton Coldfield National macro-economic issues such as the bank-rate, mortgage 
interest rate, the cost of educational reform and the cost of social housing, were all 
mediated through the particular political, social and economic milieu of Sutton 
Coldfield. The town's rapid growth in population and increased demand for low-cost 
low-density private housing developments, more schools. Local electoral 
dissatisfaction over the Conservative controlled council's handling of these issues 
resulted in partisan dealignment of the electorate in these traditionally and 
predominantly Conservative and Independent wards. The policies, tactics and 
electoral strategies of the Liberals at municipal elections tapped into this 
dissatisfaction. The resultant 'community politics' were by definition particular and 
peculiar to that location, and the effectiveness of the Liberal policies were constrained 
or facilitated by the electoral space afforded to the Liberals by the competition, or 
lack of competition, from Independent, Conservative and Labour candidates. 
However, unlike the inner-city wards of Birmingham where 'community politics' 
focussed particularly upon social housing issues and produced ever-diminishing 
returns as the electorate's grievances were satisfied, 'community politics' in Sutton 
Coldfield, that is to say the Liberal's ad hominen appeals, had been based upon the 
enduring issues of rates, educational reform and threats to property valuation, which 
were amplified by the merger with Birmingham and thus the Sutton Coldfield 
Liberals retained a much more stable core support of voters than the inner city 
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constituency. Notwithstanding the above, the effect of the 1972 Local Government 
Act upon the voting behaviour of Sutton Coldfield's traditional Conservative 
supporters, which saw a rapid return from protest voting for the Liberals back to the 
Conservative fold as merger with Birmingham imposed a new electoral calculus, 
illustrates the significance of structural change to the electoral system. 
The above argument acknowledges the long-term shifts in the electoral climate that 
have their origins in national political and national socio-economic factors. However, 
explanation of local electoral dealignment cannot ignore the effects of transient but 
stormy local electoral weather. Furthermore, explanation of parliamentary level 
electoral dealignment in the 1959-1979 period caimot ignore the phenomenon's 
connection with local electoral behaviour and activity. 
Indeed, the same hand of cards is dealt to each local authority by central government 
How each individual local authority plays its hand is in part determined by the local 
socio-economic and political environment in which their particular game is played. 
The prize is the ruling party's ability to keep the majority of the local electorate on 
side and maintain council control, whilst the consequences of a badly played hand can 
be loss of municipal and constituency level support, both temporary and permanent. 
In the next chapter attention turns to the Islington constituency in inner-London 
which, like Ladywood and Sutton Coldfield, was a derelict constituency as far as the 
Liberal Party was concerned. It had many of the problems associated with the inner-
city wards of Ladywood but also areas that had more in common with Sutton 
Coldfield. Nevertheless the flavour of politics and electoral outcomes at both local 
and parliamentary level were rather different than in our midlands case studies. 
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CHAPTER? 
ISLINGTON 
7.1:Introduction 
In his 1959 report the Chief Medical Officer of the London Metropolitan Borough of 
Islington lamented that' by far the greater of the population are still housed in old-
type houses in multiple occupation ... with no bathroom [and that]... alternative re-
housing ... which can be offered by the Council is extremely limited'. His counterpart 
for the London Metropolitan Borough of Finsbury reported serious overcrowding in 
multiple occupancy housing and added that 'there are still many unfit houses ... 
owing to the difficulties in relation to re-housing'. In 1966 owner-occupiers made up 
approximately 13 per cent of Islington residents. Around 20 per cent of Islington 
residents lived in local authority rented accommodation, and approximately 67 per 
cent resided in mostly multiple-occupation privately rented accommodation. Indeed, 
Islington had, second only to Tower Hamlets, the highest ratio of persons to rooms of 
all the London Metropolitan Boroughs. In Islington in 1962,60 per cent of 
households were without piped hot water and 45 per cent without a fixed bath. The 
same housing conditions prevailed in Finsbury (see Map 5). Within the private rental 
sector in both boroughs there was also a significant number of lodging houses where 
'single room lettings ... occupied by persons of different nationalities [without] 
adequate sanitary accommodation [and] water supplies [and where] preparation and 
cooking of food is most difficult'. 
The waiting list for council housing, with over sixteen thousand applicants registered 
at that time, had been closed by Islington Metropolitan Borough Council in 1956 and 
only re-opened in 1965 a year after the amalgamation with Finsbury. The product of 
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the combined housing problems of both boroughs was that in 1971 an estimated 
13,000 new dwellings were needed to solve the housing problem in the new borough 
of Islington, a grim confirmation of the Chief Medical Officer of Health's 1963 
forecast that 'the majority of Islington residents must continue for many years to 
come to live in old houses... which were not built for several families'. Since 1945, 
Islington council had a particularly poor record for building municipal housing. 
Islington Borough Council by 1964 had built only 4.062 flats and houses in the 
borough and carried out repairs on 43 houses, and the LCC had built 3,281 flats and 
houses whilst private house building in the borough was negligible. In contrast 
Finsbury Borough Council had a better house building record and in 1960 had 
provided more units per head of population than 27 out of the 28 metropolitan 
boroughs, although, this reflected a much higher rate of privately built 
accommodation rather than any emphasis upon much needed municipal housing 
(Annual Reports on the Health and Sanitary Conditions of the Metropolitan Borough 
of Islington 1959-1963, Annual Reports Director of Public Health and Medical 
Officer of Health London Borough of Islington 1964-1973, Annual Reports on the 
Public Health of Finsbury, Metropolitan Borough of Finsbury 1932-1964). 
It wil l be argued below that these housing conditions were a determining factor in the 
outcome of local government and parliamentary elections in the Islington and 
Finsbury Metropolitan boroughs 1959-1963, in the Islington London Borough 1964-
1979, and their coterminous parliamentary constituencies 1959-1979. Furthermore, 
that Islington Borough Council's housing policy and those of the former Islington and 
Finsbury Metropolitan Borough Councils were important determinants of the 
outcomes of both local and parliamentary elections. It has been argued that 'much of 
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the politics of Islington in general ... [was] concerned with the struggle between 
housing classes and [was] aimed at getting the council to use its powers to assist one 
class or another' (Baine 1975:33). It wil l be fixrther argued that control of the London 
Borough of Islington Council in the 1970s, and hence its housing policy, was in the 
hands of an uneasy coalition between an old-guard rightist faction that had its origins 
in the controlling Labour Groups of both the former Islington and Finsbury 
Metropolitan Boroughs, and representatives of the Irish Roman Catholic immigrant 
population of the north of the borough, and that the core support of these two groups 
was enough to fend o f f until the late 1970s, the challenge from the left of the local 
Labour Party which intended to introduce a much more costly and comprehensive 
municipal housing progranune. Also it wil l be shown, that the particular socio-
economic and political environment of Islington, with its own peculiar admix of 
sectarian political allegiances, limited the success of a revived Liberal Party in 
Islington during the 1959-1979 period, a local party that was already seriously 
weakened by internecine fighting between two rival factions, one supported by the 
London Liberal Party and the other led by an opportunistic but very effective political 
activist. In short, it will be argued below that the politics of place cannot be excluded 
from any explanation of both local and national political electoral outcomes in 
Islington and that national issues provide neither a complete explanation for local 
election results nor a comprehensive account of the determinants of parliamentary 
constituency results. 
7>2 Party political background 
At the six Islington Borough Council elections from 1945 to 1962 inclusive, the 
Labour Party, almost invariably in straight fights against Conservative candidates, 
predominated. The Liberals, who had not contested in the borough since 1928, 
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contested two wards in 1949 and, in 1959 at the start of an upturn in Liberal fortunes 
nationally, fielded five candidates in the St Mary and the St Peter wards where their 
candidates came bottom of the poll. However, in 1962 the Liberals contested only one 
Islington ward; the Highbury ward where they took 31.7 per cent of the vote in a 
contest that saw a swing of 23.2 per cent fi-om the Conservatives and 8.5 per cent 
firom Labour (see Table 37), Clearly, the 1962 Highbury result apart, Islington fi-om 
1928 was a derelict borough as far as the Liberals was concerned. Furthermore, at the 
six London Borough elections from 1945 to 1962 inclusive, Islington was persistently 
near the very 'bottom of the league' for turnout among the twenty-eight London 
boroughs of the LCC. Electoral dominance by the Labour Party, apathy among its 
electorate and a dearth of Liberal local electoral activity characterised the Borough of 
Islington at the post-war London Borough elections before the 1964 reorganisation of 
local government in London. 
Similarly, in contention with Conservative candidates the Labour party had dominated 
local elections in the London Borough of Finsbury since the late 1920s and the 
Liberal Party had not contested a single seat since 1925. However, at the 1962 diet of 
borough elections the Liberals made a sudden and dramatic return to contest in all 
eight of the borough's wards. Clearly Finsbury, which was amalgamated with 
Islington to form the new London Borough o f Islington in 1964, was not a hive of 
Liberal local electoral activity for at least thirty- five years preceding their 1962 
return. Electoral apathy, albeit at a lesser degree than in neighbouring Islington, 
Labour dominance and Liberal absence, characterised local electoral politics in 
Finsbury 1945-1962. (see maps 4 and 5 below). 
(To avoid unnecessary confusion, Map 4 depicts the wards of the borough of Islington 
in 1978, the former London Borough of Finsbury was transformed into the 
Pentonville, Clerkenwell and Bunhill wards) 
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Table 37: Lower-tier municipal electoral data. Borough of Islington 1964-1982. 
Year Ward Seats Electorate Turnout Majority CON LAB LIB OTH 
1984 Bamsbury 3 8081 17.7 65.4 13.0 78.4 0.0 8.7 
1964 Bunhill 2 6355 23.3 49.69 17.0 66.7 7.8 8.5 
1964 Canonbury 4 11887 18.4 49.5 16.7 66.2 9.8 7.2 
1964 Cterkenwelt 3 8113 16.2 53.26 18.2 71.4 10.4 0.0 
1964 Highbury 4 11003 16.2 39.52 24.3 63.8 0.0 11.9 
1964 Highview 3 8576 22.6 17.51 34.4 51.9 9.1 4.6 
1964 Hillmarton 2 6498 15.8 32.42 31.2 63.7 0.0 5.1 
1964 Hillrise 3 8741 17.6 35.82 28.7 64.5 0.0 6.8 
1964 HoIIoway 4 10256 12.1 59.11 15.1 74.2 0.0 10.7 
1964 Junction 4 11306 16.6 35.78 26.9 62.6 0.0 10.5 
1964 Mildmay 4 12502 18 27.91 27.5 55.4 10.7 6.5 
1964 Partway 3 8621 12.4 63.58 12.4 76.0 0.0 11.5 
1964 Pentonville 3 8925 18.9 45.42 22.2 67.6 10.3 0.0 
1964 Quadrant 4 11930 17.8 32.7 26.8 59.5 0.0 13.7 
1964 St.George's 3 8321 17.4 37.43 25.5 63.0 11.5 0.0 
1964 St. Mary 3 8608 13.7 45.4 22.8 68.2 0.0 9.0 
1964 St. Peter 3 9761 16.3 60.62 16.5 77.2 0.0 6.3 
1964 Station 2 5738 12 74.86 0.0 87.4 0.0 12.6 
1964 Thomhill 3 9373 15.5 43.37 0.0 71.7 0.0 28.3 
1968 Bamsbury 3 7013 23.5 7.06 0.0 40.6 0.0 59.4 
196S Bunhill 2 5977 27.5 5.18 48.7 43.5 0.0 7.7 
1968 Canonbury 4 11528 25.7 10.9 46.0 35.1 12.5 6.4 
1968 Clertcenwe!) 3 6644 24.3 7.47 46.3 53.7 0.0 0.0 
1968 Highbury 4 9519 22.4 18.07 56,6 36.5 0.0 5.0 
1968 Hiflhview 3 7899 25.9 26.58 57.2 30.6 6.9 5.4 
1968 Hillmarton 2 6309 21.8 22.77 61.4 38.6 0.0 0.0 
1968 Hillrise 3 7688 21.1 20.71 60.4 39.6 0.0 0.0 
1968 HoIIoway 4 8921 13.1 0.44 45.8 45.4 0.0 8.8 
1968 Junction 4 10417 24.1 16.41 52.5 36.1 8.0 3.4 
1968 Mildmay 4 12294 25.6 30.63 63.8 33.2 0.0 3.1 
1968 Parlway 3 8299 17.1 16.49 58.3 41.8 0.0 0.0 
1968 Pentonville 3 7408 26 9.86 54.9 45.1 0.0 0.0 
1968 Quadrant 4 11121 23 19.73 56.6 36.8 0.0 6.6 
1968 St. George's 3 8171 23 0.17 50.1 49.9 0.0 0.0 
1968 St. Mary 3 8138 22.4 15.07 54.7 39.7 0.0 5.6 
1968 St. Peter 3 8236 24.4 10.31 51.1 40.8 0.0 8.1 
1968 Station 2 4913 19.1 12.27 40.2 52.5 0.0 7.3 
1968 Thomhill 3 7756 14.8 11.19 0.0 35.1 24.9 38.9 
1971 Bamsbury 3 6220 43.52 43.52 25.6 69.1 0.0 5.3 
1971 Bunhill 2 5635 50.6 50.6 24.7 75.3 0.0 0.0 
1971 Canonbury 4 10494 53.11 53.11 21.5 74.6 3.9 0.0 
1971 Cterkenwel) 3 6114 68.1 68.1 14.2 82.3 0.0 3.6 
1971 Highbury 4 9161 45.31 45.31 27.3 72.7 0.0 0.0 
1971 Highview 3 7775 38.12 38.12 25.0 63.2 5.7 6.2 
1971 Hillmarton 2 4721 30.65 30.65 34.7 65.3 0.0 0.0 
1971 Hillrise 3 6574 36.59 36.59 29.8 66.4 0.0 3.7 
1971 HoIIoway 4 8223 61.26 61.26 18.2 79.5 0.0 2.3 
1971 Junction 4 8485 23.41 23.41 38.3 61.7 0.0 0.0 
1971 Mildmay 4 12089 31.82 31.82 33.3 65.1 0.0 1.6 
1971 Partway 3 7705 44.38 44.38 27.8 72.2 0.0 0.0 
1971 Pentonville 3 6663 46.12 46.12 26.9 73.1 0.0 0.0 
1971 Quadrant 4 10961 41.27 41.27 29.4 70.6 0.0 0.0 
1971 St.George's 3 7562 42.94 42.94 24.1 67.0 6.2 2.8 
1971 St. Mary 3 7544 51.34 51.34 21.0 72.4 0.0 6.6 
1971 St. Peter 3 7853 34.31 34.31 32.8 67.2 0.0 0.0 
1971 Station 2 4030 49.37 49.37 25.3 74.7 0.0 0.0 
1971 Thomhill 3 6844 41.5 41.5 23.0 64.5 0.0 12.6 
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1974 Bamsbury 3 5322 31.6 24.79 25.2 49.9 19.5 5.4 
1974 Bunhill 2 5652 26.3 46.42 26.8 73.2 0.0 0.0 
1974 Canonbury 4 9881 28.1 51.13 14.1 68.5 17.4 0.0 
1974 Qerkenweil 3 5694 22.2 56.5 21.8 78.3 0.0 0.0 
1974 Highbury 4 8582 24.6 44.13 20.4 64.5 15.2 0.0 
1974 Highview 3 7313 25.2 35.3 28.9 64.2 0.0 7.0 
1974 Hillmarton 2 4257 25.7 33.21 33.4 66.6 0.0 0.0 
1974 Hillrise 3 4689 23.1 50.7 24.7 75.4 0.0 0.0 
1974 Holloway 4 5590 21.9 36.79 11.8 62.5 25.7 0.0 
1974 Junction 4 7598 28.1 25.02 31.6 56.6 11.8 0.0 
1974 Mildmay 4 11191 28.7 28.44 25.4 53.8 20.9 0.0 
1974 Parlcway 3 6803 23.3 56.48 12.7 71.9 0.0 15.4 
1974 Pentonville 3 6169 28.4 37.41 19.1 57.7 20.2 3.0 
1974 Quadrant 4 10233 23.8 40.51 21.3 61.8 16.9 0.0 
1974 St.George's 3 7516 24.6 44.01 28.0 72.0 0.0 ao 
1974 St. Mary 3 6311 30.9 34.74 15.0 54.8 20.0 10.2 
1974 St. Peter 3 7525 29.4 27.54 17.3 48.1 14,0 20.6 
1974 Station 2 3307 22.9 75.24 12.4 87.6 0.0 0.0 
1974 Thomhill 3 5720 19.4 45.49 24.8 70.3 0.0 4.9 
1978 Highbury 3 7268 43 12.07 39.7 51.8 4.1 4.4 
1978 Hillmarton 2 5212 38.5 11.68 41.0 52.6 0.0 6.4 
1978 Holloway 3 6019 33.5 27.44 32.2 59.6 0.0 8.2 
1978 Junction 3 6428 44.2 15.47 40.5 55.9 0.0 3.6 
1978 St. George's 3 7291 37.5 3.78 43.9 47.7 0.0 8.4 
1978 St. Peter 3 7228 36.7 9.35 39.0 48.3 6.5 6.2 
1978 Bamsbury 3 6355 42.2 13.45 37.2 50.6 5.3 6.9 
1978 Bunhill 3 7135 40.1 8.43 41.0 49.5 0.0 9.5 
1978 Canonbury East 2 4249 34.6 23.41 31.9 55.3 5.3 7.5 
1978 Canonbury West 2 4689 42.9 061 43.3 44.0 7.4 5.3 
1978 Clerlcenwell 3 7804 35.3 5.26 40.1 45.3 5.8 8.8 
1978 Gillespie 2 4562 38.8 14.85 36.9 51.7 7.6 3.8 
1978 Highview 2 4212 37.9 11.76 38.7 50.4 3.1 7.8 
1978 Hlllrise 3 5207 37.4 0.83 46.6 47.4 0.0 6.1 
1978 Mildmay 3 8467 38.9 14.6 33.5 48.1 4.9 13.5 
1978 Quadrant 2 5764 43 12.25 39.7 51.9 0.0 8.4 
1978 St. Mary 3 6017 37.7 9.42 38.0 47.4 5.5 9.1 
1978 Sussex 2 3757 38.4 37.82 28.5 66.3 0.0 5.2 
1978 Thomhill 2 4269 42.2 14.87 30.3 45.1 0.0 24.6 
1978 Tollington 3 5931 31.4 36.16 28.8 64.9 0.0 6.3 
1982 Highbury 3 6706 41.5 27.12 24.9 52.0 23.1 0.0 
1982 Hillmarton 2 5204 43.5 34.61 20.9 55.5 20.9 2.6 
1982 Holloway 3 6862 31.5 33.01 21.8 54.8 20.7 2.7 
1982 Junction 3 6341 44.7 26.39 26.6 53.0 20.4 0.0 
1982 St. George's 3 7525 37.3 29.31 24.5 53.8 17.0 4.7 
1982 St. Peter 3 7137 37.1 14.42 28.3 43.1 28.7 0.0 
1982 Bamsbury 3 6745 45.5 31.02 18.7 56.2 25.2 0.0 
1982 Bunhill 3 6838 37.3 6.6 32.5 39.1 24.9 3.5 
1982 Canonbury East 2 5037 38.6 15.31 19.2 40.2 24.9 15.7 
1982 Canonbury West 2 4884 49.5 14.42 29.8 44.2 18.5 7.6 
1982 Clerkenwell 3 7068 35.8 2.01 30.7 34.5 32.5 2.4 
1982 Gillespie 2 4178 41 31.49 25.1 56.5 18.4 0.0 
1982 Highview 2 3889 40.5 38.46 16.7 60.9 22.4 0.0 
1982 Hillrise 3 6451 43.5 28.69 25.9 54.6 19.6 0.0 
1982 Mildmay 3 8445 38 27.26 25.4 52.6 19.7 2.3 
1982 Quadrant 2 5494 44 20.8 25.6 46.5 25.3 2.6 
1982 St. Mary 3 5529 37.5 14.65 31.1 45.7 23.2 0.0 
1982 Sussex 2 4236 44.3 36.47 16.1 60.2 23.7 0.0 
1982 Thomhill 2 4570 35 39.5 19.7 59.2 17.1 4.1 
1982 Tollington 3 6937 40.8 46.19 14.6 65.8 19.6 0.0 
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Map 4 :Islington borough ward boundaries, constituency and G L C boundaries 1978 
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7.3:Tfae Labour group and housing in Islington 
In his 1966 study of Islington Borough Council Butterworth described Islington's 
Constituency Labour Party associations as being 'dominated by a Borough Council 
"clique"'. Islington, like all multi-constituency boroughs in the L.C.C. did not have a 
borough wide party organisation. The Borough Party system had been abolished by 
Labour in London in 1934 and had been replaced in each Constituency Labour Party 
by a Liaison Committee. However, the Labour council group by virtue of their 
predominance over the leadership of the Labour constituency parties, refiased any 
'critics a forum by failing to convene' these Liaison Committees. A largely 
autonomous group of multi-office holders thereby consolidated their power and 
insulated the Labour council group decision making process fi"om the wider party 
membership and the various units of local party organisation' (Butterworth 1966: 21-
31). 
Over in the Finsbury and Shoreditch Metropolitan Borough an equally strong grip 
upon the levers of local political power was exercised by Labour councillors. Indeed, 
Len Scott, a Labour Party Ward Secretary, in a rancorous resignation statement to the 
local press explained how, 'the fear of discipline and expulsion for not "toeing the 
party line" blocked every discussion of local problems' (Islington Gazette , 5 
Oct., 1959).Scott considered his efforts on behalf of party members and local 
residents in general over housing conditions in the borough to have been met with 
'hostility and suspicion' by Labour councillors whose 'right-wing ideas' frustrated 
attempts to change the borough council's housing policy (ibid). Paradoxically, 
housing problems had been the main plank of Labour's electoral appeal at the May 
borough elections and at the October 1959 General Election campaign in Islington. 
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However, the Islington Labour group's focus had been upon the failings of the 
Conservative Government's housing policy and how this had constrained any 
initiative on their part to ameliorate the borough's housing conditions. 
Labour had retained full control of Islington council at the 1959 borough elections 
and electoral apathy reflected in an 18,2 per cent turnout was ascribed by the council 
leadership as pointing to * a degree of satisfaction with the Council's work,' rather 
than an expression of voter dissatisfaction. Islington Labour had issued the same 
electoral manifesto to all wards and in it listed the achievements of their housing 
policy, and had emphasised how they had *kept the rates down and had in fact [that] 
year reduced them by 4d .... to get the best value for the ratepayer's money'. 
Nevertheless, siren voices had expressed concern about voter apathy and its effect 
upon Labour support as early as the Finsbury Parliamentary by-election in February 
1959 when low turnout was explained by the left of the party as the result of the 
electorate 'having lost their faith in the Labour Party'. At the October 1959 General 
Election Labour retained all three Islington seats, but with much reduced majorities, 
reduced turnout in the Islington East and the Islington South West constituencies, and 
its majority in North Islington halved. However, Dr. Eric Fletcher, Labour MP for 
Islington East, and Albert Evans the Labour MP for Islington South West, were quick 
to defend the borough council's housing record and place the blame upon the 
constraints imposed by the incumbent Conservative Government. 'The housing 
problem ... could only be dealt with through the local authorities, and they needed 
more power to deal with the shortage of homes in areas like Islington' Fletcher 
explained. (Islington Gazette 20Feb.. 17 April,12 May, 2, 5 Oct.,1959). 
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The constraints alluded to by Fletcher and Evans concerned the 1957 Rent Act and the 
House Purchase and Housing Bi l l that was making its way through Parliament in 
1959. The proposed bill would enable purchasers to acquire older properties with 
government assisted loans, however, local authorities under the 1957 Rent Act had 
little power to prevent a purchaser subsequently subletting rooms at exorbitant rents 
and thereby adding to the overcrowding in often substandard accommodation. I f a 
local authority decided to use its statutory powers under the sections of the 1957 Rent 
Act relating to overcrowding the courts invariably ordered eviction of the tenants and 
the re-housing of them by the local authority concerned. Indeed, in Islington, as 
elsewhere in central London 'the dire effects of the Rent Act [was] a big problem'. 
Evans and Fletcher wanted an amendment in the proposed House Purchase and 
Housing Bill to prevent what they considered to be the encouragement of further 
multi-occupancy dwellings, however, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
argued that adequate provision was already in place and a council could make 
qualification for a mortgage conditional upon an agreement not to sub-let in the 
future. 
Exacerbating this problem for councils such as Islington and Finsbury was Clause 4 
of the proposed bill , which allowed improvement grants for separate dwellings. The 
term dwelling was ill-defined by the 1957 Rent Act and thus local authorities would 
be obliged to provide grants to landlords to improve the part of a multi-occupancy that 
they resided in, whilst the sub-let dwellings in the property, often declared unfit for 
human habitation and overcrowded, could remain untouched. Islington Labour 
councillors and MPs regarded the bill as an encouragement to landlords to increase 
multi-occupancy dwellings in the borough. Furthermore, they argued that the bill 
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would make it look like a Labour council condoned overcrowding. At the third 
reading of the bi l l in March 1959 the South West Islington Constituency Labour MP 
argued: 
My own council ... has not sufficient housing 
accommodation to deal with people living in properties 
that are the subject of closing or demolition orders let 
alone those affected by overcrowding notices .... 
Islington Borough Council just cannot look at 
overcrowded cases at all 
In their post-1959 General Election statements to the press, Evans and Fletcher placed 
the blame firmly with the Conservative Government for the slow down in council 
house building in Islington. The removal of the general housing subsidy and of the 
facility for cheap loans to local authorities had resulted in an increase in the cost of 
building a council flat in Islington from £3,000 in 1950 to £8,000 in 1959. However, 
unlike the left of the party membership of their constituencies who regarded the 
council's inaction over housing as the cause of a decline in both turnout and Labour 
support at both national and local level, the hierarchy of Labour in Islington regarded 
the adverse effects of the 1957 Rent Act and the proposed bill as encouraging former 
Tory voters, both council and private rental sector tenants, to switch allegiance to 
Labour. Indeed, at the May 1959 borough elections with an above average turnout in 
the East and West Finsbury ward (32.8 per cent: borough average 25.4 per cent). 
Labour took all the seats in a decisive victory, which, both Labour and Conservative 
activists agreed could be accounted for by the notices of rent increases sent to tenants 
of City Corporation housing. (Islington Gazette. 17 March, 12 May, 2 Nov., 1959). 
Protests and petitions over rent increases by the tenants of various council estates 
across the Metropolitan Borough of Islington had occurred since the November 1957 
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Rent Act, and such was the level of dissatisfaction that rent riots and a three week rent 
siege had taken place in 1960. However, Islington Labour group were constrained by 
the deficit in the Housing Account, which stood at £554,861 in November 1959, and 
their determination to keep rates to a minimum (Islington Metropolitan Borough 
Council Minutes,Vols.,LDC and LX, 1958-1960).The Labour group in Finsbury were 
also under the same constraints and like Islington had the added problem of spiralling 
land values in central London. In both boroughs those tenants lucky enough to be re-
housed by slum clearance faced hikes in council rents they did not find easy to pay. 
Rents in the private rental sector had also vastly increased, indeed, a typical privately 
rented house costing £3 per week before the act, was in 1960 'now being let at £7 a 
week plus rates' flslington Gazette. 4 March, 12 April 1960). In both boroughs the 
Labour groups were harangued by Conservative, and increasingly by Liberal 
candidates, to introduce a means tested fair rent scheme to replace the blanket council 
rent subsidy, which they considered a burden upon the ratepayer. Clearly, with over 
60% of the electorate in the private rental sector where rate increases, via landlords 
impacted as increased rents, or direct payment of increased rates; rates was an 
electoral consideration that the Labour groups in Islington and in Finsbury could i l l -
afford to ignore. The Labour group in Islington took all sixty seats at the 1959 
borough elections and may, or may not, have been too concerned about electoral 
apathy in the borough amongst erstwhile Labour voters. However, in Finsbury on an 
increased poll the Conservatives had made three gains in St Mark's ward. 
Notwithstanding that this meant that the Conservative 'opposition' on Finsbury 
Borough Council was only increased to five members. Labour had lost the hitherto 
marginal St Mark's ward by a resounding 13.4 per cent of the vote. 
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7.4:Islington Labour Party dissent 
Housing conditions in Islington were brought more directly to the attention of the 
Labour group by the resignation of the Labour Councillor Raymond Moriey. Morley, 
w^o had been elected to council in 1956 to represent the Tufiiell ward of the North 
Islington Constituency, had championed the campaign by North Islington Tenants 
Association against the Labour group's housing policy. Moriey was re-elected to 
represent the Thomhill ward in the Islington South West constituency at the 1959 
borough elections. However, Moriey resigned as a Labour councillor in protest over 
the Labour group's housing policy and forced a local by-election in which he ran as 
an Independent. The election, in which the issues of race and housing predominated, 
was a landslide for the Labour Party candidate. Nevertheless, housing had been 
brought to the fi-ont burner of local politics in the South West Islington Constituency. 
Indeed, at the February 1961 Bamsbury ward by-election thirty years of political 
supremacy came to an end when the South West Islington Labour Party candidate was 
defeated by an Independent Labour candidate in an election that centred upon the 
housing issue. Dr. Michael O'Donaghue became the only member of Islington 
Borough Council without allegiance to any one of the three constituency Labour 
parties. On a platform that 'called attention to neighbouring St Pancras where 
tremendous strides in improving [housing] conditions had been made by a Labour 
council, O'Donaghue had mobilised the votes of the ward's large Irish immigrant 
population. At the 1962 borough elections the Independent Labour candidates took 
two of the three seats in the Bamsbury ward and O'Donaghue was re-elected on a 
turnout six percentage points higher than the borough average. In the Thomhil! ward , 
Moriey, now joined by another Labour rebel councillor, E.Mills, and three other 
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Independent Labour candidates took 33.7 per c«nt of the vote, although the Labour 
Party candidates took all the seats. Clearly, by 1962 in two of the three South West 
Islington Constituency local electoral wards, housing had become a salient borough 
election issue (North London Press. 1 Feb. 1961,30 March 1962, UK News 2 
Dec. 1961, Independent Labour Leaflet May 1962, YL280.789 Islington Central 
Library). 
7.5;London Liberal Party strategy 
It was against this backdrop that the London Liberal Party launched a recruitment 
campaign in the late 1950s. A contact card system had been introduced and by 1958 
the majority of Liberal Constituency Associations in London were using them to 
discover 'where Liberal supporters were and a fair return was being achieved in each 
constituency'(ACC 144/6/6, Minute Book, Executive Committee, London Liberal 
Party 1958-1966). Progress by 1961, in what had been considered derelict 
constituencies, was considered to have been extremely good. It is unsurprising that 
such a revival in the Islington Metropolitan Borough was first attempted in the wards 
of its South West Constituency. Firstly, in March 1959 a pilot canvass of the area was 
carried out, then in April 1959 a much more extensive canvass of voter opinion was 
carried out, and consequently the revived South West Islington Liberal Association 
decided to contest in the St Peter's and in the St Mary's wards at the 1959 borough 
elections. On a platform that emphasised local issues, that urged revision of the rating 
system, the introduction of a fair rent scheme to replace the blanket subsidy of council 
tenants, the call for a government scheme of 100 per cent mortgages to help first time 
buyers, and criticism of the 'complacent... all Labour council's snail's pace' 
regarding the housing problem in the borough, the Liberals attracted 11.8 and 11.9 per 
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cent of the vote in the St Mary's and the St Peter's wards respectively, taking most of 
their vote from former Labour supporters fislington Gazette 5 May 1959,23 
December 1960). However, at the 1961 LCC elections in the Islington South West 
Constituency, although there was a dramatic -21.5 swing from Labour, the Liberal 
candidates were only able to attract 5.5 per cent of the vote, as the bulk of Labour's 
disaffected voters turned to Independent Labour candidates, whose electoral platform 
criticised the Labour council's housing record and advocated a vast increase in local 
authority housing provision. 
Nevertheless, it was clear that there was some electoral mileage for the Liberals in the 
issue of voter dissatisfaction with the council's housing policy. The Liberal's first 
intervention in the Highview ward of the North Islington Constituency at the 1964 
borough elections had rewarded the party with 9.4% of the vote. The Liberal electoral 
appeal in the ward had been based upon a call for a ' f u l l debate on matters which 
affect you the ratepayer', a very apposite platform considering the Homsey Rise 
Residents Association petition to the LCC not to grant outline planning permission to 
build blocks of council flats in the Highview ward fNorth London Press 24 April 
1964). 
In the East Islington Constituency, A.Lomas, a Conservative who had contested in 
the Highbury ward at the 1959 borough elections, experienced a Damascus style 
conversion to liberalism and began canvassing the area as a Liberal. Lomas, 
subsequently with the help of activists from the London Liberal Party established a 
ward association in Highbury and revived the derelict East Islington Constituency 
Liberal Association that had been dormant since it last contested a parliamentary 
election in 1935. Lomas was made Constituency Organiser, but, there was 
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considerable disagreement between him and the London Liberal Party over electoral 
strategy and policies. Lomas favoured a wide electoral fi-ont and the establishment of 
a borough wide Liberal Associatioa Furthermore, Lomas's campaign platform had 
conflated the issues of commonwealth immigration and the housing problem; views 
that conflicted with those of the leadership of the East Islington Constituency 
Association, and those of the London Liberal Party. Furthermore, the East Islington 
Liberal Association leadership, like the London Liberal Party, favoured an electoral 
strategy that concentrated efforts and resources on a narrow electoral front in selected 
wards fEvening Standard 30 Nov. 1962,2 Aug 1963, North London Press. 27 April , 
16 Nov., 1962). 
The consequence of this conflict was a damaging feud between the maverick Lomas 
and the East Islington Liberal Association leadership. The leadership did not wish to 
contest at the 1962 borough elections in the constituency, only to continue canvassing 
and recruiting in preparation for the next general election. However, Lomas and his 
supporters barnstormed the Highbury ward and signed members up to Lomas's New 
Liberal Party (aka Islington Liberal Party). Lomas, and five other New Liberals 
contested the Highbury ward at the 1962 borough elections where they pushed the 
Conservatives into third place and took 31.7 per cent of the vote. Lomas's manifesto 
had called for the borough council Housing List to be re-opened and made public, 
thus pandering to the white residents who feared that they were being leapfi-ogged by 
immigrant families. Lomas had claimed during the election campaign that seven out 
of ten ward residents who had promised their vote to him had been disgruntled Labour 
voters, and indeed, without the presence of Independent Labour intervention to 
account for the fall in Labour Party support, the East Islington Constituency Labour 
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Party were becoming increasingly concerned by Liberal success. However, measured 
against the 1959 Highbury results, the bulk o f Lomas's support was comprised of a 
23.2 per cent swing against the Conservatives whilst the Labour vote in Highbury was 
only eroded by 8.5 per cent The Liberals had emerged as a credible challenger to 
Labour's local electoral hegemony in a second Islington constituency. Indeed, in the 
weeks after the election the membership of the East Islington Liberal Association 
doubled, as did, however, the rancour between the London Liberal Party and Lomas 
(Islington Gazette. 8 March, 22 June, 7 September, 1962, North London Press. 17 
Feb., 1961,4 May 1962). 
Rather than capitalising upon the political gains of the May 1962 borough elections 
the rejuvenated Liberal Association in East Islington seemed threatened by self-
strangulation . In a damaging and protracted public feud Lomas and his supporters 
battled for control of the East Islington Liberal Association and its funds. Lomas 
announced his intention to contest the seat at the next general election and in response 
the London Liberal Party issued a press statement that Lomas held 'no official 
position ... and [was] not entitled to act or speak on behalf of the East Islington 
Liberal Association', and promptly had the association's bank account frozen. What 
followed was over one year of public wrangling and a failed county court action by 
Lomas to access the ftinds. Undeterred, Lomas simply rebranded as the New East 
Islington Liberal Association and put up candidates at both the 1964 borough and the 
GLC elections against those of the official Liberal Party. Lomas and his party called 
for controlled immigration and attracted even more adverse publicity to the Liberals 
when it was revealed by the press that one of his New Liberal Party candidates had 
formerly contested for the BNP. Lomas may have split the Liberal vote in the 
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constituency by standing against the official Liberal Party prospective parliamentary 
candidate at the 1964 and the 1966 general elections, and by association even deterred 
voters from supporting the Liberals. However, what support he did attract at these 
local and national elections was based upon electoral campaigns where the problems 
of housing and immigration featured prominently. Indeed, though recorded as an 
Independent Liberal, Lomas's electoral support was reflected in the new party name 
adopted in 1966, the Islington Tenants and Ratepayers Political Association and New 
Liberal Party, which Butler and King described at the 1966 general election as having 
fielded an anti-immigration candidate (Butler and King 1966: . North London 
Press,4 May, 18 Sept., 10 Nov., 1962; 11 Jan., 1 Nov., 1963; 24 March, 11 Sept, 
1964; 9 March 1965; 70ct., 1966, Evening Standard 2 Aug., 1963. Islington Gazette. 
8 March, 22 June 1962). 
7.6:The Liberal Party's foothold in Islingtop. 
The electoral achievements of the early 1960s Liberal revival in Islington might at 
best be considered modest. However by 1964, in the three derelict constituencies of 
the Metropolitan Borough of Islington and in the eight wards of the Metropolitan 
Borough of Finsbury, the Liberals had established a foothold. This foothold of 
electoral support, and equally as important party organisation, enabled the Liberals to 
contest two constituencies of the Islington London Borough at the 1964 and 1966 
general elections, field a full-slate in Islington at the first GLC elections in 1964 and 
continue contesting GLC elections in the borough. Furthermore, this modest revival 
enabled the Liberals to maintain a presence, albeit precarious at times, especially in 
North Islington, in the three constituencies of the London Borough of Islington and 
continue to field candidates at borough elections despite a significant erosion in both 
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local and parliamentary support. At the 1982 borough elections in Islington the 
Liberals were able to contest in all twenty wards and take 22.4% of the whole 
borough vote, only 1.7% behind the Conservatives. 
The Liberal revival in the South West Islington Constituency had been limited by the 
intervention of Independent Labour candidates who took ground from them with a 
campaign that specifically addressed the housing problems of the local authority 
tenants and the bulk of the electorate who lived generally in multi-occupancy in the 
private rental sector neither able to afford to purchase a house nor prospect of 
obtaining a council house. Both tenures were aggrieved by substandard living 
conditions and increasing rents. The main feature of the Liberal campaigns in the 
Islington constituencies was housing, but the focus of the Liberal's electoral appeal 
was the ratepayer, both owner-occupier and private rental tenant. The Liberals 
campaigned for an end to the indiscriminate subsidy of all council tenants regardless 
of need by the ratepayer, reform of the rating system and government led initiatives to 
make the first purchase of a home more affordable. Liberal intervention in the wards 
of the East Islington Constituency was however undermined by the adverse effect of 
competition from the New Liberals rather than any competition from Independent 
Labour candidates. Lomas's electoral appeal was pitched at the dissatisfied electors in 
both the private rental sector and the public rental sector and focussed upon an, anti-
immigration homes for locals first policy. In the North Islington Constituency neither 
Independent Labour nor any Independent Liberal intervened However the Liberals 
were only able to find support and to contest in the Highview ward of this staunchly 
Labour constituency from 1964. 
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Although the Liberals were able to maintain a presence in the electoral life of the 
London Borough of Islington after 1964, the party only contested with any regularity 
in the Highview ward of the North Islington Constituency, and the Mildmay and 
Canonbury wards of the Islington Central Constituency. Indeed, of the 96 ward 
contests in borough elections 1964-1978 inclusive, the party only intervened in 29. 
The Liberals never won a seat on the council even at the 1968 borough elections when 
Labour's hegemony was brought to an end in an electoral rout that saw a whole 
borough swing of-25.3% away from Labour, and the Conservatives take 47 of the 60 
council seats. Indeed the Liberal's share of the whole borough vote was only 2.8%. At 
GLC elections in the borough, 1964-1981 inclusive, the Liberals were able to 
maintain a presence. However, at the 1973 GLC elections the party were only able to 
contest in the Islington Central Constituency where they took a 15.2% share of the 
vote. Clearly in the Islington Central Constituency the Liberals had a residual support. 
In somewhat of an upturn in party fortunes the Liberals were able to contest all three 
constituencies at the 1977 and 1981 GLC elections. Yet the party never won an 
Islington seat on the GLC, or ever posed any threat to the major parties duopoly, 
throughout the 1964-1981 period. At the 1986 borough elections the Liberals took 16 
seats to Labour's 36 and formed a significant opposition on Islington Borough 
Council. Nevertheless, at no time were the Liberals ever able to win a seat in the 
wards of the North Islington Constituency. 
7.7:The electoral salience of housing in Islington 
Housing remained at the top of the political agenda for all parties contesting in local 
elections in the London Borough of Islington throughout the period of this study's 
interest. At the 1967 GLC elections, despite a huge swing to the Conservatives, the 
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Labour Party held all three Islington seats. The Economist commented that Labour at 
the 1967 GLC elections had been abandoned by its most loyal supporters and that 
'there was widespread evidence that Labour lost because of the wage freeze'. The 
biggest swing in London, it was noted, had been in the 'predominantly working class 
borough of Islington'. Indeed, the swing against Labour had been a national one, but 
unlike when the Conservatives were in power the Liberals were no longer 'the half-
way house for voters changing sides'. Furthermore, at the 1968 borough elections 
thirty-four years of absolute Labour control in Islington came to an end when 47 
Conservative, three Independent and only ten Labour candidates were returned. 
Before the election The Times had ventured that 'the state of the crowded tenements 
... will have less to do with the result than the way people feel about Harold Wilson'. 
However, the local press took the opposite view and predicted that the Labour council 
would see 'chickens come home to roost' because it had 'taken years for the council 
to tackle the tenement blocks and then only after the most determined tenant's 
campaigns'. In contrast, in Birmingham where the Conservatives had controlled the 
council since 1966 and imposed a regime of retrenchment, from 1968 onwards 
Labour's stock was in the ascendant as the party focussed its attention on housing 
issues and the city's vast council estates returned to the Labour fold (see Chapter 5, 
section 5.6). Clearly, the Wilson government's performance cannot explain the 
revival of Labour in Birmingham in the late 1960s or for that matter completely 
account for their defeat in Islington in 1968. Consideration of the local political 
environment cannot be excluded from either account. 
Islington was still one of the worst housing areas in London despite a building 
programme of new estates announced in 1964, which had 'failed to get of f the ground 
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until 1971'. Indeed, the Labour Government had contemplated putting a Housing 
Commissioner into Islington ' just to force [the Labour council] to start building some 
property'. As Keith Veness, a leading Labour militant in the North Islington Labour 
Party observed, ' i t was no surprise that people did not bother to vote in 68'. Indeed, 
the Islington Gazette reasoned that the Conservative landslide in this predominantly 
working class and socialist borough was because 'Housing was the number one 
[issue] ... Residents saw newcomers being re-housed within a few years while people 
who had been in substandard property for 30 to 40 years were getting nowhere on the 
housing lists'. Indeed, in the Thomhill ward of the South West Constituency 38.9% of 
the vote had gone to a variety of Other candidates, three of whom were Independent 
Labour candidates sponsored by the Islington Rent Protest Association. The Liberals 
had taken second place with 24.9% of the vote and the three Labour Party candidates 
had taken all the seats, but over 63% of the votes cast in the ward had gone to 
candidates espousing criticism of the council's housing policy. In the Bamsbury ward, 
where it was reputed that only one family in a hundred had a bathroom, three 
Independent candidates had been elected to council in a swing of -37.8% away from 
Labour. (Islington Gazette. 9 April, 13 May, 1968; Islington Gutter Press. Dec. 1975, 
The Times 3 May 1968, Independent Labour Leaflet, YL280.789, 1962, Economist 
22 April, 20 May. 1967). 
Clearly, whatever the influence of national issues in this Labour heartland, whatever 
the alienation of the traditional Labour voter from the party because of the Labour 
Government's performance, partisan dealignment at these local elections because of 
discontent over Islington Borough council's housing policy was a factor in much of 
the borough electorate's voting behaviour. The Economist at the time was of the 
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opinion that at local elections in London campaigns are fought on local issues * but 
decided by national preference', and that the electorate were confused by the division 
of administrative responsibilities. The article said that *few people know whether the 
local issues that they care about are the responsibility of the borough council, GLC, 
the Government, the Inner-London Education Authority, or the London Transport 
Executive'. However, it concluded that the 'chief of these [issues] are undoubtedly 
housing and transport*. This does not stand up to scrutiny i f the party campaign 
leaflets are examined. At a time of mass leafleting and intense canvassing by all 
parties the borough electorate would have been in little doubt which institution was 
the immediate author of their housing ills. The predominant theme of campaign 
literature, (emphasis dependent upon party), was how control of the borough council 
would affect either local authority rent or rate levels of its electorate, and prospects of 
re-housing. Indeed, arguably the key feature of the reorganisation of local govenmient 
in London, exploited by each party at the 1964 borough elections and subsequent 
elections, was that the responsibility for housing was now in the hands of the lower 
tier borough councils. 
7.8:The 1970s Liberal revival constrained by the Labour left 
The Liberal Party's failure to attract significant support in Islington in the late 1960s 
at the local electoral level can in part be accounted for by the party's internal divisions 
and the intervention at these elections by candidates from the left of the Labour Party. 
In Islington the disaffected Labour voter in the 1970s did not turn to the Liberals in 
the way they had in Liverpool. The hegemony of the moderate centre-right Labour old 
guard, which dominated Islington, those whose 'mission was to keep the rate low and 
the majority constant' (Butterworth 1966:31), had come under increasing threat from 
the left throughout the 1960s. After the 1968 electoral massacre of Labour in 
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Islington and throughout London (Baston 2000: 463) many of the old-guard who had 
lost their seats had never returned to local politics and when Labour returned to power 
in Islington in 1971 had been replaced by left-wing councillors. The battle between 
the left and the right for control of Islington's three constituency Labour parties had 
begun in the early 1960s as left wing activists challenged the Labour group's policy 
stasis over housing. The North Islington Labour Party were accused of 'failing 
thousands of working class supporters', and a National Executive Committee of 
inquiry into its affairs launched in 1961 because of the dramatic fall in membership 
from 9,379 in 1951 to 394 in 1961.The succ^s of the challenge from the left in each 
of Islington's constituencies was however conditioned by local factors (North London 
Press 30 June 1961). 
The Labour parties in the Central and the South constituencies were, from the mid-
1960s, increasingly controlled by middle class, nominally left of party, elements that 
had recently moved into the area. However, the Islington North Constituency Labour 
Party was 'dominated by a group that runs its own politics on sectarian lines, mostly 
on the basis of the Catholic Church'. Control of the Islington North Constituency 
Labour Party, and thus selection of its local government candidates and its 
pariiamentary candidate, was in the hands of the remnants of the Labour old-guard-
right and the representatives of the huge Irish community of the north of Islington 
borough, especially from the Junction ward. Control of the constituency party was 
reputed to have been retained by the use of bogus Labour party memberships at 
critical constituency party office elections that precipitated si.x Labour Party inquiries. 
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Indeed, at the election that resulted in the adoption of Mike O'Halloran as 
parliamentary candidate for the constituency in 1969 it is claimed that '39 delegates 
suddenly turned up at the meeting, most of whom had never been before'. In an eight 
year dispute from O'Halloran's adoption in 1969 to 1978 when Transport House sent 
'troubleshooters' to oversee all North Islington Constituency Labour Party meetings, 
O'Halloran and his predominantly Irish Catholic party machine, and the old-guard 
Labour right were able to resist the challenge from the left. However by 1980 even in 
North Islington the left had gained the upper-hand. Islington North now fell in line 
with the other two Islington Labour Constituency parties, which the left had gained 
control of in the mid-1970s. gslington Gutter Press Dec. 1975, Feb. 1980. Nov., 
1981: Islington Gazette. 12 Nov., 1968 ,16 March 1979. 27 March 1981; North 
London Press 30 June 1961.6Feb., 1970; New Statesman 31 Aug., 1962; Guardian 16 
Sept., 1977). 
The internecine battle between the left and right of Islington Labour had centred upon 
the issue of the borough's housing policy. Furthermore, once enough control over 
Islington Borough Council had been achieved the left had introduced a policy that 
'favour[ed] new arrivals in the borough at the expense of long-term residents'. Indeed, 
in 1975 with 13,000 families on the waiting list, two moderate Labour councillors 
who opposed the new policy were expelled from the local party. At the 1975 
Highbury ward local government by-election both 'rebels' urged the electorate to 
'vote for anyone but Labour', because *the Labour council is not doing enough to re-
house long-standing residents' flslington Gazette 31 Oct., 1975). The euphemism 
'long standing residents' referred of course to the white traditionally Labour voting 
working class electorate of the borough, and 'new arrivals' to the immigrant 
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population that now benefited from the left's housing policy that had replaced what 
they considered to be a discriminatory selection policy under the old Labour group. 
7.9:1970s Liberal campaigns 
It was against this backdrop that the Liberals contested Islington local elections in the 
1970s. The main planks of the Liberal electoral platform were criticism of profligate 
local authority spending, rates and inflation. The party slammed the left controlled 
council's spending on housing and remodemisation of properties as a flagrant waste 
of ratepayers money and called for the cut price sale of council houses, and council 
land to reduce the rate burden. This was an almost complete volte face from their 
1970 local electoral platform in the borough when they considered the sale of council 
houses as utterly wrong for Islington because of the housing shortage. However, 
against a groundswell of electoral dissatisfaction over rent and rate levels, and the 
effects of seemingly uncontrollable inflation, the Liberals had managed to push the 
Conservatives into third place in three of Islington's wards at the 1974 borough 
elections. The Liberals, like the Conservatives, in Islington, focussed upon the waste 
of ratepayers money by extreme left-wingers masquerading as the Labour Party. 
Nevertheless, as serious as the wounds inflicted by civil war upon the constituency 
Labour parties of Islington were, they still retained enough lifeblood of traditional 
Labour support to survive the additional challenge from the Liberals and the 
Conservatives. 
Clearly, in this traditionally Labour voting borough the local electoral prospects for 
the Liberals were limited. However, housing policy and concern for rate levels 
provided a common ground for both Liberal and moderate Labour electoral appeal. 
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This commonality was given endorsement at the parliamentary electoral level by the 
Steel/Callaghan electoral pact of 1977. Furthermore, at the 1977 GLC elections in 
Islington in a -25.2% swing away from Labour the Conservative share of the whole 
borough vote had increased from 22.9% at the 1973 GLC elections to 40.0%. The 
three Islington constituencies in 1977 at the GLC electoral level were now most 
definitely marginal. Alarmingly for the Liberals their support in the Central Islington 
Constituency, the party's foothold in the Miole borough had plummeted by 50%. The 
Liberals had seen a +4% swing in the whole borough vote in their favour at the 1973 
GLC election reduced to a -0.1 swing against them in 1977. In contrast in 1977 the 
Other vote, an assortment of independents associated with Independent Labour, the 
far left, the Liberals and single issue residents association candidates, had benefited 
from an +8.1% swing in the vote. The Liberal's fiagile electoral presence in Islington 
had taken a body blow at the GLC electoral level in its only foothold of any 
substance, the Central Islington Constituency. However, at the 1978 borough 
elections in the eight Islington wards contested by the Liberals the party averaged a 
16.8% share of the ward vote, indeed, taking a 27.4% and 28.1% share of the vote in 
the Canonbury East and the Holloway vmds respectively. The 1978 borough 
elections had, however, seen a revival in Conservative support when their whole 
borough share of the vote increased fi^om its 22.2% at the equivalent borough 
elections in 1974 to 38.2%. The Conservatives had also taken two Labour seats on the 
council. Ominously the swing to the Conservatives in the whole borough vote, though 
predominantly from Labour support vras also comprised of a -2.1 swing against the 
Liberals and a -1.0 svAng against the Other candidates. 
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At the borough electoral level the Liberals had maintained a significant following in a 
number of wards. However, this following was under threat. There had also been a 
significant swing from the Other candidates to the Conservatives. Labour in Islington 
had experience a 20% fall in support over the three borough elections of 1971,1974 
and 1978.The inescapable logic was for some form of electoral cooperation between 
the beleaguered Liberals and the embattled Labour moderates. It will be argued below 
that the conflict over housing in the borough of Islington was a significant catalyst in 
the electoral alliance at the local and pariiamentary level between the Liberals and the 
emerging SDP, 
7.10:An alliance lifeline 
The first significant moves that precipitated the eventual SDP/Libera! Alliance in 
Islington were at the 1979 general election when all three incumbent Labour MPs ran 
as Labour/SPD candidates or Labour/SPD/Independent Labour candidates to 
differentiate themselves from the left of the party, and were returned albeit with 
reduced majorities. The next milestone came in March 1981 when the left gained 
control over North Islington Labour Party Management Committee. Its moderate 
Labour leader, who was also Chairman of North Islington Residents Association 
immediately resigned and issued a press statement that 'Labour was not the same 
party anymore. It is now full of lefties... Last year, even this year they wanted to 
make higher rates... I 'm joining the Social Democrats'flslington Gazette 27,March 
1981). The mass defection of sixteen moderate Labour councillors from the Labour 
Group on Islington Borough Council and the official defection of North Islington's 
MP Mike O'Halloran, occurred on 8 September 1981, some six months after the 
formal establishment of the SPD and its subsequent speedy alliance with the Liberals. 
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However, the electoral campaign for the local government by-election in the 
Hillmarton ward that had been held on the 9 September had been a joint campaign by 
Liberal and SPD activists in which the former Labour Party member Kevin O'Keefe 
won the seat for the SPD, Earlier defections to the SDP, O'Keefe's victory and the 
defection of the sixteen shifted the balance of power on Islington Borough Council 
from a huge Labour majority to 23 SPD, 2 Conservative and 27 Labour councillors. 
At the 1982 borough elections the now Liberal/Alliance contested every ward in the 
London Borough of Islington and took a 22.4% share of the whole borough vote, only 
0.7% behind the Conservatives, and at the 1986 borough elections the Liberals 
replaced the Conservatives as the party of opposition in Islington with a 33.3% share 
of the vote to the Tory's 13.7% and the Other candidate's 6.5%. 
At the 1983 general election in the now two Islington constituencies the SDP were 
defeated by Labour candidates. In the revised Islington South and Finsbury 
Constituency the left Labour candidate had won by a margin of 1% over their 
moderate Labour come Liberal/Alliance adversary. In the revised North Islington 
Constituency the SDP had been pushed into third place by the Conservatives. 
However, the SPD had nominated J.Grant the incumbent of the now defunct Islington 
Central Constituency to fight in plac« of O'Halloran, who promptly declared as an 
Independent Labour candidate and thereby split the moderate Labour vote. 
7,ll:Conclusion 
It is clear that partisan alignment changed quite dramatically in Islington and that the 
alignment between class and party was significantly weakened. The 1983 and the 
1987 general elections in Islington saw an electoral realignment that contrasted 
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Starkly with the two-party duopoly that had existed up until 1979. However, unlike 
Ladywood and Sutton Coldfield the SDP/Liberal Alliance have a crucial part to play. 
Any explanation of the genesis of this parliamentary electoral level dealignment in 
Islington cannot exclude the connection with local electoral dealignment and the 
determinants of that local level dealignment. A hegemony by the right of the local 
party over local party office appointments, local government and parliamentary 
electoral candidate selection, over the Labour Group on the council and its policies, 
reinforced and perpetuated by multi-office holding, had resulted in a sclerosis in 
policy formation and a seeming immunity to criticism or influence from significant 
sections of the wider party membership and the electorate in the London Borough of 
Islington. Constrained by electoral consideration of the potential impact that any 
increased spending on housing would have upon the rates and thus their majority the 
Labour controlled Islington borough council pursued a parsimonious and minimal 
housing policy. 
Limited modernisation of existing properties by both council and private landlords 
and only a remote possibility of either allocation of a council house or of purchase of 
a home, was exacerbated by the effect of the 1957 Rent Act, inflation of council rents, 
private sector rents, rates and house prices. Added to this electoral discontent was the 
competition for scarce housing posed by immigrants. This discontent found political 
expression at the local electoral level and provided the Liberals with a window of 
electoral opportunity. Much of the Liberal's initial success in Islington had its origins 
in the conflation of the housing and the immigration issues by the maverick Liberal 
activist Lomas. However, the party's foothold in the borough was maintained by the 
electoral purchase of its role as guardian of the ratepayer's interest. In competition for 
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the disaffected Labour vote were a number of Independent Labour candidates who 
challenged on a ticket of expansion of council spending on housing. The expectation 
of an improvement in local authority housing provision in Islington under the Wilson 
governments had been unfulfilled, as both major parties appealed to an increasing 
number of owner-occupiers in the inflationary economic climate of the 1970s that 
pared ftirther any public spending by Islington council. 
The issue of housing through the 1960s and 1970s thereby provided the vehicle for 
the rise of the left in Islington and a periodic boost to Liberal local electoral fortunes. 
In reaction to the challenge from the left, the moderate and right of Islington Labour 
Group on the council jumped ship to the SDP and, with the beleaguered Islington 
Liberals, whose local electoral appeal also gave precedence to rate levels, formed a 
symbiotic electoral relationship that kept both parties temporarily afloat. The Liberals 
had built up a small core of support in the 1960s that sustained them at local and 
parliamentary elections through the 1970s and a foundation to forge an alliance with 
the SDP into the 1980s. This support had its origins in local electoral conflict over 
housing. 
It is generally regarded that the 1950-1970 period is one of electoral stability in terms 
of party and class alignment at the parliamentary electoral level, and of electoral 
change that was slow, small and short term. Certainly, in the Islington constituencies 
this is the case. However, in their coterminous local electoral units at borough 
elections this cleariy was not the case. Thus the evidence challenges the view that 
local electoral behaviour mirrors that of pariiamentary behaviour and responds solely 
to national electoral determinants (see Newton l976).The evidence also contradicts 
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the view that voters in the 1960s failed to meet the conditions for issue voting (Butler 
and Stokes 1983; Franklin 1985a 37-56). 
However, at the local electoral level, for significant numbers of the Islington 
electorate the issue of housing was a salient electoral issue that found expression in 
support for Independent Labour candidates, Independent Liberal candidates, 
Liberals,Conservatives and a variety of resident and ratepayer association candidates. 
Clearly, the moderates of Islington Labour and the left of the local party opposed each 
other over the issue of housing, and indeed the left gained an electoral advantage over 
the issue because opinions in the electorate were sufficiently skewed. The Liberals 
also gained an electoral advantage because of their role as guardians of the rate payer, 
albeit not much electoral advantage, but enough to attract some disaffected Labour 
voters who could cast a protest vote that was less damaging than voting for the left or 
the Conservatives, and enough to sustain the Liberals through lean times. A more 
acceptable home for this protest vote against the left was found in the eventual 
Liberal/SDP alliance. Thus the issue of housing did become integrated into the party 
system at the local electoral level in Islington in part because of the ineffectual 
conduit for electoral discontent at the parliamentary electoral level and in the main 
because of the policy stasis of Labour at the local electoral level. 
The case study contradicts Franklin's view that the electorate was more open to 
rational argument in the 1970s than it was in the past (Franklin 1985a:52:53). 
Clearly, even in the staunchly Labour and predominantly working class borough of 
Islington a significant section of the electorate at local elections in the early 1960s 
were susceptible to rational arguments about housing. The study also evidences that 
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the 1960s electorate at the municipal level were as *ready to swing in response to 
short term factors, especially the issues that were cause of immediate concern' as 
were the parliamentary electorate of the 1970s (Sarlvik and Crewe 1983:337). 
Clearly, short-term factors of immediate concern evoked electoral swings at the local 
electoral level in Islington, as evidenced by the electoral reaction to council rent rises 
and the plan to build multi-storey flats in Homsey Rise. At the local electoral level it 
seems that the electorate were open to rational argument and susceptible short-term 
factors, giving fiirther evidence of the disparity in local and national electoral 
behaviour and its determinants. 
This case study of Islington up to a point is supportive of Davis's conclusion about 
the housing crisis in London as being an illustration of how conventional politics 
could fail to provide an outlet for extensive social grievances during the age of 
affluence (Davis 2001). However, it does so i f by conventional politics Davis means 
exclusively parliamentary level electoral politics and excludes local government 
electoral behaviour. Social grievances over housing in the London Borough of 
Islington did find electoral expression at the local level, (and at times conflated with 
the issue of immigration), and these social grievances did impact at the parliamentary 
level via the defection of moderate Labour councillors and MPs to the SDP, thus 
eventually finding an outlet in 'conventional polities'. The evidence also concurs with 
Dunleavy's explanation of dealignment that centres upon a consumption cleavage 
around the directly politicised provision of housing (Dunleavyl979:409-443 and 
1982). 
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The evidence of this chapter shows that the conflict over housing policy did influence 
the Islington electorate's alignment towards local and national politics in that it 
created the conditions for the emergence of collective consciousness and action at the 
local electoral level. Indeed, the emergence of Independent Labour candidates, 
various residents and ratepayer association candidates. Independent (New) Liberal, 
Liberal candidates, and Labour left in Islington can be explained in terms of support 
from those disaffected by the housing policy of the Islington Labour Group. 
Furthermore, as Dunleavy argues, local conflicts have an important structuring 
influence on the electorate's alignment towards national politics and on party 
differentiation at various points in time. Clearly, the rise of the left in Islington local 
government politics in the 1960s and 1970s was a major determinant in the decisions 
of the Labour Group on council and the constituency MPs to rebrand as SPD 
candidates in order to differentiate and distance themselves from the profligacy of the 
left. 
In the next chapter the neighbouring constituency of Camden is examined and, 
although very similar in socio-economic characteristics and political stripe to 
Islington, a rather different course of political events and outcomes transpired. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CAMDEN 
8.1;Introduction 
'Another most extraordinary amalgamation is between the respectable Conservative 
Borough of Hampstead ... and the former red flag Borough of St Pancras. It is an 
extraordinary marriage. I f it does not lead to divorce I will be very surprised' (Lord 
Morrison quoted by Wistrich 1972:9). The London Borough of Camden, created by 
the London Government Act 1963, was indeed a merger of three quite diverse 
metropolitan boroughs; Hampstead, Holbom, and St Pancras (see Map 5, p212). 
However, the resultant compound vras not as volatile as Morrison had feared. Yes, 
each individual borough did have its own particular configuration of socio-economic 
and political characteristics, whose synthesis shaped the political environment of 
Camden. Nevertheless, by 1964 even the 'red flag borough* of St Pancras, was 
characterised by a strong element of political and electoral pragmatism in respect of 
problems that were common to each borough, a pragmatism that underpinned a 
stability that may have surprised the doctrinaire Morrison. 
8.2:Partv political background 
The Labour Party had replaced the Liberals as the main party of opposition in the 
metropolitan borough of St Pancras in the early 1920s. Indeed, the Liberals had made 
their last pre-war appearance in the borough when the party contested the 1925 
London borough elections. Thereafter, the party was able only to contest in a single 
ward in 1953 and two in 1956. The Liberals reappeared on the St Pancras electoral 
sc^ne at the 1964 post- reorganisation election to the now Camden borough council. 
Clearly, as far as the Liberals were concerned, St Pancras was a derelict borough. 
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In contrast support for the Labour Party in the 1930s had increased and at the 1945 
borough elections Labour had taken 63.6% of the whole borough vote in St Pancras 
and 54 out of 60 council seats. In the post war period up until the local government 
reorganisation of London and the creation of Camden, council control had alternated 
between the two major parties. The Conservatives had taken council control in 1949 
and 1959, and Labour in 1953 and again in 1962. At L.C.C. elections (electoral unit -
the four northern wards of St Pancras MB, coterminous with the St Pancras North 
Constituency) the electorate had returned three Labour councillors at every L.C.C. 
election 1949-1961, and a Labour MP at each general election 1945-1970. The 
Liberals were unable to contest any of the post war/pre-reorganisation L.C.C. 
elections in St Pancras North and had lost their deposit at the 1950 genera! election, 
the only general election the party contested in the constituency up until February 
1974. Thus, there had been mixed electoral fortunes for the two major parties at post 
war borough elections in the St Pancras MB. In contrast at the LCC electoral level the 
four northern wards voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Labour Party as they did 
at the parliamentary level. 
The Conservative Party had dominated Holbom Metropolitan Borough Council 
elections since 1900. Liberal opposition had collapsed before the First World War and 
the Labour party had replaced the Liberals as the main party of opposition by 1919, 
albeit with only two seats on council. Labour contestation was fragmentary and only 
at the 1945 borough elections and thereafter was the party able to field a full-slate of 
candidates in Holbom. In contrast the Liberals, apart from 1956 when they fielded 
one candidate in the Saffron Hill ward, did not contest another ward seat in the 
borough from 1922 to 1962 inclusive. Labour had won 24 out of the 42 seats with a 
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48.6% share of the whole borough vote to the Conservative's 47.6% at the 1945 local 
elections. At all other Holbom MB elections (1962 apart v^ hen the Conservative share 
was 12.9% ahead of Labour's) the Conservative share of the whole borough vote 
exceeded that of Labour by 20%. 
Clearly, Holbom MB was not only a derelict borough as far as the Liberals were 
concerned, but also one dominated by the Conservatives. Furthermore, at LCC 
elections when the electoral unit was coterminous with the Holbom and St Pancras 
South Constituency, and wards 5-8 of southern St Pancras were included with the 
Holbom MB wards, the electoral results still favoured the Conservatives. At LCC 
elections from 1949-1961 inclusive the Conservatives took 12 of the 15 seats in 5 
contests, of which only three were marginal results. However, at the parliamentary 
level, at the 1950-1970 general elections inclusive (1959 apart). Labour returned an 
MP in what were marginal contests up until 1964. Thus, at the metropolitan borough 
electoral level Holbom's electorate tended to favour the Conservative Party, and even 
with the addition of the four southem St Pancras wards at LCC elections, the 
electorate in the main returned Conservative candidates. However at the 
parliamentary electoral level the same Holbom and St Pancras South / LCC electorate 
invariably returned a Labour candidate. 
In the Hampstead Metropolitan Borough the Conservatives dominated council 
elections from 1900-1962. The Liberals from 1922 to 1945 inclusive did not contest a 
single seat. The Labour Party had contested in fourteen of the sixteen borough 
elections from 1906 to 1962, albeit in five or less wards before 1945 (1931 contested 
all wards). Labour had taken two seats in 1919 in the Kilbum Ward, four in Kilbum 
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and one in Priory in 1922, and six in Kilbum in 1937. Indeed, the wards of the west of 
Hampstead, especially Kilbum, were the bedrock of Labour's support in the borough, 
and in total returned fourteen Labour councillors at the 1945 borough elections, and 
thereafter ensured a whole borough average share of the vote of 31.8% at these 
elections up until 1962. 
There was however the beginning of a Liberal Party revival in Hampstead from 1949 
onwards. The Liberals contested five wards in 1949 and took 7.9% of the whole 
borough vote. At subsequent borough elections the Liberals contested in all the 
Hampstead wards and gained an increasing share of the vote (11.2% in 1953,12.8% 
in 1956 and 16.7% in 1959). At the 1962 borough elections the Liberals took 29.6% 
of the whole borough vote and three seats in the Town Ward At LCC elections the 
electoral unit was coterminous with both the Hampstead Metropolitan Borough and 
the Hampstead Constituency and, as at the borough elections, the Conservatives 
dominated. Indeed, at the five LCC elections 1949-1961 inclusive the Conservatives 
took all fifteen seats. Nevertheless, the Labour candidates averaged 34.4% of the vote. 
The Liberals were only able to contest at the 1955, 1958 and 1961 LCC elections in 
Hampstead and although increasing their share of the vote from 5.1% in 1955 to 17% 
in 1961, were unable to repeat their borough electoral success at the upper-tier level. 
Similarly, at pariiamentary elections in the Hampstead Constituency the Conservative 
Party dominated and returned an MP at each general election 1950-1964 inclusive. 
The Labour Party candidates at these general elections averaged a 31 % share of the 
vote, and at the 1964 general election the Labour candidate took 39.3% of the vote 
only 4% behind the Conservative candidate. In contrast, the Liberals were unable to 
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translate their early 1960s borough level success into parliamentary level success in 
Hampstead. 
Clearly, for the electorate in all three boroughs at both local electoral levels and to 
some extent at the parliamentary electoral level there were horses for courses. There 
was a contextual variance in voting behaviour that challenges orthodox assumptions 
about the relationship between national and local voting behaviour. 
M a p 6 Camden borough ward boundaries at 1964 London Borough elections 
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Table 38: Lower-tier municipal electoral data, Borougb of Camden 1964-1982. 
Year Wards Seats Electorate Turnout M^ority C O N L A B U B O T H 
1964 Adelaide 4 11180 35.5 18.5 52.8 34.3 9.2 3.7 
1964 Belstze 4 10885 39.6 8.9 46.2 37.3 13.2 3,3 
1964 Btoomsbury 3 7909 32.2 10.9 55.4 44.6 0 0 
1964 Camden 4 11451 29.5 41.5 22.4 63.9 7.1 6.7 
1964 Chalk Farm 2 6042 32.1 15.6 39.4 55.1 0 5.5 
1964 Euston 2 4852 29.5 4.3 47.8 52.2 0 0 
1964 Gospel Oak 2 5514 34.5 35.8 28.8 64.6 0 6.7 
1964 Grafton 4 12285 28.9 54.3 18.6 72.8 0 8.48 
1964 Hampstead Central 3 8159 35.3 22.9 54.9 31.9 13.2 0 
1964 Hampstead Town 3 8630 43.8 21.4 51.6 30.2 18.3 0 
1964 Highgate 3 7703 47 15.8 54.3 38.5 0 7.25 
1964 Holbom 3 9337 42.2 10.3 52.7 42.5 4.8 0 
1964 Kilbum 3 8472 31.6 42.8 24.1 66.9 6.3 2.6 
1964 Kings Cross 3 9479 36 10.4 44.8 55.2 0 0 
1964 Priory 4 10785 37.7 14.1 37.2 51.3 7.7 3.8 
1964 Regents Park 3 9291 40.3 25.7 34.7 60.4 0 4.9 
1964 St John's 3 7332 31 41.6 25.3 66.9 0 7.9 
1964 St. Pancras 4 9626 29.9 55.81 17.1 72.9 0 10.0 
1964 West End 3 9637 37.6 4.0 45.3 41.3 10 3.4 
1968 Adelaide 4 10450 38.3 32.3 59.1 26.8 9.4 4.7 
1968 Belsize 4 11171 37.6 24.6 56.4 31.9 11.7 0 
1968 Bloomsbury 3 6810 29.6 46.2 73.1 26.9 0 0 
1968 Camden 4 11358 30.1 2.8 42.7 45.4 0 11.8 
1968 Chalk Farm 2 5999 32.3 13.6 51.9 38.3 9.7 0 
1968 Euston 2 4341 30.2 8.9 49.0 40.0 10.9 0 
1968 Gospel Oak 2 5208 36.4 1.4 45.6 44.2 10.2 0 
1968 Grafton 4 10902 26.3 12.6 40.4 52.9 0 6.7 
1968 Hampstead Central 3 9074 34.2 39.1 63.9 24.9 11,2 0 
1968 Hampstead Town 3 9350 40.6 30.2 55.3 24.9 14.8 5.04 
1968 Highgate 3 7722 47.9 23.7 56.8 33.1 5.6 4.5 
1968 Holbom 3 8325 34.4 48.4 74.2 25.8 0 0 
1968 Kilbum 3 8126 36.6 5.9 42.4 48.4 5.7 3.51 
1968 Kings Cross 3 8980 32 20.9 60.4 39.6 0 0 
1968 Priory 4 10963 40.4 3.7 44.7 40.9 9.3 5.1 
1968 Regents Park 3 9061 37.6 5.0 49.2 44.1 0 6.7 
1968 St. John's 3 6563 36.5 13.7 43.2 56.8 0 0 
1968 St. Pancras 4 9004 26.1 23.6 31.9 55.5 7.5 4.9 
1968 West End 3 9821 33 30.9 60.9 30.1 8.9 0 
1971 Adelaide 4 11110 39,5 2.4 46.5 44.0 9.5 0 
1971 Belstze 4 11203 40.3 5.5 39.8 45.3 7.2 7.7 
1971 Bloomsbury 3 9017 27.8 11.2 44.4 55.6 0 0 
1971 Camden 4 11337 36.1 46.5 22.5 69.0 0 8.4 
1971 Chalk Farm 2 5491 37.8 13.9 43.0 56.9 0 0 
1971 Gospel Oak 2 3582 46.5 38.9 27.9 66.8 0 5.3 
1971 Grafton 4 10334 35.8 59.8 16.4 76.2 0 7.5 
1971 Hampstead Town 4 10236 39 11.7 48.6 36.9 8.4 6.05 
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Year Wards Seats Electorate Turnout Majority CON L A B L I B O T H 
1971 Highgate 3 7631 46.9 0.3 46.6 46.3 0 7.0 
1971 Holbom 2 6345 39.9 24.3 37.8 62.2 0 0 
1971 Kiibum 3 8343 40.3 41.1 26.3 67.4 3.9 2.4 
1971 Kings Cross 4 10026 36 16.4 41.8 58.2 0 0 
1971 Priory 3 7520 45.7 34.7 30.7 65.4 0 3.9 
1971 Regents Park 4 10284 40.1 35.7 32.2 67.8 0 0 
1971 St John's 3 6655 35.8 50.26 24.9 75.1 0 0 
1971 St. Pancras 3 8359 32.3 76.8 11.6 88.4 0 0 
1971 Swiss Cottage 4 10578 38.8 5.4 43.5 48.9 7.6 0 
1971 West End 4 10557 36.8 0.7 50.4 49.7 0 0 
1974 Adelaide 4 10980 41.6 5.0 47.8 42.8 9.4 0 
1974 Belsize 4 10454 41.4 3.5 39.6 43.1 11.6 5.7 
1974 Bloomsbury 3 7793 27.1 13.2 43.4 56.6 0 0 
1974 Camden 4 10211 28.9 42.6 20.4 62.9 9.6 7.2 
1974 Chalk Fanm 2 5116 37.9 20.2 34.9 55.1 9.9 0 
1974 Gospel Oak 2 3803 42.3 42.5 22.9 65.5 7.0 4.6 
1974 Grafton 4 9483 30.3 52.7 15.6 68.3 5.8 10.4 
1974 Hampstead Town 4 9546 40.3 21.9 51.7 29.8 14.5 3.9 
1974 Highgate 3 6785 48.4 6.6 37.9 44.5 11.7 5.8 
1974 Holbom 2 5887 37 38.5 25.7 64.2 10.1 0 
1974 Kiibum 3 7466 33.3 32.7 28.3 60.9 10.7 0 
1974 Kings Cross 4 8979 36.9 16.4 35.4 51.8 12.8 0 
1974 Priory 3 6646 43.3 31.9 24.7 56.6 11.8 6.9 
1974 Regents Park 4 8966 37 30.9 34.6 65.4 0 0 
1974 St John's 3 6114 34.6 54.5 18.6 73.2 8.2 0 
1974 St. Pancras 3 7451 30.6 71.8 14.1 85.9 0 0 
1974 Swiss Cottage 4 9245 38.3 2.8 45.7 42.8 11.5 0 
1974 West End 4 9603 41.8 2.3 42.4 44.8 10.8 2.1 
1978 Adelaide 3 7071 47.9 18.4 55.8 37.3 6.9 0 
1978 Belsize 3 7423 41.7 24.4 57.1 32.7 10.2 0 
1978 Bloomsbury 3 8465 35.6 3.3 48.4 51.6 0 0 
1978 Brunswick 2 4350 50.1 5.4 52.7 47.3 0 0 
1978 Camden 2 4020 36.5 25.3 35.3 60.6 0 4.2 
1978 Castlehsven 2 4252 38.4 37.0 28.9 66.0 0 5.0 
1978 Caversham 2 5542 41.2 26.7 33.9 60.6 0 5.5 
1978 Chalk Farm 2 5585 44.6 10.2 44.9 55.1 0 0 
1978 Fitzjohns 2 4303 37.8 30.4 59.5 29.0 11.5 0 
1978 Fortune Green 2 4462 48.9 9.5 49.1 39.7 9.5 1.7 
1978 Frognal 2 4912 43.6 41.9 64.8 22.9 12.3 0 
1978 Gospel Oak 2 4104 46.1 32.7 30.8 63.5 0 5.8 
1978 Grafton 2 4842 37.2 38.1 28.7 66.8 0 4.5 
1978 Hampstead Town 2 4791 45.4 27.5 56.9 29.5 13.5 0 
1978 Highgate 3 7550 53.6 5.4 50.3 44.9 0 4.8 
1978 Holbom 2 5391 45.4 6.7 46.7 53.3 0 0 
1978 Kiibum 3 7312 40.2 8.4 34.5 42.9 5.4 17.2 
1978 Kings Cross 2 4554 38.9 3.8 46.7 50.5 0 2.9 
1978 Priory 2 4845 49.2 13.7 40.03 53.7 4.0 2.3 
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classification of variables, and areal units of enumeration make comparison of census 
statistics on a table to table basis over time problematic. 
Table 41: Census data related to particular electoral data. 
CENSUS SPATIAL 
UNIT 
ELECTIONS 
Local Govt. Lower-
tier 
Local G o v t 
Upper- tier 
Pariiamentary 
Constituenci^ 
196l(various HMSO 
publications) 
Local authority LCC 1958,1961. 1959 
SN 1488- 1966 Census 
Small Area Statistics 
(Waid Libraiy) 10% 
Sample 
Ward Londrai Borough 
Council 1959,1962. 
B'Ham Council. 1959-
1968 
Sutton Coldfield Council 
1959-1967 
LCC 1964.1967. 1964. 1966. 
SN 1182-1971 Census 
Small Area Statistics 
O-Vcxd Ubraij-) lOOT'o 
Households Aggregated to 
Ward Boundary 
Definitions 
Ward London Borough 
Council 1964, 
1968,1971 and 1974 
B'Ham Council 
1969-1972 
Sutton Coldfield Council 
1968-1972 
1970 
SN 1181 - 1971 Small 
Area Statistics ( Ward 
Library) 100% Population 
Aggregated to Ward 
Boundary Definitions 
Ward London Borough 
Council 
1964,1968,I971and 
1974 
B'Ham Council 
1969-1975 
Sutton Coldiicld Council 
1968-1972 
1970 
SN 1180-1971 Census 
Small Area Statistics 
(Ward Library) 10% 
Sample 
Ward London Borough 
CouncU 1964 1968.1971 
and 1974 
B'Ham Council 
1969-1975 
Sutton Coldfield Council 
1968-1972 
1970 
SN 1191 - 1971 Census 
SmaUArea Statistics 
(Ward Library) 100% 
Households Aggregated to 
Post- 1974 Poilituiiciitaiy 
Constituciu^ Boundary 
Defmitions 
C<mstituency LCC 1970 
GLC 1973 
West Midlands County 
Council 
1973 
Februaiyl974 
October 1974 
SN 1190- 1971 Census 
Small Area Statistics 
(Waixl Library) 100% 
Population Aggregated to 
Post-1974 Parliamentary 
Constituency Boundary 
Defmitions. 
Constituency LCC 1970 
GLC 1973 
West Midlands Coimty 
Council 
1973 
February 1974 
October 1974 
SN 1893- 1981 Census 
Siuall Area Statistics 
(Ward Library) 100% 
Popubtion and 
Households Aggregated to 
Ward Level 
Ward London Borough 
Couitcil 1978. 
B'Ham Council 1976-
1979 
GLC 1977. 1981 
West Midlands Coujity 
(Council 
1977,1981 
1979 
Compounding these shortcomings is the pitfall of ecological fallacy whereby spurious 
inferences may arise from the analysis of data derived from groups of people rather 
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than from individuals. Furthermore, the spatial nature of the census makes standard 
statistical methods problematic in that the different levels of areal units of a particular 
census, such as ward level and constituency, can produce different answers in analysis 
of grouped data. In short, that the aggregation of data can distort findings (Norris and 
Mounsey:1983). 
Table 42: Socio-economic variables used in the analysis 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION (SEG = SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP) 
SEEKWORK % economically active seeking work, 15+ years of age (16+ 1981 census) 
OWNOCC % households owner-occupied 
COUNCIL % households local authority rented 
UNFURN % households rented unfiimished 
FURN % households rented flinushed 
BXUK % residents bora outside the UK(includes Eire) 
NONMAN SEGs 1,2,3,4,5 and 13 (up to 1971 Census). SEGs 1,2„34.5.I,5.2 and 13 
(1981 Census) 
JNONMAN SEG 6 (up to 1971 Census). SEG 6 (1981 Census) 
^4ANUAL SEGs 7,8,9.10.11,12.14 and 15 (up to 1971). SEGs 7,8,9,10,11,12.14,and 15 
(1981 Census) 
AF[D=Arraed forces 
and 
Inadequately described 
SEGs 16 and 17 (up to 1971 Census). SEGs 16 and 17 (1981 Census) 
FAGW ^Farmers, 
(employers and 
managers) farmers 
(own-account). 
Agricultural workers 
SEGs 13,14,and 15 (up to 1971 Census). SEGs 13,14,15(1981 Census) 
SCI = Social Class I SEGS 1,2,3,4, and 13 (up to 1971) . Professional occupations etc.(1981 
Census) 
sen = Social Class I I SEGs 5,6,12,and 14 (up to 1971). Intermediate occupations+ Skilled 
occupations non-manual (1981 Census) 
SCin=Social Class in SEGs 7,8 and 9 (up to 1971 Census). Skilled occupations manual (1981 
Census). 
SCIV=Social Class IV SEG 10 (up to 1971 Census). Partly skilled occupations (1981 Census). 
SCV+Social Class V SEG 11 (up to 1971 Census). Unskilled occupations (1981 Census). 
SCVI= Social Class VI SEGs 16 and 17 (up to 1971 Census). Armed forces inadequately described 
(1981 Census) 
RDI>1.5 % households room density >l .5 per room 
RD 1-1.5 % households room density >l-l.5 per room 
SHDWELL % households defined as shared dwellings 
SLHOTWAT %households share or lack hot water ( no values 1981 Census) 
SLBATH % households share or lack bath 
SHTNWC % households share inside toilet 
NOINWC % households no inside toilet 
There are two initial dilemmas that face the researcher who wants to compare change 
over time in the 1959-1979 period using census data; whether the statistics measure 
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Table 56: Logits of sigoincant predictors categorical dependent variable CONWIN/CONLOSE 
at Innei^London lower-tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and pariiamentary constituency 
electionsl959-1979 and by decade. First column of each is Block 1 = socio-economic variables, 
second column Block 2= socio-economic + political variables, asterisk denotes coefTtcient not 
signincant at p<0.05 level. Exp.B in brackets. 
V A R U B L E London lower-
Her 1959-1979 
London lower-
(fer 1959-1970 
London lower-
tier 1970-79 
London 
oppeMier 
1959-1979 
London 
Pariiamentaiy 
1959-1979 
DEPENDENT CONWlN=l 
CONLOSE=0 
CONWIN =1 
CONLOSE=0 
CONWIN =1 
CONLOSE=0 
CONWIN=1 
CONLOSE=0 
CONWIN =1 
CONLOSE=0 
N 1211 1211 462 462 749 749 144 144 238 238 
% Predictol 77 77 72.9 75J 82.9 90.0 833 91.7 81.5 91.2 
CONSTANT .51 S.2 4.4 3.4 4.1 8.8 -10.5 -10.4 -.19 -2.8 
COUN-RENT -.03 
(.97) 
-.03 
(.98) 
-.04 
(.95) 
-.06 
(.94) 
-.03 
(.97) 
-.03 
(.97) 
• * • • 
NON-MAN .07 
0.1) 
.05 
(I.I) 
* * * • .21 
(1.2) 
• 
J NON-MAN .4 
(1.5) 
.4 
( 1 ^ 
MANUAL * • • * -.08 
(.93) 
• • 
SOC 1 -.06 
(.94) 
-.06 
(.95) 
• • • • 
(1.7) 
.5 
(1.7) 
• • 
SOC2 • • • • m • • -.08 
(.92) 
• 
SOC 4 -.09 
(.91) 
-.09 
(.93) 
-.14 
(.87) 
^19 
(.83) 
• • 
SOC 6 • • • * • * -.41 
(.67) 
•-.41 
(.67) 
• • 
SO. BATH • • • * -.06 
(.94) 
* • • 
PPC CON * • • * • * * • • -4.31 
(.01) 
CON COUNC • • « 2.00 
C7.3) 
* • • • • 
TURNOUT • • -.06 
(.94) 
-.04 
(.96) 
• • * * • • 
MARGINAL 1 • .8 
(2.2) 
• * 1.77 
(5.9) 
• * • * 
MARGINAL 2 * 1.0 
(2.6) 
* • • • * • 
MARGINAL 3 • .7 
(1.9) 
* • • • • • • 
The results of the logistic regression analysis of the Sutton Coldfield data in respect of the 
odds of a Conservative Party victory at lower-tier elections 1959-1972 are set out in Table 
57 (analyses of Labour and Liberal not possible, nor parliamentary level, because of small 
sample size). Once more the significance of electoral context for Conservative Party 
fortunes is evidenced. At these lower-tier elections the odds of the Conservative Party 
winning a ward contest were reduced in relation to the predictor JUNIOR NON-
MANUAL, and those odds could be multiplied by .72 for every unit increase in JUNIOR 
NON-MANUAL. 
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Year Wards Seats Electorate Turnout Majority CON LAB LIB OTH 
1978 Regents Paii^ 3 7679 47.3 48 45 5 50 3 0 4.3 
1978 St John's 2 4719 39 9 369 31 5 68 5 0 0 
1978 St. Pancras 2 4129 39.1 42.9 25.9 688 0 5.3 
1978 Somers Town 2 4970 35.2 405 27 5 67.9 0 4 5 
1978 South End 2 5025 484 4.1 456 41.5 8 9 40 
1978 Swiss Cottage 3 7768 45 1 93 50.1 40.9 9.0 0 
1978 West End 2 4738 46.4 0.7 45.3 44.5 10.2 0 
1982 Adelaide 3 6469 47.3 233 51.7 28 3 200 0 
1982 Batsize 3 6467 46.6 21.8 474 23.6 25.5 0 
1982 Bloomsbury 3 7315 39.1 34 40 3 369 22.8 0 
1982 Bainswick 2 4727 439 14 8 462 31 4 22 5 0 
1982 Camden 2 4077 45 23.3 21.4 509 27.7 0 
1982 Castlehaven 2 4090 446 34.5 14 3 556 21.1 89 
1982 Caversham 2 5206 46.1 18.6 17.5 506 31.9 0 
1982 Chalk Farm 2 5017 48.7 11.9 27.5 42 3 30.3 0 
1982 Fitzjohns 2 4370 40.6 209 51.1 18 7 30.2 0 
1982 Fortune Green 2 4084 49 6.5 39 1 28.3 326 0 
1982 Frognal 2 4705 45.5 26.8 55.2 16.3 28.5 0 
1982 Gospel Oak 2 4913 47.4 27.9 17.4 52.2 24 3 62 
1982 Grafton 2 4546 41.8 33.4 15.2 59 1 257 0 
1982 Hampstead Town 2 4788 45.4 14.8 46.6 21.7 31.7 0 
1982 Highgate 3 7970 53 10 36 5 355 27.9 0 
1982 Holbom 2 5011 453 196 282 478 17 7 6 3 
1982 Kilbum 3 6980 43.4 234 20 3 51 6 28.2 0 
1982 Kings Cross 2 4932 36.7 15.9 30 3 46.3 234 0 
1982 Pnory 2 5521 51 6 23.8 294 532 174 0 
1982 Regents Park 3 7876 39.3 5.6 362 41 7 222 0 
1982 St John's 2 4719 41.6 32.0 14.7 586 26.6 0 
1982 St. Pancras 2 3712 42 8 34.8 17.9 58 5 23.6 0 
1982 Somers Town 2 4567 41.8 46.3 16 8 64 8 18.5 0 
1982 South End 2 4673 49.9 3.7 40 2 36 5 23.4 0 
1982 Swiss Cottage 3 7313 46 1 76 41 1 33 5 22 8 28 
1982 West End 2 4672 48 5 1.9 366 38 5 248 0 
8.3:Labour's tenuous control 
The new London Borough of Camden at the first post reorganisation borough 
election of 1964 was considered marginal (see Wistrich 1976:8, London Labour 
Party: Jim Raisin Papers ACC 24/7/3/47). At the 1962 borough elections Labour had 
regained control of St Pancras, with fifty of the sixty seats now in the party's hands. 
In Holbom, the Labour Party had taken eight seats and the remaining thirty-four had 
gone to the Conservatives, albeit with reduced majorities. However, of Labour's eight 
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Holbom seats, three were in the St George the Martyr ward which they had dominated 
since 1953, four were in the St Giles Central ward where Labour had averaged 48% of 
the ward vote at post-war elections, and one seat was won in Bloomsbury North 
where Labour had averaged 44% of the ward vote over the same period All three 
wards were areas of the worst housing conditions and all three had a history of close 
straight fights between the two major parties. 
Furthermore, in Hampstead, the Labour Party's vote declined significantly; in the 
Belsize ward by -7.2%. in the West End ward by -8.6%, in the Priory ward by -2.3% 
and by -0.2% in the Adelaide ward. Thus, in four of the west Hampstead wards, some 
of the areas of the worst housing conditions in Hampstead, the wards that had been 
the bedrock of Labour support in the borough, the party was losing support. Labour 
support had fallen in the majority of Hampstead wards and alarmingly the Liberals 
had pushed Labour into third place in four wards, and significantly reduced Labour 
support in many of the areas of worst housing. In contrast the Liberals had benefited 
from huge swings in most of the Hampstead wards from the Conservatives, and only 
in Labour's heartland ward of Kilbum had Labour been the beneficiary of a swing 
from the Conservatives. The Liberals had contested in neither Holbom nor St Pancras 
at the 1962 borough elections. However, in Holbom even though every ward had 
swung towards Labour to produce a whole borough swing in the vote of 9.4%, Labour 
were still almost 13 percentage points behind the Conservatives and only able to take 
eight of the forty-two seats. On closer inspection of the post-war electoral history of 
the three pre-reorganisation metropolitan boroughs, amalgamation for the Labour 
Party did not auger well, as Table 39 illustrates. 
249 
Table 39: Seats won by party at metropolitan borough elections 1945-1962, 
Metropolitan Borough 
Elections 1945-1962 
Labour Party 
Seats Won 
Conservative Party 
Seats Won 
Total 
Seats 
St Pancras wards 1-4 149 31 180 
St Pancras wards 5-8 83 97 180 
Holbom 43 209 252 
Hampstead 44 208 252 
Total Seats Won 319 545 864 
Percentage Won 36.9% 63.1% 100% 
(Source Willis and Woollard:2000) 
Labour had a core support in wards 1-4 of St Pancras MB. nevertheless, the remaining 
wards 5-8 were marginal. Furthermore, at L C C elections and parliamentary elections 
it was these 5-8 St Pancras wards that made up the Holbom and St Pancras South 
electoral unit. However, at borough elections 1945-1962, out of 252 contested seats 
the Holbom MB wards had retumed 209 Conservative candidates. In the Hampstead 
MB the Labour Party's borough electoral fortunes were as dire as in Holbom. It is 
then, far from clear how the London Labour Party at the 1964 London Borough 
elections considered Camden to be a marginal borough, or indeed how later 
commentators have come to this conclusion. At the 1964 London Borough elections 
the recent history of its constituent metropolitan boroughs would suggest that Labour 
had an uphill struggle to take control of the new borough council of Camden. It will 
be argued below that in the wake of the 1959 borough election defeat in St Pancras 
there was a significant moderation of the Labour Group's housing policy driven by 
pragmatic electoral calculations concerning Labour's prospects upon amalgamation 
into the new London borough of Camden. 
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8.4:Housing conditions and voter discontent 
Upon merger, tenure in the London Borough of Camden comprised 17% owner-
occupiers, 16% council tenants and 62% private sector The St Pancras Metropolitan 
Borough had contributed by far the largest number of council dwellings, some 9,000, 
and had by far the largest Housing Revenue Account deficit. In contrast, at the time of 
the amalgamation Holbom Metropolitan Borough had only 1,000 council dwellings, 
but had a very healthy commercial rate income by virtue of its central London 
locatioa Hampstead Metropolitan Borough had 3,000 council dwellings, however, in 
relation to the size of its population this a much smaller proportion than the St 
Pancras level of provision. Hampstead had the highest proportion of middle class 
residents but the lowest income from rates and the lowest debt of the three boroughs. 
Holbom's post-war provision of council housing in relation to its population size was 
superior to that of Hampstead but inferior to the St Pancras council house building 
record. 
The inadequacy of social housing provision by all three metropolitan boroughs is 
however put into perspective by the combined council housing wailing list for 
Camden that numbered 11,441 applicants in 1965 (Wistrich 1972:202). Indeed, 
almost half the households in the London Borough of Camden lacked essential 
facilities and were seriously overcrowded. Moreover, one in four households were 
under multi-occupancy, and by 1968 it was estimated that the borough needed '22,000 
new houses just to solve its present problem' (The Camden and St Pancras Chronicle 
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26 April 1968). The areas of worst housing conditions were in the central and north-
eastern wards of St Pancras, and the wards of west Hampstead. 
Housing provision and council rents had been at the forefront of the political battle for 
control of St Pancras Metropolitan Council at post-war borough elections. The 
explanation for this was because ' housing development was one of the few real 
powers held by the old Metropolitan Boroughs and certainly bad housing was the 
greatest social evil in St Pancras' (Duff 1971:89). In all three metropolitan boroughs, 
to varying degrees, in both the uncontrolled private rental sector and the local 
authority rented sector, soaring rents added to existing electoral discontent over 
housing conditions and the rate and extent of local authority provision. Faced vAth 
escalating land prices and construction costs, and the increased cost of council 
borrowing, formeriy at 2% from the centrally funded Public Works Loan Board and 
thence, after the 1957 Rent Act, from free-market sources at much higher interest 
rates, council rent levels could only be suppressed by ever- increasing subsidy from 
the local rates. The refrisal by the then Labour controlled St Pancras council to 
increase rents had resulted in legal action and a number of Labour councillors had 
been surcharged in 1958 and 1959. 
Labour had controlled St Pancras council since the 1953 borough elections and had 
rescinded a Conservative scheme of differential rents in favour of a standard council 
rent subsidy. This, and the suppression of rent levels in general was naturally opposed 
by the Conservatives, but also by the councillors on the right of the local Labour 
party. However, in the months before the 1959 borough elections fourteen Labour 
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councillors had been expelled from the local party because of their support for 
increased rents and a curtailed housing programme. 
In power again in 1959 the Conservatives immediately reintroduced a differential 
rents scheme and thereby precipitated a concerted and organised campaign against 
rent increases that involved v«despread rent strikes and a riot in 1960. Labour's 
borough election landslide of 1962 was on the back of this groundswell of general 
discontent among the St Pancras electorate over housing conditions and rents in the 
private and public sector and the party's electoral promise to repeal the differential 
rent scheme. However, once in control, 'it was not possible to carry out... [the] 
promise'. As Peggy Duff the Labour Group's Chairman of the Housing Committee 
later recorded 'It could not be abandoned... without further surcharge on the 
councillors responsible'. More important, a retum to the standard rent subsidy system 
would have increased the Housing Revenue Account deficit and produced a 
politically damaging imbalance between rent and rate contributions to the account. 
The deficit stood at £300,000 in 1961/1962 and was increasing at a rate of £50,000 a 
year ( St Pancras Chronicle 12 Oct. 1962. Duff: 96). 
Such an electoral consideration had not been of paramount importance in the 
Conservative dominated Holbom borough where rate income from valuable central 
London office properties financed services and its council house building programme 
without a negative impact upon its Housing Revenue Account and thus, any adverse 
burden on domestic ratepayers. Similarly, in the predominantly middle class 
Hampstead Metropolitan Borough a low level of council house provision, minimal 
rates and a small Housing Revenue Account debt was the prevailing local political 
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economy. Labour councillors were well aware that upon merger of the three 
metropolitan boroughs a significant proportion of Camden's electorate would be 
averse to high council expenditure, especially on housing, that impacted upon the 
rates. Indeed, as Peggy Duff lamented,' St Pancras changed into Camden... 
Inevitably the question of rents ceased to be the hub and centre of our socialist faith' 
(Duff 1971:96. St Pancras Chronicle 8 May, 28 August 1959,18 May, 12 October 
1962). 
Clearly, in the interim between their 1959 borough electoral defeat and the initial 
election to the newly formed Camden in 1964, Labour's policies had moderated 
somewhat. Indeed, a motion to return to a standard rent subsidy had been defeated 
within the St Pancras Labour Group in 1962, as it was again in 1965 within the now 
Camden Labour Group. New electoral calculations had come into play with the 1959 
borough electoral defeat and the onset of amalgamation that necessitated a shift in 
policy towards the rent/rate issue. Furthermore, as will be evidenced below, just as 
Labour in St Pancras had 'come to terms with the realities of limited power' (Wistrich 
1971:8), or rather transient council control by cutting their rent policy cloth according 
to electoral considerations, so the Labour Group on Camden Council became much 
*more conscious of the rising rate burden and the movement of public opinion 
towards the Conservatives' and reluctantly tailored their housing policy accordingly. 
Wistrich has argued that this 'did not influence the broad policy line of the [Labour] 
Council', i.e. that the Labour Group were 'determined to... .increase the amount of 
local authority housing'. Indeed, this intention was made explicit in Labour's local 
electoral appeals to the Camden electorate and goes some way to explain why the 
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Labour Party in Camden, unlike the neighbouring borough of Islington, did not 
fracture into two factions of candidates ruiming as Labour Independents on a socialist 
housing policy in a damaging competition for the Labour vote with moderate official 
Labour candidates. There was, nevertheless, a chasm between the Labour Group's 
electoral rhetoric over housing and the actuality of provision and thus the amelioration 
of the grievances of a significant section of the Camden electorate concerning 
housing. Indeed, the average number of new buildings completed by Camden Council 
in the period 1964-1968 was 587 per annum, and although this was an improvement 
upon the annual average of its three constituent former metropolitan boroughs, it was 
nevertheless not enough to turn the tide of the ever-increasing housing waiting list 
(Wistrich:1971:213-214). However, other than abstention or a protest vote for a 
Conservative candidate (Liberals in Hampstead and a few Conmiunist candidates 
apart) there was no alternative party or independent candidate to champion the cause 
of a significant section of Camden's electorate disaffected by housing conditions. 
8.5:Liberal revival 
An attempt had been made by the Liberals to establish a foothold in the derelict 
constituencies of St Pancras North and Holbom and St Pancras South in the 1950s. 
During this period the general aim of the national party leadership had been to replace 
Labour as the main party of the left in British politics, as a non-socialist but 
nevertheless radical party. The strategy was never universally popular within the party 
because of the implication of possible cooperation with the Labour Party and the 
desire of many in the party to cultivate a distinct party image as an independent force 
in the eyes of the electorate. Furthermore, the autonomous nature of the various 
organisational units and constituency associations that made up the Libera! Party 
255 
meant that Uiere was little formal contact between national leadership and local level 
activism, or control over electoral strategy and policy. A disadvantage on the one 
hand if a national party wants to employ a coherent electoral strategy but on the other 
hand a distinct advantage if a party wants to play to the local electoral gallery as these 
case studies have shown. Even after the appointment of a Local Government Officer 
in 1959, there were few sanctions to influence matters of electoral policy or strategy 
at local and parliamentary elections, (see Wallace 1968:243,Cyr 1977:40. Butler and 
King 1966:81. Pinkney 1983:347 Joyce 1989:264). 
Indeed, at the 1953 and 1956 borough elections in the St Pancras MB, and the 
Holbom MB, the Liberal candidates' electoral appeals had been pitched at the 
ratepayer. The candidates had acknowledged the dire housing conditions and 
criticised the rate of council house provision, but any resolution of the problem 
involved a revision of the rating system to reduce the burden upon the ratepayer and 
the introduction of a fair rent scheme assessed by need that threatened increased rents 
for most council tenants. It is unsurprising that these Liberal candidates failed to 
detach Labour support but succeeded in benefiting from a small swing from the 
Conservatives. Clearly, there was a certain incongruity between national Liberal party 
image and local electoral reality in these cases. 
However, the fortunes of the London Liberal Party were in the ascendant after a 
concerted recmitment campaign in the late 1950s in the London region. At a finance 
meeting of the London Liberal Party in May 1960 it was revealed that £1,050 had 
been raised, a vast improvement upon 1958 when they had faced bankruptcy 
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(ACC144/6/6). Furthermore, membership in London had increased from 5,700 in 
1959 to 23,000 by January 1962 (Liberal News January 1962), It was in these more 
propitious circumstances that the London Liberal Party Executive Committee reported 
that party activists had agreed to launch a membership campaign in the St Pancras 
North area (ACC1446/11). However, by this time the focus of the Liberal electoral 
appeal at the national level had shifted much more explicitly to the upwardly mobile 
section of the working class, the younger voters in newer industries who did not have 
strong attachments to the Labour Party. 
The Liberal appeal for support in the 1960s was also pitched at the disillusioned 
voters of both parties in that it tapped into the national mood of dissatisfaction of the 
electorate over the post-war performance of both the major parties when in 
government. The focus of Liberal blandishments towards the discontented 
Conservative voter and the so-called 'new man', the upwardly mobile technically 
skilled young worker, was the impact of interest rates upon mortgage repayments, the 
local authority rating system and waste of taxpayer's money through inefficient 
government at national and local level. The general tack of the Liberal Party policy 
was the pursuit of the lower middle class voter and the better off more skilled working 
class section of the electorate. Thus, in the predominantly working class 
constituencies, where housing conditions were decisive at elections the Liberal 
solutions were hardly distinguishable from those proposed by the Conservatives, and 
the Liberals were unable to fracture Labour partisanship and establish a foothold. 
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8.6:Liberals limited by local Labour Party oreanisation 
Opportunity for Liberal candidates in these areas v ^ also dependent upon the 
electoral latitude allowed by its rivals. A rebel candidate running as an independent 
against an official Conservative candidate and thereby splitting the right vote was a 
rare occurrence. However, this was not the case with the Labour Party. Perhaps the 
reasons why rebel Labour candidates did not contest at borough elections on the 
single-issue of housing, as they had in Birmingham and Islington, can in part be 
explained in terms of the organisational structure of constituency Labour parties in the 
borough, the influence of the local party upon the Labour Group on council, and the 
democratic nature of control and policy making within the Labour Group. 
The constituency boundaries of the former metropolitan boroughs meant that St 
Pancras and Holbom CLPs were engaged in common constituency party activities. 
Upon merger into Camden, unlike Islington and Birmingham where their respective 
Coordinating Committees and Borough Labour Party were either not convened or 
ignored, an active Liaison Committee made up of twenty representatives from each 
CLP was established and affiliated associations such as Trades Unions were 
represented. The Liaison Committee, was represented at the ward level selection of 
prospective local electoral candidates, coordinated electoral activity and formulated 
policy. Camden also had an active Local Government Committee made up from 
members of each CLP, a number of whom attended Labour Group meetings in an 
advisory capacity. There was much multi-office holding as in Islington and 
Birmingham, however, the influence of the wider party and affiliated associations 
meant that the Labour Group on council were more aware of, and responsive to, wider 
party dissention and criticism. 
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There were also a number of checks and balances upon the exercise of power by the 
leadership of the group and ample opportunity for the expression of dissent. Unlike 
the Birmingham Labour Group, the leader of Camden Labour Group was not able to 
dominate the chairmen of the various council committees or the proceedings of 
Labour Group meetings. An elected chairman presided over Labour Group meetings 
and the Leader of the Labour Group like all other members was subject to his ruling 
and thus all members had the opportunity to voice their opinions during the policy 
making process. Equally as important, the Policy Committee that generated the 
provisional policy proposals that went before meetings of the Labour Group, was 
much more broadly based than those of Birmingham and Islington. It included the 
chairmen of the Standing Committees and two elected officers, whose inclusion had 
the effect of further eroding the power of the Leader of the Labour Group and any 
leadership clique. 
The most significant departure from Labour Party Standing Orders in Camden 
compared with Islington and Birmingham, was the replacement of the conscience 
clause that virtually compelled Labour councillors to conform to Group decisions and 
only allowed a councillor to abstain on matters of conscience such as religious issues. 
The Standing Orders of Camden extended matters of conscience to any policy issue 
that was considered to be of importance by an individual member albeit contrary to 
the Group opinion. As Wistrich points up 'The effect of this was to free members 
from the psychological burden that they must conform to Group decisions'. Indeed, 
unlike Birmingham and Islington dissident Labour councillors who were often also 
representatives of council tenant associations, dissident Camden Labour councillors 
did not feel stymied or denied a voice, just democratically outvoted. Unlike 
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Birmingham and Islington dissent over housing policy could be demonstrated to one's 
ward electorate without recourse to competing as an Independent Labour candidate 
and splitting the Labour vote. Indeed, 'party discipline and organisation in Council 
were more important for the way they determined the style of local politics than their 
effects upon individual councillors or the decision making process' (Wistrich 
1972:61-82). Thus, damaging splits in the Labour Group on Camden Council were 
less likely and any electoral opportunity for Liberal candidates to gain advantage or a 
foothold in the area through the protest vote of disaffected Labour voters was 
diminished. 
8.7:Housing and the 1964 election for control of Camden 
Housing policy remained a key electoral consideration for all parties in Camden. At 
the first GLC elections in Camden in April 1964 and the first London Borough 
elections in Camden in May 1964, Labour's past record of council house building, 
modernisation of properties and policy of affordable rents was extolled. In leaflets, 
letters and circulars to all local authority tenants in Camden, Labour outlined its 
intention to pursue the same policy if elected to represent Camden on the GLC. 
Furthermore, the literature highlighted how council rents in the Holbom Metropolitan 
Borough were much higher; £5.2s.3d for a two-bedroom flat, whereas in council 
dwellings controlled by the L C C or St Pancras MB, two-bedroom flats were £3.1s.2d. 
The difference, they argued, was that Holbom MB council was Conservative 
controlled. Labour had also promised to calculate rents in the same way 'subject to 
the requirements of the law'. This electoral promise was contrasted with the 
Conservative manifesto that had announced the intention to replace differential rents 
with a rent-rebate scheme based upon need, and thus the introduction of means 
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testing. Furthermore the Conservatives had emphasised redevelopment through 
cooperation with private developers and the intention to keep rates to a minimum. 
Labour made no direct reference to rates at these elections but promised to 'ease the 
burden upon the hardest hit' of Camden's electorate. (Jim Raisin Papers GLC 
Election Borough of Camden: ACC/2783^CC 2417/C/120, Wistrich 1972: 64). 
The Liberal electoral appeal at the 1964 G L C and London Borough elections focussed 
upon defence of the ratepayer and the private rental sector. The party's interest in the 
private rental elector was not however in terms of council provision. Indeed the 
Hampstead Liberals were totally against council compulsory orders, both for 
redevelopment or modemisation of properties, especially in the Hampstead area. The 
Liberals wanted to create parity between the costs of private renting and those of 
house purchase, a policy that would particularly appeal to the more socially mobile of 
the electorate, especially in Hampstead where the costs of renting in the increasing 
number of prestigious apartment developments was rapidly escalating. 
However, the three Liberal candidates at the GLC elections polled only 6.4% of the 
Camden vote, the bulk of which reflected their Hampstead support (The Camden and 
St Pancras Chronicle 17 April 1964). At the May 1964 borough elections the Liberals 
in Camden polled a mere 5.5% of the whole borough vote, a figure that belied the 
party's level of support in Hampstead. The Liberals had contested all twenty-four of 
the Hampstead seats, but only contested in one ward of each of the former St Pancras 
and Holbom metropolitan council areas. If Liberal support in the Hampstead wards 
only is considered then the party took 11.8% of the vote. Nevertheless, compared to 
1962 the Liberal electoral bubble had burst in Harapstead. The party's transient 
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protest vote had returned to its former Conservative and Labour camps. The Liberals 
at the 1962 London Metropolitan Borough Council elections had taken, on average, a 
29.5% share of the vote in each of the Hampstead wards. 
In contrast the Labour Party at post-war metropolitan borough elections had averaged 
a 31.8% share of the Hampstead vote, and in 1962 they experienced a -2.1 % swing, 
whilst the Conservatives experienced a -15,2% swing against them. However, at the 
1964 election in the same Hampstead vwds Labour had increased their vote by 11.3% 
over its 1962 share, whilst the Conservatives had only increased their share by 8.8% 
over 1962. Labour in 1964 had taken 41.7% of the votes cast in the seven Hampstead 
wards of Camden and outperformed their post-war mean in Hampstead by 10.1%. 
Clearly, the concerted electoral campaign by the Conservatives in Hampstead to paint 
the prospective Labour candidates as profligate socialists intent on the 
municipalisation of Camden at the expense of the ratepayer was not of comprehensive 
appeal to the electorate even in this most Conservative of the three fonmer 
metropolitan boroughs. Furthermore, Liberal's electoral message to the ratepayers and 
the more well off in the rental sector of Hampstead had not differentiated them 
enough from the Conservatives and at the same time alienated them from those 
electors in the worst housing conditions who had little prospect of either purchasing a 
home or re-housing by the council. The shift in support towards the Labour Party at 
the 1964 G L C and borough electoral levels was reflected in the results of Camden's 
three constituencies at the 1964 General Election. In St Pancras North the party 
increased its majority. Labour took the historically marginal Holbom and St Pancras 
South seat, and turned the safe Conservative seat of Hampstead into a marginal with 
an increase of 11% in its share of the vote over 1959. 
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8.8:Camden Labour Group 1964-1968 
Labour took control of Camden Council with 34 seats to the Conservative's 26 and 
consolidated their position with the appointment of eight Labour Aldermen out of the 
ten vacancies available. Thus Labour's small majority was extended to fourteen and 
thereby tolerance to withstand a degree o f dissent within the Labour Group was 
extended, Wistrich has argued that the Labour Government of October 1964 was 
'anxious to push ahead wdth increased programmes of municipal housing and Camden 
Council was keen to meet the challenge' (Wistrich 1972:161). This intention was 
expressed at the first council meeting and indeed, housing was considered to be the 
main election issue at the 1964 general election in Camden's constituencies 'due to 
the huge housing list in the area' (The Camden and St Pancras Chronicle 17 A p r i l , 
25 Sept 1964). 
However, the Labour Group's housing policy was almost immediately out of step 
with the Labour Government's policy which shifted decisively in favour of the 
stimulation of owner-occupation and the revitalisation of the private rental sector by 
the introduction of a means-tested Fair Rent Scheme, and economic rents for council 
tenants. Furthermore. Camden's housing policy under the Labour Group 1964-1968 
failed to satisfy the borough's electorate across the range of tenures. 
For the electors in the worst housing conditions there was no significant improvement 
in housing conditions or prospect of being re-housed throughout this period. Indeed, 
despite the Labour Group's much-trumpeted redevelopment and modernisation 
programme Camden's housing waiting list lengthened and, paradoxically. 
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overcrowding in the private rental sector worsened (Wistrich 201-219, The Camden 
and St Pancras Chronicle 26 April 1968). Furthermore, by 1968 'Camden Borough 
Council's loan debt stood at more than £41 million the largest proportion of which 
was ascribed to housing. In consequence Camden's domestic rate was the 'highest of 
all the London boroughs except Westminster and Kensington' 
(The Camden and St Pancras Chronicle 5 Jan. 1968). In 1966 the Labour Group had 
increased council rents in the face of threatened siu^charges by the District Auditor. 
Twelve Labour councillors had opposed the rise on behalf of the tenants organisations 
as an unfair burden upon council tenants and one that should be met by the 
community as a whole. For their part the Labour Group had argued that increased 
costs to solve the borough's dire housing problems should be met by a greater 
contribution from the rate fund and an increased government subsidy to improve and 
modernise compulsory purchased properties, and that the refusal by the Minister of 
Housing and Local Government to agree to these proposals meant that they had been 
faced with a choice between surcharge or a cut back in their housing programme. 
Indeed, the Minister of Housing had rescinded a Compulsory Purchase Order made by 
the Labour Group concerning properties in the Oak Village area and found in favour 
of the owner-occupiers who opposed the plan. 
The Camden Labour Group had by the 1968 borough elections managed to alienate 
council tenants through an unpopular rent increase, alienate the most hard-pressed 
private rental sector tenants by way of means tested rent assessment, made no 
im.pression upon the size of the housing waiting list, and concomitantly imposed one 
of the highest rate burdens in London upon its rate paying electorate. Furthermore, 
they had exposed to the local electorate the ambivalence of the Labour Government's 
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housing policy. This electoral dissatisfaction over housing was addressed by the 
Conservatives who criticised the Labour council's administration in an attack that 
linked high spending, low council rents and high rates. The Conservative campaign 
particularly criticised the Labour Group's costly strategy of compulsory purchase and 
modernisation of properties, which were then let at uneconomic rents subsidised by 
the ratepayer. 
Attitudes towards council rents and rate levels had been changing in favour of the 
Conservatives, and some indication of this can be gained from a survey commissioned 
by the Labour Party. A local attitude survey was conducted among the electors of five 
London boroughs in November 1966 at the behest of Transport House. The survey, 
conducted by Roger Jowell and John Cole, was undertaken in order to plan Labour's 
campaign for the May 1967 GLC elections. The survey used personal interviews, 
structured questionnaires, and selected five GLC marginal boroughs, four of which 
were not formerly in the LCC and Camden Borough. One Conservative and one 
Labour controlled ward were randomly selected from each of the five boroughs in the 
sample and seventy-five electors randomly selected from the Electoral Registers of 
each ward. A key finding on specific electoral issues was that the Conservative 
Party's policy towards council housing was gaining ground among the electorate. 
Almost half of the respondents in the sample complained that council rents were too 
low, and two-thirds of the respondents cited the ratepayer, rather than the Council or 
the Government, as the subsidiser of council rents. Asked the amount of importance 
attached to party politics in local affairs 'half the informants thought it made a great 
deal of difference which party controlled the borough council and the GLC. 
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In terms of party affiliation the survey found that of those informants that did not 
always vote for the same party, half cited policies and a third cited record in office as 
the reason for change, with only one informant citing candidate. Interestingly, of the 
fourteen Liberals in the sample asked how they would vote i f a Liberal candidate did 
not stand at the GLC elections, 'they split on this exactly evenly between Tory and 
Labour', Furthermore, when the informants were asked to choose from a list often, 
the two most important issues of relevance to the area that they lived in, no one issue 
predominated and borough comparisons revealed considerable variation. 
( Local Attitude Survey, Jowell,R., and Cole.J„ 1966, ACC2783/JWRySTA/25). 
The massive defeat of Labour in London at the May 1968 borough elections, which 
left the Conservatives in control of 28 of the 32 London boroughs, included what was 
by then considered the Labour stronghold of Camden. The Conservatives gained 
fifteen seats in the borough and took control of the council with forty-two seats to 
Labour's eighteen. 
8.9:Labour's declining support 
The failures of the Labour Party in government in the 1960s no doubt have a major 
explanatory role in this dramatic change in local electoral allegiances. Indeed, 1964-
1970, was a period of severe, and unpopular, economic restraint which had impacted 
in Camden by January 1968 as 'shock unemployment figures' (The Camden and St 
Pancras Chronicle 5 Jan., 1968). However, a commitment to the resolution of 
Britain's housing problems had been a central plank of Labour's 1964 electoral 
campaign. Such was its importance that Wilson considered that upon the issue of 
housing 'we win or lose' (Timmins 1995:233). 
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Labour had been confronted with political realities that created a chasm between 
electoral rhetoric and actual performance. On the one hand the Labour governments 
were committed to the extension of local authority rented housing provision as 
exemplified by the 1967 Housing Subsidy Act which enabled local authorities to 
borrow at much lower interest rates and financed a surge in council house 
completions by industrialised building methods. On the other hand there had been two 
significant changes in the party's thinking regarding the economics of housing. 
Firstly, the party's traditional commitment to the municipalisation of the private rental 
sector had been abandoned in the early 1960s, a move that proved extremely 
unpopular with the London Labour Party whose inner-London constituencies 
comprised vast areas of private rental housing. The government had repealed the 1957 
Rent Act and introduced a 'Fair Rents Scheme' and Rent Tribunals to ease the 
circumstances of this sector which made up over 60% of the electorate in Camden, 
however, the means tested assessment of rents had meant for many tenants, an 
unpopular increase in rents for substandard properties, and a seemingly diminished 
likelihood of obtaining a council house. Secondly, the Labour government's policy 
had shifted towards a mixed economy resolution of the housing problem by a much 
bigger private sector contribution. Furthermore, at a time of rising affluence and home 
ownership for many of the party's traditional supporters, and the electoral necessity to 
broaden the party's base of support. Labour had to accommodate the needs of the 
home owner and facilitate the aspirations of those clamouring to join their ranks by 
making house purchase more affordable. There was then, a shift in Labour 
government policy from its association exclusively as the champion of the council 
tenant to a much wider appeal. 
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Symptomatic of this change, and expedited by economic crises, was a cut back in 
large-scale redevelopment and an emphasis upon Genera! Improvement Areas, that is 
conversion and modernisation. Although this change of emphasis brought great 
savings to the Treasury in terms of the costs of subsidising local authority loans by 
virtue of the short-lived Housing Subsidy Act, it imposed increasing burden upon the 
ratepayer via expensive compulsory purchase, and modernisation of properties 
subsequently let at uneconomic subsidised rents in boroughs like Camden. 
Labour's defeat in Camden had been presaged by the dramatic fall in party 
membership in the London region from the mid 1950s to the late 1960s. The 
constituency Labour parties of Camden were affiliated to the London Labour Party 
(post 1965 Greater London Labour Party) which coordinated all electoral activity. The 
party published electoral campaign material and party literature, organised 
conferences and training courses, directed campaigns on issues such as housing and 
rents, and sponsored Labour Group local electoral campaigns throughout its region. 
The London region covered the London County Council and the Middlesex County 
Council areas. However, the efficiency of the London Labour Party and its affiliated 
CLPs was undermined by its failure to recruit an adequate number of ftill-time party 
agents. This was a national problem for the Labour Party. However, in the whole 
London region there were just 23 full-time party agents in 1963 and, even after two 
general election victories, only 24 in 1966 (ACC 2783/JWR/STA/22/23/24). There 
were however, 42 constituencies in the LCC area alone and a ftirther 23 in the 
Middlesex County Council area, in total 65 constituencies. Clearly the role of party 
agents in organising, coordinating and mobilising party effort at parliamentary and 
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local elections was an inefficient cog in the London Labour Party's electoral 
machinery. At a time when only candidate names and not party labels appeared upon 
polling cards it was essentia! that campaign literature was widely distributed and areas 
efficiently canvassed. Furthermore, some areas of Camden posed particular 
'problems for canvassing... [as the] majority of residents in St Pancras North, and 
Holbom and St Pancras South [lived] in blocks of flats or in houses in multiple 
occupation' (The Camden and St Pancras Chronicle 25 Sept., 1964). An added 
problem for Camden was that party membership was not very strong, particularly in 
some residential areas, and this required party workers to be transferred from safe 
Labour seats like Hackney to help electoral campaigns in areas such as Holbom and 
St Pancras South (ACC2417/C/47). 
Nevertheless, whatever strategies were adopted to overcome these deficiencies, a 
determining factor, not only in terms of manpower but also finance, in the electoral 
efficiency of both the London Labour Party and the Camden CLPs was the level of 
party membership. Although membership figures need to be considered with caution 
and are only approximate because as membership declined many constituency parties 
affiliated on the basis of a standard minimum figure rather than actual membership,( a 
practice that would exaggerate membership numbers), a clear trend of declining 
membership at the national and the London region level can be observed in Table 40. 
The membership of the London region, which stood at 157,629 in 1953 had fallen to 
76,288 in 1964, the year of the first London borough elections under the new structure 
established by the Local Government of London Act 1963. Over the whole period, 
1953-1967, the membership of the Labour Party in the London region had fallen by a 
staggering 58%. This fall in membership of the London Labour Party is somewhat 
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paradoxical. There was a 20% fall in membership between 1957, the year that the 
Rent Act was introduced by the Conservative Government, and 1962, by which time 
the ful l impact upon rents, especially on the private rental sector, was felt (see Davis 
2001:76). In contrast Labour's dominance of LCC elections in the post-war era was 
'unequivocal and electoral landslides were commonplace. In six 
elections held between 1946-1961 the party captured two-thirds or 
more of the seats on four occasions. In 1958 eight out of every ten 
LCC members was Labour. During the long period of 
Conservative dominance of national government, therefore, it was 
the Opposition party that occupied County Hall (Railings and 
Thrasher in Willis and Woolard 2000:vi). 
Furthermore, Labour's grip upon local politics in the capita! was reinforced at the 
borough level with the party's seat share at the London Borough elections between 
1953 and 1962 never below 64%. 
It is the contention here that electoral dissatisfaction over housing was a significant 
contributory factor to the decline in Labour Party membership in London. 
Furthermore, that between 1964 and 1967 the ineffectual housing policies followed by 
boroughs such as Camden added to Labour party members'disaffection engendered 
by national economic issues. The single most enduring divisive issue v^thin the 
Camden Labour Group, and the Labour groups of its three constituent former 
metropolitan boroughs, was council rents. Council rents however, were inextricably 
linked with the resolution of the housing problem and electoral considerations of rate 
levels. Expression of dissatisfaction over rents and council house provision could find 
its way from the individual members of CLPs to the Labour Group, and as shown 
above was not stymied by the organisational structure of Camden Labour. Indeed, it 
was the avowed intent of the group to expand council house provision at affordable 
rents. Nevertheless, for the wider membership of Camden CLPs, the more politically 
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aware and active of the borough's Labour voting section of the electorate, 
disillusionment vnth the actual performance and record of the party at local level and 
ambivalent policy at national level cannot be ruled out as a contributory factor in the 
decline of party membership. As a case study in Southvwk of the relationships 
between socio-economic change and the borough's constituency Labour parties points 
up, not only must explanations of changing political allegiances take account of the 
social and economic context but also, so the context in terms of political events and 
how voters make sense of them be included (Goss 1988:85-143). 
YEAR NATIONAL LONDON REGION 
1953 1,004,685 157.629 
1954 927,947 154.314 
1955 843,356 142.439 
1956 845,129 fNOFIGURESl 
1957 912.987 95.554 
1958 888,955 93.311 
1959 847,526 99,076 
1960 790.192 80.437 
1961 750,565 77.396 
1962 767,459 76.984 
1963 830.162 78,978 
1964 830,116 76,288 
1965 816.765 74.245 
1966 775.693 71,245 
1967 734,795 65,920 
Table 40:Me[nbership of the Labour Party 19S5-1967.Sources: Reports of the Conference of 
Regional Organisers, Reports of StafT Conference (ACC2783/JWR/STA 8, 
17,19,20,21^2,23,24,25). 
8.10;The Labour Group in the 1970s 
The first priority of the 1968 Conservative council was the reduction of the borough's 
immense loan debt of which the housing budget was by far the greatest component. 
Camden, however, had the highest domestic rate in London and in order to balance 
the books a housing report concluded that an average standard rent of £4 10s a week 
an increase of just over £2 was required. In July 1968 council rents were increased by 
a third and an unpopular means tested rent rebate scheme proposed. Nevertheless, 
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despite economies that included the v^thdrawal of school meals, the Conservatives 
had to increase rates by I5p in the pound in March 1971. It was the biggest increase 
of all the London boroughs. A Conservative govenunent, high unemployment in the 
borough, increased council rents, welfare cuts, increased rates, and an ever-increasing 
housing waiting list were the backdrop to a Labour Party landslide at the 1971 
Camden council elections (The Camden and St Pancras Chronicle. 5 Jan., 26 April, 
17 May, 12 July 1968, 12 March, 21 May, 6 Aug.,24 Sept, 1971). 
The Labour Group maintained control of Camden council throughout the 1970s and in 
an economic climate of roaring inflation made little impact towards ameliorating the 
housing needs of the borough, indeed, the housing list stood at 9,645 in 1978. Labour 
however, shifted the burden on to the rate payer in March 1974 with a 25% increase 
in rates and in the run up to the 1978 local elections promised a 12 month freeze on 
council rents i f returned to power, a reflection of the increasing influence of the left of 
the local party within the Labour Group. Labour's majority was reduced from 36 to 7 
at the 1978 election on an above average turnout in an election that centred upon the 
conflicting issues of rates versus council rent levels, and retrenchment versus 
borrowing to finance the housing programme. 
Camden council and its housing policy had come under the influence of the left so 
much so that the Shadow Housing Minister Hugh Rossi described as Munacy of the 
greatest magnitude' the council's housing development in west Hampstead where 
' the lucky occupiers ... will be subsidised by the ratepayers to the tune of £120 per 
week' (Camden and St Pancras Chronicle 4 Aug. 1978). In November 1981 a 
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moderate Labour councillor resigned and was re-elected in a council by-election as an 
SDP candidate and in January 1982 the Camden SDP and the Hampstead, Holbom 
and St Pancras Liberal parties signed an agreement to contest the forthcoming May 
elections as Alliance candidates. 
8.11:Liberal lifeline 
In cahoots with Labour moderates the Liberals under the baruier of the Alliance were 
able to contest in all Camden's wards at the 1982 borough election and take a 25% 
share of the total borough vote albeit without taking a seat. The Liberals had never in 
Camden's brief electoral history reached double figures in total borough share o f the 
vote or for that matter taken a seat. However, a local govenmient electoral revival on 
the back of voter discontent over housing conditions, council rents and rate levels had 
enabled the party to gain a foothold in hitherto derelict constituencies, to build a local 
party organisational structure, to establish a core support, and thereby contest the 
Holbom and St Pancras South, and the St Pancras North seats at the February and 
October 1974, and the 1979 general elections. Furthermore, for the first time since 
1934 the Liberal Party were able to field a candidate at the LCC elections in St 
Pancras in 1964. 
8.11:Conclusion 
In this chapter it has been shown that the three boroughs under scrutiny were derelict 
as far as Liberal contestation and organisation was concerned. It has been evidenced 
that in all three metropolitan boroughs before their merger into the new London 
borough of Camden there was variance in the voting behaviour of electors within 
local authorities between lower and upper-tier elections and, in the cases of the St 
Pancras MB and the Holbom MB, variance between local and parliamentary levels of 
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elections. This evidence of the significance of electoral context in the calculus of the 
electorates of these three boroughs at pre-1964 elections contradicts the accepted view 
that local electoral choice in this period reflected to a large extent parliamentary level 
partisanship (Fletcher 1967, Green 1972, Butler and Stokes 1975, Newton 1976, 
Gyford 1984, Miller 1988). Indeed, the evidence contradicts the accepted view of the 
1950-1970 period as one o f aligned voting as far as local elections are concerned in 
the three metropolitan boroughs examined ( Denver 1994 32-50, Sarlvik and Crewe 
1983 332-335) 
The evidence has also shown that support for the Labour Party had fallen in the areas 
of worst housing conditions such as in west Hampstead where Liberal intervention 
pushed Labour candidates into third place in 1962. Moreover, it has been 
demonstrated that membership of Labour's constituency parties rapidly declining 
and given the recent electoral histories of the three metropolitan boroughs it has been 
shown that Labour faced an uphill electoral battle for control of Camden. It has been 
argued that an explanation for the fall in Labour's share of the vote and dramatic 
decline in membership cannot exclude the political failings of Camden Labour group 
in relation to the core local electoral issue of housing. Thus, along with changing class 
structure part of any explanation of the Labour Party's decline at parliamentary 
elections 1964-1983 should include erosion of support due to Labour's political 
failings at the municipal level. These findings accord with Heath's thesis regarding 
the importance of Labour's political failings in the explanation of their loss of 
electoral support in that period (Heath et al 1985:37). 
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Social housing provision, council rents, private rental sector rents and rates have been 
evidenced by this chapter to have been at the forefront of council elections in these 
three metropolitan boroughs and for the two major parties a key electoral 
consideration in each borough was the relationship between the level of the Housing 
Revenue Account deficit and the level of rates imposed. Indeed, even before the new 
political landscape of Camden came into being, pressure to return to a standard rent 
subsidy for council tenants had been resisted by the moderate majority of St Pancras 
council Labour group in 1962. It is indicative of the group's changing electoral 
calculations when contrasted with the expulsion of Labour councillors in 1959 for 
having supported increased council rents and cut backs in the housing programme. 
Although the 1964-1968 Labour group's broad policy line endorsed an increase in 
local authority housing and the amelioration of the borough's dire housing conditions 
by compulsory purchase and slum clearance or modernisation of the private sector, it 
has been shown that there was a yawning gap between electoral rhetoric and reality. 
Clearly, the London Government Act of 1963 that brought about the merger of three 
quite different boroughs also brought into being a very different electoral context that 
the Labour Party in Camden adapted its policies to in order to successfully compete. 
This was a development confirmed by the findings of the Labour Party's local attitude 
survey of 1967 that evidenced a shift in local electoral opinion in favour of the 
Conservative's policy towards council housing and rents. 
The Liberal Party's electoral appeal in Camden has been shown to have been pitched 
at the ratepayer and the better off in the private rental sector. However, the party's 
housing policy was against social housing provision and compulsory purchase of 
properties for redevelopment or modernisation. Thus, for a substantial number of 
Camden's electorate, those living in the poorest of housing conditions in the private 
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rental sector, not only was there not any immediate prospect of a council house but 
also no credible alternative candidate to champion their interests. For them the 
Labour controlled council of 1964-1968 delivered platitudes not houses and the 
Conservative controlled council 1968-1971 delivered retrenchment. 
The evidence of this case study also highlights the role of contextual institutional 
factors in shaping the political environment, which in turn has an impact upon the 
calculus of the voter at the local electoral level. It has been shown that unlike 
Birmingham or Islington the organisational structure of constituency Labour parties in 
Camden was much more democratic and that the Labour group on council was not 
cushioned from the influence of the wider local party and was much more aware and 
responsive to dissention and criticism. Moreover, dissenters were free from Labour 
party Standing Orders and thereby able to register their ward electorate's disapproval 
without recourse to standing as rebel candidates. A locally determined style of party 
discipline and organisational structure can thus be seen to have shaped the climate of 
politics in Camden and illustrates the need for a broader vision in local electoral 
studies to take account of the process, context and meaning of the many determinants 
of voting behaviour. 
However, it has been shown that in the 1970s this consensus among Labour 
councillors broke down as the left gradually gained control over Camden Labour. It 
was under these circumstances that the Liberals who had established a minimal core 
support and organisational structure in Camden upon the back of electoral 
dissatisfaction over rates, rents and housing conditions were well placed to collude 
with moderate Labour councillors and reap a modicum of electoral success under the 
Alliance party colours. At the 1983 general election the SDP candidate in the Camden 
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Hampstead and Highgate constituency took 25.4% of the total vote and a counterpart 
in the Camden Holbom and St Pancras constituency 21.4%. Thereafter, in both 
constituencies Libera! and Liberal Democrat candidates have contested the seats. 
Indeed at the 2001 general election a Liberal Democrat pushed the Conservative 
candidate into third place at the Camden Holbom and St Pancras constituency. 
Clearly, electoral dealigimient at the parliamentary level is not entirely divorced from 
local electoral activity. Partisan alignment at general elections was very difiTerent in 
the constituencies of Camden in last two decades of the last century fi"om what it was 
in the 1959-1979 period and part of the explanation for this phenomenon lies in local 
electoral activity. 
The evidence of this study of Camden is supportive of Davis's conclusion about the 
housing crisis in London, which he said illustrates how conventional politics could 
fail to provide an outlet for extensive social grievances (Davis 2001). It also supports 
Dunleavy's explanation of dealignment that centres upon a consumption cleavage 
around the directly politicised provision of housing (Dunleavy 1979:409-443 and 
1982). In short, the evidence presented here supports the contention that local socio-
economic and political factors have an explanatory role in both local and 
parliamentary electoral outcomes and partisan dealignment at both electoral levels. 
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CHAPTER 9 
M U L T I V A R I A T E REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
9.1 Introduction 
It has been established in Chapter 4 by use of descriptive statistical techniques that 
there were disparities between the patterns of voting behaviour at local and general 
elections in the 1959-1979 period in both Birmingham and London. Indeed, it has 
been demonstrated that there was, at particular times and in particular areas 
considerable variance in the voting behaviour of electors between local authorities of 
the same type, within individual local authorities at upper- and lower-tier levels of 
local elections, and between local goverrunent electoral behaviour and that at the 
pariiamentary level in coterminous electoral units. In Chapter 2 it has been shown that 
these disparities cannot solely be explained by the 'Annual General Election' thesis. 
Further, it has been argued in Chapters 5-8 that such variations in voting patterns can 
in part be explained by the characteristics of the environment in which the act of 
voting takes place, that there was a relationship between the socio-economic and 
political characteristics of the electoral units under scrutiny and voting behaviour 
therein. 
The aims of this chapter and the next are to establish corroborative evidence of the 
relationships between contextual influences and electoral behaviour revealed by the 
case study research. Many of the contextual influences upon local electoral voting 
behaviour identified by the qualitative research may be discemable to inferential 
statistical techniques of data analysis. Analysis of data that captures the electoral, 
socio-economic and political context in which these acts of voting took place would 
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be expected to reveal significant associations between variables that measure these 
influences and support for a particular party. For instance, quantitative analysis should 
substantiate the findings of the qualitative research that has evidenced underlying 
general processes common to all case study locations in varying degrees, such as the 
impact of housing conditions and diverse local issues upon party support at municipal 
elections and indirectly upon aligrunent at parliamentary election. It v^ould also be 
expected that change over time in the influence of these local factors and, indeed, the 
changes in class and party alignment evidenced by the case studies would be captured 
by the quantitative analysis. The case studies have evidenced cross-cutting cleavages 
in terms of class and party support and in terms of tenure and party support Further 
statistical analysis is needed to substantiate and quantify these findings and with 
particular regard to the determinants of support for the Liberal Party. 
It is desirable to establish convergent evidence not only to substantiate these findings, 
but also to exemplify how the methods of two supposedly incommensurable 
epistemoiogical perspectives can be employed to produce mutually reinforcing 
warrantable evidence concerning political phenomena of interest to both disciplines. 
With these intentions inferential statistical techniques wil l be used to try to 
corroborate the findings of the case studies. It is intended that the variables selected 
and the hypotheses formulated to assess the link between party support and contextual 
factors have a sound evidential and theoretical base in the above case studies and 
previous political science studies. 
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9.2 The Variables in the Data-Base 
In order to analyse the effects of contextual factors upon party support at local 
government elections a database that has combined ward level local electoral data and 
census data aggregated to ward level has been employed. To analyse these effects at 
parliamentary elections, constituency level electoral data and census data aggregated 
to constituency level has been combined. Three general categories of variables have 
been used - socio-economic, political and structural - and these same variables are 
used at ward, local authority and constituency levels of analysis in order to facilitate 
comparison of the extent of contextual effects on party support at different types of 
elections. 
The socio-economic variables have been derived from the 1961, 1966, 1971 and 1981 
censuses and have been combined with political data-sets that include local 
government elections in Birmingham, Sutton Coldfield, and inner-London 1959-1979, 
and the parliamentary elections in Birmingham, Sutton Coldfield and inner-London 
constituencies 1959-1979. Table 41 below outlines how each individual census has 
been matched with each particular election and is followed by Table 42 in which the 
socio-economic/demographic variables used are defined. An index of the cells used 
from each census in relation to each variable is outlined in Table A l in Appendix A. 
The use of census data to analyse change through time is however not without 
problems of comparability. There is of course concern over how effectively inter-
censal change can be captured on a decennial 'snapshot' in time basis. The use of the 
1966 census ameliorates this problem somewhat in regard to change in the 1960s. 
More critical is the fact that changes in the questions asked, definitions and 
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the same thing and whether the statistics cover the same physical area. The 
geographical base of the census changed between the 1971 and the 1981 surveys to 
correspond with the local govenunent reorganisation introduced in 1974 and 
subsequent ward boundary revisions. Consequently the geographical bases of 
enumeration districts and wards used for calculation of the Small Area Statistics at 
these respective censuses are not the same. However, the effect of this has been 
ameliorated in relation to upper-tier local elections and parliamentary elections by use 
of Small Area Statistics for 1971 aggregated to post-1974 boundaries and hence, 
comparability exists at county, local government area and constituency levels. To 
overcome this problem at ward level the Office of Population Census and Survey 
User Guide 84:Guide to Comparability 1971-8U England and Wales has been used. 
Although the guide does not cover the total output of these censuses 'many factors 
affecting ... Small Area Statistics comparability ... can be generalised to other forms 
of output' and researchers can 'identify comparable variables from their own SAS 
files', (User Guide 84: 1-2, Norris and Mousey 1983; 265-286). Hence, comparable 
cells and compounds of cells identified by the guide and by this researcher have been 
employed. 
A further issue of comparison of change over time concerns change in the definitions 
of occupations and thereby comparability o f socio-economic groups (SEGs) between 
censuses, and also therefore comparability between social class categories. The 
classification of occupations was changed for the 1981 census. Prior to 1981 persons 
in employment were classified to one of 17 categories based upon their occupation 
and the unemployed and retired classified on the basis of their most recent job. To 
overcome this problem and obtain reliable comparisons, combinations of SEGs have 
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been used (OPCS Census User's Guide 84: 56-57). Indeed, as Champion has advised 
'only a relatively broad grouping of SEGs can be compared with any confidence 
between 1971 and 1981'(Champion 1995:323). The six social class categories used in 
this study and the SEGs that comprise them are outlined in Table 42 above. The 
counts of the cells used to calculate these variables measure economically active or 
retired persons and are measures of individuals rather than heads of households as 
these have been shown to give the best predictions regarding socio-economic 
groupings (see Warde e/a/. 1983:343). 
The categories of social class used at the 1981 census are defined by assigning 
occupations of persons who are economically active and working or previous 
occupations for persons out of employment, permanently sick, or retired when stated, 
into the following groups: I = Professional occupations, I I = Intermediate occupations, 
ni N= Skilled occupations non-manual, IH M= Skilled occupations manual, rv= 
Partly skilled occupations, V= Unskilled occupations, VI= Armed Forces and 
Inadequately Described (no equivalent table exists for the 1971 census). Thus, 
the 1971 SEGs have been assigned to these 1981 categories. However, the 1981 
categories n and I I I N have been conflated to approximate a closer correspondence 
with the 1971 SEGs. 
Aggregation bias and ecological fallacy are somewhat more problematic. Aggregation 
bias is the phenomenon whereby the strength of a relationship between variables 
observed at one level of aggregate data can be exaggerated when the same variables 
are observed at a higher level of aggregation of the same data. For example the 
strength of the association at ward level may be inflated purely as result of 
aggregation of the data to a much larger unit of aggregation such as local authority or 
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constituency. Clearly the integrity of comparisons between upper and lower tier local 
electoral behaviour and their respective socio-economic/political/structural variables 
may be compromised, as would comparisons between local and parliamentary 
electoral behaviour. However, the expectation would be that at ward level in council 
elections, where the voter can register dissatisfaction concerning local issues and 
where decisions that affect the electorate directly are contested, the influence of 
contextual factors and thus the association between socio-economic/ political/ 
structural variables and voting behaviour would be stronger than at upper-tier local or 
constituency level parliamentary voting levels. 
Ecological fallacy is the mistaken assumption that relationships observed for groups 
necessarily apply to individuals in the group. An ecological fallacy is committed 
when one assumes that relationships observed at an aggregate level imply that the 
same relationships exist at the individual level. Ecological inference, that is, a 
conclusion about associations or causal relationships among individuals drawn on the 
basis of variables measured at an aggregated level can be misleading (Robinson 
1950, Goodman 1953 and 1959, Alker 1969, Miller 1995). Since Robinson's 
conclusion that ecological correlations cannot validly be used as substitutes for 
individual correlations (Robinson 1950: 357) studies across the ensuing decades have 
attempted to tackle the problem encountered by social researchers who use regression 
techniques on aggregated data and thereby commit an ecological fallacy when making 
inferences about individual level behaviour. Most famously King published a solution 
to the problem of ecological inference (King 1997). Nevertheless, critiques by 
Anselin (2000), McCue (2001), Anselin and Cho (2002) have pointed to flaws with 
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King's solution. Anselin has concluded that 'there is no solution to the ecological 
inference problem' (Anselin 2000; 589). 
This thesis has no recourse to individual level data and wil l make inferences from 
v^rd level aggregate voting behaviour and constituency level aggregate voting 
behaviour. However, as Jargowsky has concluded ' In the absence of data about 
individuals, one can derive estimates about individual relations only by carefully 
specifying models, and these assumptions must be guided by theory, experience and 
consistency with observable relations' (Jargowsky 2003: 16). It is hoped that the 
literature review, methodology and case studies approximate Jargowsky's criterion 
and thereby the inferences drawn from the regression analysis make the best possible 
use of the aggregate data. It is the belief of this author that analysis of aggregate level 
data can offer valuable evidence about and insights into individual electoral behaviour 
and, when corroborated by case study evidence or, deemed as counterintuitive by case 
study evidence, a closer approximation of individual level behaviour can be achieved 
by use of aggregated data. 
The political and structural variables used in this analysis are as follov^.-
CONVOTE = % share of the vote for the Conservative Party 
LABVOTE = % share of the vote for the Labour Party 
L I B VOTE = % share of the vote for the Liberal Party 
OTHVOTE = % share of the vote for the Other parties 
MGNLY = marginality scale [% lead of the winning party over the second placed 
party at the previous election calculated as :- majority<5%= very marginal (coded I ) , 
>5-10%= marginal (coded 2), >10-25%= reasonably safe (coded 3), >25-35% = safe 
(coded 4), >35%= very safe (coded 5) ] . 
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PPC = past political control (ward level and constituency level incumbency effect), 
dummy variable for each party model of support. 
COUNMAJ = party in control of council prior to election ( at constituency level, 
party of government at election) dummy variable for each party model of support. 
TURNOUT = % electorate vote 
MAJORITY = percentage vote lead of winning candidate over second placed 
candidate at previous comparable election. 
9.3 Outline of the core Model 
The aim of the analysis is to make inferences about party support at local government 
and parliamentary elections by measurement of aggregate level relationships between 
the level of party support and ward/constituency level socio-economic and political 
conditions. The analysis is based upon the assumption that the probability that support 
for a particular party in a given ward at local elections and in a given constituency at 
parliamentary elections is in part determined by the socio-economic and political 
environment of the ward or constituency that the election is held. It is intended that 
the analysis wil l not only add weight to the argument for the varying effect of socio-
economic context and local political environment at different types of elections but 
also impinge upon the class dealignment debate by indicating the effects of social 
class on party support at local government and parliamentary elections. 
9.4 Determination of Relevant and Irrelevant Variables 
Preliminary bivariate analysis investigated the strength and nature of the relationship 
between each individual independent variable and party support, using techniques of 
correlation and simple regression and identified the general trends in each 
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independent variable's relationship with the dependent variable. It was shown that 
there was much disparity in the influence o f many of the variables in the data set upon 
each party's level of support at different levels of political activity. However, 
coefficients produced by bivariate regression analysis can only give an indication of 
possible relationships because 'they give no indication of the direction of causality... 
they say nothing about vAnch variable causes the other to change', and indeed, 'there 
may be other measured or unmeasured variables affecting the result' (Field 2002:89-
90). In order to obtain a clearer idea of the relative influence of these variables at local 
and national elections, and to test whether support for a particular party in a particular 
area, was affected by the local socio-economic environment, the data was subject to 
multivariate regression analysis. A best fitting model for each party's support at each 
level of voting will allow comparison of the relative impact of our socio-economic 
indicators. 
Thus, in the next stage, multivariate analysis wi l l examine the nature and strength of 
the relationships between the socio-economic independent variables and the 
dependent variable and assess the effect of each when controlling for the influence of 
the other independent variables. Multivariate regression analysis tries to predict a 
single dependent variable (e.g. percentage total party support) from a range of 
predictor variables ( i n this instance our socio-economic variables). An indication of 
each predictor variable's relative importance can be achieved by relating the 
dependent variable to each predictor variable in turn, always controlling for the 
remaining predictor variables. Only those variables with a statistically significant 
contribution to make to the explanation of our outcome variable, party support, are 
included in the final equation, or model of party support. 
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The measure of the overall strength of the model, is given by the multiple correlation 
coefficient R, this shows the explanatory power of all the predictors that have been 
included in the model taken together. The R-squared statistic (R2) is the square of the 
multiple correlation coefficient (R) and when multiplied by 100 is converted to a 
percentage which explains the amount of variance in party support accounted for by 
the model. The tables in section 9.6 below present the best fitting models of party 
support for each party at municipal and parliamentary elections. The R2 value for 
each model is reported as are a number of relevant statistics relating to each of the 
significant predictors that make up that model. Multiple regression analysis provides a 
range of statistics that assess the relationship between predictors in the model and the 
outcome variable, (see Appendix C: Technical appendix, for explanation of 
regression). 
The beta values indicate the individual contribution of each predictor in the model and 
tell us about the relationship between each predictor and the outcome variable. Beta 
values represent the change in the outcome variable resulting from a unit change in a 
predictor variable. The beta values, i f positive, indicate a positive relationship 
between the predictor and the outcome variable (party support) and i f negative the 
converse. They also tell us to what degree each predictor effects the outcome (party 
support) i f the effects of all other predictors are held constant. The unstandardised 
beta value of a predictor can be used to calculate the degree to which that predictor 
effects the level of party support, i f the effects of the other predictors in the model are 
held constant. Thus, the unstandardised beta value of each significant predictor 
variable is reported in our tables which outline the best fitting models of each party's 
support at municipal and parliamentary elections. The unstandardised beta value 
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provides us with a comparable measure of the influence of a particular predictor at 
different types of elections and at the same elections in different periods. 
The unstandardised beta value has an associated standard error statistic which wil l 
also be reported. A t-test statistic, which when significant at p<0.05. indicates that the 
predictor is making a significant contribution to the model, is reported The magnitude 
of the t-test statistic is an additional indication of the relative impact of each predictor 
upon the outcome variable party support for a particular model. 
The final statistic to be reported in the cells of each significant predictor variable is 
perhaps the most useful; the standardised beta value. As it name suggests it is not 
dependent upon the units of measurement of a predictor. Al l standardised beta values 
are measured in standard deviations and not only inform us of the number of standard 
deviations the outcome variable will change as a result of one standard deviation 
change in the predictor, but also, make all predictors in a model comparable as they 
are expressed in the same unit of measurement. Thus, comparison can legitimately be 
made between the relative impact of different predictors within a model, and between 
the same predictor's relative impact at different elections. Of course the SPSS 
programme carries out all of this computation. 
Using stepwise regression the independent variables are entered one at a time into the 
regression equation according to their explanatory importance. At each step the 
variable that accounts for the largest proportion of variance not explained by the 
variables already in the equation is entered. This iterative process continues until the 
significance of any remaining variables precludes them ft-om the equation. Identical 
regression analyses, using each party's percentage share of the vote as the dependent 
variable and the socio-economic as the independent variables, will be employed at 
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both local and parliamentary levels of voting and provide an indication of the relative 
importance of the independent variables in explaining the variation in party support at 
different levels of electoral behaviour. Comparative analysis of the influence o f these 
independent variables at different types of elections wil l reveal any cross-level voting 
disparities. I f the beta coefficient of a particular independent predictor is greater at the 
lower-tier electoral level than at either the upper-tier or the parliamentary level then 
we could conclude that even with the exaggerating effect of aggregation bias that the 
indicator shows cross-level electoral disparity and evidence of voting on different 
criteria at local and parliamentary elections. An even stronger indication of the 
effects, i f any, of socio-economic environment would be provided by the inversion of 
a particular coefficient from a negative to a positive relationship, or vice versa at 
different types of elections. 
In further analyses, in chapter 10, the role of political/structural variables will be 
examined by use of logistic regression. An explanation of why we are prevented from 
using the same statistical techniques as employed above will be outlined in section 
10.1. 
9.5 HvDotheses 
The premise of each model is that the probability of support for a particular party in a 
given ward at local elections and in a given constituency at parliamentary elections is 
significandy affected by the socio-economic and political environment of the ward or 
constituency that the election is held. Percentage share of the total vote i.e. party 
support will be used as the dependent variable, measures of the socio-
economic/political characteristics of the electoral unit the votes were cast in wi l l be 
used as independent variables, and identical regression analyses wil l be used at 
municipal and parliamentary electoral level. 
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The formal statement of the models to be used in regression analyses of the effects of 
socio-economic/demographic conditions upon support for each party at ward level 
and at local authority level in relation to lower- and upper-tier local government 
elections and at constituency level in relation to parliamentary elections are as 
follows:-
Probability that the percentage support in a given ward at time t for the Conservative 
(or Labour, or Liberal) Party at a lower-tier municipal election = f [ ward level 
characteristics (socio-economic)] 
Probability that the percentage support in a given ward at time t for the Conservative 
(or Labour, or Liberal) Party at an upper-tier municipal election f [local authority 
level characteristics (socio-economic)] 
Probability that the percentage support in a given ward at time t for the Conservative 
(or Labour, or Liberal) Party at a parliamentary election = f [constituency 
characteristics (socio-economic)] 
The specific hypotheses to be tested are :-
H I : There is no difference between the effects upon party support of individual socio-
economic characteristics of an electoral unit at different types of elections. 
H2 : There is no significant difference between the effects upon party support of 
individual political/structural variables of an electoral unit at different types of 
elections. 
H3: There is no variance in the effects upon party support of individual socio-
economic indicators over time between the decades of the 1960s and 1970s at the 
same or at different types of election. 
H4 There is no significant association between the odds of a party winning a 
municipal ward election and past party political control of a ward at the previous 
election. 
H5 There is no significant association between the odds of a party winning a 
municipal ward election and party political control of the council at the time of that 
election. 
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H6 There is no significant association between party support and household amenity 
variables 
H7: There was no significant weakening o f class aligrunent behind the two major 
parties at municipal elections in Birmingham and Itmer-London elections from its 
level in the 1960s to that in the 1970s. 
Having outlined how the data has been collected, the characteristics of the data, the 
hypotheses to be tested and how the data wi l l be analysed, the findings of the analysis 
vAW now be reported below. 
9.6 Multivariate regression analysis Birmingham and Inner London elections 
A best-fitting regression model of support for each party at each level of electoral 
activity is presented in the tables below, the table includes the number of cases and 
the R-squared coefficient for each model. In the cells of each significant predictor, the 
unstandardised beta value (UB coefficient hereafter), its standard error, the t-test 
statistic, and the standardised beta value (SB coefficient hereafter) can be found. A 
report on how the data met the assumptions of the regression analysis presented in 
Table 43 can be found in Appendix B, as can a report of the best fitting model for 
Conservative Party support at lower-tier Birmingham elections. For those unfamiliar 
with statistics a technical appendix that describes the methods used in the thesis is 
included as Appendix C. The technical appendix is also intended to serve as a 
glossary of terms. Hereafter only the parameters of the best fitting model for each 
party at each level of electoral activity wi l l be presented in the tables below. 
Birmingham 
Table 43 below outlines the best fitting models of each party's level of support at 
Birmingham municipal and parliamentary elections, 1959-1979. The best fitting model 
for Labour Party support at lower-tier municipal elections has an R-square of .52 and thus 
the model can account for 52% of the variation in Labour Party support at these elections. 
The regression models of the upper-tier Birmingham elections and Birmingham 
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parliamentary elections could respectively account for 6 1 % and 76% of the variation 
in support for the Labour party at these elections. The regression model of support for 
the Labour Party at lower-tier municipal 1959 to 1979 evidences the significance of both 
class and socio-economic group predictors; UB coefiBcients -0.9 NON-MANUAL and 
+0.6 SOCIAL CLASS 4, and also highlights the importance of household amenity 
indicators to the explanation of Labour Party support. With a positive UB coefficient 
of+0.84 the predictor SHARE INSIDE WC evidences the significance of housing 
conditions upon the calculus of the voter at these elections. Revealingly, with a UB 
coefficient of + 1.8, room density, RD>1-1.5, is strongly and positively associated 
with support for the Labour Party at the lower-tier, although the most overcrowded 
households indicated by RD>1.5 are clearly and strongly negatively associated with 
support for the party at this level, UB -1.2. Indeed, for every percentage increase in 
RD>1.5, support for the Labour Party diminished by 1.2%. Clearly, the greater the 
number of overcrowded dwellings in a ward the greater the erosion of Labour support 
in that ward, indeed the variable SHARE DWELLING is also negatively associated 
with support for the Labour Party at these lower-tier elections. The standardised beta 
coefficients of SHARE DWELLING, RD> 1-1.5, SHARE INWC, -.36,-.31 and .31 
are almost of the magnitude of the SB coefficient for NON-MANUAL of -.4, and 
confirm the relative importance of housing conditions in regard to explanation of the 
variance in support for the Labour Party at these elections. 
It was, as evidenced in the Ladywood case study, in such inner-city wards of 
Birmingham with their dire housing conditions that Labour's support was eroded and 
an electoral opportunity for the Liberals opened up. The models of Labour support in 
Table 43 also evidence the variability of the effect of turnout at different types of 
elections upon support for the Labour Party. Mobilisation of support was much more 
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difficult at the upper-tier level than the lower-tier level, UB coefficient -.99 and +1.4 
respectively, and although to a lesser degree at the parliamentary level the UB 
coefficient of -.49 indicates that for every percentage decrease in TURNOUT at 
parliamentary elections in Birmingham 1959-1979, Labour support diminished by 
0.5%. 
In contrast at the lower-tier and even more so at the upper-tier elections support for 
the Liberal Party was positively related to TURNOUT, increasing by 0.83% at the 
lower-tier and 1.37% at the upper-tier, for every percentage increase in the indicator. 
As far as household amenities were concerned Liberal Party support at the lower-tier 
was positively associated with the indicator SHARE/LACK HOT WATER, a UB 
coefficient of +0.26 indicating that support increased by 0.3% for every percentage 
increase in the number of dwellings that shared or lacked a hot water supply. Clearly, 
the Liberal's campaign focus upon housing conditions in Birmingham's inner-city 
wards reaped some reward at lower-tier elections as already evidenced in the 
Ladywood case study. Cross level variability in the influence of indicators was 
apparent when SOCIAL CLASS 4 was considered. At the lower-tier elections 
SOCL\L CLASS 4 is negatively related to Liberal Party support, UB -1.0, yet at the 
parliamentary level the bonds of class and party alignment were somewhat loosened 
and a positive UB coefficient +0.8 indicates that support for the Liberal Party 
increased by 0.8% for every percentage increase in SOCL\L CLASS 4. The 
regression models of Liberal Party support, reflect the difficulty of assessing its 
determinants and could only account for 33%, 40% and 53% of the variation in 
support for the party at lower-tier, upper-tier and parliamentary elections respectively 
(R-square figures Liberal support Table 43). Nevertheless, at the lower-tier level the 
SB coefficient + .4 for SHARELACKHOTWATER was of the same magnitude as 
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TURNOUT, +.44, a variable generally recognised as having a clear association with 
Liberal Party support. 
Table 43 A comparison of the regression coefTicients for best fitting models of party support and 
socio-economic variables (turnout included), at Birmingham, lower-tier municipal, upper-tier 
municipal and parliamentary constituency elections 1959-1979 Statistics in each significant 
variable ceil: unstandardised beta coefficient, standard error in square brackets, t- statistic, and 
standard beta in round brackets. P<0.05 
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Further evidence of variability in the influence of socio-economic indicators 
dependent upon electoral context is provided in Table 43 when the models of support 
for the Conservative Party are examined. The models accounted for 64%, 58% and 
67% of the variation in support for the Conservative Party at lower-, upper-tier and 
pariiamentary electoral levels respectively. The indicator JUNIOR NON-MANUAL 
had a much stronger relationship with Conservative support at the upper-tier than the 
lower-tier municipal elections, which accords with the Birmingham case studies' 
evidence of partisan dealignment at lower-tier council elections in the Conservative 
suburban strongholds and increased support for Liberal candidates, and illustrates the 
significance of contextuality in the calculus of the Conservative Party supporter. 
In addition the magnitude of the SB coefficient for SHARE DWELLING was almost 
as strong as the SB coefficients for NON-MANUAL, a generally recognised socio-
economic variable associated with support for the party. Clearly, as much of the 
variance in support for the Conservative Party at lower-tier elections can be accounted 
for this measure and illustrates the importance that housing conditions had in relation 
to Conservative Party support at council elections in Birmingham. 
In Tables 44,45 and 46 below, the regression coefficients for the best fitting models 
of each party's support at Birmingham elections, contrasting the decades of the 1960s 
and 1970s is outlined. All socio-economic indicators and the variable TURNOUT 
were analysed. Table 44, outlines the models of Conservative Party support. There are 
unfortunately, few points of comparison between models, although one could interpret 
this as evidence of variability in cross-level electoral influence and variability 
be^veen the decades. What is evidenced, however, is that OWNER-OCCUPCER had a 
much stronger relationship with support for the Conservatives at the parliamentary 
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level than at the municipal electoral levels in the 1970s. Indicating the importance of 
electoral context in relation to Conservative support and corroborating the findings of 
the case study evidence of class-party dealignment at the lower-tier council elections, 
especially in the 1970s. Indeed, for every standard deviation unit increase in 
OWNER-OCCUPEER in a ward at lower-tier elections Conservative party support 
increased by 0.3 standard deviations, i f the effects of the other variables are held 
constant, whereas, at the upper-tier elections in the same wards the SB coefficient 
evidences a 0.24 increase in support for every standard deviation increase in 
OWNER-OCCUPIER. 
Table 44: A comparison of the regression coefficients for best fitting models of Conservative 
Party support and socio-economic variables (turnout included), controlling for decade at 
Birmingham, lower-tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and pariiamentary constituency 
elections 1959-1979.Statistics in each significant variable cell: unstandardised beta coefTicient, 
standard error in square brackets, t- statistic and standard beta in round brackets. P<O.OS 
Party Conservative 
1959-1972 
Conservative 
1973-1979 
Electoral level Lower-Tier PARL Lower-Tier Upper-Tier PARL 
N = 542 52 126 126 36 
R square = .60 .67 .83 .59 .80 
CONSTANT 121.6 48.0 37.4 58.4 61.2 
Owner-Occupiers .28 |.04| 
t=7.9 (J) 
.29 (.051 
t=5.7 ( J l ) 
.24 (.071 
t=3.4(.24) 
.48 (.09( 
t=5.5 (.47) 
Council 
Rented 
-30 (.061 
t=-4 J (-.4) 
Junior Non-
Manual 
2.44 (31 
t=8 J (.6) 
Non-Manual 1.1 I.I9I 
t=5.9(.56) 
.48 (.11( 
t=4.5 (.26) 
Manual -.90 |0.6I 
t=-15.7 (-.6) 
-.78 (.11( 
t=-6.9 (-.6) 
AFID -.15|.I2| 
t=-12.1 (-.4) 
-.70 |.22| 
t=.33 (-2.8) 
Social class 5 -1.26 (J8| 
t=-3 J (-.29) 
Share inside WC .63 |.07| 
t=8.6 (.24) 
Share/Lock Hot 
Water 
-3S (.081 
t=-4.6 
(-.26) 
Turnout -.56 (.08) 
t=-6.7 (-.22) 
The beta coefficients for OWNER-OCCUPATION at the lower-tier elections in the 
60s and 70s are remarkably stable, as are the beta coefficients at the upper-tier level in 
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the 70s and for the whole period (1959-1979 in Table 43). Similar stability is 
evidenced, albeit in a much stronger association, by the indicator JUNIOR NON-
MANUAL, when its coefficients for 1970s at upper-tier and for the whole period are 
compared (1959-1979 in Table 43). It would seem with a UB coefficient of 2.44 that 
this socio-economic group were solidly aligned with support for the Conservatives at 
the upper-tier West Midland County Council electoral level. The significance of 
tenure and socio-economic class are evidenced by the R-square statistics in the 
regression models of support for the Conservatives at lower-tier and parliamentary 
elections from 1973 to 1979 that show the models account for 83% and 80% 
respectively of the variation in support for the party at these elections. Furthermore, 
the significance of measures of housing conditions in relation to Conservative Party 
support at lower-tier elections in both decades is evidenced, notwithstanding the fact 
that SHAREINWC was positively associated in the 1960s and SHARE/LACKHOT 
WATER negatively associated in the 1970s. 
Table 45 contains the regression coefficients for the best fitting models of Labour 
Party support at these Birmingham elections, controlling for decade. The variable 
SOC 2/3N, made up of skilled non-manual workers, was, as expected, strongly 
negatively associated with support for the Labour Party at lower-tier elections in both 
decades, albeit to a lesser degree in the 1970s and thus there is little evidence of class-
party dealignment among SOC 2/3N between the decades. In contrast, it is clear that 
manual workers had a much stronger relationship with support for the Labour Party at 
the lower-tier electoral level in the 1960s than in the 1970s, evidencing a degree of 
class-party dealignment, as has been shown in the Ladywood case study. The UB 
coefficient for the 1960s indicates that for every percentage increase in the indicator 
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MANUAL WORKER, Ubour Party support had increased by 1.7% at lower-tier 
elections in the 1960s, but during the 1970s this had slumped to 0.45%, a fall reflected 
also in the decline in the relative contribution of the predictor MANUAL to the model 
of Labour support, as evidenced by an SB coefficient of 1.3 in the 1960s and 0.33 in 
the 1970s. 
Clues to an explanation of the dealignment evidenced by the variable MANUAL lie 
perhaps with other indicators. The category SHARED DWELLING had a negative 
relationship with support for Labour at the parliamentary electoral level in the 1960s 
shown by a, UB coefficient of-1.87. The expectation would be that in the main 
Labour's natural constituency would encompass much of the electorate categorised as 
living in shared dwellings in that period. Once again the evidence corroborates that of 
the Birmingham case study of the Ladywood constituency with its high percentage of 
multi-occupancy dwellings and Labour's support declining in the 1960s. 
Furthermore, SOCIAL CLASS 5. the unskilled workers, no doubt a large component 
of those that lived in shared dwellings, registered a UB coefficient of-1.9 at the 
lower-tier in the 1960s, and a -1.62 coefficient at the parliamentary level throughout 
the whole 1959-1979 period (see Table 43). Thus, for every percentage increase in 
SOCIAL CLASS 5, Labour Party parliamentary support in Birmingham fi-om 1959 
tol979 diminished by 1.62%, however at the lower-tier level in the 1960s by 1.9%. 
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Table 45: A comparison of the regression coeflicients for best fitting models of Labour Party 
support and socio-economic variables (turnout included), controlling for decade at Birmingham 
lower-tier municipal, uppei^tier municipal and parliamentary constituency elections 1959-
1979.Statistics in each significant variable cell: unstandardised beta coeflicient, standard error 
in square brackets, t- statistic, and standard beta in round brackets. P<0.05 
Party Labour 
1959-1972 
Labour 
1972-1979 
Electoral level Lower-Tier PARL Lower-Tier Upper-Tier PARL 
N = 542 52 249 126 36 
R square = .51 .65 .58 .60 .84 
CONSTANT -18.8 -17.1 38.2 913 100.5 
Council 
Raited 
0.01 |.02| 
t=3.6 (.13) 
Rented 
Furnished 
2.1 1.51] 
t=4.1 (1.2) 
Non-Manual -.96 (.13) 
t=-7.2 (-.51) 
-1.00 |.11| 
t=-9.5 (-.7) 
Manual 1.70 |.12| 
t=15.6(lJ) 
.99 |.13| 
t=7.8(1.05) 
.45 [.09] 
t=4.8 (33) 
Social class 2/3N -.90 [.08] 
t=-11.6 (-.7) 
-.72 1.12] 
t=-6.8 (-.47) 
Social class 5 -1.9 |.21| 
t=-8.8 (-.54) 
Share Dn'elling -1.87 | J 5 | 
t=-5.4(l.6) 
BoraXUK M 1.111 
t=3.1 (.2) 
Turnout -.99 (.25) 
t - 4 (-.27) 
-^4 l.lj 
.t=.5.5 (-.41) 
The sources of class dealignment in Labour Party support in the 1970s are indicated 
by the best fitting models of Liberal Party support at these Birmingham elections 
shown in Table 46 below. Social class 5 was positively related with support for the 
Liberal Party at upper-tier elections, with a UB coefficient of+1.04, and SOCIAL 
CLASS 4 negatively associated. UB coefficient -1.0 at the lower-tier level in the 
1970s but positively associated, +0.8, at the parliamentary level throughout the 
period 1959-1979. Clearly, there was much volatility in the patterns of party support 
amongst these classes dependent upon type of election. In addition there was also a 
positive relationship, UB coefFicient +0.67, between the household amenity variable 
SHARE/LACK HOT WATER at the lower-tier elections in the 1960s, +0.42 in the 
1970s, and a stronger positive association of + 1.72 at the upper-tier in the 1970s. 
Again the evidence corroborates that found by the case study of Ladywood of the 
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importance of housing conditions in any explanation of the revival of Liberal Party 
support at municipal elections in these inner-city wards. 
The percentage of variation in Liberal Party support accounted for by each of the 
regression models in Table 46, as revealed by the R-square statistics, is not as large as 
the preceding models of support for the two major parties. Nevertheless, they account 
for a remarkable amount of that variation. 
Table 46: A comparison of the regression coefTicients for best fitting models of Liberal Party 
support and socio-economic variables (turnout included), controlling for decade at Birmingham, 
lower-tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and pariiamentary constituency elections 1959-1979. 
Liberal Party contested only. Statistics in each significant variable cell: regression coefficient, 
standard error in square brackets, t- statistic, and standard beta in round brackets. P<0.05 
Parly Liberal 1959-1972 Liberal 1973-1979 
Electoral le^d Lower-Tier PARL Lower-Tier Upper>T(er PARL 
N = 245 12 100 71 30 
R square = J 2 .66 .52 .40 .54 
CONSTANT -10.0 3.2 18.7 -33.6 30.5 
Owner-Occupiera -.51 (.071 
t=-7.7 (-.8) 
-.37 (.09] 
t='-4.l (-.49) 
Council 
Rented 
.29 (.07) 
t=4.4 (.81) 
AFID .55 [.16] 
t=3.4 (.22) 
Social class 2/3N ^55 (0.1] 
(=-5.7 (-.74) 
Social class 4 -.78 (.19] 
l='-4.l (-J7) 
Social class S 1.04 (.38] 
(=2.7 (.29) 
Share/Lack Hot 
Water 
.67 Ml 
1=6.9 (1.1) 
.42 1.08] 
t=5.5 (.43) 
1.71 1.35] 
(=4.9 (.53) 
BoraXUK 1.15 (.231 
t=4.9 (.83) 
Turnout .78 (.131 
(=6.2 (.43) 
RD = >1.5 -3.15 {.8) 
t=^.9 (-.8) 
The investigation of the effects of socio-economic environment upon electoral 
behaviour will now consider lower-tier elections in the case study location of Sutton 
Coldfield from 1959 to 1972. Problems of small sample size preclude analysis of 
Sutton Coldfield's parliamentary electoral data in isolation, as it has precluded that of 
Labour Party support at its lower-tier elections. However, multivariate analysis of 
Conservative and Liberal support is set out in Table 47 below. The best fitting model 
of Conservative Party support accounts for 57% of the variation in support at lower-
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tier elections and has shown both OWNER-OCCUPATION and COUNCIL-
RENTED to be positively associated with support for the party. Indeed, that support 
increased by 0.4% for every percentage increase of either of the two indicators and 
reflects the findings of the Sutton Coldfield case study of class-party dealignment 
among ostensibly Labour supporting council tenants. Conservative Party support was 
positively associated with the majority held by the winning candidate at the previous 
election and rose by 0.5% for every percentage increase in the predictor MAJORITY. 
Indeed, the magnitude of the SB coefficient for the predictor MAJORITY is equal to 
that of the predictor OWNER-OCCUPIER, both +0.59. The only dark cloud on the 
lower-tier electoral horizon in this overwhelmingly Conservative borough appeared to 
be located in the manual working class. The coefficient for MANUAL was negatively 
related and for every percentage increase reduced Conservative support by 0.3%. 
However, this was not the only source of potential threat to the Conservative 
hegemony over council elections in Sutton Coldfield. 
As the best fitting model of Liberal Party support evidences (43% of variation 
accounted for), there was considerable class-party dealignment among the socio-
economic group JUNIOR NON-MANUAL. The coefficient for this predictor was 
positively associated with Liberal Party support and for every percentage increase. 
Liberal Party support increased by 1.2% and corroborates the findings of the Sutton 
Coldfield case study of a significant protest vote among erstwhile Conservative 
supporters in respect of the level rates and local issues at these lower-tier council 
elections. These findings accord with those of municipal elections in Birmingham 
wards outlined above, where JUNIOR NON-MANUAL's support for the 
Conservative Party has been shown to vary across different types of elections. 
Furthermore, the evidence that housing conditions were a factor in the voting calculus 
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of a part of the Sutton Coldfield electorate when it came to Liberal Party support was 
provided by the predictor S/LBATH which registered a UB coefficient of +.96. an 
increase of .96% in Liberal support for every percentage increase in S/LBATH. This 
substantiates the findings of the case study of a shift in support away fi-om Labour to 
the Liberals in the wards or parts of Sutton wards with poor housing conditions. 
Nevertheless, Liberal Party support at these council elections was it seems conditional 
upon the size of the majority held by the winning candidate over the second placed 
candidate at the previous ward election. As Table 47 shows, the predictor 
MAJORITY had a UB coefficient of -.32, a negative association with support for the 
Liberal Party, thus for every pjercentage increase in the majority of the winning 
candidate at the previous election Liberal support diminished by 0.3% at Sutton 
Coldfield council elections. These findings reflect the Sutton Coldfield Liberal Party's 
campaign strategy of contesting on a narrow electoral front and targeting marginal 
wards where some local issue was fulminating and electoral discontent high (see 
Chapter 6, section 6.4). 
Like the inner-city wards of Birmingham, support for the Liberal Party, even in a 
borough that epitomised suburban Conservatism, was in part associated with housing 
conditions. Additionally, and of much more significance, one of the mainstays of 
Conservative Party support, the socio-economic group JUNIOR NON-MANUAL, at 
these lower-tier municipal elections, displayed a large degree of class-party 
dealignment. However, the source of this dissatisfaction was perhaps located in other 
aspects of housing, those of levels of rates/council rents, unwelcome housing 
developments and interest rates in general. Whether such electoral phenomena, as 
outlined above, were (peculiar to Birmingham and Sutton Coldfield, or more general, 
will now be assessed by multi-regression analysis of the inner-London data. 
304 
Table 47: A comparison of the regression coefTicients Tor best fitting models or Conservative 
Party and Liberal Party support and socio-economic variables, (turnout and majority included, 
all wards Conservative, Liberal Party, contested wards only) at Sutton ColdPield lower-tier 
municipal elections,1959-1972. Statistics in each signincant variable cell: regression coefTicient, 
standard error in square brackets, t- statistic, and standard beta in round brackets.P <0.05 
Party Conservative 
1959-1972 
Liberal 
1959-1972 
Electoral level Lower -Tier Lower- Tier 
N = 104 93 
R square = ^7 .43 
CX)NSTANT 18.4 13.7 
Owncr-Occupicrs .42 I.12I t=3.6 (.59) * 
Council Rented .42 1.091 t=4S (.65) ft 
Manual -.25 1.111 t = -2J (-.23) * 
Majority .47 1.051 t=8.4 (.59) -J2 1.061 t=-4.9 (-.4) 
Share/Lack Bath * .95 |.19| t=S2 (.43) 
Junior Non-Manual • 1.2 11.21 t=3.4 (.28) 
Inner-London 
In Table 48 below, a best fitting regression model of support for each party at each 
level of electoral activity in Inner-London 1959-1979 is presented. The models of 
Conservative Party support evidence cross level variability in the electoral influence 
of the predictor NON-MANUAL. At the upper-tier municipal elections support for 
the Conservative Party by this socio-economic group was much more strongly related 
than at the lower-tier level and the parliamentary level. This pattern was mirrored in 
the negative relationships between NON-MANUAL and support for the Labour Party 
which was much more intense at the upper-tier, UB coefficient -1.23, than at the 
lower-tier, -.21. Clearly, electoral context may have had some influence upon the 
relationship between support for the Conservative Party and the NON-MANUAL 
sector. In contrast, the relationship between SOCIAL CLASS 4 and support for the 
Conservative Party was stable across different types of elections and registered UB 
coefficients of-.92 at the lower-tier and -.97 at the parliamentary levels. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that the room density indicator RD>1-1.5 was negatively associated with 
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support for the Conservative Party, nevertheless, there was a large disparity in the 
influence of this variable between the lower-tier municipal and the parliamentary 
electoral levels. As evidenced in the Islington case study the electorate was in no 
doubt that the institution responsible for its housing ills was the borough council and 
could show its dissatisfaction at lower-tier elections. Indeed, as the best fitting model 
for Labour Party support at these London elections 1959-1979 reveals, both the NON 
MANUAL and the JUNIOR NON MANUAL coefficients in relation to Labour Party 
support show that theses socio-economic groups were much less disinclined towards 
Labour support at the lower-tier than the upper-tier council elections. Indeed, the SB 
coefficient at lower-tier evidences that for every standard deviation increase in NON-
MANUAL support for the Labour Party decreased by 0.13 standard deviations, 
whereas at the upper-tier decreased by 0.64 standard deviations. 
In Table 48 the UB coefficients of + .93 and +.92 respectively for social classes 4 and 
5 reveal a solid level of support among these classes for the Labour Party at the 
parliamentary electoral level, as does the coefficient for the socio-economic group 
MANUAL at the lower-tier level. Furthermore, the predictor TURNOUT was 
positively associated with Labour support at the lower-tier borough electoral level as 
was the household amenity predictor NO INSIDE WC. Nevertheless, as the best 
model of Liberal Party support at the lower-tier evidences there was a positive 
association between social class 4 and support for the Liberals at London borough 
elections 1959-1979, indeed, as shown in Table 50 below, in the 1970s there was a 
negative association, UB coefficient -.38 between social class 4 and support for 
Labour at lower-tier elections. 
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Table 48: A comparison of the regression coefTicients for best fltting models of party support and 
socio-economic variables (turnout included) at Inner-London lower-tier municipal, upper-tier 
municipal and pariiamentary constituency elections, 1959-1979.Statistics in each signincant 
variable cell: unstandardised beta coefficient, standard error in square brackets, 
t- statistic, and standard beta in round brackets. P<O.OS 
Party Conservative Labour Liberal 
Electoral level Lower 
Tier 
Upper 
Tier 
PARL Lower 
Tier 
Upper 
Tier 
PARL Lower 
Tier 
Upper 
Tier 
PARL 
N = 966 132 236 935 156 236 692 77 148 
R square = .48 .83 .63 JSl .82 .62 .13 .41 .69 
CONSTANT S4.6 -17.2 41.4 24.9 105.0 58.1 17.1 17.9 113.5 
Council 
Rented 
-.28 (.02 ( 
(=-11.6 
(-3) 
Junior Non-
Manual 
1.6 (.19] 
t=8.1 
(.43) 
.97 [.19] 
t=5.l 
(34) 
-.37 [.10] 
t=^.7 
(-14) 
-1.39 (.17] 
(=-7.9 
(-35) 
-.22 (.071 
(=5.9 
(.23) 
Non-Manual .46 [.05] 
(=9.1 
(.27) 
1.0 
( = 9.9 
(.53) 
.62 (.121 
(=5.4 
(.44) 
2^1 (.071 
t=-3.l 
(-13) 
-1.23 (.08] 
(=-14.8 
(-64) 
-.74 [.12] 
(=-6.4 
(-45) 
-1.53 (.011 
(=-15.5 
(-1.1) 
Manual .63 (.05] 
( = a i 
FAGW 1.7 [31] 
( = 5.2 
(.19) 
AFID -.63 (.081 
(=-7.2 
(-.78) 
-1.25 (J8] 
(=-3.3 
(-48) 
Social class 
2/3N 
6^9 (.141 
(=5.1 
(-67) 
-.47 (.09] 
t=-5.2 
(-46) 
-.81 (.15) 
(=-5.6 
(-89) 
Social class 4 -.92 (.10] 
t = -9.5 
(-.26) 
-.97 (.281 
(=-3.5 
(-44) 
.93 (.271 
(=3.5 
(.38) 
.39 (.071 
t=-3.5 
(-13) 
Social class S .92 (.251 
(=3.7 
(.28) 
Share Duelling -.13 [.04] 
(=-3.2 
(-12) 
Share/Lack 
Bath 
.10 (.03] 
(=3.6 
(.18) 
Share/Lack Hot 
Water 
-.20 (.05] 
(=-4.1 
(-44) 
No Inside WC .29 (.05] 
(=5.7 
(.14) 
RD>I-1.5 -6.8 (.13] 
t«-5.2 
(-13) 
-1.2 [.42| 
t=-2.9 
(-2) 
Turnout .23 [.06] 
(=3.8 
(.11) 
It is clear from Table 48 that social-ciass, socio-economic group and housing 
conditions were important factors in any explanation of support for the two major 
parties at these elections and that there was variance in voting behaviour at different 
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levels of electoral activity within what are considered the natural constituents of the 
two major parties. These findings accord especially with those of the Camden case 
study of the mixed electoral fortunes of the two major parties at different levels of 
voting behaviour in the three former metropolitan boroughs that made up Camden 
after 1964 (see Chapter 8. section 8.2). 
In Table 49 below, the best fitting regression models of Conservative Party support at 
these Inner-London elections contrasted by decade are presented. Once more the 
socio-economic groups, NON-MANUAL and JUNIOR NON-MANUAL play a 
significant role in the explanation of Conservative Party support. It is, however, 
apparent that the relationships between these socio-economic groups and support for 
the Conservatives differed over the decades. Support was in both decades much 
stronger at the upper-tier level than at the lower-tier and parliamentary levels in the 
1960s. At lower-tier elections in the 1960s for every standard deviation increase in 
JUNIOR NON-MANUAL in a ward support for the Conservative Party increased by 
0.23 standard deviations, whereas at the lower-tier in the 1970s by 0.1 standard 
deviations. 
In contrast the coefficients for NON-MANUAL at the parliamentary level are much 
strengthened in the 1970s and evidence a realignment rather than a dealignment of 
support for the Conservatives in this socio-economic group at the pariiamentary 
electoral level. At the parliamentary level in the 1960s for every standard deviation 
increase in NON-MANUAL in a constituency Conservative Party support increased 
by 0.42 standard deviations, whereas at the pariiamentary level in the 1970s it 
increased by 1.3 standard deviations. It is also apparent that the negative relationship 
between RD>1-1.5 and Conservative Party support at the lower-tier level was much 
more pronounced in the 1970s than in the 1960s, a trend reflected in SOCL\L CLASS 
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Table 49: A comparison of the regression coefTicients for best Titting models of Conservative 
Party support and socio-economic variables (turnout included), controlling for decade at Inner-
London lower-tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and parliamentary constituency elections, 
1959-1979. Statistics in each significant variable cell: unstandardised beta coeflicient, standard 
error in square brackets, t- statistic, and standard beta in round brackets. P< 0.05 
Party Conservative 
1959-1970 
Cooservath'e 
1971-1979 
Electoral level Lower 
Tier 
Upper 
Tier 
PARL Lower 
Tier 
Upper 
Tier 
PARL 
N = 497 120 168 469 48 103 
R square = .65 .84 .54 .72 .78 .64 
CONSTANT 68.9 •12.0 20.6 64.6 •28.0 -21.7 
Council 
Rented 
-.19 |.03| 
t=-5.7 
(-.18) 
-.25 (.031 
t=-8.5 
(-3) 
J Non-Manual .69 |.13] 
e=s.4 
(.23) 
1.53 (.21 
1=7.9 
(.43) 
.24 [.06| 
t=3.9 
(.11) 
1.62 t.34| 
(=4.8 
(.34) 
1.75 (.28) 
(=6J 
(^2) 
Non-Manual .201-08] 
t=2-5 
(.11) 
1.07 (.10) 
t=10.3 
.571.131 
t=4.6 
(.42) 
1.34 (.13] 
t= 10.4 
(.74) 
1.82 (.17) 
(=11.0 
( I J ) 
AFID -43 |.I6] 
t=-2.7 
(.11) 
Social class 2/3N ^47 [.08| 
t=-5.8 
(-.29) 
-1.16 [ .22] 
t=-5.4 
(-73) 
Social class 3 .85 (.21 
*=4.3 
(.37) 
Social class 4 -.18 [.16| 
t=-7.2 
(-32) 
-73 {.111 
t=-6.5 
(-2) 
Social class 5 -.81 |.26) 
(=-3.1 
(-29) 
Share/Lack Bath -.17 |.04| 
t=-4.2 
(-.14) 
Shore inside WC .21 (.05) 
t=4.6 
(.18) 
RD>I-I.5 ^791.181 
t=-4.5 
(-18) 
-2.57 1.23) 
t=U.2 
(-4) 
Turaoul 311.08) 
t=3.8 
(-2) 
4 whose negative association with support for the Conservatives also increased in 
intensity in the 1970s, thereby adding weight to the evidence in both London case 
studies of the continued electoral salience of housing at 1970s London borough 
elections (see Chapter 7,section 7.8 and Chapter 8, section 8.10). 
The models of party support in Table 50 make comparisons between the decades in 
relation to Labour Party support. The variable MANUAL indicates that the 1970s was 
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a period of realigrmient at the upper-tier municipal and parliamentary electoral level 
of Labour's traditional core vote rather than one of dealignment At upper-tier 
elections in the 1960s the UB coefficient for MANUAL was +1.05, and in the 1970s 
this had almost doubled to +1.88. Yet, at municipal elections in the 1970s SOCIAL 
CLASS 4 and Labour Party support had a strong negative relationship, UB 
coefficient -1.49 at the upper-tier, -.38 at the lower-tier and SOCIAL CLASS 6 a 
negative association of-1.1 at the parliamentary level. The general socio-economic 
category MANUAL clearly masks subtle differences in the strength of the individual 
relatioitships between its component categories of class. For a part of the Labour 
Party's traditional core vote among the working class of London the 1970s was a 
period of dealignment Interestingly, as with Birmingham, the indicator RD>1-1.5 
was a strong positive indicator of Labour support at the lower-tier in the 1970s.. 
Room density, it would appear, was an important issue in favour of Labour support in 
the 1970s and reflects the findings of both London case studies as to the continued 
salience of housing as a borough electoral issue. Indeed, at the lower-tier elections in 
the 1960s for every standard deviation increase in COUNCIL RENTED, that is the 
percentage council tenants living in a ward. Labour Party support increased by a mere 
0.03 standard deviations, whereas in the 1970s at lower-tier elections it increased by 
0.3 standard deviations. This seems to contradict the evidence of class dealigrmient 
with the Labour Party shown for instance by the negative UB coefficients for 
SOCIAL CLASS 4 at upper-tier elections in the 1970s. However, it serves to illustrate 
the subtlety of the relationship between variables that measure class and those that 
measure conditions of tenure such as room density. 
The variable of room density RD>1.5, that is more than 1.5 persons per room the 
measure of dire overcrowding, does not register any significant relationship with 
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Labour Party support and perhaps this reflects the party's negative relationship with 
SOCL^LL CLASS 4. 
Table 50: A comparison of the regression coefTicients Tor best ntting models of Labour Party 
support and socio-economic variables (turnout included), controlling for decade at Inner-London 
lower-tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and parliamentary constituency elections, 1959-
1979.Statistics in each significant variable cell: regression coeflicient, standard error in square 
brackets, t- statistic, and standard beu in round brackets. P<O.OS. 
Party Labour 
1959-1970 
Labour 
1971-1979 
Electoral level Lower 
Tier 
Upper 
Tier 
PARL Lower 
Tier 
Upper 
Tier 
PARL 
N = 482 120 168 459 35 103 
R square = .71 .87 .56 .73 .82 .72 
CONSTANT 23.8 -10.4 46.1 183 -7.8 51.9 
Owner-
Occupiers 
-.26 I.07J 
t=-3.S 
(-3) 
(Council 
Rented 
.10 [.03J 
t=4.0 
(.03) 
.24 1.071 
t=3.6 
(.27) 
.19 |.02| 
t=8.2 
(3) 
-.46 |.05] 
t=-8.9 
(-.7) 
Junior Non-
Manual 
-.69 |.07| 
t=-10.1 
(.07) 
Manual .61 |.04| 
t=14.0 
(.04) 
1.05 |.06| 
t=17.5 
(.84) 
1.88|.16| 
t=11.9 
(1.2) 
.96 [ .071 
t=13.8 
(.8) 
Social class 1 -.22 |.07| 
t=-3.2 
(-.10) 
Social class 3 .28 |.0S) 
t=5.9 
(.05) 
Social class 4 -38 1.12} 
t=3.2 
(.1) 
-1.49 |.24| 
t=-63 
(-.62) 
Social class S 1.2 (.251 
t=4.5 
(J6) 
Social class 6 -1.11|.21| 
t=-53 
(-.4) 
No Inside WC .65 [.15| 
t=4.5 
(.26) 
-.48 |.05| 
t=9.2 
( 3 ) 
Shore Lack Bath -.21 |.06| 
t=-3.4 
(-.14) 
RD>I-1.5 2.01.41| 
t=4.8 
(.22) 
332 (.231 
t=13.9 
(.5) 
BomXUK -.171.051 
t=-3.4 
(.05) 
-.50 |.10| 
t=-53 
(-.34) 
Turnout -.28 |.09| 
t=-3.1 
(-.17) 
1.91.61 
t=3.4 
(.1) 
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It is clear from an examination of Table 51 below that little was revealed about the 
determinants of Liberal Party support at these Inner-London elections by the 
regression analysis. 
Table 51: A comparison of the regression coefficients for best fltting models of Liberal Party 
support and socio-economic variables (turnout included), controlling for decade at Inner-London 
loweMier municipal, upper-tier municipal and parliamentary constituency elections, 1959-1979. 
Liberal Party contested only. Statistics in each significant variable cell: unstandardised beta 
coefliclent, standard error in square brackets, t- statistic, and standard beta in round brackets. 
P<0.05 
Party Liberal 
1959-1970 
Liberal 
1971-1979 
Electoral level Lower-Tier Up|)cr-Tier PARL Lower-
Tier 
Upper-Tier PARL 
N = 78 65 80 614 129 119 
R square = .15 .46 .57 .13 .19 .29 
CONSTANT 21.9 16.4 15.7 21.5 12.7 4.6 
Council 
Rented 
.12 (.02) 
t=5.1 
(52) 
.07 (.021 
t=3.1 
(.27) 
Raited furnished -.1 (.021 
t=3.1 
(.12) 
Rented 
unfurnished 
-.14 .04) 
t=-3.8 
(-.17) 
Junior Non-
Manual 
-.29 (.081 
t=-3.5 
(-.14) 
Non-Manual .21 (.041 
t=S.8 
(.64) 
Manual .15 (.03] 
t=-5.5 
(-.44) 
AFID -.57 (.09) 
t=-6.7 
(-.64) 
Social class 4 .23 (.08) 
t=2.9 
(.14) 
Social class S -.47 (.111 
t=-4.3 
(-.41) 
Social class 6 -.63 (.071 
t=-.93 
(-.8) 
Turnout 0 2 |.1| 
t=-3.6 
( 0 8 ) 
-.12|.04] 
t=-35 
( O ) 
.15 |.05| 
t=3.0 
(.24) 
Seek Work -.71 (.111 
t=-6.5 
(-.58) 
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Nonetheless, what was evidenced was a positive relationship between SOCIAL 
CLASS 4 and Liberal Party support in the 1970s at lower-tier elections and positive 
relationships between COUNCIL RENTED and Liberal support at the parliamentary 
level in both decades. Interestingly, the indicators of the private rental sector, which 
made up a large component of the electorates in the London case study constituencies, 
were both negatively associated with support for the Liberal Party. Rented furnished 
had a UB coefficient -. I and rented unfurnished a -. 14 coefficient at lower-tier 
borough elections in the 1970s and did not register any significant association for the 
1960s. As evidenced in the London case studies, unlike the worst areas of housing in 
Birmingham, the Liberals had pitched their campaign rhetoric at the ratepayers and 
had been constrained by competition from the Labour left candidates. Nevertheless at 
the lower-tier elections, unlike in Birmingham, support for the Liberals was 
negatively associated with the socio-economic group JUNIOR NON-MANUAL. 
However, at the parliamentary electoral level in the 1960s for every standard 
deviation increase in NON-MANUAL in a constituency. Liberal Party support 
increased by 0.64 standard deviations. The predictor NON-MANUAL was not a 
significant influence upon Liberal Party support in the 1970s, as evidenced by its 
absence from the model, and perhaps reflects the general trend in realignment with the 
Conservative Party in the 1970s already evidenced in Table 49. 
9.7 Conclusion 
The findings so far allow us to discount the following hypotheses in regard to voting 
behaviour at elections in Birmingham, Sutton Coldfield and inner-London from 1959-
1979. The evidence rejects the null-hypothesis H I , that there is no difference between 
the effects upon party support of the individual socio-economic characteristics of an 
electoral unit at different types of elections. Indeed, it has been shown that there was 
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variance in the strength of the association between many of our socio-econoniic 
indicators and support for a party at different levels of voting activity. 
The evidence also allows us to reject H2, that there is no significant difference 
between the effects upon party support of individual political/structural variables of 
an electoral unit at different types of elections as the relationship between TURNOUT 
and support for both the Liberal and the Labour parties has shown. 
The evidence also allows us to discount the hypothesis H3, that there is no variance in 
the effects upon party support of individual social class indicators over time between 
the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. We can also reject the hypothesis H6, that there 
is no significant association between party support and household amenity variables. 
The evidence does not allow us to reject Hypothesis 7, and thus supports the 
proposition that there was no significant weakening of class alignment behind the two 
major parties in Birmingham and inner-London elections at municipal elections over and 
between the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. Clearly the evidence suggests that the issue 
of class alignment is more complex than a stark polarisation between trends of alignment 
or dealignment. The patterns in trends of class-party alignment were more heterogeneous. 
In the case of the Labour Party at Birmingham municipal lower-tier elections the 
indicator MANUAL evidences significant dealignment, however SOCIAL CLASS 5, 
indicates significant realigrmient. At council elections in Sutton Coldfield the indicator 
JUNIOR NON-MANUAL evidences a significant class-party dealignment in 
Conservative support in the 1960s and early 1970s. At municipal elections in Inner-
London, the evidence points towards a realignment with Labour Party support at the 
upper-tier in terms of the indicator MANUAL, nevertheless evidence of significant 
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dealignment in support from SOCIAL CLASS 4. Unfortunately the regression analysis of 
Conservative Party support at Birmingham municipal elections gave few points of 
comparison, although it is evident that the indicator JUNIOR NON-MANUAL reveals a 
strong positive association with Conservative Party support in the 1970s but no 
significant relationship for the 1960s. At the inner-London municipal elections JUNIOR 
NON-MANUAL indicates a dealignment in class-party support for the Conservative 
Party at lower-tier elections, and a tendency towards realignment at the upper-tier. 
Studies of the relationship between the electorate and support for the two major parties in 
the 1959 to 1979 period at the parliamentary level have evidenced the importance of key 
socio-economic variables. High levels of economic deprivation, high levels of housing 
density and the non-salariat have been shown to have a strong positive relationship with 
support for the Labour Party and the converse in regard to Conservative Party support. 
The class and economic bases of the Labour and Conservative parties' support at the 
parliamentary level were at their strongest in the 1960s and weakening in the 1970s. 
These trends according to orthodox views were mirrored at the municipal electoral level. 
However, what is clear from the evidence so far is that the relationship of class and party, 
and indeed, many socio-economic factors, with municipal elections was much more 
nuanced and heterogeneous than previous studies of local electoral behaviour of this 
period would allow. 
Measures of the relationship between socio-economic variables of the context in which 
votes have been cast and party support at municipal elections in Birmingham and inner-
London have evidenced variance in the trends of these relationships at different levels of 
voting activity. The regression models have evidenced the relative importance of 
contextual socio-economic indicators, such as measures of housing conditions in their 
accounts of party support and their changing influence over time and at different levels of 
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electoral activity. Thus, the regression analysis of this chapter adds much weight to the 
case study evidence of the significance of contextual factors in relation to party support at 
local elections for the two major parties and the Liberal Party. 
Table 52: Birmingham and Inner-London lower-tier municipal elections 1959-1979 : comparison 
of the standardised betacoefTicients for best Pitting models of Liberal Party support, socio-
economic variables and turnout, controlling for past party political control of ward at time of 
election, all contests. 
P<0.05. 
Party 
B'ham London B*ham London 
Liberal 
1959-1979 
Liberal 
1959-1979 
Liberal 
1959-1979 
Liberal 
1959-1979 
PPC ward CON CON LAB LAB 
Electoral level Lower-tier Lower-tier Lower-tier Lower-tier 
N = 394 193 134 810 
R square = ^3 .12 36 .12 
CONSTANT J 7 15.8 -.49 -1.6 
Owner-Occupiers -.24 
Rented Furnished .05 
Non-Manual .77 
AFID -.87 .56 
Social class 1 -.78 
Social class 2/3N -.28 
Social class 4 .20 
Social class 6 .64 - J 
Share inside WC .11 -.79 
Share/Lack Hot 
Water 
.21 
Shore/Lack Bath -.14 
Turnout .24 .55 .23 
Electoral context looms large in any explanation of support for the Liberal Party and, 
indeed, as Table 52 above illustrates, when past political control of a ward is taken 
into account there is some disparity in the influence of our indicators. There is also 
however, some disparity between local authorities. It would appear that indicators of 
class and turnout are common determinants of Liberal Party support at both 
Birmingham and Inner-London elections and their relative influence at different types 
of elections shaped by electoral context. In contrast the household amenity variables 
were influential at lower-tier elections in Birmingham irrespective of past party 
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political control of a ward, however, they appear to have had no influence at the 
lower-tier inner-London elections. The regression models of Table 52, as their R2 
statistics testify, are poor predictors of support for the Liberal Party. In order to gain a 
greater insight into the effects of political context and to test the hypotheses related to 
political variables we must by necessity turn to a more appropriate method of 
analysis, that of logistic regression. 
317 
CHAPTER 10 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
10.1;Introduction 
One of the key assumptions of linear regression is that the relationship between 
variables is linear (see Appendix C). However the political/structixral variables in the 
analysis are dichotomous and thus violate the assumption of linearity the data must 
meet in order for the statistical test to be accurate. What logistic regression permits us 
to do is to f i t a model to the data that estimates values of the outcome variable (in this 
case the probability a party will win an electoral context, e.g. categorical dichotomous 
variable = CONWIN or CONLOSE) from known values of the predictor variables, 
including our categorical variables (also dichotomous e.g. a party is either in control 
of council or it is not) such as past party political control of a ward, or party control of 
council. The aim of the logistic regression is to consider what factors predict whether 
or not a party win an election - our outcome variable is a dichotomy i.e. an electoral 
contest is either won or lost. The logistic regression analysis is a two stage process 
termed, block entry regression. In the first stage, block I , the socio-economic 
predictors will be entered into the model, and in the second stage, block 2, the 
political structural variables wil l be added thereby enabling us to discern the effect, i f 
any, upon our socio-economic model of political context. 
Thus logistic regression is multiple regression, as used in chapter 9, but with an 
outcome variable that is a categorical dichotomy. The method permits the prediction 
of which of two categories a case is likely to belong to given the information we know 
about the case, i.e. our predictor variables. A model is created that establishes which 
variables are influential in predicting a particular outcome. In this instance whether a 
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party wins a ward or a constituency contest or not, (e.g. dichotomous variable: 
C0NWIN=1, CONLOST-0). 
The formal statement of the models to be used in the logistic regression analyses of 
the effects of socio-economic/demographic, political structural conditions upon 
support for the Conservative and Labour parties at ward level and at local authority 
level in relation to lower- and upper-tier local goverrunent elections and at 
constituency level in relation to parliamentary elections are as follows:-
(Conservative Party example) 
Probability that the Conservative Party wi l l WIN/LOSE in a given ward at time t at a 
lower-tier municipal election = f [ ward characteristics (socio-economic) + political/ 
structural characteristics ] . 
Probability that the Conservative Party wil l WIN/LOSE in a given local authority at 
time t at an upper-tier municipal election = f [local authority level characteristics 
(socio-economic) + political/ structural characteristics]. 
Probability that the Conservative Party wi l l WIN/LOSE in a given constituency at 
time t, at a parliamentary election = f [constituency level characteristics (socio-
economic) + political/ structural characteristics]. 
The logistic regression model for the Liberal Party by necessity employs a model that 
assesses the probability of the Liberal Party achieving an above the mean share of the 
vote (see section 10.4 below). The formal statement of the models to be used in the 
logistic regression analyses of the effects of socio-economic/demographic, political 
structural conditions upon the probability that the Liberal Party will achieve an above 
the mean share of the vote at ward level and at local authority level in relation to 
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lower- and upper-tier local government elections and at constituency level in relation 
to parliamentary elections are as follows:-
Probability that the Liberal Party wil l achieve a >MEAN SHARE OF THE VOTE in 
a given ward at time t at a lower -tier municipal election = f [ ward characteristics 
(socio-economic) + political/ structural characteristics ] . 
Probability that the Liberal Party wil l achieve a >MEAN SHARE OF THE VOTE in 
a given local authority at time t at a upper-tier municipal election = f [ local authority 
characteristics (socio-economic) + political/ structural characteristics ] . 
Probability that the Liberal Party will achieve a >MEAN SHARE OF THE VOTE in 
a given constituency at time t at a pariiamentary election = f [ constituency level 
characteristics (socio-economic) + political/ structural characteristics ] . 
The analysis measures the probability that a case belongs in a certain category and is 
expressed as a probability value that varies between 0 and 1, The odds (the ratio of the 
probability that something is true divided by the probability it is not) is converted into 
a Logit (the natural logarithm of the odds) which can take a positive or negative value. 
Logits measure the strength and direction of an association. A positive Logit 
coefficient means that the predictor variable has an effect of increasing the odds that 
the dependent variable (eg CONWIN) equals 1 .An odds ratio above 1 indicates an 
increase, that is to say, a unit change in the predictor variable is associated with an 
increase in the odds that the outcome variable equals 1. A negative Logit means that 
the predictor variable has the effect of decreasing the odds that the dependent variable 
equals 1, and an odds ratio of below 1 indicates a decrease, that is, a unit change in 
the predictor variable is associated with a decrease in the odds of the outcome being L 
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Further, the value of the coefficient exp.B is an indication of the change in the odds 
resulting from a unit change in the predictor. I f the value of exp.B is greater than I 
then it indicates that as the predictor increases, the odds of the outcome occurring 
increase. A value less than 1 indicates that as the predictor increases the odds o f the 
outcome decrease. For example in Table 53 below, Birmingham lower-tier municipal 
elections 1959-1979, categorical dependent variable CONWTN/CONLOSE, the odds 
of the Conservative Party wirming a ward are 1.4 times higher for every unit increase 
in the predictor JUNIOR NON-MANUAL when controlling for socio-economic 
indicators of block 1 analysis, and 1.4 times higher for every unit of increase when 
controlling for both socio-economic and political predictors together in block 2. As 
the table indicates the political variables had no significant impact upon the 
probability of the Conservative Party winning a ward at these elections over the whole 
period. 
A table of comparison can be constructed to evidence any cross-level disparity in the 
influence of particular predictor variables at different types of elections and, indeed, 
any difference in the effects of all our variables between the decades. We can then 
gauge the relative strength and direction of any relationships between influential 
independent variables, including categorical dichotomous predictors, and support for 
a party (Field 2002:ppl63-204). Tables 53 and 54 below contrast the Logits and 
expB coefficients (in brackets) for significant predictors of LAB WIN and CONWIN, 
our categorical dichotomous outcome variables at Birmingham elections 1959-1979. 
In Tables 55 and 56 those for inner-London elections are outlined. The method of 
Logistic Analysis used was block entry of our socio-economic variables and a second 
block entry of both our socio-economic variables and our categorical 
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political/structural variables, PPCCON, PPCLAB, CONCOUN, LABCOUN and 
MARJ. 
Logistic regression as well as producing a predicted probability of Y occurring given the 
values of each predictor for a given case, also produces a predicted group membership. 
Thus, the analysis predicts which of our two groups, (e.g. CONWIN or CONLOSE, 
LAB WIN or LABLOSE) a case is most likely to belong to based on the model. 
Exceptional cases that do not concur with the model are listed as residuals. All cases for 
which the standardised residual is greater than 2 standard deviations will be hsted. It is 
expected that the cases listed at each logistic regression analysis of levels of elections in 
Birmingham, Sutton Coldfield and London, will include those wards identified in the case 
studies of Chapters 4-8 and thereby add further weight to the evidence for the effects of 
local socio-economic environment and political context upon the voting behaviour at 
municipal elections. Indeed, such atypical and exceptional values can point toward 
atypical behaviour and, 'in a geographical sense ... identification of unusual cases is 
essentially the identification of exceptional places' (Brundson 1995:272). 
In the reports below, the focus will be the effect, i f any, upon the odds of a particular 
party winning an electoral contest of our socio-economic indicators, and secondly the 
effect with the addition of our polifical/structural variables. Thus, each model will predict 
the odds that a party are likely to win a contest at a particular type of election and how 
these odds are favourably or adversely affected by the predictors in the best fitting 
models. It is felt that most readers wiU have a more intuitive feel for statements about 
odds and that reporting the Exp.B coefficient is a more intelligible medium to convey the 
direction and magnitude of any effects of our predictors. 
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10.2:Report of Birmingham logistic regression analysis 
The odds that the Labour Party would win a ward contest at lower-tier elections in 
Birmingham, or a parliamentary constituency contest, remained very stable across the 
1959-1979 period in relation to the percentage manual workers who resided in a 
particular ward or constituency (see Table 53 below). The odds that the Labour Party was 
likely to win a ward contest at the lower-tier were multiplied by 1.2 in the 1960s and the 
1970s for each unit increase in manual workers who resided in a ward. These odds were 
only slightly reduced, by 0.1, when the effects of political context were considered by the 
introduction of our pohtical/structural variables in to the logistic regression model. Thus, 
the stability of class-party alignment irrespective of council control, past-party political 
control of a ward, or constituency is evidenced. 
The findings do not however support those of the multiple-regression analysis that 
evidenced a degree of dealignment among Labour supporters in the 1970s when measured 
in terms of the indicator MANUAL. Nevertheless, like the findings from the multiple 
regression analysis, logistic regression analysis reveals the nuances of class-party 
alignment. The indicator SOCIAL CLASS 6 evidences that the odds that the Labour Party 
were likely to win a lower-tier ward contest in the 1960s were multiplied by 1.2 for every 
unit change in the percentage of SOCIAL CLASS 6 residents in a ward, yet at the 
parliamentary electoral level, 1959-1979, the odds were multiplied by 1.6 for every unit 
change in the percentage of SOCIAL CLASS 6 residents in a constituency. Arguably this 
could be a function of turnout differential between levels of voting activity. Nevertheless, 
class-party loyalty with the Labour Party was less robust at the Birmingham lower-tier 
municipal level than at the parliamentary level, among the voters in SOCIAL CLASS 6, 
who no doubt made up much of the electorate in the inner-city wards that comprised the 
case study constituency of Ladywood. 
323 
An indication of the origins of Labour's relative loss of support may lie with the 
household amenity indicator SHARE/LACK HOT WATER. During the 1960s at the 
lower-tier, irrespective of party control of council, or past political control of a ward, the 
odds that the Labour Party were likely to win a ward contest were multiplied by 0.96, for 
every unit increase in the indicator S/LHWATER, a reduction of around 4% in the odds, 
evidencing the significance of housing conditions to Labour's level of support at the 
lower-tier Birmingham elections, and substantiating the case study findings of the 
importance of housing conditions to the Liberal revival in Ladywood's inner-city wards 
of Birmingham with its h i ^ percentage of multi-occupancy dwellings with substandard 
housing conditions. At first glance it may seem that the exp.B coefficient for the room 
density indicator RD>1.5, militates against the above assertion of support for the Labour 
Party being adversely affected by housing conditions. The indicator of overcrowding 
RD> 1.5, as can be seen in Table 53, evidences a strong positive relationship with support 
for the party in the 1970s. Indeed, the odds of a Labour victory at a lower-tier contest can 
be multiplied by 1.9 for every unit change in percentage RD>1.5, and by 2.1 when past 
political control of ward and council control are considered. This, I would argue, reflected 
the dramatic change in the Birmingham Labour group's public housing policy, a platform 
that arguably reduced the Conservative group's majority on council fi-om 66 to 6 at the 
1971 elections and resulted in a Labour group majority of 20 at the 1973 elections (see 
Ladywood case study pp 144-148). 
The differential in influence of political context is perhaps illustrated firstly by 
consideration of the relationship between council control and the likelihood of a party 
winning a lower-tier ward contest, and secondly by consideration of the likelihood in 
terms of past party political control of a ward. If it is accepted that the group of cases that 
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contribute to the likelihood of Conservative Party victory in our lower-tier model are 
predominantly consistent Conservative supporting wards, and those that make up the 
group of cases that underpin the likelihood of Labour Party victory, predominantly 
consistent Labour supporting wards (see Ladywood case study, pp 137-139, for 
marginality of council control and control dependent throughout much of the period on a 
small number of volatile wards) then a unit change in council control would not be 
expected to register a significant effect upon the odds of a party's victory in what are 
overwhehningly heartland wards 
Table 53 : Logits of signincant predictors categorical dependent variable L A B W I N / L A B L O S E 
at Birmingham lower-tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and parliamentary constituency 
elections 1959-1979 and by decade. First column of each is Block 1 = socio-economic variables, 
second column Block 2= socio-economic + political variables, asterisk denotes coefficient not 
signiFicant at p<0,OS level. Exp.B in brackets. 
VARIABLE B h^mn lower-
ller 1959-1979 
B*haii] lowcr-
(kr 1959-72 
B'ham Lower -
Her 1973- 1979 
B^ ham Upper-
Ucr 1973- 1979 
B'ham 
Pariiamentary 
1959-1979 
DEPENDENT LABWIN=1 
LABLOSE=0 
LABWIN=1 
LABLOSE=0 
LABWIN=1 
LABLOSE=0 
LABWIN=1 
LABLOSEXI 
LABW1N=1 
LABLOSE=0 
• N 740 740 539 539 201 201 84 84 87 87 
% Predicted 77.0 82.8 ns 813 83.6 89.1 69.0 903 85.1 86.2 
CONSTANT -5.9 -8.1 -13 -14.4 - U . l -143 2.2 ft -14.7 -16.5 
NON-MANUAL * * ft ft ft * -.15 
(.86) 
-.57 
(.57) 
ft ft 
MANUAL .05 
(1.0) 
• .16 
0.2) 
.10 
(I.I) 
.19 
(1.2) 
.15 
(1.2) 
* * .19 
(1.2) 
.18 
(1.2) 
SOC6 • • .16 
(1.2) 
.21 
(1.2) 
ft ft • * .45 
(1.6) 
.42 
(1.5) 
RD>1.5 • * ft ft .64 
(1.9) 
.74 
(2.1) 
* * • 
RD 1-1.5 .41 
(1.5) 
,26 
( O ) 
JO 
(13) 
.23 
(13) 
ft ft * * • * 
S/LHOTWAT * * -.04 
(.96) 
-.03 
(.97) 
ft ft * * * * 
PPC CON • * ft ft ft * • * * * 
CONCOUNC • * ft ft ft -2.9 
(•>) 
• * • • 
This is certainly the case as far as the Labour Party are concerned. The odds in the 1970s 
of a Labour candidate being returned under the political context of a Conservative council 
could be multiplied by a coefficient of a mere 0.1 as shown in Table 53. The implication 
is that at times of nadirs in Labour support in the city and the ascendancy of Conservative 
support. Conservative council control had litde deleterious effect upon Labour's heartland 
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wards. There is little evidence of political context in terms of council control or past 
political control of award having any impact upon the odds of a Conservative or Labour 
party win at these elections as evidenced by the minimal change in the odds between 
block 1 and block 2 models. This, no doubt, reflects Birmingham's long held reputation 
of electoral marginality. 
The predictor NON-MANUAL was a significant factor in all logistic regression models 
of the probability of the Conservative Party wirming a contest at Birmingham elections 
1959-1979, albeit one that varied in its impact at different types of elections and between 
the decades (see Table 54 below). Over the whole period at the lower-tier elections the 
odds of a Conservative win could be multiplied by 1.3 for every unit increase in the 
percentage non-manual residents in a ward. These odds were increased fi-om an exp.B 
coeflBcient of 1.1 to 1.5 in the 1970s at lower-tier elections an indication of a trend of 
class-party realignment in Conservative support and reached parity with the coefficient in 
relation to parliamentary elections 1959-1979, a trend clearly evidenced in the Sutton 
Coldfield case study as former Conservative voters returned to the fold upon 
amalgamation of the borough with Birmingham. There is clear evidence of a disparity in 
the influence of the predictor NON-MANUAL at different types of elections and between 
the decades, and also an indication of class-party realignment rather than dealignment at 
the municipal level in the 1970s. Furthermore, the block 2 logistic regression of upper-tier 
elections in the 1970s, which included political/structural variables, revealed that the odds 
of a Conservative victory could be multiplied by 2.0 for every unit increase in NON-
MANUAL. It would seem that for non-manual residents the propensity to vote for the 
Conservative candidate at the upper-tier was increased and that this increase was in some 
way related to political control of ward and/or council. The more likely explanation is 
turnout differential with the Labour Party finding it harder to mobilise support at upper-
tier elections. 
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As expected, the odds of a Conservative win were adversely affected by the percentage of 
manual workers in a ward. At lower-tier elections the odds could be multiphed by 0.8 in 
relation to MANUAL, by 0.87 in relation to SOCL\L CLASS 6, and by 0.97 in relation to 
the tenure category COUNCIL RENTED. It is revealing that the index of overcrowding 
RD>1.5/room was positively associated with the likelihood of Conservative Party victory 
at lower-tier elections throughout the whole 1959-1979 period 
Table 54 : Logits ofsignincant predictors categorical dependent variable C O N W I N / C O N L O S E 
at Birmingham loweMier municipal, upper-tier municipal and pariiamentary constituency 
electionsl959-1979 and by decade.. First column of each is Block 1 = socio-economic variables, 
second column Block 2= socio-economic + political variables, asterisk denotes coefficient not 
signiHcant at p<O.OS leveL E i p . B in brackets. 
V A R I A B L E B^ham lowers 
tier 1959-1979 
B^ham lower-
tkr 1959-1972 
B'ham lower-
tier 1973-79 
B^ham Upper-
tier 197J- 1979 
B'ham 
Partiamaitary 
1959-1979 
DEPENDENT CONAVlN=l 
CONLOSEX) 
CONWUV =1 
CONLOSE=0 
CONWIN =1 
CONLOSE=0 
CONWIN =1 
CONLOSE=0 
CONWIN =1 
CONLOSE=0 
N 740 740 539 539 324 324 84 84 87 87 
% Predicted 81.8 84.1 79.0 82.0 883 90.1 762 92.9 87.4 87.4 
CONSTANT -533 -3.6 12.7 13.8 -13.1 -8.6 -3.2 ft -63 -7.8 
O W N E R - O C C * • * * .12 
(1.1) 
.12 
(1.1) 
* * ft ft 
C O U N a t R E N T -.03 
(.97) 
-.02 
(.98) 
-.04 
(.96) 
-.03 
(.97) 
* ft * ft ft 
NON-MANUAL .26 
( I J ) 
.21 
(1.2) 
* • .4 
(\S) 
.4 
(1.5) 
.21 
(1.2) 
.70 
(2.0) 
.4 
(1.5) 
.4 
(1.4) 
Jr . NON-MAN 3 5 
(1.4) (1.4) 
* ft ft ft * 
MANUAL * * -.14 
(.87) 
-.09 
(.92) 
* • ft ft ft ft 
S 0 C 3 -.12 
(M) 
-.13 
(.88) 
ft • * * ft ft ft ft 
S O C 6 * -.21 
(.8) 
-.26 
(.8) 
* * ft ft ft ft 
RD>1.5 .16 
(1.2) 
* * • • • ft ft ft ft 
S H A R E D W E L L * * * * * • * ft .17 
(1.2) 
ft 
The odds of the Conservative candidate winning a ward could be multiplied by 1.2 for 
every unit increase in the percentage households classified as overcrowded at the 
RD>1.5/ room level. An exp.B coefficient of 1.2 also prevailed at the parliamentary 
electoral level in relation to RD>1.5. Clearly, overcrowding was a factor in the calculus 
of some of the voters that comprised Conservative Party support at both municipal and 
parliamentary elections in Birmingham 1959-1979, Whether such considerations were 
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characteristic of the Birmingham electorate or more general will perhaps be answered in 
the next section that reports upon the logistic regression of the inner-London data. 
10.3;Report of inner-London logistic regression analysis 
In Table 55 below the influence of the indicator COUN-RENT, the percentage council 
rented households in a ward can be seen to be quite stable at different levels of municipal 
voting and between the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, the tenure category council 
rented, generally recognised as a significant predictor of Labour Party support, does not 
indicate any significant deabgnment at the lower -tier level. However, at lower-tier 
elections in the 1970s the indicator TURNOUT had become negatively associated with 
the probability of a Labour win, a trend clearly evidenced in the Islington case study fi'om 
the 1968 borough election and after. The danger of broad brush generalisations 
concerning class-party alignment are apparent i f the relationship between SOCIAL 
CLASS 5 and the odds of a Labour win at upper-tier and those at the parliamentary level 
are contrasted for the 1959-1979 period. The odds of Labour victory at LCC/GLC 
elections could be multiplied by 1.8 for every unit increase in SOCIAL CLASS 5 in a 
division, and 2.1 when political context variables are introduced in the block 2 model. 
These coef^cients are of a much higher magnitude than at the parliamentary electoral 
level in the same period, when SOCIAL CLASS 5 increased the odds by 1.2. There is 
evidence of the impact of electoral context and of variant trends in class-party alignment 
dependent upon political context that reflect the findings of the Camden and the Islington 
case studies. The significance of household amenity variables is apparent at all levels of 
electoral activity in relation to the likelihood of a Labour Party victory. At lower-tier 
elections 1959-79 the indicator RD>1-1.5, increased the odds of Labour victory in a ward 
election by 1.3 for every unit increase in RD. l - l .5, and the indicator RD>1.5, the most 
overcrowded of households, increased the odds of a Labour victory in the 1960s by 1.3 
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for every unit rise. Similarly an exp.B coeflBcient of 1.9 for RD>1-1.5 at the 
parliamentary electoral level illustrates the significance of housing conditions to the 
likelihood of Labour Party victory at all types of elections and accords with the two 
London case studies. 
Table 55: Logits of signinoint predictors categorical dependent variable L A B W I N / L A B L O S E at 
laner-LondoQ lower-tier municipal, upper-tier municipal and pariiamentary constituency 
electionsl9S9-1979 and by decade. First column of each is Block 1 - socio-economic variables, 
second column Block 2= socio-economic + political variables, asterisk denotes coefUcient not 
significant at p<0.05 level. Exp.B in brackets. 
VARIABLE London lower-
licr 1959-1979 
London lower-
tier 1959-1970 
London Lower -
tier 1970-79 
London Upper — 
tier 1959-1979 
London 
Parliamentary 
1959-1!>79 
DEPENDENT LABWIN=1 
LABLOSEM) 
LABW1N=1 
LABLOSE=0 
LABWIN=1 
LABLOS&=0 
LABWIN=1 
LABLOSE=0 
LABWIN=^1 
LABLOSE==0 
N 6S0 680 462 462 220 220 144 144 238 238 
Ve Predicted 74.9 72.8 74.9 803 85.5 93.2 86.8 89.6 81.1 91.2 
CONSTANT -4.5 -8.7 -7.9 5.1 1.8 -10.5 -12.5 -.35 -4.2 
COUN-RENT .04 
(1.0) 
.04 
(LO) 
.06 
(LI ) 
.08 
(LI ) 
• • .14 
(L2) 
.16 
(L2) 
• • 
FURNISHED • • -.02 
(.97) 
-.06 
(.94) 
• • • • 
UNFURNISHED • .05 
(LI ) 
.06 
(LI) 
* • • • • • 
NON-MAN * * -.07 
(.93) 
* • * 
SOC4 • .10 
(LI ) 
.15 
(1.2) 
* • • • 
sees • • « • * .6 
(1.8) 
.7 
(2-1) 
.21 
(L2) 
• 
RD>I.5 • • .26 
( I J ) 
.41 
(1.5) 
* • * • 
RD 1-1.5 .3 
(l"J) 
.28 
( I J ) 
* • .62 
(1.9) 
SO-HOTWAT .04 
(LO) 
.05 
(LI ) 
* • • * " • • * 
S/LBATH • « • * .08 
(LI ) 
.09 
(LI ) 
* * 
NOINWC • • * • .15 
(L2) 
* • « • 
SHARE IN WC • • • • * * -.05 
(.95) 
• 
PPC CON • * * -2.63 
(.07) 
* * • * • 3.69 
(38.8) 
TURNOUT .05 
(1.0) 
.06 
(LI ) 
.12 
(LI ) 
.09 
(LI) 
-.09 
(.92) 
* • • 
MARGINAL 1 * •L2 
(.3) 
• * • * • 
MARGINAL 2 • -1.6 
(.2) 
* • • • * • • 
MARGINAL 3 • 
6) 
• • * • • • 
Nonetheless, the impact of housing amenity conditions upon the probabihty of a Labour 
win could be as nuanced as the impact of social class indicators. At the parUamentary 
level 1959-1979 the indicator SHAREINWC, which measured the percentage households 
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in a ward/division/constituency which shared use of an inside toilet, was negatively 
associated with the likehhood of a Labour Party win. The odds were reduced by around 
5% for every unit increase in SHAREINWC. In contrast the indicator 
SHARE/LACKBATH, was positively associated with the likelihood of a Labour victory 
at upper-tier municipal elections, as was the indicator SHARE/ LACK HOT WATER, at 
the lower-tier in the 1960s. 
The impact of housing amenity variables can be examined from another perspective. 
Across a range of measures of marginality (1= <5-%, 2= <5-10%, and 3=<10-20%, the 
percentage lead over the second placed candidate at the previous election) the impact of 
marginahty upon the odds of a Labour victory at lower-tier elections was remarkably 
stable, albeit adverse. The expectation would be that in wards where the proportion of 
council tenancies and privately rented households far outweighed owner-occupation that 
the Labour majority would be large. Conversely, in wards where owner-occupation 
predominated the reverse could be expected to be true. Given this, it could be expected 
that the odds of a Labour party victory would vary in relation to degree of marginality, 
and that the exp.B coefGcient would rise and fall in relation to marginality. The fact that 
the coefficient was so stable across measures of marginality, and that marginality is 
closely associated with relative proportions in categories of tenure, may indicate that the 
impact of household amenity variables upon Labour Party odds of winning a ward are 
more significant than at first appear. It is intriguing that in wards where Labour's majority 
had been large at the previous election and presumably the balance of tenure favourable 
to the party, that the odds of a Labour victory were not far greater than in marginal wards 
where the balance of tenure was more likely to be in equilibrium. 
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In stark contrast, the indicator marginality was favourably associated with the probabiHty 
of a Conservative Party victory at lower-tier elections, and the odds could be multiplied 
by 2 .6 in wards where the margin of victory at the previous election over the second 
placed part>' was between 5-10%. Indeed, the indicator NON-MANUAL reveals little 
variance in its impact upon the probability of a Conservative Party win at different types 
of elections (Table 56 below). There was nevertheless some loss of support from 
SOCIAL CLASS 2 at the parliamentary level The odds of the Conservative Party 
winning an inner-London constituency at general elections 1959-1979 were reduced by 
around 0.8% for every unit increase in SOCIAL CLASS 2, a clear indication of class-
party dealignment. Similarly, the indicator SOCIAL CLASS 1 reveals an erosion in the 
likelihood of a Conservative Party victory at lower-tier ward elections 1959-1979 of 
around 5%. However, at the upper-tier municipal electoral level in the same period, the 
JUNIOR NON-MANUAL socio-economic group and SOCL\L CLASS 1 were solidly 
aligned with Conservative Party support, as evidenced by odds that could be multiplied 
by 1.5 per unit rise and 1.7 respectively. Support for the Conservative Party in Inner-
London was, for part of their natural constituency, clearly contingent upon type of 
election. Just as with analysis of Labour Party support the blunt instrument of the 
manual/non-manual dichotomy conceals a more variegated pattern of support for the 
Conservative Party, and accords with the evidence of the electoral behaviour in Camden's 
three former metropolitan boroughs (see Chapter 8, section 8.2). 
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Table 57: Logits of significant predictors categorical dependent variable C O N W I N / C O N L O S E , 
Sutton Coldfidd lowei^tier municipal elections 1959-1972. First column of figures block 1 
analysis of socio-economic variables, neit column of figures block 2 analysis of socio-economic 
and political variables, asterisk denotes not significant at p<O.OS level, Exp.B in brackets. 
DEPENDENT CONWIN/< CONLOSE 
N= 105 105 
P R E D I C T E D 75.2 * 
CONSTANT -4.9 * 
COUN-RENT .11 * 
(1.1) 
NON-MAN ,19 
(1.2) 
Jr NON-MANUAL - J 3 
(-72) 
However, there was DO evidence of such class-party deahgnment among the NON-
MANUAL, which multiplied the odds of a Conservative Party win by 12 for every unit 
increase. The Conservative domination of this borough is reflected in the significant 
positive relationship between the odds of the Conservative Party winning and COUN-
RENT, which multiplied those odds by 1.1, and the absence of a significant coefficients 
for OWNER-OCC, or any of the political variables. 
10,4:Liberal Party support and odds of winning in Birmingham, Sutton Coldfield 
and inner-London 
It has been asserted in the case studies that support for the Liberal Party was also 
contingent upon socio-economic environment and pohtical context at municipal elections 
in Birmingham, Sutton Coldfield and London 1959-1979. It is however, not possible to 
explore Liberal Party support at these elections using logistic regression in terms of a 
dependent categorical dichotomy WIN/LOSE as there are so few cases of win. What is 
possible is a logistic regression analysis of the probability that a Liberal candidate would 
outperform the mean Liberal share of the vote at these elections in Liberal contested 
wards only. At the lower-tier Birmingham elections 1959-1979 the mean Liberal Party 
share of the vote (contested wards only) was 17.2%, at lower-tier Sutton Coldfield 
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elections it was 41.6% and at the lower tier inner-London elections 16%. The categorical 
dependent variable used in the logistic regression will provide a best fitting model of the 
likelihood of those cases belonging to the group that scored > MEANLBB share of the 
vote at these elections. Our categorical dependent variable was coded : LIB>MEAN = 1, 
and LIB<MEAN = 0. In this way it was intended to discern whether any particular socio-
economic predictors were associated with the probabiUty that a Liberal candidate would 
outperform the mean share of the vote at these elections and whether pohtical context had 
any bearing upon that probability. The analyses have also been restricted to lower-tier 
elections only, because of problems of small N . 
Table 58: Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only 3inninghani lower-tier municipal elections 
1959-1979^erisk denotes not significant at p<0.05 level, block 1 socio-economic variables, block 2 socio-
economic and political variables. 
DEPENDENT LtB>MEAN= 1 LIB<MEAN=0 
N= 338 338 
% PREDICTED 76.0 76.0 
CONSTANT -2.04 -10.9 
TURNOUT .08 
(1.08) 
* 
OWN-OCC -.04 
(.96) 
-.03 
(.97) 
S/LHOTWATER .03 
(1.03) 
« 
CONPPC • 3.07 
(21.4) 
LABPPC * 3.52 
(33.7) 
Table 59: Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only .Birmingham lower-tier municipal elections 
1959-1972,asterisk denotes not significant at p<0.05 level, block 1 socio-economic variables, block 2 socio-
economic and political variables. 
DEPENDENT LIB>MEAN=1 L1B<MEAN=0 
N= 241 241 
% PREDICTED 74.3 76.0 
CONSTANT -5.4 -13.1 
TURNOUT .08 
(1.08) 
• 
S/LHOTWATER .03 
(1.03) 
.03 
(103) 
COUN-RENT .03 
(1.03) 
.03 
(1.03) 
LABPPC * 3.43 
(30.7) 
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Table 60: Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only 3iniunghani lower-tier municipal elections 
1972-1979,asterisk denotes not significant at p<O.OS level, block 1 socio-economic variables, block 2 socio-
DEPENDENT LTB>MEAN=1 LIB<MEAN=0 
N= 144 144 
% PREDICTED 80.6 80.6 
CONSTANT .10 -10.5 
OWN-OCC -.04 
(1.2) 
• 
RD>I.5 .18 
(1.2) 
« 
In Table 58 above, it can be seen that the odds of a Liberal Party candidate achieving an 
above the mean share of the vote at Birmingham lower-tier elections, 1959-1979, could 
be multiphed by 1.03 for every unit increase in the household amenity predictor, 
S/LHOTWATER, and 1.08 for every unit increase in the predictor TURNOUT. The 
probability of a Liberal candidate achieving >MEAN share of the Liberal vote was, 
however, reduced by 4% for every unit increase in the predictor OWNER-OCCUPIER. 
Liberal support at these elections can be seen to be dependent upon the adverse housing 
conditions in a ward and reaflfirms the findings of the Ladywood case study. When our 
political/structural variables were introduced in to the analysis it was found that neither 
turnout nor S/LHOTWATER were significant factors in prediction. However, PPC, past 
political control of a ward at the previous election, registered a significant influence upon 
the odds of a Liberal Party candidate achieving an above the mean share of the vote. 
OWNER-OCCUPATION maintained its deleterious effect upon Liberal fortunes, eroding 
the Liberal odds by 3% for every unit increase in owner-occupation. Conservative Party 
past pohtical control of a ward increased the odds of a Liberal candidate achieving an 
above the mean share of die vote by 21.4 times for the unit change in PPC, and Labour 
Party past political control of a ward by 33.7 for the unit change in PPC. What is apparent 
is that the Liberal Party were more hkely to achieve an above the mean share of the vote 
at ward competitions where the Labour Party had past political control of the ward, where 
owner-occupation was low, and where the percentage households with substandard 
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amenities was high, confirming the findings of the Ladywood case study as to the 
importance of housing conditions to any explanation of Liberal support and dealignment 
in Labour Party support in the traditionally Labour voting inner-city wards. 
The analysis of lower-tier Birmin^am elections 1959-1972 outlined in Table 59 above, 
shows that TURNOUT and the household amenity variable S/LHOTWATER were 
positive influences upon the odds of a Liberal candidate achieving an above the mean 
share of the vote. What has changed in the model of the 1960s is that OWNER-
OCCUPATION was not a significant influence on Liberal odds but COUN-RENT was 
influential. Indeed, COUN-RENT can be seen to have increased the odds of a Liberal 
candidate achieving an above the mean share of the vote by 1.03 for every unit change in 
the predictor COUN-RENT. Furthermore, in the 1959-1972 period it appears that the 
likelihood of an above the mean share of the vote was positively associated with Labour 
Party past political control of a ward, and Conservative Party past political control had no 
significant influence upon these odds. As with the 1959-1979 model the influence of 
turnout has been supplanted by the influence of past party pohtical control of a ward, 
however, only in the case of the Labour Party is PPC a significant influence upon Liberal 
fortunes. 
It can be observed in Table 60 above that at these lower-tier Birmingham elections 1972-
1979, OWN-OCC supplanted COUN-RENT, and RD>1.5 had supplanted 
S/LHOTWATER, as influences upon the odds of an above the mean share of the vote for 
a Liberal Party candidate. Further, that neither any socio-economic nor any pohtical 
variables made a significant impact upon Liberal odds. The predictor OWN-OCC is seen 
to have had a negative association with Liberal prospects in die 1970s, however, the 
household amenity variable RD>1.5 continued to assert a positive influence. These 
findings accord with those of both Birmingham case studies which evidence a 
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reaUgnment in Conservative support, in Birmingham wards in general and in the newly 
merged Sutton Coldfield wards in particular, and the continued importance of housing 
issues in the 1970s. 
The logistic regression analyses of inner-London lower-tier elections in respect of the 
categorical dependent variable. LIB>MEAN =1 and LIB<MEAN =0 are outlined in 
Tables 61, 62 and 63, below. Like that of Birmingham the analysis of lower-tier inner-
London elections 1959-1979 in Table 61, reveals the significance of housing conditions 
to the likelihood of a Liberal Party candidate/candidates achieving an above the mean 
share of the vote and corroborates the evidence fi^om the London case studies that 
evidences the importance of housing conditions to the establishment of a Liberal foothold 
in some IsUngton and Camden wards. The odds of this occurrence could be multiphed by 
1.2 for every unit increase in the predictor S/LHOTWATER, and multipUed by 1.2 for 
every unit increase in SOCIAL CLASS 4, and accord with the London case study 
findings of Liberal Party intervention and support in the areas of worst housing 
conditions such as in west Hampstead and St Pancras North. 
At the same elections in the 1960s (see Table 62) the significance of SOCIAL CLASS 4 
to Liberal Party fortunes is evidenced. The odds of the Liberal Party achieving an above 
the mean share of the vote could be multiplied by 1.1 for every unit rise of SOCIAL 
CLASS 4 in a ward. Turnout and social class four became positive assets to Liberal 
fortunes in the 1970s. Although, as Table 63 shows, the predictor UNFURN, which 
measures the percentage households in a ward rented unfurnished, was adversely related 
to Liberal odds of achieving an above the mean share of the vote, and reduced those odds 
by some 4% for every unit increase in UNFURN. In neither decade, nor across the whole 
period, did our pohtical/structural variables register any impact upon Liberal fortunes at 
these inner-London lower-tier elections. 
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Table 61: Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only ,lnner-London lower-tier municipal elections 
1959-1979^erisk denotes not significant at p<0.05 level, block 1 socio-economic variables, block 2 socio-
DEPENDENT LIB>MEAN=1 LIB<MEAN=0 
N= 263 263 
% PREDICTED 86J 86J 
CONSTANT -5.2 -6.5 
S/LHOTWATER .10 0.9 
( U ) (1.1) 
MAJORITY -.03 • 
(.97) 
S 0 C 4 .21 .18 
( I J ) (1.2) 
Table 62: Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only Jnner-London lower-tier municipal elections 
1959-1970,asterisk denotes not signiflcont at p<0.05 level, block 1 socio-economic variables, block 2 socio-
DEPENDENT LIB>MEAN=1 LIB<MEAN=0 
N= 192 192 
% PREDICTED 85.0 85.0 
CONSTANT -3.5 -3.1 
S0C4 .11 .12 
(1.1) (1.1) 
Table 63: Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only Jnner-London lower-tier municipal elections 
1970-1979,asterisk denotes not significant at p<0.05 level, block 1 socio-economic variables, block 2 socio-
DEPENDENT LIB>MEAN=1 LIB<MEAN=0 
N= 192 192 
% PREDICTED 85.0 85.0 
CONSTANT -1.5 -.5 
SOC4 .09 .09 
0.1) (1.1) 
TURNOUT .04 .03 
(1.0) (1.0) 
UNFURNISHED -.04 -.04 
(.96) (.96) 
In Table 64 the best fitting model of the logistic regression analysis of the categorical 
variable >LIBMEAN/<LIBMEAN at Sutton Coldfield lower-tier elections evidences the 
importance of tenure to the outcomes of these elections. The predictors OWNER-
(X:CUPATION and COUNCIL-RENTED were both negatively associated with the odds 
of a Libera] candidate achieving an above the mean share of the Liberal vote, the odds 
being multiplied by .86 and .87 respectively, for every unit increase in the predictor. 
Liberal chances of achieving an above the mean score were also constrained by the 
majority held by the winning candidate at the previous election, every unit increase of 
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which multiphed those odds by .81. Thus it appears that Liberal fortunes in Sutton 
Coldfield, as in Islington and Camden, were conditional upon marginahty, the closer the 
contest at the last election the more hkely a Liberal candidate would score above the 
mean at that contest. Unfortunately, as Table 64 shows, our political structural variables 
were not significant in our block 2 analysis, so it is not possible to get a more precise idea 
of the degree of marginaUty that favoured Liberal candidates the most. 
Table 64: Logistic regression Liberal contested wards only ,Sutton ColdHeld lower-tier municipal elections 
1959-72,asterisk denotes not significant at p<0.05 level, block 1 socio-economic variables, block 2 socio-
economic and political variables. 
DEPENDENT LIB>MEAN/LIB<MEAN 
N= 88 88 
% P R E D I C T E D 84.1 * 
CONSTANT 17.34 * 
O W N E R - O C C -.15 * 
(.86) 
COUN-RENT -.16 * 
(.87) 
M A J O R I T Y -.22 * 
(.81) 
lO.SrSummary of Logistic Regression of Birmingham and London Elections 
In regard to Birmingham elections the logistic regression analysis has shown that 
class-party alignment was somewhat heterogeneous and that generalisations can hide 
subtle intra-class differences in electoral behaviour. Analysis of the Labour Party odds 
of winning at lower-tier elections has not indicated class-party dealignraent between 
the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, when measured by the indicator MANUAL. This 
would appear to support hypothesis H3, that there is no variance in the effects upon 
party support of individual social-class indicators over time at the same or different 
types of elections. In contrast the indicator SOCIAL CLASS 6 contradicts this 
assumption, as it has shown that class-party alignment with the Labour Party was 
clearly less robust at the lower-tier municipal electoral level than at the parliamentary. 
Nevertheless, as far as the Conservative Party are concerned we can reject hypothesis 
339 
H3, as the indicator NON-MANUAL clearly evidenced electoral cross-level 
variability and differences between the two decades at Birmingham elections. 
Similarly, the evidence from the regression analyses of inner-London rejected 
hypothesis H3, as the predictor SOCIAL CLASS 3 was shown to have impacted upon 
the odds of a Labour Party win at different types of election with variability, as did 
the predictors SOCL\L CLASS 1 and SOCL\L CLASS 2. 
The evidence so far allows us to reject hypothesis H6, that there is no significant 
association between party support and household amenity variables. At Birmingham 
lower-tier elections in the 1960s this was clearly not the case, as the odds of Labour 
winning a ward contest were reduced by 4% for every unit increase in the indicator 
S/LHOTWATER. Similarly, at lower-tier inner-London elections 1959-1979, the 
household amenity variables RD>1.5 and SHAREINWC had a significant impact 
upon the odds of a Labour Party win, as did the indicator SHARE/LACK HOT 
WATER in relation to Liberal Party support, and thus add weight to the rejection of 
H6. 
Our evidence allows us to reject the following hypotheses: H2 - that here is no 
significant difference between the effects upon party support of individual 
political/structural variables of an electoral unit at different types of elections, H4 that 
there is no significant association between the odds of a party winning a municipal 
ward election and past political control of a ward at the previous election, and H5 that 
there is no significant association between the odds of a party winning a municipal 
ward election and party political control of the council at the time of that election. In 
respect of hypothesis H7, that there was no significant weakening of class-alignment 
behind the two major parties at municipal elections in Birmingham and inner-London 
from its level in the 1960s to that in the 1970s, the evidence would suggest that this 
340 
was the case. We cannot therefore reject H7, although with the caveat that there is 
evidence of both intra-class category dealignment and realigrunent. 
The logistic regression analysis of the Liberal Party odds of achieving an above the 
mean share of the vote at lower-tier elections in Birmingham and imier-London have 
revealed the significance of the following independent variables -: SOCIAL CLASS 
4, RD>I.5, S/LHOTWATER, OWNER-OCCnjPATION, COUNCIL RENTED, 
UNFURNISHED, LABPPC, TURNOUT and MAJORTFY. What is clear is that the 
odds of the Liberal Party achieving an above the mean share of the vote, i,e, their 
level of electoral support was dependent upon: the level of turnout at the election, the 
housing conditions prevailing in the ward, the past political control of that ward at the 
previous election, and in the case of inner-London the percentage residents of social 
class 4 in the ward. We can then, reject hypothesis H6 that there is no significant 
association between party support and household amenity variables. We can also 
reject H4, that there is no significant association between the odds of a party winning 
a municipal ward election and past party political control of a ward at the previous 
election. 
The logistic regression analyses, as can be seen in the tables, predicted a percentage of 
all cases that best fitted each particular model, and also listed those cases that were 
deemed atypical as residuals, i.e. those cases that did not coriform to the best fitting 
models. It is to those cases and to what makes them different, that our attention turns 
in the section to follow. 
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10.6:lDterpretation of the Residuals 
The standardised residual coefficient, ZREl , in 95% of cases in an average normally 
distributed sample should have values that lie within + or - 2, and 99% should have 
values that lie within + or - 2.5. This was certainly the case with our logistic 
regression analysis of the odds of our categorical dependent variables. 
CONWm/CONLOSE and LABWIN/LABLOSE. However, our concern here is not 
so much to identify cases that have had undue influence on the models as to identify 
cases for which the models fit poorly. SPSS output has listed those cases that do not 
conform to the above parameters. The next step is to identify which of the 
Birmingham and inner-London wards were atypical in their voting behaviour, why 
these wards do not fit these models, and to identify what is different, i f anything about 
these wards in terms of their socio-economic and political characteristics, whether 
these atypical wards correspond to those identified in the case studies, and whether 
they comprise the constituencies where the Liberal Party achieved above the mean 
success at subsequent pariiament£uy elections. 
The logistic regression analysis of the Birmingham electoral data revealed 25 
atypically performing wards in relation to our categorical dependent variable 
LABWIN/LABLOSE. Eleven of these residual cases were inner-city wards that, in 
the early 1960s to the early 1970s, broke the mould at one or more lower-tier elections 
in terms of expected support for the Labour Party. The wards were: Al l Saints, Aston, 
Deritend^ Duddeston, Ladywood, Handsworth, Newtown, Rotton Park, Saltley, Small 
Heath and Sparkbrook. 
The wards that made up the Ladywood constituency, except the Soho ward (see Table 
30, pi 31, Chapter 5) were all identified as residual cases at one or more elections, and 
thus accord with the case study findings as having exhibited unusual voting 
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behaviour. Indeed, at 17 elections to Birmingham City Council between 1945 and 
1962 inclusive there were 105 seats available and contested by the two major parties 
in the wards that comprised the Ladywood constituency. At these lower-tier elections 
the Labour Party returned 85 councillors, some 81% of the seats. A Labour MP, 
Victor Yates, had represented the constituency since 1945. Clearly, the constituency 
and its local electoral wards were a Labour heartland yet as has been evidenced the 
electorates of these wards at lower-tier elections in the early 1960s to the early 1970s 
behaved atypically at the polls. These were the Ladywood, Duddeston, A l l Saints 
(previously St Paul's), Rotton Park and Soho wards. The remainder of the eleven 
residuals were wards contiguous to the Ladywood constituency and had featured in 
the revival of Liberalism in inner-city Birmingham. 
Thus far we have identified which of the Birmingham wards were atypical in their 
voting behaviour and found that all but one of the wards that comprised the 
Ladywood constituency, where the Liberal murucipal electoral revival and subsequent 
parliamentary success occurred have been identified as exceptional cases that do not 
concur with our Labour Party model. In order to add fiirther weight to our argument 
for the effect of local determinants on voting behaviour at municipal elections we 
must firstly, identify what is different about these erstwhile Labour heartland wards in 
terms of their socio-economic and political characteristics from the characteristics of 
those wards identified as typifying LABWIN wards by the logistic regression model. 
We can do this by comparing the value of a predictor in a residual ward to the all 
ward mean value of the same predictor in the model for LABWIN. Secondly, the 
predictors that are shown to be different must also correspond to those predictors 
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proven to be associated with enhanced odds of the Liberal Party gaining an above the 
mean share of the vote at Birmingham lower-tier elections. 
If , as the case study evidence of the Ladywood constituency has argued, the socio-
economic environment and political context of its wards shaped the outcomes of these 
lower-tier elections and these determinants were favourable towards the Liberal Party, 
then it should follow that those predictors shown to have been significant in 
enhancing the odds of an above the mean share of the vote for the Liberals (see Tables 
58,59,60) TURNOUT, OWNER-OCCUPATION, COUNCIL RENTED, RD>L5 and 
SHARE/LACK HOT WATER, should have exceptional values when compared to the 
all-ward mean of the same predictors of our LABWIN wards. 
The eleven residual inner-city Birmingham wards have been listed in Tables 65 
below. Included are the predictors that were found to be significant in enhancing the 
odds of an above the mean share of the vote for the Libera! Party at Birmingham 
elections. The table also includes; the mean value of the variables TURNOUT, OWN-
OCC, COUN-RENT, RD>L5 and S/LHOTWATER, and their standard deviation for 
all LABWIN lower-tier contests 1959-1979. These all wards mean values are 
contrasted with the values of these predictors for our individual residual wards and in 
brackets the unit standard deviation increase or decrease peculiar to a ward. 
In Table 65 the ward level mean value of the predictors, TURNOUT, OWNER-
OCCUPEER, COUNCIL RENTED, RD. 1.5 and S/LHOTWATER, and their standard 
deviations have been listed in the first three rows. In the lower half of the table the 
individual ward value for each of the above predictors in relation to our atypically 
performing wards is listed. In the same cell as the individual mean is a measure (in 
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brackets) of the variance of that figure from the all ward mean of that particular 
predictor. This variance has been calculated by subtraction of each individual residual 
ward score fi-om the all ward mean and the result divided by the standard deviation of 
that all ward mean to provide an index of dissimilarity. 
In the wards of the Ladywood constituency the indices for the predictors RD>1.5 and 
S/LHOTWATER at lower-tier Birmingham elections range fi-om +1.8 to + 4.4 SDs 
above the all ward mean values for these predictors. Furthermore, TURNOUT was 
below the all ward mean, -.2 to -.8, and COUNCIL RENTED well above the all ward 
mean, +.7 to +2.4. In the Al l Saints ward the index of overcrowding RD>1.5 was 
almost 2 standard deviations above the mean for those wards predicted by our 
LABWIN logistic regression model, and the index SHARE/LACK HOT WATER 2.5 
standard deviations above the mean. In the Ladywood ward the indices RD>1.5 and 
SHARE/LACK HOT WATER were respectively, 4.4 and 1.8 standard deviations 
above the mean. In the Duddeston and Rotton Park wards the RD>1.5 was 
respectively 3.1 and 2.1 standard deviations above our LABWIN mean. 
Thus, there were great differences between a number of socio-economic predictors of 
these erstwhile Labour heartland wards and their counterparts that predicted a Labour 
win and, more importantly they are predictors shown to be associated with above the 
mean support for Liberal candidates. Clearly, the socio-economic environment and 
political context of these wards at those particular elections had some impact upon 
Liberal Party local electoral fortunes, and i f only in the sense of providing a base of 
party support for contesting parliamentary elections in the Ladywood Constituency 
some influence at the national level. 
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Table 65: Birmingham loweMier elections 1959-1979, wards of the Birmingham Ladywood 
Constituency classed as residuals, and contiguous wards classed as residuals. 
T U R N O U T O W N - O C C COUN-RENT RD>1.5 S / L H O T W A T E R 
N= 752 753 753 744 669 
All ward mean 34^2 39.81 34.49 321 19.18 
All ward S D 10.44 19.24 23.17 3.14 20J7 
R E S I D U A L L A D Y W O O D WARDS 
T U R N O U T O W N - O C C COUN-RENT RD>1^ S / L H O T W A T E R 
Duddeston 31.23 4.67 82.68 12.73 28.61 
+/-SD ( O S ) (-1.83) (+2.08) (+3.03) (+.46) 
Ladywood 26.45 0.58 90.69 16.86 55.52 
+/-SD (-.81) (-2.03) (+2.43) (+435) (+1.78) 
Newtown 35.61 12.11 74.72 3.74 15.5 
+/-SD * (-1.45) (+1.74) (+.17) (-.18) 
All Saints 28^9 16.86 51.6 9.40 69.40 
+/-SD (-.2) (-.58) (+.74) (+1.97) (+2.46) 
Rotten Park 31.97 22.01 36.56 9.96 62J9 
+/-SD (-.28) (-.93) (+.09) (+2.15) (+2.48) 
R E S I D U A L C O N T I G U O U S WARDS 
Deritend 17.25 13.54 53.64 11.85 61.46 
+/-SD (ST) (-1.4) (+.83) (+2.75) (+2.08) 
Handswortb 51.2 46.1 22.6 3.86 23.5 
+/-SD (+1.6) (+J3) (-.53) (+.20) (+.21) 
Aston 20.07 19.61 52J2 9.68 66.78 
+/- SD (-.43) (-.51) (+.77) (+2.06) (+234) 
Saltley 25.17 37.99 40.25 9.21 19.00 
+/-SD (-.93) (-.09) (+.24) (+1.9) • 
Small Heath 27.23 43.77 29.69 10.74 25.6 
+/-SD (-0.74) (+.20) (-.21) (+2.40) (+32) 
Sparkbrook 26.62 35.73 22.89 10.56 37.56 
+/-SD (-.82) (-.21) (-.50) (+2J4) (+.90) 
A total of 52 atypically performing wards were identified as residuals by logistic 
regression analysis in relation to our categorical dependent variables 
LABWIN/LABLOSE, and CONWIN/CONLOSE at the lower-tier inner-London 
elections 1959-1979. Those wards that are relevant to the London case study locations 
are listed in Table 66 below. The table lists those residuals relevant to the case studies 
of Camden and Islington. The vrards of Highgate, Holbom, Regent's Park, and West 
End were identified as atypically performing in relation to the categorical dependent 
variable LABWIN/LABLOSE, and the remainder in relation to the categorical 
dependent variable CONWTN/CONLOSE. To avoid unnecessary complexity the 
post-1964 ward names and the post-1970 constituencies are cited. Camden LB was 
346 
made up of 19 wards and of these 8 were classified as residuals by the best fitting 
models of logistic regression analyses. Islington LB was also made up of 19 wards 
and 3 of these were also identified as atypical in their voting behaviour at lower-tier 
elections. At parliamentary elections these 11 local government electoral units were 
distributed over a number of constituencies. The 8 Camden wards in the following 
constituencies; Camden Hampstead, Camden Holbom and St Pancras South, and 
Camden St Pancras North. In the Camden Holbom and St Pancras South 
Constituency, made up of 6 local electoral ward units, three wards, Holbom, Regent's 
Park and Bloomsbury were atypically performing at lower-tier elections. Thus, the 
electorates of 50% of the wards that made up this constituency were atypical in their 
municipal voting behaviour. Two were atypical in relation to the odds of victory for 
the Labour Party and the other in relation to the odds of the Conservative Party. The 
Camden Hampstead Constituency also had three of its wards where the electorate 
voted atypically at lower-tier elections; the Belsize, West End and Swiss Cottage 
wards. Belsize in relation to the odds of a Labour Party victory and the other two in 
relation to the Conservative Party's prospects. In Camden St Pancras North 
Constituency, two of its component local govemment electoral units were atypical in 
their municipal voting behaviour. Although the measures of the variance from the all 
ward mean of the predictors conducive to a Liberal above the mean share of the vote, 
are not as extreme as the inner-city wards of Birmingham, they nevertheless, are 
informative. The level of turnout in these Camden wards was above the mean and in 
the Bloomsbury, Belsize, Chalk Farm and Regent's Park wards the percentage 
households rented unfurnished was also above the mean for inner-London wards. 
Thus two of the predictors associated with an above the mean share of the vote for 
Liberal candidates were at force in these wards. The incidence of atypical lower-tier 
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voting behaviour was less prevalent in the Islington LB. Nevertheless, the wards of, 
Bunhill, Pentonvitle and Highview were identified as residuals, and were components 
of the following constituencies; Bunhill and Pentonville were two of the six wards 
that comprised the Islington South and Finsbury Constituency, and the Highview 
ward was one of seven that made up the Islington North Constituency. Once more the 
measures of dissimilarity are not as extreme as those for the wards of inner-city 
Birmingham, although tumout was below the mean and the percentage residents of 
social class four above the all ward mean. 
Table 66: Inner-London lower-tier elections 1959-1979, (Camden L B and Islington L B ) 
residuals. 
M A J O R T F Y T U R N O U T S 0 C C L A S S 4 UNFURN 
N= 221. 2209 1544 1538 
All ward mean 33.69 33.83 14.42 25.43 
All ward S D 22.61 10.48 6.59 16.25 
LONDON R E S I D U A L S 
C A M D E N L B M A J O R I T V T U R N O U T S 0 C C L A S S 4 UNFURN 
WARDS 
B E L S i Z E 5.49 40.30 4.09 27.37 
4V- SD (-1.23) (+.62) (-1.57) (+.12) 
BLOOMSBURY 13.23 27.1 4.38 68.50 
+/.SD (-.90) (-.64) (-1.52) (+2.65) 
C H A L K FARM 13.97 37.80 2.08 40.81 
+/-SD (-.87) (+•38) (-1.87) (+.95) 
HIGHGATE 6.59 48.40 5.81 27.42 
+/-SD (-1.19) (+1.39) (-1.31) (+.12) 
HOLBORN 48.44 34.4 6.77 46.35 
+/.SD (.065) * (-1.16) (+1.29) 
SWISS 2.82 38.30 4.43 28.65 
C O T T A G E 
47-SD 
(-1.37) (+0.43) (-1.52) (+.19) 
R E G T ' S PARK 25.29 36.7 2.19 56.01 
+/-SD (-.37) (+.27) (-1.86) (+1.88) 
WEST END 2.12 45.15 6.08 18.56 
+/. SO (-1.39) (+1.08) (-1.27) (-.42) 
I S L I N G T O N L B 
W A R D S 
BUNHILL 5.18 27.50 15.85 28.42 
+/-SD (-1-26) (-.6) (+.22) (+.18) 
PENTONVILLE 9.86 26.00 24.48 46.44 
+/-SD (1.05) (-.75) (1.53) (+1 .3) 
HIGHVIEW 25.58 25.9 18.53 1994 
+/-SD (-.36) (-.76) (+.62) (-.34) 
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The logistic regression analysis of Sutton Coldfield classified only two wards as 
residuals, the Hil l West ward in 1963 and the Boldmere West ward in 1970, both 
wards were, however, significant in the resurgence of Liberalism in the borough. 
Using the predictors from the best fitting model of the logistic regression of > 
LIBMEAN share of the vote, it was found that the Hi l l West ward had an above the 
mean percentage of both non-manual and junior non-manual residents, and Boldmere 
West an above the mean presence of junior non-manual residents. It remains to be seen 
i f any of the constituencies to which these atypically performing local government 
electoral units belonged, also performed atypically at parliamentary elections. 
At inner-London parliamentary electionsl959-1979, in constituencies contested by the 
Liberals the mean Liberal share of the vote was 12.3% and standard deviation 4,2. In the 
constituencies of interest to this study the Liberal share of the vote at the February 1974 
General Election was 18.4 in Camden Hampstead, 18.3 in Holbora and St Pancras, 22.1 
in Islington Central, and 19.5 in Islington South and Finsbury, all >1.5 standard 
deviations above the mean for the 1959-1979 period and >.9 standard deviation above 
the Liberal Party contested constituencies mean for February 1974. 
At parliamentary elections in Birmingham constituencies 1959-1979 the Liberal mean 
share of the vote, in constituencies contested by the Liberals was 13.6% and a standard 
deviation 5.5. However, in the Ladywood Constituency the Liberal share of the vote was 
23.7%, at the parliamentary by-election of 1969 the Liberals polled 54.3% and at the 
1970 general election 35%, all well above the mean for the Liberal share of the vote in 
other Birmingham constituencies at the same elections. 
10.7:Conclusion 
In this chapter census data and electoral data have been analysed in order to explore the 
relationships between the socio-economic/political/structural characteristics of a 
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municipal electoral unit and the voting behaviour therein. The aim has been to gain 
insights into the process, meaning and determinants of municipal voting behaviour and its 
relationship, i f any, with party fortunes at the parliamentary level. A main plank of the 
analysis has been the issue of whether local electoral environment and context in any way 
influenced the prospects and performance of the Liberal Party at municipal elections and 
whether this in turn influenced class-party alignment at the parliamentary level in the 
same locations. In order to assess this, municipal electoral class- party alignment has been 
examined. Its trends, and the causes of these trends have been evidenced by use of 
inferential statistical techniques that have tested a battery of hypotheses. 
These analyses of Birmin^am, Sutton Coldfield and inner-London have evidenced 
variability in the influence of individual socio-economic indicators upon party support at 
different types of elections. The influence of social class on party support has been shown 
to have varied between the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, between types of elections 
and between different authorities. It has been evidenced that the relationship between 
class and party at the municipal electoral level was complex and much more nuanced than 
a dichotomy between a pattern of alignment or one of dealignment would allow, and that 
class-party alignment was dependent to some extent upon electoral context, i.e. past party 
political control of a ward, and or, party political control of a council at the time of the 
election. Although the evidence is somewhat ambivalent in regard to trends in class-party 
alignment and support for the two-major parties at municipal elections it does not 
however support a clear cut case for class-party dealignment in the 1970s. 
Class-party dealignment in relation to support for the Labour Party has been evidenced as 
emanating fi-om indicators of household amenity, level of turnout and conditioned by the 
political context of type of election, past party political control of a ward and or control of 
the council. In the case of class-party dealignment and support for the Conservative Party 
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it has been evidenced to have been contingent upon the type of municipal election, 
political control of a ward and, or, council. Indeed, political context at municipal elections 
looms large in any explanation of Conservative Party class-party dealignment. 
Political context has also been evidenced as setting the parameters of Liberal Party 
fortunes at the municipal level. Nevertheless, support for the Liberal Party has been 
clearly associated with housing amenity variables. Socio-economic environment and 
political context have been evidenced as having had significant influence upon the 
fortunes of the Liberal Party at these municipal elections. Indeed, at Birmingham 
municipal elections it has been shown that the Liberal Party were most likely to be 
relatively more successful in wards where past political control had been in the hands of 
the Labour Party, where turnout was low, where owner-occupation was low and where 
the percentage of households with substandard amenities was high-
Examination of the residuals, those cases that did not conforai to the best fitting models 
of party support, has confirmed the significance of particular socio-economic/ political/ 
structural characteristics of a ward and support for the Liberal Party at municipal 
elections. It can be concluded that the evidence of this chapter has identified the existence 
of variability in voting behaviour at different types of municipal elections and that the 
sources of these variations he in the prevailing socio-economic environment and political 
context that the act of voting at theses municipal elections took place in. 
Furthermore it has been shown that those wards found to be atypical in their municipal 
voting behaviour had above the mean measures of the socio-economic indicators found to 
be associated with enhanced Liberal Party electoral performance. These atypically 
performing wards were major components of the constituencies that made up Camden, 
were a major component of the Birmingham Ladywood Constituency, and were integral 
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parts of the constituencies of Islington, and the constituency of Sutton Coldfield. 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that in all of these constituencies the Liberals, at a 
subsequent parliamentary election, achieved an above the mean share of the vote. 
The inference of this evidence is that municipal electoral success, in part determined by 
local socio-economic environment and political context, provided the base for the 
establishment of core support for the Liberal party that provided the stepping-stone to 
above the mean success at parliamentary elections. What, unfortunately, has been 
prohibited by small sample size and inadequate models, has been a regression analysis of 
the deteminants of Liberal Party support and the odds of an above the mean Liberal share 
of the vote in a constituency over the 1959-1979 period and subsequent comparison with 
the determinants of support in that constituency's coterminous local electoral units over 
the same period. 
In the next chapter the quantitative evidence of chapters 4, 9 and 10, and the qualitative 
evidence of chapters 5-8 will be compared and contrasted and the substantive issues of 
this thesis, such as the nature, sources and causes of electoral dealignment at municipal 
and parliamentary election addressed. 
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C H A P T E R 11 
A C O M P A R A T I V E ANALYSIS 
11.1 Introduction 
The aim of the thesis has been to examine the relationship between local government 
electoral behaviour and that at the parliamentary level in a period of political 
dealignment in Britain. In chapter 4 quantitative methods were used to assess the 
extent of any variation in local electoral behaviour within authorities, between 
authorities of the same type, and in contrast with parliamentary electoral behaviour in 
coterminous electoral units. The general hypothesis that there is no difference 
between local and parliamentary electoral behaviour was tested and orthodox 
explanations of the relationship between the two levels of electoral activity 
challenged. Indeed, it was evidenced that there was considerable variance in intra- and 
inter-authority voting behaviour and disparity between local and parliamentary voting 
behaviour in coterminous electoral units. 
In chapters 5 to 8 qualitative methods were employed and it has been argued that 
disparities in electoral behaviour can, in part, be explained by the local social and 
political environment in which the act of voting takes place. It was also argued that 
local government electoral activity can shape subsequent pariiamentary electoral 
activity and outcomes. 
In chapters 9 and 10 we returned to the quantitative methods of analysis to test a 
number of hypotheses concerning the influence of a range of socio-economic and 
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political variables upon a party's level of support and the odds of a party winning a 
lower-tier electoral contest. Furthermore, we assessed whether local socio-economic 
environment and political context influenced the prospects and performance of the 
Liberal Party at municipal elections and i f this in turn presaged success for the Liberal 
Party at subsequent parliamentary elections in these locations, thereby impacting on 
party alignment at the national level. 
This chapter will comprise a comparative analysis of the quantitative and qualitative 
evidence of the thesis. In section 11.2 a review of the findings from chapters 4,9 and 
10 wi l l be outlined. A synthesis of each case study's qualitative and quantitative 
evidence wil l follow and in a final section conclusions about the nature, sources, and 
causes of dealignment at these municipal elections and interconnection with 
parliamentary electoral dealignment will be presented. 
11.2 Summary of quantitative evidence 
The expectation that local government voting behaviour would closely resemble 
parliamentary electoral behaviour was not borne out by the findings of chapter 4. 
The politicisation of municipal elections in both Birmingham and Inner-London over 
the 1959-1979 period has been evidenced. It has also been shown that irrespective of 
the differences in the timing of elections there was variance in the degree and 
incidence of partisan dealignment between municipal and parliamentary levels of 
voting. Desertion of the two major parties by the electorate has been shown to be 
period specific and no strong evidence of a trend in dealignment in the 1970s found. 
Trends in municipal and pariiamentary electoral behaviour differed considerably. 
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The level of contestation by the Liberal Party at municipal elections in both imier-
London and Birmingham 1959-1979 was characterised by a fluctuating ability to field 
candidates. It was also evidenced that the percentage Liberal share of the vote 
calculated over all wards, contested or not, masked not only the real extent of Liberal 
support in contested wards but also distorted any notion of the rate and pace voters in 
particular wards were entering or exiting the Liberal camp. At the borough level of 
aggregation, where differences tend to be smoothed out, it was shovm that turnout in 
Liberal contested wards was consistently higher than the mean for all wards and, at 
Inner- London borough elections, and the mean turnout in non-marginal wards 
contested by the Liberals was almost a quarter higher than in non-marginal wards 
uncontested by the Liberals. Furthermore, it became evident that the patterns of 
turnout in the socio-economically very similar boroughs of Camden and Islington 
were considerably different. 
The proposition that over time voting behaviour at local elections would closely 
resemble that in their coterminous parliamentary electoral units was not realised. 
Examination of the case study locations revealed clear disparities in trends of turnout, 
party support and net volatility between municipal and parliamentary electoral 
behaviour in coterminous electoral units. The evidence has shown that the electorate 
in inner-London and Birmingham at certain times and in particular wards 
concomitantly held contradictory municipal and parliamentary voting preferences. 
The context of an election was shown to be important to the calculus of voters when it 
came to deciding which party to vote for and thereby partisan dealignment was shown 
to have varied according to local electoral context. 
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In chapters 9 and 10 inferential statistical techniques were used to assess how far 
variation in party support could be explained by socio-economic / political/ structural 
factors peculiar to an electoral unit. When contrasted, the best fitting regression 
models of party support at different types of elections evidenced that the effect upon 
party support of individual socio-economic indicators varied. Furthermore, the effects 
of indicators of political context upon party support varied at different types of 
elections, as did the influence of social class and household amenity indicators. The 
regression analysis rejected the hypothesis that there was a significant weakening of 
class alignment with the two major parties at municipal elections in Birmingham and 
inner-London between the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, class-party 
alignment was shown to be much more nuanced at municipal elections and these 
differences in class- party alignment were shown to be in part determined by electoral 
context. 
Logistic regression analysis demonstrated that support for the three parties at these 
municipal elections was conditioned by local political context. It has been shown that 
variance in voting behaviour at different types of municipal election can be explained 
by the prevailing socio-economic envirormient and political context in which the act 
of voting took place. An examination of the residuals from our best fitting models 
confirmed the presence of particular socio-economic/political structural 
characteristics that had been shown to be significant in predicting an above the mean 
share of the vote for the Liberal Party. These atypically performing wards were shown 
to be components of the case study constituencies and in these constituencies the 
Liberal Party subsequently achieved an above the mean share of the vote. 
11.3: Birmingham qualitative and quantitative evidence 
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It has been argued in chapter 5 that the revival of the Liberal Party at municipal 
elections and subsequent success at the parliamentary level in the Birmingham 
Ladywood Constituency can in part be explained by electoral discontent over housing 
issues, such as the conditions of housing and the levels of both rents and rates. The 
qualitative evidence has demonstrated that the housing policy implemented by the 
Labour Group resulted in a loss of support in these hitherto heartland wards and that 
the electoral vacuum was filled by the Liberal Party whose candidates campaigned 
upon a platform that specifically addressed the housing grievances of this inner-city 
electorate. Thus, the local socio-economic environment and political context o f these 
wards has been revealed to have influenced municipal and parliamentary electoral 
outcomes. It has also been shown that at municipal elections across the wards of the 
Birmingham borough as a whole, the level of council rents and rates was a significant 
factor in the calculus of the voter. The qualitative evidence has proposed explanations 
for partisan and class dealignment at the municipal electoral level in terms of the 
electoral context in which the voter has cast his or her vote. We will now assess to 
what extent the quantitative findings firom chapters 4, 9 and 10 substantiate the 
qualitative findings of the case study regarding electoral behaviour in the wards of 
Ladywood and in Birmingham in general. 
The quantitative evidence of chapter 4 has illustrated the variance between voting 
behaviour at different types of elections. Measures of net volatility and partisan 
dealignment have substantiated the findings of the Ladywood case study of variance 
in the voting behaviour of traditional Labour supporters between lower-tier municipal 
and the parliamentary electoral levels. The 1960s decline in Labour Party support at 
Birmingham lower-tier municipal elections in its irmer-city wards has been evidenced 
in the case study to have been recognised and explained by a variety of sources as the 
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product of discontent over housing conditions, housing policy and the level of rents 
and rates. The multivariate analysis of these Birmingham elections has evidenced the 
significance of class, socio-economic group and household amenities to the 
explanation of the level of Labour Party support and accords with existing orthodoxy 
that high levels of housing density and non-salariat variables have a strong positive 
effect upon Labour Party support. Indeed, in Birmingham, indicators of MANUAL, 
SOCIAL CLASS 4 and SOCIAL CLASS 6 had positive associations with Labour 
support at the parliamentary electoral level, and SOCL\L CLASS 4, MANUAL, 
SHARE INSIDE WC and the room density indicator RD. 1-1.5 had positive 
associations with Labour support at the lower-tier elections (see Tables 43 and 45). 
However, the multivariate regression analysis revealed that the indicator of the higher 
density of overcrowding of more than 1.5 persons per room, RD>1.5, was clearly and 
sttongly negatively associated with support for the Labour party at lower-tier 
Birmingham elections throughout the 1959-1979 period. Thus, for every percentage 
increase in RD>I.5 households in a ward, support for Labour diminished by 1.2% at 
lower-tier elections. In addition, the indicator SHARED DWELLING revealed an 
erosion of almost 1.9% in Labour support at Birmingham parliamentary elections for 
every percentage increase in households categorised as shared dwellings in the 1960s. 
Similarly, the indicator SOCIAL CLASS 5 evidenced a fall of 1.6% in Labour Party 
support at Birmingham parliamentary elections 1959-1979 for every percentage 
increase in social class 5 in a constituency, and a fall of 1.9% at lower-tier elections 
for every percentage increase of social class 5 in a ward in the 1960s. Clearly, the 
quantitative evidence from the regression analysis of the Birmingham data 
substantiates the qualitative evidence of the Ladywood case study in terms of the 
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effect of socio-economic environment upon voting behaviour. The quantitative 
analysis evidences an erosion of Labour Party support associated with that part of the 
city's woilcing-class electorate who lived in the most overcrowded households, and 
or, multi-occupancy dwellings, all predominant characteristics o f the wards of the 
Ladywood constituency. 
The logistic regression analysis in chapter 10 evidenced cross-electoral level disparity 
in the influence of predictors upon the likelihood of a Labour Party win that accords 
with the case study evidence that has shown Labour to have maintained its 
parliamentary level support but lost it in heartland wards at the municipal level. As 
with the evidence from the multivariate regression analysis, the logistic regression 
analysis evidenced the nuances of Labour Party and class-party dealignment, and has 
shown SOCIAL CLASS 6 to be less robust in its association with Labour support at 
lower-tier Birmingham elections. Similarly, the logistic regression evidenced the 
importance of the household amenity indicator SHAPIE/LACK HOT WATER to the 
likelihood of a Labour Party victory and how those odds were reduced by 0.96 for 
every unit increase in this indicator, a reduction of around 4% in the odds and 
evidence of the importance of housing conditions to Labour's level of support at the 
lower-tier Birmingham elections. It was also evidenced by the logistic regression 
analysis that control of the council (either Labour or Conservative) had little or no 
effect upon the odds of a Labour win. 
Labour's loss of support at the lower-tier electoral level has been shown by both the 
quantitative and qualitative evidence to be strongly associated with issues of housing. 
The case study evidence has argued that the Liberal revival in the inner-city wards 
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was on the back of electoral discontent over these issues and a product of a focussed 
campaign to address these electoral grievances. In hitherto derelict wards the Liberals 
displaced Labour as the champions of the housing cause and, in these heartland 
Labour wards, established a core support that, albeit temporarily, provided them with 
parliamentary electoral success. The regression analysis has shown that there 
cross-electoral variability in the impact o f socio-economic indicators and support for 
the Liberal Party in relation to what would be considered traditional Labour voters. 
Social class 4 at the parliamentary level throughout the 1959-1979 period, social 
classes 5 and 6 at upper-tier elections in the 1970s and council house tenants at the 
lower-tier throughout the 1959-1979 period have shown a positive association with 
support for the Liberal Party. Furthermore, the household amenity predictor 
SHARE/LACK HOT WATER has been shown to be positively associated with 
support for the Liberal Party at both tiers of municipal voting in Birmingham 
throughout the whole period. 
In addition our logistic regression analysis has shown that the odds of a Liberal 
candidate achieving an above the mean share of the vote could be multiplied by 1.03 
for every unit increase in the household amenity predictor SHARE/LACK HOT 
WATER and reduced by 4% for every unit increase in the predictor OWNER-
OCCUPIER throughout the 1959-1979 period. Logistic regression has shown that a 
Liberal Party candidate was more likely to achieve an above the mean share of the 
vote at lower-tier ward competitions where owner-occupation was low, where the 
percentage of households with substandard amenities was high and where past 
political control of the ward had been in the hands of the Labour Party. The 
quantitative evidence clearly chimes with the qualitative evidence of the Ladywood 
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case study as far as the determinants of municipal electoral dealignment are concerned 
in relation to the Labour Party loss of support and the Liberal Party revival in the 
Ladywood constituency. 
In the Ladywood case study it has been evidenced that the rise and decline in lower-
tier electoral support for the Liberal Party in the inner-city wards appeared to mirror 
the rise and decline in the salience of housing issues to its electorate. The housing 
grievances of the electorate were gradually being remedied and the Labour Group had 
changed the focus of its housing policy and had 'kick-started' the city's municipal 
house building progranmie when it had regained council control in 1972. The number 
of grossly overcrowded and substandard dwellings had diminished over the 1960s as 
the electorate of these inner-city wards were re-housed or their properties modernised 
(see Tables 32,33 and 34). The electoral niche of the Liberals had lost its purchase 
and the party's grip on the inner-city electorate had thereby loosened. Clearly, the 
strong relationship between the indicator of gross overcrowding RD>1.5 was no 
longer acting in favour of Liberal Party support. Regression analysis has also 
evidenced a reduction in the strength of the positive relationship between the predictor 
SHARE/LACK HOT WATER and Liberal Party support at these lower-tier elections 
over the two decades. Furthermore, the positive association of 0.7 between 
SHARE/LACK HOT WATER and Liberal support at the lower-tier in the 1960s had 
fallen to 0.4 for the 1970s. 
There is much congruence between the qualitative and quantitative evidence, thereby 
providing substantiation of the importance of socio-economic environment and 
political context to the revival of the Liberal Party at municipal elections in the wards 
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of the Ladywood constituency in the 1960s. In the case study it has been asserted that 
municipal electoral success was the foundation of a core Liberal support built upon 
local issues and translated into parliamentary success in 1969 for a Liberal Party 
candidate in the Ladywood constituency. To what extent these votes were cast in 
consideration of local issues was unclear but our quantitative evidence has added 
weight to the argument that local context had an influence upon national level 
electoral behaviour in the constituency. 
Multivariate regression analysis of parliamentary elections in the constituencies of 
Birmingham 1959-1979 has evidenced a strong negative relationship between 
SOCL^L CLASS 5 and support for the Labour Party and has shown that for every 
percentage increase in this indicator Labour support at parliamentary election fell by 
1.6% (see Table 43), The analysis also evidenced an erosion of Labour's 
parliamentary support of 1.9% for every unit increase in SHARED DWELLING, and 
a negative relationship with TURNOUT. It has also been shown that there was a 
strong positive relationship between SOCIAL CLASS 4 and support for the Liberal 
Party at these parliamentary elections (Table 43) and a positive association between 
COUNCIL RENTED and parliamentary level Liberal support (Table 46). Al l of these 
indicators have been shown in the case study to characterise the working-class 
electorate of the wards that made up the Ladywood constituency. However, more 
weight was added to the argument for the influence of electoral contextuality upon 
parliamentary voting behaviour by the examination of the residuals from the logistic 
regression analysis. 
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Al l but one of the wards that comprised the Ladywood constituency 1959-1973 were 
identified as atypical in their voting behaviour at lower-tier elections in relation to the 
odds of a Labour Party win. More importantly, it was shown that, not only were 
measures of a number of indicators very different in these cases (erstwhile Labour 
heartland wards of Ladywood) from their counterpart indicators in cases that had 
conformed to the Labour win logistic regression model, but they were also measures 
of predictors that had been shown to be associated with an above the mean share of 
the vote for Liberal Party candidates (Table 65). However indirectly, the convergence 
of these strands of quantitative and qualitative evidence reinforces the argument for 
the influence of contextuality upon parliamentary voting behaviour in the Ladywood 
constituency. 
The focus of chapter 5 was predominantly upon the Labour and Liberal parties, 
nonetheless the importance of electoral context in relation to Conservative Party 
support in terms of the rate level and protest votes for Liberal candidates in suburban 
wards was signalled. For example, at four lower-tier by-elections in 1961 the Liberals 
pushed Labour into third place in suburban wards, however. Liberal intervention had 
little or no effect upon the historic level o f Labour support in these wards but in every 
case seriously eroded the Conservative majority. Multivariate regression analysis has 
corroborated this dealignment in Conservative support in suburban wards and 
evidenced cross-electoral level variability in the association between Conservative 
Party support and the indicator JUNIOR NON-MANUAL, it has been shown to be 
much more strongly positively associated with support for the party at the upper-tier 
than at the lower-tier elections, where a vote could register dissatisfaction with 
decisions over rate and rent levels and costly social housing projects (Table 43). The 
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indicator OWNER-OCCUPIER also had a much stronger association with support for 
Conservative candidates at the parliamentary level than at the municipal level in the 
1970s (Table 44). The results of our logistic regression analysis gave support to the 
qualitative evidence of chapter 5 concerning a class-party realignment in municipal 
Conservative support in the 1970s. The odds of a Conservative candidate winning 
were shown to have improved at both lower and upper-tier Birmingham elections in 
the 1970s. 
The relationship between local and national elections was explored further in chapter 
6, the case study that looked at the revival of the Liberals in the Conservative 
dominated borough of Sutton Coldfield. The qualitative evidence has described a 
dramatic change in party alignment among the electorate at borough council elections 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A major shift in electoral support away from 
Independent candidates, significant shifts from the Conservative and Labour parties to 
positions of temporary support for the Liberals, permanent support for the Liberals 
and, or, abstention, have been evidenced. It has been argued that alignment between 
class and party was significantly weakened by contentious local issues and by Liberal 
intervention and campaign policies pitched at the disparate grievances of the Sutton 
electorate. The electorate have been shown to have held contradictory voting 
preferences at local and parliamentary level elections and it has been argued that at 
council elections the disaffected found either a temporary safe-haven for a protest 
vote, or indeed, a permanent home in the Liberal camp, so translating into the Liberal 
Party displacing Labour and contending for political power with the Conservatives at 
the parliamentary as well as the municipal level. It was also argued in the case study 
that there was a realignment with the Conservative party at the local elections in the 
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aftermath o f the merger o f Sutton Coldfield with Birmingham, as a new variable, the 
possibility of Labour control of Birmingham council, entered the electoral calculus of 
the former protest voting Conservative. 
The quantitative evidence of chapter 4 has supported the above findings. Indicators of 
electoral behaviour in the coterminous local electoral wards and parliamentary 
constituency of Sutton Coldfield revealed significant variance between the two types 
of elections (see Figures 33-36). Net volatility was shown to be at a much higher level 
at council elections than at parliamentary elections with periodic shifts in the 
distribution of party support at the municipal level that did not reflect the general 
pattern of partisan aligrmient at the parliamentary level. Support for the Labour Party 
was shown to be much stronger at the parliamentary level than the municipal, whereas 
the reverse was true for the Liberals. In contrast, support for the Conservative Party 
vras reasonably constant at the parliamentary level, whereas its municipal electoral 
support subject to periodic shifts, as comparison of the standard deviation in 
Conservative support at the two levels evidenced. Variance in turnout levels were also 
shown between the borough's wards at individual council elections, as was great 
variance in each individual ward's level of turnout over a series of elections. 
Particular wards at particular times were shown to fluctuate dramatically from the all 
ward mean turnout. The quantitative evidence substantiated that of the case study, and 
added weight to the case for contextual voting at local elections in Sutton Coldfield in 
contradistinction to the constituency's pariiamentary voting behaviour. 
Multivariate regression analysis of the Sutton Coldfield data excluded the Labour 
Party and was restricted to council elections because of problems with sample size. 
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Nevertheless, the results were congruent with those of the case study. The best fitting 
regression model of Conservative Party support evidenced a positive association with 
both main variables of tenure, OWNER-OCCUPIER and COUNCIL RENTED, and 
with the variable MAJORITY, reflecting the dominance of the party at these council 
elections and the meagre support for the Labour Party evidenced in the case study. 
The best fitting model of Liberal Party support at these council elections confirmed 
the case study findings of class-party dealignment among what would be considered 
the natural constituency of the Conservative Party. There was considerable class-party 
dealignment among the socio-economic group JUNIOR NON-MANUAL evidenced 
by the variable's positive relationship with support for the Liberal Party at council 
elections. Indeed, for every percentage increase in JUNIOR NON-MANUAL in the 
wards of this prosperous middle-class borough. Liberal Party support was shown to 
have increased by 1.2%. The case study evidence of a significant protest vote among 
Conservative voters at council elections in respect of dissatisfaction over rates, social 
housing, redevelopment and a variety of local issues in favour of the Liberals was also 
substantiated by the logistic regression analysis of the categorical variable 
CONWIN/CONLOSE which showed that the odds of the Conservative Party winning 
a ward council election were reduced by 0.72 for every unit increase in JUNIOR 
NON-MANUAL in a ward (see Figure 55). 
However, as the case study evidence has shown the Liberal electoral appeal was not 
only pitched at the dissatisfied rate-paying owner-occupier but also towards the 
council tenant and those in the private rental sector. Our multivariate regression 
analysis has evidenced a negative association between the socio-economic group 
MANUAL and support for the Conservative Party, and a positive association between 
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the household amenity indicator SHARE/LACK BATH and the Liberal Party. 
Furthermore, the case study has evidenced tactical voting for Liberal candidates, 
voter-apathy, low-turnout and general disaffection among Labour supporters over 
rents and housing conditions. Clearly, as shown in the case study, despite the positive 
association between council house tenancy and Conservative Party support shown by 
our regression analyses (Figures 45 and 55) there was significant class-party 
dealignment among Labour supporters at these lower-tier elections that favoured the 
Liberal Party. 
The assertions in the case study of an electoral realignment by the Sutton Coldfield 
electorate in the wake of local government reorganisation and the merger of the 
borough within Birmingham has been substantiated by the quantitative evidence. The 
coefficient for the variable NON-MANUAL in our logistic regression analysis of 
CONWIN/CONLOSE at the Birmingham District Council elections (includes Sutton 
Coldfield) 1973-1979, evidenced a class-party realignment in Conservative Party 
support (Table 54). Furthermore, the coefficient for the tenure category OWNER-
OCCUPIER at these same elections registered a negative association with support for 
the Liberal Party (Table 60). 
Clearly, there is much concordance between the qualitative and quantitative evidences 
in both case study locations of Birmingham. In the section below we will now 
examine i f corroboration exists between the qualitative and quantitative approaches in 
each of the London case studies. 
11.4: Inner-London qualitative and quantitative evidence 
The case study of Islington argued that in this predominantly working class and 
staunchly Labour borough, class and partisan alignment were significantly weakened 
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at the municipal electoral level by contentious local issues of housing. The 
quantitative analysis of chapter 4 has evidenced marked differences in the trends of 
the share of the vote for the Labour Party between parliamentary elections in the 
constituencies of Islington and lower-tier municipal elections in coterminous electoral 
units. Indeed, the stability of Labour's parliamentary level support and its instability 
at the lower-tier level were evidenced by comparison of the standard deviation in vote 
share over the period between each electoral level (Table 29). This disparity in 
electoral behaviour was also shown to characterise Conservative Party support at the 
same elections over the same period. Similarly, comparisons between trends in 
turnout in the Islington East, Islington North and the Islington South West 
constituencies with trends in turnout at their coterminous ward borough elections 
revealed disparities in electoral behaviour. 
It is clear that class and partisan aligrmient changed in Islington at the lower-tier level. 
Furthermore, at the parliamentary level by the early 1980s an electoral realignment 
had occurred that contrasted starkly with the solid two-party duopoly of the post-war 
decades and in the case study this transformation has been ascribed in part to local 
electoral issues and behaviour. Electoral discontent in Islington over housing issues, it 
was argued, gave rise to the Labour left in the 1970s, provided the Liberals a foothold 
in the borough, and created the circumstances for an alliance between moderate 
Labour and the Liberals that transformed the parliamentary level electoral alignment 
in the constituencies of the borough. 
Multivariate regression analysis has evidenced solid support between social classes 4 
and 5 for the Labour Party at the parliamentary level 1959-1979 (Table 48), but 
negative associations between social class 4 at lower-tier and GLC elections in the 
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1970s (Table 50). Logistic regression analysis of the odds of a Labour candidate 
winning a municipal election seemed to contradict this evidence of dealignment at the 
municipal level as it showed the indicator COUN-RENT to be quite stable at different 
levels of municipal voting and between the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, However^ 
the qualitative evidence of the case study has shown that the vast majority of residents 
in the borough, some 67%, had lived in multi-occupancy private rental dwellings, 
60% without piped hot water and 45% without a fixed bath. In contrast, only around 
20% of residents lived in local authority rented accommodation. As the case study has 
shown there was much electoral discontent over high rents in the private rental sector 
and the dearth of social housing provision, there was low turnout at borough elections, 
and loss of Labour support in the areas of worst housing conditions. Indeed, Labour 
rebels had contested as Independent Labour candidates, campaigned on a platform 
that criticised the Labour Group's housing policy and by 1962 had a significant 
following in a number of wards. The quantitative analysis has given support to the 
significance o f the private rental sector in Labour's loss of support with the logistic 
regression evidencing a negative relationship between the tenure category 
FURNISHED and the odds of Labour winning a ward contest in the 1960s (Table 55). 
Multivariate regression analysis and logistic regression analysis of these lower-tier 
London borough elections has evidenced strong negative associations between 
support for the Conservative Party, or the odds of a Conservative candidate wirming a 
ward contest, and the predictors, SOCL\L CLASS 4, SOCIAL CLASS 6, RD>1-I.5, 
COUNCIL-RENTED, SHARE/LACK BATH, and MANUAL (Tables 47,48 and 55). 
Labour's loss of support among those living in the worst of housing conditions was 
clearly not in the direction of the Conservative camp and, thereby, this quantitative 
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evidence lends support to the case study evidence of loss of Labour support to 
independent Labour left and Liberal candidates in Islington. Indeed, the positive 
association between TURNOUT and the odds of a Labour Party candidate winning a 
ward contest in the 1960s was transformed into a negative association in the 1970s as 
the left*s grip on the borough increased (Table 55). 
The significance of household amenity variables in relation to Labour Party support at 
al\ levels of electoral activity in Islington has been established by the quantitative 
analysis and adds support to the case study finding of the central ity of housing issues 
to electoral outcomes in the borough. At lower-tier and pariiamentary elections 1959-
1979 the odds of a Labour candidate win could be multiplied by 1.3 and 1.9 
respectively for every unit increase in the overcrowded category RD>1-1.5, and in the 
1960s by 1.3 forRD>1.5. The household amenity predictors SHARE/LACK HOT 
WATER, NO INSIDE WC. and SHARE/LACK BATH were positively associated 
with the odds of a Labour candidate victory. Therein, however, lay Labour's 
vulnerability. As has been evidenced in the case study the cost of the Islington Labour 
group's failure to address these significant issues was an eventual erosion of support 
to Labour left candidates and in some wards to the Liberals. 
Indeed, the indicators RENTED FURNISHED and TURNOUT were both positively 
associated with Liberal Party support at these lower-tier elections when past political 
control of a ward was in the hands of the Labour party (Table 52). The odds of a 
Liberal candidate achieving an above the mean share of the vote at these lower-tier 
elections was negatively associated with the predictor MAJORITY, evidence that the 
level of Liberal support was generally increased the more marginal the ward contest 
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between the two major parties. The logistic regression analysis also evidenced the 
odds of an above the mean share for a Liberal Party candidate could be multiplied by 
1.2 for every unit increase in the household amenity predictor SHARE/LACK HOT 
WATER, and multiplied by 1.2 for every unit increase in SOCL\L CLASS 4. The 
quantitative evidence corroborates the findings of the case study of support for the 
Liberals in the areas of worst housing, where Labour support was declitung and 
majorities much reduced. 
The case study evidence has shown that the sources of Liberal Party support in 
Islington were among those traditionally linked to both of the major parties. It has 
been shown that in the main the disaffected Labour supporter turned to the 
Independent Labour candidate whose electoral platform criticised the Labour Group's 
housing record and advocated a vast increase in social housing provision. Although 
the Liberals especially in the wards where the issues of housing and race were 
conflated by the maverick Liberal candidate Lomas gained some support from the 
disaffected Labour voters, the party had also pitched their electoral appeal in the 
borough at the ratepayer. The Liberal's had campaigned on reform of the rating 
system and the end to the blanket subsidy of council rents. As shown in the case study 
the rewards for the Liberals were a foothold in two of the borough's three 
constituencies and at the 1974 borough elections second place in three wards with the 
Conservative candidates pushed into third place. Corroborative evidence of this 
leakage of Conservative support has been provided by the quantitative analysis. The 
variability between parliamentary electoral support and that at the municipal level has 
been outlined above. Evidence of class-party dealignment at lower-tier elections was 
provided by the multivariate regression analysis that has shown a much weaker 
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association between the socio-economic group indicators NON-MANUAL and 
JUNIOR NON-MANUAL and support for the Conservative Party at the lower-tier 
electoral level than at the upper-tier electoral level. Indeed, the logistic regression 
analysis of the odds of a Conservative win at these lower-tier elections 1959-1979 
show a very small negative coefficient evidencing an erosion in the odds in relation to 
SOCIAL CLASS 1. Yet at the upper-tier elections over the same period the odds 
could be multiplied by 1.7 for every unit increase in SOCL\L CLASS 1, (Table 56), 
and at the parliamentary level both NON-MANUAL and JUNIOR NON-MANUAL 
were solidly aligned with support for the Conservative Party (Table 49). The 
quantitative evidence accords with that o f the case study of the Liberals in the 1970s 
attracting some former Conservative voters and moderate Labour voters through an 
electoral campaign that criticised the profligate spending on housing of the Labour 
left controlled council, called for the end of subsidised rents and for the sale of 
council houses at a time of rampant inflation. 
The revival of the Liberals in Islington has been shown to be quite modest and the 
incidence of atypical voting behaviour less prevalent than in the wards of the 
Birmingham Ladywood Constituency. Nevertheless, the logistic regression analysis of 
the odds of a Labour candidate, or a Conservative candidate, winning a lower-tier 
ward contest revealed three atypically performing wards as residuals. The Highview, 
Bunhill, and Pentonville wards identified as atypical in their voting behaviour in 
respect of the major parties were the footholds gained by the Liberals in two o f the 
three constituencies of the borough. Logistic regression analysis has shown that each 
had characteristics associated with an above the mean share in a Liberal vote. The 
quantitative evidence is convergent with that of the case study that this foothold of 
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core support, built upon local issues, in an alliance with the moderate Labour 
councillors was the basis of much enhanced subsequent local and parliamentary 
success in Islington for the Liberals. Indeed at the 1982 borough election the Liberals 
had taken 22.4% of the whole borough vote, and at the 1983 general election in the 
Islington North Constituency the SDP had taken 22.4% of the vote, and in the 
Islington South and Finsbury Constituency 35.3% of the vote. 
The case study of Camden has evidenced a more widespread Liberal revival than that 
in Islington where the malcontent Labour voter had the alternative from the early 
1960s of Independent Labour candidates to express disapproval over much the same 
housing problems as in Camden. A difference that was reflected in the quantitative 
analysis that evidenced an above the borough mean turnout in Liberal contested 
Camden wards, whereas in contrast, very little difference between Islington's mean 
turnout and turnout in Islington wards contested by Liberal candidates. 
It was shown in the case study that even before their reorganisation into the new 
London Borough of Camden, the electorates of the three metropolitan boroughs of 
Hampstead, Holbom and St Pancras had voted quite differently at municipal elections 
from how they had at the parliamentary level. Declining support for the Labour Party 
in its heartland wards of these metropolitan boroughs and the impending 
amalgamation, it was argued, did not auger well for the party's electoral prospects. 
Control of St Pancras council had alternated between the two major parties whilst 
Hampstead and Holbom councils had been dominated by the Conservatives. In the 
areas of worst housing conditions of Hampstead and Holbom, Labour were losing 
support and the case study has argued that such pragmatic electoral considerations had 
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shaped Labour's housing policy for fear of any adverse impact upon the level of 
rates. The dire housing conditions of the three metropolitan boroughs and their 
councils* inadequate social housing provision has been evidenced in the case study, as 
has the continuation of this policy by the Labour Group that controlled the new 
Camden borough. Housing issues, it has been argued, were central to the explanation 
of the loss of Labour control o f the council in 1968 and its recapture in a Labour 
landslide at the 1971 borough elections after three years of Conservative council 
retrenchment. Housing issues have been shown to be central to the 1970s rise of the 
left in Camden and the subsequent migration of moderate Labour councillors to 
contest for power in alliance with the Liberals of Camden. In short it has been argued 
that the local socio-economic and political milieu shaped municipal electoral 
outcomes and impacted upon electoral alignment at the parliamentary level in 
coterminous electoral units. 
The quantitative analysis of chapter 4 has evidenced the disparity between municipal 
and parliamentary electoral behaviour in Camden and its former metropolitan 
boroughs. Multivariate regression analysis has evidenced the solid support of social 
classes 4 and 5 for the Labour Party at the parliamentary level and the contrasting 
negative association between social class 4 and the party at lower-tier and GLC 
elections in the 1970s. Furthermore, the logistic regression analysis has shown a 
negative relationship between the tenure category FURNISHED and the odds of a 
Labour Party candidate winning a ward contest in the 1960s (Tables 48 and 55). The 
multivariate and logistic regression analyses have evidenced strong negative 
associations between support for the Conservative Party, or the odds that a 
Conservative candidate would win a ward contest, and the predictors, SOCIAL 
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CLASS 4, SOCL\L CLASS 6, RD>1-1.5, COUNCIL RENTED, SHARE/LACK 
BATH and MANUAL (Tables 48,49 and 56). Labour's loss of electoral support 
among those living in the worst of housing conditions is not indicated as being 
towards the Conservative Party. However, unlike Islington and Birmingham there was 
no organised and consistent challenge from rebel or Independent Labour candidates at 
lower-tier elections in Camden or its pre-1964 metropolitan borough constituents. 
Support for the Labour Party had been declining in the Hampstead Metropolitan 
Borough at lower-tier elections from the mid-1950s, and as the quantitative evidence 
shows there was increased volatility in the distribution of the vote at successive 
borough elections in Hampstead's wards from 1959 (Figure 32), Over the 1950s the 
Liberals had gained an increasing share of the borough vote and at the 1962 borough 
election had taken 29.6% of the whole borough vote along with three seats in the 
Tovm ward that had been in the hands of the Conservatives since 1922. Labour had 
been pushed into third place by the Liberals in three wards, where the Liberals had 
benefited from a swing to them from the Conservative. Critically for Labour its 
support had fallen in four of Hampstead's wards and ominously, support had fallen 
quite dramatically in the West End ward, one the areas of worst housing conditions in 
west Hampstead. The quantitative evidence supports the case study evidence of 
partisan dealignment, of an erosion of Labour support, and indeed Conservative 
support in the wards of Hampstead. Nevertheless, the case study has argued that the 
catalyst of this class-party dealignment in Hampstead and Camden in general had its 
origins in electoral discontent over housing issues and needs to be supported by the 
quantitative evidence. 
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The quantitative analysis has evidenced cross-electoral level disparity in the strength 
of association between the socio-economic group NON-MANUAL and support for 
the Conservative Party at inner-London elections (Table 48). This variance in 
electoral behaviour was also revealed when the standard deviations of Coriservative 
Party share of the vote at lower-tier and parliamentary elections in coterminous 
electoral units of Camden were contrasted (Table 29). Conservative support at lower-
tier elections was much more volatile in the Holbom St Pancras South, and the St 
Pancras North constituencies than at the parliamentary level and when contrasted with 
the Hampstead constituency it appears that through the 1960s Conservative lower-tier 
support was much more prone to attrition in these two constituencies than the latter. 
The case study has shown that the Conservatives dominated both municipal and 
pariiamentary elections in Hampstead and that the two major parties had mixed 
electoral fortunes in St Pancras MB and Holbom MB. In St Pancras MB council 
control had alternated between the Labour and Conservative groups but the St Pancras 
North constituency had returned a Labour candidate at general elections 1945-1970, 
and the Holbom M B council was dominated by the Conservatives but the Holbom 
and St Pancras South constituency had retumed a Labour MP until 1964. In the early 
1960s the electorates, a proportion of which were already quite fluid in their party 
attachments, were given an alternative conduit to express dissatisfaction at the local 
electoral level with the intervention of Liberal candidates. 
The case study has shown that the Liberal Party's electoral appeal in the London 
Borough of Camden was pitched at the disillusioned voter from both major parties. 
The rate payer in general and, in particular what was then termed the 'new man*, the 
upwardly mobile technically skilled young worker. Liberal campaign rhetoric 
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criticised housing conditions but saw the solution in reform of the rating system and a 
fair rent scheme rather than a blanket subsidy of council tenants. Defence of the 
ratepayer's interests was at the heart of the Liberal electoral message. Compulsory 
purchase of property for modernisation or redevelopment and increased social 
housing provision were considered profligate policies that increased the burden upon 
the home owning ratepayer and tenants in the private rental sector via increased rate 
levy upon landlords. The housing policy of the Liberal Party was hardly 
distinguishable from that of the Conservatives, other than the Liberals' aim to achieve 
parity between costs of private renting and mortgage repayment in order to make 
homes more affordable. 
The quantitative analysis lends support to the qualitative and evidences a much 
weaker association between support for the Conservative Party and the socio-
economic groups NON-MANUAL and Junior NON-MANUAL at lower-tier elections 
(Table 49). In the same table it is also evidenced that there was a negative association 
between SOCIAL CLASS 2/3N, made up of skilled non-manual workers, and support 
for the Conservative Party at lower-tier elections in the 1960s,and an even stronger 
negative association at the parliamentary level in the 1970s. Thus for every 
percentage increase in SOCIAL CLASS 2/3N in a ward Conservative Party support 
was diminished by 0.5% at lower-tier elections in the 1960s, and by 1.7% at the 
pariiamentary level for every percentage increase in a constituency. The direction of 
this leakage in Conservative Party support at the parliamentary level in the 1960s was 
evidenced by a positive relationship between the variable NON-MANUAL and 
support for the Liberal Party (Table 51). Logistic regression analysis of the odds of a 
Conservative candidate winning a lower-tier election 1959-1979 revealed a small 
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negative coefficient and erosion of support among SOCELA CLASS 1. Yet at the 
upper-tier the odds of a Conservative wirming could be multiplied by 1.7 for every 
unit increase in SOCIAL CLASS 1 in a division (Table 56), and at the parliamentary 
level NON-MANUAL and JUNIOR NON-MANUAL were solidly aligned with the 
party (Table 49). However, the water was rather muddied by the negative associations 
between JUNIOR-NON MANUAL and Liberal Party support at lower-tier elections 
in Tables 48 and 51. Nevertheless, the weight of the qualitative and quantitative 
evidence points towards class-party dealignment among Conservative Party 
supporters at lower-tier elections and the significance in electoral context in the 
calculus of these voters. When considered in the light of the qualitative evidence, the 
quantitative evidence adds weight to the argument that much of this support went to 
Liberal candidates, and was motivated by discontent over local issues of rates, rents 
and housing policy. 
The significance of housing amenity variables in relation to Labour Party support at 
all levels of electoral activity in inner-London has been established above and 
Labour's loss of support in Camden, as in Islington, can in part be explained by the 
failure of the Labour Group to adequately address housing issues. The revival of the 
Liberals in Camden at the lower-tier level was based upon a small core of support 
built upon and bolstered by intermittently significant levels o f class-party dealigrmient 
from the two major parties. Nevertheless, this transient support built upon local issues 
and contingent upon local political context was sufficient even at its nadirs to carry 
the party through to the more conducive electoral environment of the late i970s and 
early 1980s and an alliance with Labour moderates. Indeed, at the 1982 borough 
elections the Liberal Party had contested every Camden seat and had taken 25% of the 
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whole borough vote, and at the 1983 general election Liberal candidates in the 
Holbom and St Pancras Constituency, and the Hampstead and Highgate Constituency 
had taken 21,4% and 24.8% of the vote respectively. 
The logistic regression analysis of the categorical variables CONWIN/CONLOSE and 
LABWIN/LABLOSE at lower-tier inner-London elections identified eight Camden 
wards as residuals. The electoral behaviour in four of these was atypical in relation to 
the Conservative Party and four in relation to the Labour Party thereby adding to the 
evidence of dealignment at these elections affecting both major parties. Al l eight 
wards exhibited characteristics associated with an above the mean share of the vote 
for a Liberal candidate at a lower-tier inner-London election (Table 66). The 
quantitative evidence is convergent with the qualitative of the case study that has 
argued that the foothold of core support built upon local electoral issues at municipal 
elections was the basis of much enhance subsequent local and parliamentary success 
for the Liberals in Camden. 
11.5 :Conclusion 
The melding of the qualitative and quantitative evidence of the thesis has strengthened 
the case against the proposition that municipal elections are purely a form of national 
referendum. Corroborative evidence has confirmed that the dynamics of municipal 
electoral behaviour in the four case study locations were conditioned by the socio-
economic and political milieu in which the act of voting took place. Furthermore, the 
impact of municipal politics and voting behaviour upon subsequent parliamentary 
level politics and electoral behaviour in all four case study locations has been attested 
by convergent qualitative and quantitative evidence. Indeed, congruent quantitative 
and qualitative evidence has shown how local socio-economic enviroimient and 
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political context influenced the prospects and performance of the Liberal Party at 
municipal elections and provided a steppin^stone to parliamentary level electoral 
success in these case study locations and thereby impacted upon class-party alignment 
and partisan alignment at the national electoral level. 
Trends in class-party/partisan alignment at the local electoral level in these case study 
locations have been shown to differ considerably from trends in alignment at 
parliamentary elections in coterminous electoral units over the same period. These 
trends have also been shown to differ between local authorities and within local 
authorities. The evidence has attested that at certain times a proportion of the 
electorates of our case study locations held contradictory municipal and parliamentary 
electoral preferences and that electoral context influenced the calculus of the voter. 
In all four case studies the significance of class, socio-economic group, tenure and 
household amenities to the explanation o f the level of Labour Party support at both 
municipal and parliamentary elections has been attested. The Labour Party's loss of 
electoral support at lower-tier elections in these locations, as that of the Conservative 
Party, has been strongly associated with housing issues. However, the extent, rate and 
direction of Labour's loss of support was also shown to have been conditioned by 
idiosyncratic factors that defy quantative analysis. Electoral considerations were 
shown to have shaped the housing policies of the council Labour groups in 
Birmingham, Islington and Camden. Local party organisational structure and the 
decision making process of each Labour council group, the level of influence of wider 
party units, and the influence and following of particular activists and personalities 
have been shown to have determined the parameters of the electoral opportunity for 
the Liberal Party at these municipal elections. In turn the autonomous nature of 
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Liberal Party constituency organisations in each of our four case study locations, the 
role of particular activists and personalities in shaping electoral strategy and campaign 
policy emphasis, rational decisions by parts of the electorate to lodge protest votes 
and to vote tactically have all played a part in the impact of Liberal intervention in 
these locations. 
The combined evidence has rejected the view that lower-tier Birmingham and inner-
London elections can be characterised by a linear trend in class-party dealignment in 
the 1970s. Changes in class-party alignment have been shown to be fluctuating and 
much more nuanced than a simple dichotomy between manual and non-manual can 
reveal. These changes in class-alignment have been clearly associated with local 
conflict over levels of council rents, rates and social housing provision. 
Local electoral behaviour in the case study locations was influenced by a multiplicity 
of factors originating both locally and nationally. However, the most significant 
national political issue that affected the most elemental need of the voter, that of 
housing, was mediated through the prism of local electoral context and its impact 
shaped municipal electoral alignment which in turn made a contribution to the shape 
of parliamentary electoral alignment in these locations. In the final chapter the 
findings of the thesis wil l be considered in the light of existing explanations for 
municipal electoral behaviour and its relationship with electoral behaviour at the 
parliamentary level. 
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSIONS 
12.1;Introduction 
At the heart of this thesis is the conviction that the study of voting needs a broader 
vision. The aim has been to gain a greater insight into local electoral behaviour in a 
period of political dealignment at the parliamentary level. In order to achieve this it 
was necessary to use a multi-disciplinary approach to the research. It was, however, 
undertaken on the premise that the methods of political science and those of political 
history each only offer a partial view of complex social behaviour and that their 
melding would widen the research scope and bring into view factors which otherwise 
remained obscured. The prescriptive positivist and the implacable idealist may 
consider the multi-theoretical as a Procrustean enterprise that forces the 
incommensurable into some congruence. It is the hope of the author that this thesis 
and its conclusions outlined below will go some way to counter these views and 
illustrate the utility of the multi-disciplinary approach in producing convergent lines 
of evidence that increase the scope of our knowledge. The integration of evidence 
from the different modes of analysis used in the thesis has enabled us not only to 
cross-check for convergent evidence of the influence of a variety of contextual factors 
from both quantitative and qualitative sources but also to synthesise more nuanced 
explanations of local electoral behaviour. 
In the sections that follow, the findings of the thesis will be reviewed in the context of 
existing literature on the study of local elections, the connection between such 
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elections and parliamentary electoral behaviour, the wider debate of dealignment, the 
generalisability of the findings, and future research. 
12.2:Not so irrelevant elections 
The prevailing orthodoxy is that national considerations are the major, i f not sole, 
contributory factor to the calculus of the voter at municipal elections and hence arbiter 
of party fortunes at the local electoral level (see Butler and Stokes 1975, Fletcher 
1967, Green 1972, Gyford 1984, Miller 1988). These 'annual general elections' in 
Newton's view 'tell us practically nothing about the preferences and attitudes of 
citizens to local issues and events ... [and] neither turnout nor voting patterns ... are 
associated with any local factors' (Newton 1976: 13-17). There is then, according to 
this view, no explanatory role for local factors in municipal and parliamentary 
electoral behaviour and thereby no contextual influence upon partisan alignment or 
class-party alignment at the local and the parliamentary electoral levels in the 1959-
1979 period. 
Studies of more recent electoral behaviour have nevertheless shown that a proportion 
of the electorate hold contradictory local and national voting preferences at one and 
the same time and that there is significant variation in party performance both 
between and within local authorities (see Railings and Thrasher 1993,1994a, 1994b, 
1997, 1999; Miller 1988, 1990, Waller 1979, Widdecombe Report 1986). The 
findings of this study accord with these most recent studies. Measures of partisan 
dealignment, net volatility, and turnout at local and parliamentary elections in 
Birmingham and inner-London have evidenced significant variance in electoral 
behaviour at different types of elections within an authority, between authorities of 
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the same type, and between trends in municipal and parliamentary voting behaviour in 
coterminous electoral units in the 1959-1979 period. The evidence has supported the 
proposition that a proportion of the electorate in Birmingham and inner-London in the 
1959-1979 period at certain times and in particular places concomitantly held 
contradictory voting preferences at local and national elections. 
Nevertheless, the sources of these variations in municipal voting behaviour needed to 
be identified and evidenced as emanating from the context in which the act of voting 
took place. Newton has argued that, turnout and voting behaviour at municipal 
elections have no connection with local issues and events, and do not reflect attitudes 
and preferences conditioned by contextual ity. In contrast there is considerable 
evidence that the behaviour of local government voters is affected by the activity of 
local parties ( Fletcher 1967, Hi l l 1967. Gregory 1969, Bochel and Denver 1971, 
1972, Bruce and Lee 1972, Pimlott 1973, Dyer and Jordan 1985, Gibson and Stewart 
1992). Furthermore, studies employing, survey data, aggregate voting data, and 
census data have revealed much about the dynamics of local electoral behaviour and 
its associations with diverse socio-economic and political variables. Indeed, social 
class £uid the socio-economic character of a ward have been shown to be of primary 
importance in any explanation of the variance in ward level local electoral behaviour 
(Rowley 1971 ,Davies and Newton 1974,N4iller 1978,1979, 1984, 1986,1988.1990, 
Warde 1988). Local electoral studies have established significant associations 
between contextual factors and voting behaviour in relation to the two major parties at 
municipal elections. Nevertheless, the dynamics of Liberal Party support at these 
elections have remained enigmatic (Dunleavy 1990, Johnson and Pattie 1998, Laver 
1984. DoHing et al 1998), as have wider explanations of the statistical associations 
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between municipal voting in general and a raft of socio-economic and political 
variables. The how and why of these associations has remained largely unanswered. 
The qualitative evidence of the case studies has aspired to give account of the process, 
meaning and context of some of the determinants of local electoral behaviour. It has 
evidenced how institutional features, such as the decision making process of council 
policy by a Labour Party group and that group's relationship with wider party 
influences can differ from one location to another and thereby shape the climate of 
local politics and the possibilities for third party intervention. The evidence has also 
shown how the autonomous organisational structure of the Liberal Party also shaped 
the local electoral climate. The free-booting political style, candidate personality, 
personal following, electoral strategies and tactics of Wallace Lawler in Ladywood, of 
Ken Hovers in Sutton Coldfield and of Ken Lomas in Islington are all contributory 
factors to the political context in which these elections took place. So too the 
iron-grip of Harry Watton over the Birmingham Labour group's housing policy and 
the consequent electoral vacuum it created in the inner-city wards for fiiiitfiil Liberal 
intervention. The qualitative evidence has shown in all case study locations that the 
parameters of locally determined Liberal electoral appeals were facilitated and 
constrained by the political space afforded to them by the major parties, and in the 
case of Sutton Coldfield in some wards firmly established independent candidates. In 
addition, structural change such as the reoganisation of London local government and 
the merger of Sutton Coldfield into the city of Birmingham have exemplified the 
impact of municipal reform upon patterns of party support. The reorganisation of 
London's local government has been shown to have impacted upon the policy 
calculus of the Camden Labour group. The reorganisation of Birmingham to have 
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impacted upon the electoral calculus of the Sutton Coldfield Conservative voter in 
relation to protest votes for the Liberals as the possibility of coming under Labour 
council control increased. Again in respect of Sutton Coldfield the spatial distribution 
of Labour support has been shown to have induced not only voter apathy and 
abstention among its traditional supporters but also tactical voting. Clearly, the thesis 
has evidenced contextual influences that are not conducive to quantitative analysis but 
nevertheless impact upon voting behaviour. 
The synthesis of the results from the quantitative and qualitative analyses has 
substantially strengthened the case against the proposition that municipal elections are 
purely a form of national referendum and evidence that the dynamics of municipal 
electoral behaviour are conditioned by the socio-economic and political and structural 
context in which the act of voting takes place. Furthermore, that municipal politics 
and voting behaviour impact upon parliamentary electoral behaviour and outcomes. 
Indeed, it became clear that the local socio-economic, political and structural context 
influenced the prospects and performance of the Liberal Party at municipal elections. 
Indeed, it has been evidenced that it was on the back of local issues that the Liberal 
Party established a core support in formerly derelict constituencies that subsequently 
provided the springboard for parliamentary level electoral success, either in its own 
right or as part of the SDP, and thereby impacted upon class-party and partisan 
alignment at the national electoral level. 
12.3:Partisan and class- party alignment 
Comparison of trends in partisan alignment at Birmingham and inner-London 
municipal elections with the orthodox view of partisan alignment at British 
parliamentary elections in the 1959-1979 period reveal a distinct disparity with 
386 
accepted views of electoral behaviour. There is no dispute among political scientists 
that at parliamentary elections party attachments declined in the 1970s and that the 
1960s was a period of partisan alignment (Sarlvik and Crewe 1983, Heath et al 1985, 
Denver 1994, Farrell et al., 1995). However, the analysis of Birmingham and inner-
London local electoral data presented a rather different picture. Except for period 
specific elections the two-party grip over the electorate at the lower-tier Birmingham 
elections remained firm and actually increased in the 1970s. In inner-London electoral 
behaviour was much more volatile at the borough electoral level in the 1960s than at 
the parliamentary level, and in the 1970s the reverse was true (see Chapter 4). Clearly, 
the electoral behaviour of a significant proportion of the electorate in these locations 
was much more variegated than orthodoxy allows and militates against the argument 
for the 'annual general election thesis'. 
The Birmingham and inner-London local electoral evidence has also contradicted the 
generally accepted view that the pre-1970 electorate was predictable, less volatile, and 
its partisan attachment stronger in the 1960s than the 1970s, and has ftirther weakened 
the top-down deterministic link between parliamentary and municipal electoral 
behaviour. It has shown that traditional connections between part of the electorate and 
the two-major parties in particular areas at particular times in the early 1960s 
significantly weakened, a phenomenon that predates the emerging trend of 
dealignment at the pariiamentary level of the late 1960s identified by Butler and 
Stokes. Furthermore, contrary to accepted views, the evidence has shown that in some 
locations the electorate at municipal elections in the eariy 1960s was as 'ready to 
sway in response to short-term factors and issues that were the cause of immediate 
concern' as was the pariiamentary electorate of the 1970s (see Butler and Stokes 
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1974, Sarivik and Crewe 1983, Franklin 1985b, Denver and Hands 1992, Denver 
1994). 
The evidence from all four case studies contradicts the notion that any electoral 
change in the 1960s driven by issues was exceptional. Voters may have failed to meet 
conditions for issue voting prescribed by Butler and Stokes. As far as the inner-city 
wards of Birmingham and many wards of Islington and Camden are concerned the 
importance of issues of housing conditions, council rents, renovation and housing 
policy have been evidenced. The importance of rate-level, council-rent subsidy, 
expensive social housing programmes and unwanted development to the calculus of 
the Sutton Coldfield voter and the municipal voter in many parts of Camden and 
Islington have been evidenced. The fact that these issues were not definitively 
integrated into the party system with one major party clearly opposing the other on the 
issue because of pragmatic electoral considerations meant that for part of the 
electorate voter opinion was not skewed to the advantage of one over the other, was 
not cut cleanly along party lines, but fragmented. Nonetheless, this policy stasis made 
the issues around housing salient for Liberal candidates, and in some places 
independent Labour candidates, and of such salience to parts of the electorate that 
housing issues could erode the partisan attachment and class-party links between 
municipal voters and the two-major parties. Indeed, as Curtice points out 'volatility is 
of^en regarded as an attribute of voters... yet in truth ... may be an attribute of 
elections. Voters might... be more likely to change their preferences ... i f the policy 
positions of the parties are close to each other rather than i f they are apart' (Curtice 
2002:165). Curtice was referring to pariiamentary elections however, the local 
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electoral evidence of the thesis concurs with the view that political context has such a 
role to play in electoral alignment. 
At the parliamentary electoral level British voting behaviour in the 1970s has been 
characterised by the decline in traditional class-party attachments that has affected the 
level of support of both the major parties. Central to the dealignment debate has been 
the relationship between class and voting behaviour and explanations for the decline 
in Labour Party support during the 1959-1979 period. Some political scientists regard 
class-dealignment as a key determinant of changing electoral behaviour and the 
decline in support for the Labour Party. Others reject class-dealignment as a major 
determinant of changing patterns of party support and argue that the electorate 
remained class-aligned but the Labour Party failed to offer class-based policy choices 
and hence the leakage of the working class vote, and in the case of the Conservatives 
a less marked but similar decline because of its reduced appeal to its traditional 
supporters ( Sarlvik and Crewe 1983, Heath et al. 1985 and 1991, Kavanagh 1996). 
The evidence of this thesis has shown class-party dealignment in respect of the 
Labour Party at council elections to be much more nuanced and Segmentary than a 
simple dichotomy of manual and non-manual reveals, to be associated with particular 
socio-economic/political contexts and clearly connected to the perceived political 
failings of Labour councils. Similarly, class-party dealignment in respect of 
Conservative Party support at council elections has been evidenced to be as 
fragmentary and conditioned by political context and the perceived failings of 
Conservative councils. The trends in class-party alignment at local elections in 
Birmingham and inner-London, evidenced by the strength of associations between 
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class variables and party support do not indicate a linear decline in party attachments 
in the 1970s. The findings of this thesis, in respect of dealignment at the municipal 
electoral level in the 1959-1979 period, accord with Heath's thesis regarding the 
importance of Labour's political failings in any explanation of their loss of support at 
the parliamentary level (Heath e( al 1985,1987 pp 256-77). 
Local political context and housing issues have been shown to be important factors in 
municipal electoral level dealignment. Indeed, the case studies have clearly illustrated 
that the Birmingham and London housing markets in the late 1950s and early 1960s were 
in crisis. In regard to London, John Davis has argued that the 'potential was clear for 
some sort of political eruption over housing in the years from the mid-1950s'. However, 
this potential was stymied because the problems over housing and the race issue became 
conflated, and thereby 'threatened to intensify a potentially explosive issue*. Davis 
suggests that the failure of the political system 'to provide an outlet for this pressure' can 
be explained by a 'tacit consensus between the major parties not to play the race card in 
such a way as to exacerbate racial tension and ... on the broader questions of rent and 
landlordism, where the situation was far from consensual, the [Labour] opposition proved 
unable to exploit an apparently promising issue' (Davis 2001). 
Added to this reluctance to address the issue of housing was the fact that the Labour 
Party's housing policy of 1945-1951, which had prioritised council housing to the virtual 
exclusion of the private sector, had subsequently been wrong footed by the Conservative 
Party's drive towards home ownership and the impact of rising affluence. Furthermore, 
rampant inflation of rents, house prices and land costs had scuppered Labour's plans to 
municipalise the rented sector because of the prohibitive compensation costs that local 
authorities would face, especially in the central areas of London and the major cities. 
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Upon Labour's return to power in 1964 the focus of the party's housing policy had shifted 
towards legislative protection of the rights of those in the private rental sector and an 
emphasis upon the growth of home ownership. Davis remarks how this crisis in housing 
in London during the late 1950s and early 1960s illustrates 'the way in which 
conventional politics could fail to provide an outlet for extensive social grievances during 
the "age of aflQuence" '(Davis 2001:69). Implicit in the argument here is the recognition 
of a social cleavage focussed around housing, albeit one whose potential to impact upon 
parliamentary electoral behaviour was, according to Davis suppressed. 
The evidence of this thesis has shown that the crisis in housing did 'find an outlet' at the 
municipal electoral level in both Birmingham and London and subsequently did impact 
upon so called 'conventional politics' at the parliamentary level in the constituencies of 
our case study locations. The impact of municipal politics and voting behaviour upon 
parliamentary level politics and electoral behaviour in all four case study locations has 
been attested by convergent qualitative and quantitative evidence. 
According to Dunleavy parliamentary electoral level dealignment is partly explicable 
in terms of the growth of a new social cleavage in post-war Britain caused by far 
reaching changes in the consumption pattern in housing. He argues that local conflicts 
influence party differentiation and political alignment and thus, 'local conflicts have 
an important structuring influence on the electorate's alignment towards national 
politics and on party differentiation at various points in time'. Moreover, that the 
'apparent convergence of Conservative and Labour housing policies at the national 
level in the period up to 1970 has in fact disguised the continued politicisation of 
housing issues at the local level, and the maintenance and development of the sectoral 
character of party differentiation'. In terms of class, his argument asserts that the 
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housing consumption cleavage cut across occupational class lines, especially in the 
manual categories where consumption locations were much more diverse and thus the 
links between the manual working voter and the Labour Party were weakened. 
(Dunleavyl979:409-443 and 1982, see also Daunton 1987). The evidence of the 
thesis accords with Dunleavy's theory of dealigrmient being in part explicable in 
terms of a consumption cleavage over housing (Dunleavyl979:409-443 and 1982). 
Clearly in London and Birmingham, local council housing policies of the competing 
Labour and Conservative groups had converged at the beginning of the 1960s. and 
local conflicts over housing influenced municipal level alignment in many wards and 
had an important structuring influence on the electorate's alignment towards national 
politics in their coterminous constituencies. The thesis has evidenced the fragmentary, 
nuanced impact of housing issues upon class-party aligrunent in respect of both the 
Labour and Conservative parties and accords with Dunleavy and with Daunton's 
views that housing issues cut across occupational class lines, especially in the manual 
categories where consumption locations were much more diverse and thus the links 
between the manual working voter and the Labour Party were weakened. There are 
then subtle intra-class differences in local electoral behaviour that not only reflect the 
particular socio-economic and political context of the v ^ d in which a vote is cast but 
also the peculiar consumption location of the individual voter. These points highlight 
the dangers of broad-brush generalisations concerning class-party alignment and 
testify to the variegated nature of British political culture and the utility of local 
studies of voting behaviour. 
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12.4;Future research 
There has been a growing consensus among political scientists as to the importance 
of local context for the understanding of individual electoral behaviour. However, 
little has changed since Books and Prysby summed up the status quo in 1991 that' On 
the one hand, there is general agreement that one can be influenced by the area in 
which one lives. On the other hand there is a good less consensus on how and why 
such influences occur' (Books and Prysby 1991: 17). The dilemma is how election 
studies can take such influences into account, what should be looked at and how. 
WIezien and Franklin argue that 'election studies ... are facing ... fundamental 
methodological problems' (WIezien and Franklin 2002; 157). What is needed is some 
acceptable method to measure the 'conditions under which relationships exist, or 
become stronger, rather than just establishing the general valididty or otherwise of a 
particular individual level association' (Curtice 2002:165), The goal is a causal 
connection between an individual's environment and that individual's opinions and 
voting actions. Johnson et al. argue that the emphasis of such research is 'placed 
upon the aggregate or the sociological aspect of the linkage [and that] measures used 
in models [are] indirect [and] explanatory mechanisms left unspecified and untested' 
(Johnson et al., 2002: 224). Knight and Marsh conclude that 'Haifa century of 
academic study has certainly not produced agreement on any parsimonious set of 
variables necessary for understanding electoral behaviour' ( Knight and Marsh 2002: 
179). Nonetheless, perhaps Franklin and WIezien point the way out of the woods, ' in 
our view, election studies ... should focus on ... providing the best possible 
characterisation of the nature and concomitants of the voting act' (Franklin and 
WIezien 2002: 337). The resolution of these problems lies in the methodology 
393 
adopted in this thesis, in the fusion of the strengths of political science with those of 
the discipHne of history. 
A step in that direction has been the use of local case studies in this thesis that have 
put the individual voter back into the socio-economic environment and political 
context in which the act of voting took place. Franklin and Wlezien advocate 'indirect 
tracers for the presence of contextual effects ... [and argue that] i f contextual effects 
are present, we should expect those for whom the context is most relevant and 
important to exhibit the effects most strongly' (ibid). The multiple windovi^ onto the 
determinants of local electoral behaviour used in this thesis and the corroboration 
between its disparate sources of evidence have, it is hoped, fulfilled this criteria. 
Nevertheless, there remains the thorny issue of generalisability. 
Although it is generally accepted that a case study, or a small number of case studies, 
cannot provide the legitimate foundation for generalisation to a wider population, it is 
nevertheless accepted that the method can refine theories, reveal new areas worthy of 
analysis, and help to define the parameters of generalisability. At the very least this 
thesis has done much to establish the limits of generalisability of the 'annual general 
election' thesis and has revealed complexities in local electoral behaviour that warrant 
further investigation. At most, the thesis challenges views about dealignment. Indeed, 
as Dunleavy argues, the intended use of the case study is ' to detect the more 
fundamental processes which can be taken to operate in other areas in substantially 
the same form' and that this by necessity means the use of qualitative methods, 
detailed, narrative accounts of the processes involved (Dunleavy 1982:199). Therein 
lies the dilemma of generalisability for the positivist. 
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There are some political scientists who argue that theory plays a pivotal role in any 
generalisation from case studies and that the researcher is attempting to generalise a 
particular set of results to some broader theory and the method of generalisation is 
analytical rather than statistical (King 1994, Yin 1994, Dunleavy 1982). In this thesis 
a previously adopted theory, i.e. the 'aimual general election' thesis, has been used as 
a template to compare the results from one case to another. Yin argues that the use of 
multiple sources of evidence in a manner encouraging convergent lines of inquiry and 
the creation of a chain of evidence ameliorates criticism that subjective judgements 
have been made to collect data. Further, Yin claims that the reliability of the methods 
depends upon the explicitness of the researcher concerning the procedures used and 
an audit trail of how claims to knowledge have been arrived at (Yin 1994:34-50). It is 
the hope of the author that these criterion have been met and an acceptable level of 
generalisability approximated. Indeed, that by use of such methods in future research 
the detenminants of the variegated nature of British electoral culture can be 
unravelled. 
12.5:Conclusion 
Understanding the matrix of determinants that influence municipal electoral choice 
requires a multi-theoretical approach and cross-checks of evidence from one 
methodological perspective with that of others. Franklin and Wlezien advocate two 
critical tests to counter the claim that a contextual effect is an artifact of selection. 
Firstly, if 'contextual effects are present, we would expect those for whom the context 
is most relevant and important to exhibit the effects most strongly'. Clearly this was 
evidenced by the qualitative evidence of all case studies. Secondly, 'to be able to 
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show that the researcher would have no reason to expect this interaction as an 
outcome of selection*. Clearly there was no reason to expect the outcome of the 
evidence from the quantitative analyses. 
A final quote encapsulates the sentiment behind the choice of methodological 
approach adopted in this thesis and perhaps its significance as a mutually beneficial 
way forward for both political science and political history: 
*A knowledge of history provides opportunities for deepening 
our understanding of contemporary politics by acquiring a 
greater awareness of the context in which individual and 
group political behaviour occurs; helping us to perceive the 
immediate and medium-term consequences of actions and 
events; and providing a salutary warning against gross 
generalisations' (Kavanagh 1991: 486), 
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Appendix C: Technical Appendix 
The following is designed to assist the reader and contains a description of the 
statistical methods used in the thesis. The appendix also serves as a glossary of terms, 
albeit one that is not necessarily in alphabetic order. 
Net volatility: refers to the changes in the proportion of votes won by parties, usually 
from one comparable election to the next. 
Gross volatility: refers to individual level change in voting and is normally based 
upon estimates from sample surveys. 
Distribution : a group of numbers, a set of numbers, a set of observed values. 
Linear model: a model based upon a straight line, i.e. an attempt to summarise a 
distribution, in terms of a straight line. However, when statistical models are used it 
is essential to assess how well the model fits the data. 
Mean : a simple statistical linear model that summarises the data. A hypothetical 
value of average found by summing all the numbers in the distribution and dividing 
the total by the number of numbers in the distribution. 
Standard deviation : A statistic that summarises an average distance of all scores in a 
distribution from the mean of those scores. Calculated by subtracting each number in 
the distribution from the mean: these differences are termed 'deviations'. Each 
deviation value is squared and these squared deviations summed. The sum of the 
squared differences (deviations) is divided by the number of observations (numbers) 
in the distribution minus one and the resultant statistic is called the Variance (the 
mean of the sum of the squares). The standard deviation is the square root of the 
variance and is a measure of how well the mean represents the data. A small standard 
deviation indicates that the data points are close to the mean and thus the mean is an 
accurate representation of the data. A large standard deviation indicates that the data 
points are distant from the mean and thus the mean is not an accurate representation 
of the data. 
Variance: is the standard deviation squared and can be used as a measure of spread 
of the values in a distribution. The variance ratio (or F-test) compares the spreads of 
different distributions by looking at their variances. There are a number of useful 
statistical tests that are encompassed by the term A N O V A , 'Analysis of Variance' 
which will be explained as an when appropriate. 
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Standard error: samples are used to estimate behaviour in a population, e.g. 
Birmingham and inner-London municipal electoral data, socio-economic, and 
political data. I f we want to infer things about a population by use of a sample then it 
is essential to know how well that sample represents the population in questioa It is 
possible that occasionally a sample wi l l have a mean that is very different from that of 
the population. The standard error is the measure of how representative a sample is 
likely to be of the population. Statisticians have a reliable method that can ascertain 
the standard error from the sample's standard deviation. A large standard error 
statistic relative to the sample mean indicates a lot of variability between the means of 
different samples and that the sample may not be representative of the population and 
a small standard error the converse, i.e. the sample is likely to be an accurate 
reflection of the population. 
Descriptive statistics : statistics that summarise and describe typical patterns and 
variation in large sets of numbers in a convenient and efficient manner, e.g. measures 
of central tendency and dispersion. 
Inferential statistics: statistics used for arriving at conclusions. 
Normal distribution: a normal distribution is a bell-shaped curve. It is symmetrical, 
its mean, median and mode fall in the same place on the curve and the two tails of the 
curve never actually touch the horizontal axis of the graph. Many variables have 
distributions that closely approximate the normal curve. In addition many statistical 
tests assume that the distribution is normal. In a normal distribution there is a 
mathematical relationship between the mean and the standard deviation with regard to 
the area under the curve. When a set of scores are normally distributed, 34.13% of the 
area under the curve is contained between the mean and a score that is equal to the 
mean + one standard deviation, 13.59% of the area is contained between a score equal 
to the mean + one standard deviation and the mean + two standard deviations. Hence, 
the area under the curve between one standard deviation above the mean and one 
standard deviation below the mean contains 68.2% of the data, 
Z-Scores : or standard scores is a useful measure that allows variables to be expressed 
in terms of a standard deviation score rather than original units of measurement and 
thus enables comparison of variables measured in different units. 
Parametric tests: work on the basis that the data are normally distributed and can 
therefore use the mathematical properties of this distribution to differentiate sets of 
data. 
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Parametric data : data that meets certain assumptions in order that parametric tests 
can be used to analyse that data. 
Assumptions of parametric data:(i) normally distributed data, (i i) homogeneity of 
variance, (i i i) interval data, (iv) independence. 
Homogeneity of variance: Two sets o f scores have simileu' variances, i.e. similarity 
of spread of scores between samples. The scores of two variables must be scattered by 
a roughly equal amount (tested by F-test, variance ratio). In correlational designs this 
assumption means that the variance of one variable should be stable at all levels of the 
other variable. 
Interval data: data should be measured at least at the interval level i.e. the distance 
between points on its scale of measurement should be equal at all parts along that 
scale. 
Independence: assumes that the data from different subjects are independent - the 
behaviour of one participant does not influence the behaviour of another. 
Tests for normal distribution: Summary statistical procedures to test whether data 
are normally distributed. Using SPSS the data is analysed using descriptive statistics 
and frequencies which produce measures of skewness and kurtosis whose values 
should be zero in a normal distribution (the further from zero the more likely the data 
are not normally distributed). SPSS produces standardised scores, z-scores of 
skewness and kurtosis which can be compared against values that could be expected 
by chance alone- a value above 1.6 being considered as significantly different from 
chance to cause concern. 
Histograms: of each variable with a normal distribution curve overlaid provide a 
subjective eyeball test, which with the skewness and kurtosis values provide an 
immediate notion of the normality of the distribution. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnof test: A more objective test of whether a distribution is normal 
which compares the set of scores in the sample to a normally distributed set of scores 
with the same mean and standard deviation. I f the statistic is non-significant (p>0.05) 
it means that the distribution of the sample is not significantly different from a normal 
distribution, i.e. the sample is probably normally distributed. I f the test statistic is 
significant (p<0.05) then the distribution is significantly different from a normal 
distribution and thus parametric tests cannot be employed to analyse the data. 
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Q-Q Plot: SPSS produces a Q-Q plot for any variable. It plots the values expected i f 
the distribution were normal (expected values) against the values actually in the data 
set (observed values). I f the data are normally distributed the observed values should 
fall along the straight line that plots the expected values. 
Non-Parametric data: a data set not normally distributed cannot use parametric tests 
therefore non-parametric tests used, such as the Mann-Whitney test and the Wilcoxon 
test. These tests make little or no assumptions about the data but are much less 
powerful than parametric tests and therefore increase the chance of a Type n Error i.e. 
accept that there is no difference between groups, when in reality, a difference exists. 
Categorical data: a categorical variable with only two categories, dichotomous, e.g. 
dead or alive, is a discrete and therefore truly dichotomous variable, gender or voting 
in an election. 
Crosstabulation: SPSS crosstabs examines the relationship between two or more 
categorical variables and also carries out a Chi-square test which detects whether 
there is a significant association between categorical variables. The statistic does not 
however, tell us anything about how strong that relationship might be. The Pearson 
Chi-square statistic tests whether the two variables of interest are independent. 
Conventionally Chi-square must be <0.05 in order to reject the hypothesis that the 
variables are independent and accept that the variables are in some way related e.g. a 
Chi-square statistic of p<0.001 evidences a significant effect. Chi-square is a non-
parametric test. 
Correlations: Correlation is a measure of the linear relationship between two 
variables and helps us to determine what relationship, i f any, exists between two 
variables. It measures variance of each variable (the average amount its scores vary 
from the mean) and determines covariance, that is whether the two variables covary. 
Whether changes in one variable are met with similar changes in the other variable. 
When one variable deviates from its mean then it would be expected that the other 
variable to deviate from its meem in a similar way. A positive covariance indicates 
that as one variable deviates from its mean, the other deviates in the same direction. A 
negative covariance indicates that as one variable deviates from its mean, for example 
increases in value, the other deviates from the mean in the opposite direction. 
However, it is not possible to make comparisons between covariances in any 
objective way. It cannot meaningfully be said that one covariance is particularly large 
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or small relative to another data set, unless both data sets are measured in the same 
units of measurement. 
Correlation coefTicient: is a standardised covariance value that permits this 
comparison. Standardisation of different units of measurement is accomplished by 
dividing the standard deviation ( i f any distance from the mean is divided by the 
standard deviation it gives that distance in standard deviation units). The standardised 
covariance value or correlation coefficient 'r ' , has a value that lies between - 1 and +1, 
the Pearson product moment correlation. A coefficient o f + 1 indicates that two 
variables are perfectly positively correlated, so as one variable increases, the other 
increases by a proportionate amount. Conversely, a coefficient o f - 1 indicates a 
perfect negative relationship, i f one variable increases the other decreases by a 
proportionate amount. A coefficient of zero indicates no linear relationship at all and 
so i f a variable changes the other stays the same. 
Correlation analysis: scatter plot, bivariate correlation and partial correlation. 
Scatter plot: plot that looks at general trends in the data. The graph plots each 
subject's score on one variable against their score on another and illustrates whether 
there seems to be a relationship between variables, what kind of relationship exists 
and whether any cases are markedly different. A case that differs substantially from 
the general trend of the data is known as an outlier. 
Bivariate correlation: is a correlation between two variables and measures the linear 
relationship between two variables, and partial correlation, examines the 
relationship between two variables while controlling for the effect of one or more 
variables. Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient and Spearman's rho 
correlation coefTicient are examples of bivariate correlation coefficients. SPSS allows 
the analyst to specify whether these tests relate to one-tailed or two tailed 
hypotheses. A one tailed hypothesis is a directional hypothesis that predicts the 
direction of the relationship between two variables, whereas a two-tailed hypothesis 
does not predict the nature of the relationship. 
Pearson's product moment requires parametric data and SPSS calculates the 
significance of the statistic, i.e. the probability that a correlation coefficient occurred 
by chance. A probability value p <0.05 is regarded as indicative of a genuine effect. 
Thus the probability of this correlation occurring by chance is very low and close to 
zero. Caveat: correlation coefficients give no indication of the direction of causality 
and thus care must be taken when interpreting their meaning. 
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Third variable problem: causalitv cannot be assumed because there may be other 
measured or unmeasured variables affecting the results. 
Direction of causality: correlation coefficients say nothing about the direction of 
causality, they say nothing about which variable causes the other to change. 
E.g. It may be intuitively appealing to conclude that a particular variable causes party 
support to change, there is no statistical reason why this particular variable caimot 
cause party support to change: the correlation does not tell us that it is not true. Thus 
qualitative evidence that indicates the direction of causality takes on added 
importance in electoral research. 
Interpretation of the R 2 statistic: Correlation coefficients can nevertheless be more 
informative. The correlation coefficient R2 is the measure of the amount of variability 
in one variable that is explained by the other, (e.g. the tenure category council rented 
has a correlation coefficient r = 0.44 with support for the Liberal Party, therefore R2 
or R squared = 0.194, when converted to a percentage evidences that the variable 
council rented accounts for 19.4% of the variability in the other variable, party 
support for the Liberal Party). However, 80.6% of the variability in this hypothetical 
example is unaccounted for. The R2 statistic caimot be used to infer causal 
relationships it can only tell us about the variance in variable Y accounted for by X 
but nothing of which way the causality runs (see page 2 chapter 1). 
Spearman's rho : non-parametric statistic which can be used with data that does not 
met the assumptions required for parametric tests. 
Part and partial correlation: allows examination of the relationship between two 
variables when the effects of a third are held constant. Variations can and do overlap 
and have shared variance, e.g. the amount of variance in party support accounted for 
by class might contain at least some of the variance explained by tenure. Partial 
correlation finds out the size of the unique portion of variance and measures the 
unique relationship between one variable and another. Partial correlation measures the 
relationship between two variables controlling for the effects of a third variable. 
Semi-partial correlation controls for the effect of a third variable on only one of the 
variables in the correlation. 
Regression: Correlations are useful but tell us nothing about the predictive power of 
variables. 
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In regression analysis a predictive model is fitted to the data and used to predict 
values of the dependent variable from one or more independent variables. 
Simple regression: predicts an outcome from a single predictor and Multiple 
regression: predicts an outcome from several predictors. A linear model is fitted to 
the data and summarises the data in the form of a straight line. However, with any 
data there are a number of lines that could represent the general trend of the data -
regression analysis finds the model that best fits the data by a mathematical technique 
called the Method of Least Squares. 
Any straight line can be drawn i f two things are known, (i) the slope or gradient of the 
line, (ii) the point at which the line crosses the vertical axis of the graph (the intercept 
of the line). In the equation for a straight line Y is the outcome variable (e.g. party 
support) that we v/ish to predict, X is the subject's score on the predictor variable (e.g. 
a value of percentage social class I in a ward), B[ is the gradient of the straight line 
fitted to the data. Bo is the intercept of that line. There is a residual term E i , which 
represents the difference between the score predicted by the line for the ith subject 
and the score that is actually obtained. 
Y = Bo + B i X + E i 
The gradient of the line informs us about the nature of the relationship being 
described. Regression strives to find the line that best fits the data collected then 
estimate the gradient and intercept of that line. Having defined these values we can 
insert different values of our predictor variable into the model to estimate the value of 
the outcome variable. 
The method of least squares finds a line that goes through, or as close to, as many of 
the data points as possible, the Line of Best F i t That is, the line that represents the 
least amount of difference between the observed data points and the line. 
There will be small differences between the values predicted by the line and the 
values of the data actually observed because we are using the line to predict the values 
of Y from the values of the variable X . Some of these differences lie above the line 
and are positive values (the model underestimates their values). Some of the values 
lie below the line and are negative values (the model underestimates their values). 
These differences in value are termed Residuals. I f we square the value of each 
difference (eliminates negative values) and sum these values we are provided with a 
gauge as to how well a particular line fits the data. 
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A large Sum of the Squared Differences indicates a line that is not representative of 
the data, 
A small Sum of the Squared Differences indicates a line that is a good 
representation of the data. 
Thus, the method of least squares works by selecting the line that has the lowest sum 
of the squared differences. However, we must assess the goodness of fit of a model. 
Assessing the Goodness of Fit : Sums of Squares, R and R2. 
Using the mean we can calculate (SPSS) the difference between the observed values 
and the values predicted by the mean, i.e. square all the differences and sum them to 
arrive at the Total Sum Of the Squared Differences (SST). This value represents the 
how good the mean is as a predictor. 
We then f i t our more sophisticated model to the data, our Line of Best Fit, and work 
out the differences between the model and the observed data, i.e. square these 
differences, sum them and arrive at the Sum of the Squared Residuals (SSR). 
We can use these two values, SST and SSR to calculate how much better the 
regression line (line of best fit) is than just using the mean as a model. 
The improvement is measured by calculating the difference between SST and SSR. 
This difference shows the reduction in the inaccuracy of the model achieved by fitting 
the regression line to the data. This improvement is captured by the statistic, IModel 
Sum of Squares (SSM). 
I f the value of SSM is large the regression model has made a big improvement to how 
well the outcome variable can be predicted. 
I f the value of SSM is small the regression model is little better than taking a best 
guess. 
A very useful measure resulting from the above is the proportion of improvement due 
to the model. 
We divide the sum of the squares (SSM) for the model by the total sum of squares 
(SST) and the resultant value is R 2 , and to express this value as a percentage multiply 
by 100. 
R 2 represents the amount of variance in the outcome explained by the model (SSM) 
relative to how much variation there was to explain in the first place (SST). Therefore 
as a percentage it represents the percentage of variation in the outcome that can be 
explained by the model. R2 = SSM in simple regression we can take the square root 
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SST 
Of this value to obtain the Pearson Correlation Coefficient which provides a good 
estimate of the overall fit of the regression model, and R 2 provides a good gauge of 
the substantial size of the relationship. 
F-TEST : a second test that measures how much the model has improved the 
prediction outcome compared to the level of inaccuracy of the model. The test is 
based upon the ratio of improvement due to the model (SSM) and the difference 
between the model and the observed data (SSR). The resultant statistic, the F-ratio 
should be greater than 1 (at least). This analysis of variance (ANOVA) tells us 
whether the model overall results in a significantly good degree of prediction of the 
outcome variable. The F-ratio has an associated significance value. (e.g a 
significance value of p<0.001, [acceptable by social scientist p<0.05], tells us that 
there is a less than 0.1% chance of an F-ratio this large would happen by chance 
alone. We can thus conclude that our regression model results in a significantly better 
prediction of the outcome variable(e.g. party support) than the mean value of party 
support. 
ANOVA: tells us whether the model overall results in a significantly good degree of 
prediction of the outcome variable. It DOES NOT tell us anvthing about the 
individual contribution of variables in the model. 
Parameters of the model: Equation for straight line, Y = Bo + Bi Xi +Ei 
SPSS provides the details of the model parameters, i.e. the BETA values and the 
significance of these values. Bo is the Y intercept and Bo can be interpreted as 
meaning that when X==0 (zero of a predictor variable e.g. percentage council houses 
in a ward) the model predicts Bo value of outcome variable (e.g. party support). 
Bi is the gradient of the regression line and its value represents the change in outcome 
associated with a unit change in the predictor variable. For example, i f a predictor 
(independent variable) percentage council houses in a ward is increased by 1 unit of 
change then our model predicts a (Bi) increase in unit change in the outcome variable 
(e.g. percentage of the total vote support for Labour). 
The value of B represents the change in the outconme resulting from a unit change in 
the predictor. 
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A bad model wil l have a regression coefficient of zero for the predictors i.e. a unit 
change in the predictor variable results in no change in the value of the outcome. 
I f a variable significantly predicts an outcome then it should have a B value 
significantly different from zero. 
This hypothesis is tested by a t-test 
t-test: is calculated by taking account of standard error, it tests the null hypothesis 
that the value of B is zero, therefore i f it is significant we accept the hypothesis that 
the B value is significantly different from zero and that the predictor contributes 
significantly to our ability to estimate values of the outcome variable. 
The standard error tells us how different B values would look i f we took lots of 
samples of data and calculated the B values for each sample. I f the standard error 
produced in our regression analysis of the effect of a predictor on the outcome 
variable is small then it means that most samples are likely to have a B value similar 
to the one in the sample. The t-test statistic has an associated significance value that 
provides an exact probability that the observed value of t is a chance result, and i f the 
observed significance of t is p<0.05 then the result reflects a genuine effect. 
Multiple regression : same as simple but with several predictor variables. 
Predicts outcome using the straight line equation: Y = Bo + Bi X i + Ei, logical 
extension of this equation is : Y = Bo + BX1+B2 X2 + + Bn Xn + E i 
The method seeks to find the linear combination of predictors that correlate 
maximally with the outcome variable. Thus, i f we calculate the B values then 
predictions can be made about the outcome variable (e.g. party support) based upon a 
number of variables. 
Sums of Squares, R and R 2 : 
SSj represents the difference between the observed values and the mean value. 
S S R represents the differences between the values of Y predicted by the model and the 
mean value. 
S S M represents the differences between the values of Y predicted by the model and 
the mean value. 
With multiple regression it does not make any sense to look at the simple correlation 
coefficient SPSS produces a multiple correlation coefficient (Multiple R) 
Multiple R: is the correlation between the observed values of Y and the values of Y 
predicted by the multiple regression model. Therefore large values of multiple R 
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represent a large correlation between the predicted and observed values of the 
outcome variable. A multiple R of 1 represents a situation in which the model 
perfectly predicts the observed data. As such multiple R is a gauge of how well the 
model predicts the observed data. It follows that the resulting R2 can be interpreted in 
the same way as in simple regression as the amount of veuiation in the outcome 
variable that is accounted for bv the model. 
Assessment of a multiple regression model: (i) does the model fit the observed data 
well or is it influenced by a small number of cases? 
(i i) Can the model be generalised to other samples? 
Thus it needs to be established i f the model is an accurate representation of the data 
and i f the model can be used to make inferences beyond the sample data that has been 
collected. 
(i) 
Outlier: a case that differs substantially from the main trend of the data ( how and 
why they differ, what they may have in common often of interest to the historian). 
Residual: the difference between the values of the outcome predicted by the model 
and the values observed in the sample. 
Residuals effectively represent the error present in the model. I f the model fits the 
sample data well then all residuals wil l be small. I f the model is a poor fit of the 
sample data then the residuals wi l l be large. I f any case stands out as having a large 
residual value then this case could be an outlier. 
Standardised residuals: residuals divided by their standard deviation. In a normally 
distributed sample, 95% of standardised residual values should lie between -2 and +2, 
99% should lie between -2.5 and +2.5, any with a value greater than 3 are cause for 
concern as they are unlikely to have happened by chance. I f more than 15 of 
standardised residuals have an absolute value of more than 2.5 then there is an 
unacceptable level of error in the model i.e. it is a poor fit. I f more than 5% of cases 
>2 then indication of poor fit and model deemed a poor representation of the data. 
Studentised residuals: provide a more accurate estimate of the error variance of a 
model. 
(iO 
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Generalisation: Regression analysis produces an equation that is correct only for the 
sample of observed values. 
Researchers want to generalise their findings to a wider population. Therefore must 
test whether the underlying assumption of regression analysis have been met and test 
whether the model generalises. To draw conclusions about a population based upon 
regression analysis the following assumptions must be true: 
Variable types: all predictor variables must be quantitative or categorical and the 
outcome variable must be quantitative, continuous and unbounded (quantitative in this 
instance refers to interval level measurement, unbounded means no constraints on the 
variability of the outcome). 
Non-zero variance: the predictors should have some variation in value i.e. they do 
not have variances of zero. 
No perfect multicollinearity: there should be no perfect linear relationship between 
two or more predictors, thus, predictor variables (independent variables) should not 
correlate highly. 
Predictors uncorrelated with external variables: External variables are those that 
have not been included in the regression model which influence the outcome variable. 
Homoscedascity: At each level of predictor variable(s) the variance of the residual 
terms should be constant. This means that the residuals at each level of the predictors 
should have the same variance (homoscedascity). When variances unequal-
heteroscedascity. 
Independent errors: for any two observations the residual terms should be 
uncorrelated (independent), lack of autocorrelation. 
Normally distributed errors: it is assumed that the residuals in the model are 
random, normally distributed variables with a mean of zero. This assumption means 
that the differences between the model and the observed data are most frequently 
zero, or very close to zero, and that differences much greater than zero only happen 
occasionally. 
I f the above assumptions are met then the model from the sample can be accurately 
applied to the population of interest. What the model tells us is that on average the 
regression model from the sample is the same as the population model. However it is 
possible that a sample may not be the same as the population model. 
Assessment of the model across different samples is called cross validation. 
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Cross validation: I f a model is applied to a different sample and there is a serious fall 
in its predictive powers, then it is clear the model does not generalise. I f a model can 
be generalised then it must be capable of accurately predicting the same outcome 
variable from the same set of predictors in a different group of people. 
We carmot be confident that the model derived from a sample accurately represents 
the entire population- but can assess how well the model can predict the outcome in a 
different sample. 
Adjusted R 2 : this value indicates the loss of predictive power or shrinkage. 
Whereas R2 informs us how much of the variance in Y is accounted for by the 
regression model from the sample, the Adjusted R 2 informs us how much variance in 
Y would be accounted for i f the model had been derived from the population the 
sample was taken from. 
Multicollinearity: is a strong collinezuity between two or more predictors 
(independent variables) in a regression model. This makes it difficult to assess the 
individual importance of a predictor. I f each accounts for similar variance in outcome 
how can a researcher know which of the variables is important. Identify 
multicollinearity by scanning a correlation matrix to find any variables which 
correlate highly (e.g. 0.8 or 0.9). However, SPSS also produces Variance of inflation 
factor (VIF) indicates whether a predictor has a strong linear relationship with the 
other predictors. SPSS also produces Eigenvalues which also indicate predictors that 
are correlated. 
The Statistics in the Regression Model 
Descriptive statistics in the form of a correlation matrix provide the values of the 
Paerson correlation coefficient between every pair of variables. A one-tailed 
significance of each of these correlations and the number of cases contributing to each 
correlation. This provides a preliminary idea of the relationships that exist between 
predictors and outcome and a preliminary look at multicollinearity. 
Summary of model statistics: a table that outlines statistics that assess whether the 
model is successfully predicting the outcome, R, R2, Adjusted R2, Rsquared change, 
Durbin-Watson. 
R: the value of the multiple correlation coefficient between predictors and outcome. 
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R 2 : measure of how much variability in the outcome is accounted for by the 
predictors. 
Adjusted R 2 : provides some idea of how the model generalises and ideally the value 
of the Adjusted R2 wi l l be very close to the value of R2 i.e. generalise well. 
Change statistics: inform us how much change in the amount of variance accounted 
for with each block entry of predictors. F-ratio tells us the difference made by adding 
new predictors to the model. 
Durban-Watson: informs us i f the assumption of independent errors is tenable 
(values less than 1 or greater than 3 cause for alarm). 
ANOVA Table: the analysis of variance tells us i f the model is significantly better at 
predicting the outcome than using the mean as a best guess. F-ratio in table 
represents the ratio of improvement in prediction as a result of fitting best model 
relative to the inaccuracy that still exists in the model. I f the improvement due to 
fitting the best model is much greater than the inaccuracy v^thin the model then the 
value of F-ratio will be greater than 1, and the significance ( e.g p<0.001) tells us the 
exact probability of obtaining the value of F by chance. I f the F-ratio is significant 
then the results can be interpreted as meaning that the model significantly improved 
the ability to predict the outcome variable. 
A l l the above are summary statistics that tell us whether or not the model has 
improved our ability to predict the outcome variable. 
Coefficient Table: provides the statistics for the equation that evidences the model's 
parameters, confidence intervals B values, collinearity diagnostics. 
The B values indicate the individual contribution of each predictor. 
The B values tell us about the relationship between each predictor and the outcome 
variable. 
The beta values are positive or negative and thus inform us about the direction of 
their relationship with the outcome variable (positive relationship - as predictor 
increases so does outcome variable). 
The beta values also tell us to what degree each predictor effects the outcome i f the 
effects of all other predictors are held constant (passim Field : 2002) 
